NO. 94-062
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
MICHAEL S. BOHMER,
Petitio:ner and Appellant,
-vs.-
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,
Respondent/Insurer for
APPEAL FROM: Montana Workers' Compensation Court
The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Laurie Wallace: Bathe & Lauridsen, Columbia Falls,
Montana
For Respondent:
Richard DeJana, Attorney at Law, Kalispell,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 12, 1994
Decided: September 2, 1994
Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Michael Bohmer (Bohmer) appeals from an order of the Workers'
Compensation Court dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his petition
for determination of the extent of his injuries and calculation of
the compensation to which he is entitled. We affirm.
Bohmer was injured in February, 1992, while employed by
Lybeckfs Dairy (Lybeck's). Lybeckfs was not covered by workers'
compensation insurance at the time of the injury.
Bohmer subsequently filed an independent cause of action in
the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, pursuant--
insofar as is relevant here--to § 39-71-515, MCA, which provides
for an action against an employer not enrolled in a workers'
compensation plan as required by law. In an amended order dated
November 18, 1993, the District Court stayed its proceedings
pending a determination by the Workers' Compensation Court of the
extent of Bohmer's injuries and calculation of damages to which he
would be entitled under § 39-71-515, MCA, or, in the alternative,
that it did not have jurisdiction to act in the case.
Bohmer then petitioned the Workers' Compensation Court for a
hearing. Lybeck's moved to dismiss the petition, asserting lack of
jurisdiction in the Workers' Compensation Court. The court granted
the motion to dismiss and Bohmer appeals.
The issue before us is whether the Workers' Compensation Court
had jurisdiction to determine the compensation to which an employee
is entitled from an uninsured employer pursuant to § 39-71-515(4),
2
MCA. The court concluded that it did not. It reasoned that it did
have jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 5 39-71-2905, MCA,
but that the District Court acquired jurisdiction first under 5 39-
71-516, MCA, and, therefore, retained jurisdiction to dispose of
the entire action..
The resolution of this issue hinges on the appropriate
interpretation of 55 39-71-2905 and 39-71-516, MCA. "[W]hen
several statutes may apply to a given situation, the construction
adopted should be one which will harmonize the several statutes
and, if possible, give effect to all." Section l-2-101, MCA;
Montana Power Co. v. Fondren (1987), 226 Mont. 500, 506, 737 P.2d
1138, 1141. We review legal conclusions of the Workers'
Compensation Court to determine whether they are correct. Lund v.
State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund (1994), 263 Mont. 346, 348, 868
P.2d 611, 612.
While we disagree with the court's interpretation of 5 39-71-
2905, MCA, insofar as it relates to 5 39-71-516, MCA, we conclude
that the court's ultimate decision that it did not have
jurisdiction is correct. We will affirm a court's correct result
regardless of its reasoning. Higham v. City of Red Lodge (1991),
247 Mont. 400, 402, 807 P.2d 195, 196.
Prior to 1985, the Workers' Compensation Court's statutory
grant of jurisdiction gave it "exclusive jurisdiction to make
determinations concerning disputes under chapter 71 [Montana's
Workers' Compensation Act]." Section 39-71-2905, MCA (1983). In
1985, the Montana legislature passed House Bill 529. Section 6 of
3
the bill--later codified as § 39-71-515, MCA--established "an
independent cause of action [by an injured employee] against an
uninsured employer for failure to be enrolled in a compensation
plan as required by [chapter 711;" damages recoverable in the
action are the amounts the employee would have received if the
employer had been properly enrolled in a compensation plan. Chap.
601, 1985 Mont. Laws 1258. Section 7 of House Bill 529--codified
as 5 39-71-516, MCA--provided for district court jurisdiction over
the new cause of action by requiring that an employee "pursuing an
independent cause of action pursuant to [39-71-5151 must bring such
action in the district court . . . .I' Chap. 601, 1985 Mont. Laws
1258. Finally, Section 11 of House Bill 529 amended the Workers'
Compensation Court's jurisdictional grant to read as follows:
39-71-2905 . . . The workers' compensation judge has
exclusive jurisdiction to make determinations concerning
disputes under chapter 71, exceot as provided in f39-71-
5161.
Chap. 601, 1985 Mont. Laws 1259 (emphasis added).
As stated above, a proper interpretation must give effect to
both 5 39-71-516, MCA, as enacted, and § 39-71-2905, MCA, as
amended. The legislature first created the 5 39-71-515, MCA, cause
of action and then clearly and unequivocally vested jurisdiction
over the action in the district courts. It finished by amending
the Workers' Compensation Court's statutory jurisdictional grant to
provide an exception for a cause of action filed in district court
pursuant to § 39-71-516, MCA. The interpretation which harmonizes
and gives effect to both g 39-71-516, MCA, and § 39-71-2905, PICA,
is that, via these actions, the legislature intended to prevent the
4
Workers' Compensation Court from exercising jurisdiction over the
new cause of action over which it specifically vested jurisdiction
in the district courts. We conclude, therefore, that the exception
contained in § 39-71-2905, MCA, excludes § 39-71-515, MCA, causes
of action from the Workers' Compensation Court's jurisdiction.
The Workers' Compensation Court's interpretation of the two
statutes does not give sufficient effect to the statutory
requirement that an employee file a § 39-71-515, MCA, cause of
action in the district court. Interpreting the exception in § 39-
71-2905, MCA, as modifying the "exclusive" nature of the Workers'
Compensation Court's jurisdiction results in shared, or concurrent,
jurisdiction over § 39-71-515, MCA, actions in that court and
district courts. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the
legislature's clear grant of jurisdiction to district courts in 5
39-71-516, MCA.
Bohmer's argument that the jurisdiction vested in the district
courts pursuant to § 39-71-516, MCA, is confined to the liability
issues raised in 5 39-71-515(2), MCA, is not persuasive. Such an
interpretation would limit the District Court's jurisdiction to
questions relating to Lybeck's failure to enroll in a compensation
plan and would exclude the damages issue which is an integral
element of the cause of action. Our function in interpreting
statutes is to "ascertain and declare what is in terms or in
substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or
to omit what has been inserted." Section l-2-101, MCA. Given the
legislature's clear intent to require the filing of § 39-71-515,
5
MCA, actions in the district courts, we decline to insert a
limitation into the statute where none exists.
We conclude that the Workers1 Compensation Court correctly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to calculate the extent of
Bohmer's injuries and the amount of compensation to which he was
entitled. We hold, therefore, that the Workers' Compensation Court
did not err by dismissing Bohmer's petition.
Bohmer makes an additional argument concerning whether the
District Court should have determined Bohmer's recoverable damages
as a matter of law if it retained jurisdiction in the case. We
decline to address this argument relating to proceedings which are
not before us on appeal.
As a final matter, Lybeck's requests the imposition of
sanctions against Bohmer for arguing matters not properly before us
and distorting and adding to the record. Sanctions on appeal, in
the form of damages, are appropriate if this Court "is satisfied
from the record and the presentation of the appeal . . . that the
same was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds . . . .'I
Rule 32, M.R.App.P. After reviewing the record before us, we
cannot conclude that Bohmer's appeal was without reasonable
grounds. We conclude that sanctions are not warranted.
Affirmed. , n
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September 2, 1994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Laurie Wallace, Esq.
Bathe & Lauridsen, P.C.
P.O. Box 2020
Columbia Falls, MT 59912
Daniel B. McGregor, Esq.
Dept. of Labor and Industry
P.O. Box 1728
Helena, MT 59624
Richard DeJana, Esq.
200 First Ave. E.
P.O. Box 1757
KaIispeII, MT 59901
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA