NO. 94-140
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
IN THE MATTER OF J.D.W., A Youth
Under the Age of Eighteen
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-first Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli,
The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Cannon & Sheehy, Helena,
Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Barbara C.
Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana:
George H. Corn, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July G, 1994
Decided: October 4, 1994
Filed:
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
J.D.W. appeals the order of the Youth Court of the Twenty-
First Judicial District, Ravalli County, transferring this
proceeding concerning criminal conduct to district court for
treatment of the youth as an adult. We vacate the Order of the
Youth Court dated February 9, 1994, and remand to the Youth Court
for a hearing on the matter.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Youth Court abused its
discretion by ordering the proceeding transferred to District
Court.
On January 6, 1994, the Ravalli County Attorney filed a
petition alleging J.D.W. to be a delinquent youth based on his
alleged participation in criminal activity that took place in
November and December of 1993. J.D.W. was sixteen years old on
October 24, 1993. The State alleged that J.D.W. had committed
criminal offenses including accountability for criminal mischief
(common scheme), two counts of burglary, accountability for another
burglary, conspiracy to commit arson, possession of explosives and
three counts of obscuring the identity of a machine.
J.D.W. admitted in an interview which took place on December
28, 1993, that he was involved in or participated in each of three
separate burglaries of the Porter, Eden and Starr residences, which
took place on November 12, November 26 and December 27, 1993,
respectively. Also in that interview, J.D.W. told law enforcement
authorities about an explosive device that had been constructed at
another youth's home. This device was highly explosive and was
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subsequently dismantled by law enforcement. Testimony at the
hearing indicated that the bomb may have been built to blow up one
of the three homes burglarized by the youths.
Numerous firearms were stolen in each of the three burglaries.
In one of the homes, the guns were taken from a safe which was
accessed with the aid of power tools. The "machines" involved in
the charges of altering machines included a .357 Coonan automatic
handgun, a Smith & Wesson Model 422 automatic, and a Colt MK - IV
automatic. These were not the only firearms stolen in the
burglaries.
The Youth Court determined that the residential burglaries
committed by J.D.W. and two other youths were premeditated. One of
the homes was ransacked during the burglary and had extensive
damage done to it during the course of the burglary. In addition,
there was testimony at the hearing on this matter that the youths
may have intended to sell the guns, after altering the serial
numbers, to students at Corvallis School. The firearms were not
loaded when stolen, but were loaded at the time of confiscation.
Concurrently with the petition alleging delinquency, the State
moved the Youth Court to transfer the matter for prosecution in
District Court rather than Youth Court, alleging that the offenses
committed by J.D.W. were premeditated and of such seriousness and
maqnitude that the protection of the community needed to be insured
for a longer time beyond that which could be afforded under the
Youth Court Act.
When charged with the above offenses, J.D.W. was on Youth
3
Court probation for a 1992 shooting of another youth with an air
rifle, which resulted in the blinding of an eye. The pertinent
terms of probation for the 1992 offense were that J.D.W. was not to
be in possession of or to use a firearm, except when hunting with
his father, and that he obey all laws. J.D.W.' s probation has been
revoked in connection with this proceeding and he is currently
incarcerated in the Kalispell Juvenile Detention Center pending its
outcome.
Did the Youth Court abuse its discretion by ordering the
proceedings in this matter transferred to District Court?
The Montana Youth Court Act authorizes transfer of cases from
youth court to district court for treatment as an adult under
certain circumstances set forth in 5 41-5-206, MCA, as follows:
41-5-206. Transfer to criminal court. (1) After a
petition has been filed alleging delinquency, the court
may, upon motion of the county attorney, before hearing
the petition on its merits, transfer the matter of
prosecution to the district court if:
i?i)*the*youth charged was 16 years of age or more
at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and the
unlawful act is one or more of the following:
iEj burglary or aggravated burglary as defined in
45-6-204;
iGj iossession of explosives as defined in 45-8-335:
iJj attempt, as defined in 45-4-103, of any of the
acts enumerated in subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) through
(1) (a) (ii) (1) ;
idj the court finds upon the hearing of all relevant
evidence that there is probable cause to believe that:
(i) the youth committed the delinquent act alleged:
(ii) the seriousness of t h e o f f e n s e and the
protection of the community require treatment of the
youth beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; and
(iii) the alleged offense was committed in an
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aggressive, violent, or premeditated manner.
(2) In transferring the matter of prosecution to the
district court, the court may also consider the following
factors:
(a) the sophistication and maturity of the youth,
determined by consideration of the youth's home,
environmental situation, and emotional attitude and
pattern of living:
(b) the record and previous history of the youth,
including previous contacts with the youth court, law
enforcement agencies, youth courts in other
jurisdictions, prior periods of probation, and prior
commitments to juvenile institutions. However, lack of
a prior juvenile history with youth courts will not of
itself be grounds for denying the transfer.
i4j . Upon transfer to district court, the judge
shall make written findings of the reasons why the
jurisdiction of the youth court was waived and the case
transferred to district court.
J.D.W. contends that the Youth Court incorrectly drew
inferences from the evidence presented through the testimony of
Deputy Bruce Hennell, who essentially opined that the burglaries,
possession of explosives and conspiracy to commit arson were
serious offenses involving loaded firearms which were going to be
sold at the Corvallis School. He further contends that the court
incorrectly decided that it did not need any evidence on the
adequacy of the juvenile facilities and incorrectly assumed that
the juvenile facilities were inadequate based on the average length
of stay at Pine Hills School for Boys (Pine Hills). J.D.W.
maintains that by concluding that the juvenile facilities in
Montana are inadequate to deal with a juvenile offender such as
J.D.W., the Youth Court completely ignored the rehabilitative
purpose of the Youth Court Act and instead focused only on
retribution.
5
To begin our discussion, we emphasize that one of the stated
purposes of the Montana Youth Court Act is
to remove from youth committing violations of the law the
element of retribution and to substitute therefor a
program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, and, in
appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the Youth
Court.
Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. Therefore, our review of the Youth
Court's Order transferring this case to District Court, where
J.D.W. will likely be placed in the custody of the Department of
Corrections rather than the Department of Family Services,
necessarily must ensure that the Youth Court has determined after
careful consideration that the available juvenile facilities in
Montana are inadequate in this case.
The overall standard of review applicable here is whether the
Youth Court abused its discretion in ordering the transfer of the
case to District Court for prosecution. In the Matter of J.A.
(1992) I 255 Mont. 214, 216, 841 P.2d 1130, 1131. As to specific
findings of fact relied on by the Youth Court in making the
decision to transfer the case to District Court, the standard is
whether such findings are clearly erroneous according to the test
set forth in Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. DeSaye (1991), 250
Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287. J.A., 841 P.2d at 1131. The
first prong of the DeSave test addresses whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence.
In accord with § 41-5-206(l)(d)(i), MCA, J.D.W. conceded there
was probable cause to believe he committed the alleged offenses,
but argued that the seriousness of the offense and protection of
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the community did not require treatment beyond that afforded by
juvenile facilities. His argument pursuant to § 41-5-
20G(l)(d)(iii), MCA, that the offenses were not committed in a
premeditated manner, is that the Youth Court's finding that the
acts were "premeditatedB1 is not the same thing as "in a
premeditated manner." We agree with the State that this is a
distinction without a difference. In addition, we conclude that
there is substantial evidence in the record that the offenses were
premeditated.
The critical determination we are concerned with on appeal,
however, is § 41-5-206(l)(d)(ii), MCA--whether the seriousness of
the offense and the protection of the community require treatment
of the youth beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities. The
Youth Court stated:
THE COURT: Well, in that regard, I'll take judicial
notice of the nature of the Youth Court system and
specifically the fact that the most I can do in Youth
Court is make an indefinite commitment to DFS. I can't
order DFS to retain anybody for any length of time . . .
Whereas in adult court, I have more power over the
Department of Corrections, and I can make definite
commitments timewise to the Department of Corrections,
but I simply don't have that ability anymore under the
statutes with the Department of Family Services.
Furthermore, I'll take notice of the fact that . .
. the commitment has to be indefinite, but the average
length of time that youths are kept at Pine Hills, as I
recall, [is] in the range of three to four months, and
it's rare that they're kept longer. At this point, there
are really no other youth detention facilities in the
state of Montana that are available. So I don't think I
need any evidence.
The Youth Court took judicial notice of the history of Youth Court
commitments in general. No evidence was presented as to whether
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the treatment to be afforded the youth in this case from Pine Hills
and the Youth Court System would be adequate for J.D.W.'s
rehabilitation. To the contrary, the court emphasized the
inability under the Youth Court system to incarcerate J.D.W. beyond
the average length of time at Pine Hills after a commitment there
versus the length of time J.D.W. could be incarcerated or under the
control of the court under the criminal court system if proceedings
were transferred out of Youth Court. Furthermore, no findings were
set forth by the court to support the conclusion that facilities
under the Youth Court system are inadequate for treating J.D.W.
Prior cases addressing this same issue are helpful in
addressing the question before us. In In the Matter of Stevenson
(1975) I 167 Mont. 220, 228, 538 P.Zd 5, 9, the Court discussed the
requirement of what is now § 41-5-206(l)(d)(ii), MCA, in a similar
factual situation where the Youth Court had waived jurisdiction
because of the seriousness of the offense. The youth contended
that the transfer hearing was inadequate because there was no
evidence presented to show that juvenile facilities were
inadequate. The State argued that the very nature of the offenses
demonstrated the need for treatment of the youth beyond available
juvenile facilities. The Court stated:
We cannot agree. To assume that juvenile facilities are
inadequate from the mere fact that the youth is charged
with a serious offense, completely ignores the
rehabilitative purpose of the Act . . . and is tantamount
to a judicial admission the juvenile facilities in
Montana are inadequate to cope with the hard core youth
offender. We will not do this.
. . . there was no inquiry into the important
question of whether Stevenson could be rehabilitated
8
within the present structure of the youth system. As a
related matter, there was no inquiry into the
availability of facilities, programs and personnel under
the youth court system and whether he would be amenable
to these. Y ea tjudicial consideration of this factor
,
is required by [§ 41-5-206, MCA].
Stevenson, 538 P.2d at P-10. Stevenson further stated that the
Montana Youth Court Act does not require that the court make a
specific finding that the youth is not amenable to the
rehabilitative programs currently existing for a valid waiver of
youth court jurisdiction, but it does require the judge to
carefully consider this factor along with all other factors set out
by the statute on transfer. Stevenson, 538 P.2d at 10. Stevenson
further cited an article on waiver of youth court jurisdiction
which stated that juvenile court personnel and judges regard waiver
of youth court jurisdiction as the most severe sanction that may be
imposed by juvenile court because
the probability of severe punishment [and1 the
confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile
proceeding is replaced by the publicity and normative
concepts of penal law [and] the child acquires a public
arrest record which, even if he is acquitted, will
inhibit his rehabilitation because of the opprobrium
attached thereto by prospective employers . . . .
Stevenson, 538 P.2d at 10, citinq F. Thomas Schornhorst, The Waiver
of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 Ind. Law Journal
583, 586. Stevenson held that a proper transfer hearing requires
the youth court to hear evidence relating to all factors set forth
in 5 41-5-206, MCA, and preserve that evidence in the transcript
which will permit a meaningful appellate review and to make written
findings giving reasons why the jurisdiction of the youth court is
being waived. "[A]11 factors set forth by statute must be
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carefully considered and a very deliberate evaluation of each
individual case must be effectuated prior to the entry of a waiver
order." Stevenson, 538 P.2d at 10.
Subsequently, in In the Matter of K.M.H. (1988), 231 Mont.
180, 183, 752 P.2d 162, 164, a case concerning a transfer hearing,
we affirmed the order of a youth court transferring the youth to
adult court where a medical director from a psychiatric treatment
facility testified that the youth in question suffered from a
schizotypal personality with a mild dysthymic disorder, recommended
that the youth live in a structured environment and received
treatment for several years and opined that the youth could have
another explosive reaction if faced with a similarly stressful
situation. In K.M.H., the superintendent of Pine Hills testified
that Pine Hills was not an appropriate place to treat a
"psychologically impaired youth who committed a homicide." K.M.H.,
752 P.2d at 164. The youth court in K.M.H. considered these and
other factors before determining that the Youth Court system was
inadequate for the length of time needed for psychiatric treatment
of the youth and that the adult court system was in a better
position to afford the appropriate psychiatric treatment needed by
K.M.H. K.M.H., 752 P.d at 165.
In this case, there was no recommendation from the staff at
Pine Hills, nor is there any evidence in the record that anyone
from that facility or from the Department of Family Services or an
appropriate psychiatric facility was ever contacted regarding this
matter. What we have here is a summary determination by the Youth
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Court that the average length of stay at Pine Hills is inadequate
for rehabilitation in this case. There is nothing in the record to
support this determination. There is no testimony or other
evidence from the staff at Pine Hills or anyone else that could
indicate that the rehabilitative question--the purpose of the
Montana Youth Court Act--was considered by the Youth Court.
Therefore, we conclude that the Youth Court's decision to transfer
this matter to District Court for the sole reason of retaining
control over his length of incarceration is an improper waiver of
youth court jurisdiction.
We hold the Youth Court abused its discretion by ordering the
proceedings transferred to District Court.
The Order of the Youth Court transferring this matter to
District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Youth
Court for a further hearing and redetermination.
We Concur: