NO. 93-404
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
STATE OF MONTANA,
-.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Thomas A. Olson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General,
Chris Tweeten (argued), Chief Deputy Attorney
General, Helena, Montana
Mike Salvagni, Gallatin County Attorney,
Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Richard Ranney (argued) and Shelton Williams,
Williams & Ranney, Missoula, Montana
Noel K. Larrivee, Larrivee Law Offices,
Missoula, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Lon J. Dale, Milodragovich, Dale & Dye,
Missoula, Montana (Montana Shooting Sports
Association, Inc., Western Montana Fish and
Game Association, Inc., and Michigan
United Conservation Clubs)
Submitted: April 19, 1994
Decided: June 9, 1994
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Defendant John Lilburn was charged in the Gallatin County
Justice Court with the offense of hunter harassment in violation of
5 87-3-142(3), MCA. He was convicted of that charge following a
jury trial and appealed his conviction to the District Court for
the Eighteenth Judicial District in Gallatin County. The District
Court held that 5 87-3-142, MCA, in its entirety, is facially
unconstitutional in that it is both overbroad and vague,
impermissibly infringing on the First Amendment right to free
speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process guaranteed
by the United States Constitution,
We reverse the District Court.
The State raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Is Montana's Hunter Harassment Law, found at 5 87-3-142,
MCA, void because it is overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
2. Is 1 87-3-142, MCA, void because of vagueness in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution?
In March 1990, the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks
(DFWP) allowed three persons whose names had been drawn from a
permit pool to hunt bison which had migrated from Yellowstone
National Park. One of the persons who received a permit was Hal
Slemmer .
On the morning of the hunt, when the DFWP personnel located
the bison, a group of 11 persons on snowmobiles and cross-country
skis were seen attempting to herd the bison back into the park.
The demonstrators were warned that this was a legal hunt, and were
told not to interfere with the hunters. The hunters were also
warned about the presence of the demonstrators and were cautioned
to conduct the hunt safely.
Warden David Etzwiler of the DFWP accompanied Slemmer to a
clearing where the bison were crossing. When one of the animals
was in sight, Slemmer sighted his rifle and prepared to pull the
trigger. At that time, John Lilburn, one of the protesters, moved
in front of Slemmer, placing himself between Slemmer and the
targeted bison at a distance of 10 to 12 feet from the muzzle of
Slemmerls rifle. Slemmer lifted his rifle when he saw Lilburnls
head and shoulders come into the scope of the gun. Warden Etzwiler
approached Lilburn and told him that this was a lawful hunt and not
to interfere. Slemmer moved about six feet to his left and
selected another bison from the group. He raised his rifle and
took aim through the scope. Lilburn again moved in front of
Slemmer. Slemmer testified that when he saw Lilburn's face in his
scope, he "jerked the gun up quickly because I had been squeezing
on the trigger.''
Warden Etzwiler and Slemmer got on their snowmobiles and moved
to a different area where Slemmer shot and killed a bison before
Lilburn and the other protesters caught up with them.
No arrests were made at that time. However, after DFWP
officials conferred with the Gallatin County Attorney, Lilburn was
charged with the offense of harassment, a misdemeanor, in violation
of 5 87-3-142(3), MCA. The complaint filed against Lilburn in the
Gallatin County Justice Court alleged that he disturbed a hunter
with the intent to dissuade or prevent the taking of a bison when
he placed himself between the bison and the hunter who was aiming
a loaded rifle at the animal.
None of the other protesters were charged with a violation of
this same statute.
Lilburn filed a declaratory judgment action in Federal
District Court challenging the constitutionality of 5 87-3-142(3),
MCA, on a First Amendment basis. The U.S. District Court dismissed
Lilburn's complaint, holding that there were no special
circumstances warranting federal intervention in an ongoing state
criminal action, and therefore, Lilburn's case did not merit an
exception to the abstention doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris
(1971), 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669. AS a basis
for its conclusion, the Federal Court concluded that the goal of
the statute "is clearly reasonablen because "hunting is a
legitimate activity which the state may protect in any reasonable
and constitutionally permissible manner" and that this statute
primarily Itproscribesbehavior which interferes with an individual
actually engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the
U.S. District Court's dismissal of Lilburn's constitutional
challenge. Lilbumv. Racicot (9th Cir. July 13, 1992), No. 91-35310.
Lilburn was convicted following a jury trial in Gallatin
County Justice Court. He appealed his conviction to the District
Court and alleged that the harassment statute was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad and vague. By order dated June 24, 1993, the
District Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the complaint
4
brought against Lilburn based on its determination that 5 87-3-142,
MCA, is unconstitutional on its face, and therefore, is invalid.
The State appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and
will be upheld on review except when proven to be unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt. Cily of Billings v. Laedeke (1991), 247 Mont.
151, 154, 805 P.2d 1348, 1349 (citing Fallon County v. State (1988), 2 3 1
Mont. 443, 445-46, 753 P.2d 338, 339-40).
ISSUE 1
Is Montana's Hunter Harassment Law, found at 5 87-3-142, MCA,
void because it is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution?
The statute at issue in this appeal, commonly known as
Montana's Hunter Harassment Law, provides as follows:
87-3-142. Harassment prohibite&. (1) No person may
intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of a wild
animal by another.
(2) No person may, with intent to prevent or hinder
its lawful taking, disturb a wild animal or engage in an
activity or place in its way any object or substance that
will tend to disturb or otherwise affect the behavior of
a wild animal.
( 3 ) No person may disturb an individual engaged in
the lawful taking of a wild animal with intent to
dissuade the individual or otherwise prevent the taking
of the animal.
(4) Nothing in this section prohibits a landowner
or lessee from taking reasonable measures to prevent
imminent danger to domestic livestock and equipment.
Lilburn was convicted of violating subsection (3) of this
statute because he twice disturbed Slemmer's attempt to lawfully
shoot a bison when he placed his body between Slemmer and the
animal. The District Court, in its analysis of subsection (3) for
overbreadth, concluded that 5 87-3-142 (3) , MCA is "obviously
content-based" because it "prohibits communication which is
intended to dissuade a person from hunting, while allowing
communication which encourages hunting." The court further
concluded that the statute's prohibition would encompass "all
verbal and expressive conduct which has the intention to dissuade
from hunting," and therefore, such things as "prayer vigils at
trailheads, the singing of protest songs or the burning of hunting
maps, if done with the intent to dissuade a hunter, would be
violations of the statute." Therefore, the court held that to the
extent the statute "implicates constitutionally protected speech
and expressive conduct, it is overbroad."
On appeal, the State contends that the court erred when it
invalidated 5 87-3-142 (3) , MCA, on the basis of overbreadth because
the statute primarily proscribes conduct rather than speech, and to
the extent that protected expression is reached, it regulates on a
content-neutral basis only the time, place, and manner of
expression. The State asserts that the statute is not overbroad
because any potential unconstitutional applications are speculative
and insubstantial when judged against the plainly legitimate scope
of this statute which is to promote safety in sport hunting and
protect those engaged in lawful activities from interference. We
agree.
We note first that Lilburn has raised a facial constitutional
challenge and does not aver that the statute, as applied to him,
unconstitutionally abridges his First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech. Lilburn was not charged on the basis of any
idea or view that he expressed, and he does not contend that his
own conduct, which formed the basis of the charges brought against
him, was constitutionally protected. Instead, he contends that the
statute, as written, could potentially reach a substantial amount
of protected speech or expressive conduct.
A facial overbreadth challenge is an exception to the general
rule that statutes are evaluated in light of the situation and
facts before the court. R A . K v.St.PauI (1992), 120 'L. Ed. 2d 305,
336, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2558 (J. White, concurring) (citing Broadrick
v. Oklahoma (1973), 413 U.S, 601, 610, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2915, 37
L. Ed. 2d 830, 838-39). This Court has similarly recognized that
a statute which can be appliedto constitutionally protected speech
and expression may be found to be invalid in its entirety, even if
it could validly apply to the situation before the court. C t of
iy
Wzitefihv. OgShaughnessy (1985), 216 Mont. 433, 704 P.2d 1021.
In his overbreadth challenge, Lilburn disputes the State's
assertion that the statute primarily regulates conduct but contends
that it criminalizes a broad category of speech and expressive
conduct based on its content. He claims that the law reaches
primarily conduct which conveys an anti-hunting sentiment, while
allowing, under exactly the same circumstances, conduct and speech
which conveys any other message. Lilburn cites R A Y v. St. Paul, 120
L. Ed. 2d at 316, 112 S. Ct. at 2542, for the proposition that the
statute is "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the
speech addresses."
Broadrick, 413 U . S . at 601, is the leading case addressing the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. In Broadrick, the Supreme
Court clarified that a statute or government regulation should be
invalidated on the basis of facial overbreadth in only limited
situations:
In such cases, it has been the judgment of this Court
that the possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that protected speech of others may be muted
and perceived grievances left to fester because of the
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
...
. . .
Application of the overbreadth doctrine in
this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been
employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last
resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a
limiting construction has been or could be placed on the
challenged statute. [Citations omitted].
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-13. The Court in Broadrick adopted
limitations on the overbreadth doctrine "particularly where conduct
and not merely speech is invol~ed,~~ held that a statute which
and
has constitutional applications may be facially invalidated for
overbreadth only if its overbreadth is "real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. The Court made clear that the
existence of imaginary potential unlawful applications does not by
itself render a statute facially overbroad. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
In Members of the City Council v. Taxpayersfor fincent (1984), 466 U. S . 789,
800-01, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2126, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 783-84, the
Supreme Court further explained the parameters of the overbreadth
doctrine:
It is clear . . . that the mere fact that one can
conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute
is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an
overbreadth challenge. On the contrary, the requirement
of substantial overbreadth stems from the underlying
justification for the overbreadth exception itself--the
interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting
the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.
... In short, there must be a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized
First Amendment protections of parties not before the
Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth
grounds.
After reviewing the statute in question and the arguments set
forth by Lilburn, we conclude that this is precisely the type of
situation where the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court on the
overbreadth doctrine must be carefully applied. Before the hunter
harassment statute can be invalidated on its face, there must be a
clear showing that the potential invalid applications of the
statute be both "real and substantial." For the reasons stated
below, we conclude that no such showing has been made in this case.
Under the tests articulated in Broadrick and Taxpayersfor Vincent, we
must determine whether there is a real and substantial probability
that 5 87-3-142 ( 3 ) , MCA, will compromise recognized First Amendment
protections when judged in relation to any "plainly legitimate
sweep1'of the statute.
The District Court based its holding regarding overbreadth on
its determination that the statute is llobviously
content-based1#
and
could potentially proscribe
all verbal and emressive conduct which has the intention
to dissuade from huntina. Conduct such as prayer vigils
at trailheads, the singing of protest songs or the
burning of hunting maps, if done with the intent to
dissuade a hunter, would be violations of the statute.
[Emphasis added].
It was the court's opinion that the statute prohibits
communication which is intended to dissuade a person from hunting,
while allowing a communication which encourages hunting, even if
such communication prevents or distracts a hunter from taking the
prey. While this analysis was not necessary to an overbreadth
analysis under Broadrick, we also disagree with this interpretation
of the statute.
All statutes carry with them a presumption of
constitutionality and it is a duty of the courts to construe
statutes narrowlyto avoid constitutional difficulties if possible.
Montana Automobile Association v. Greely (1981), 193 Mont. 378, 382, 632 P.2d
300, 303; Statev. Ytterdahl (1986), 222 Mont. 258, 261, 721 P.2d 757,
759. This Court made clear that, when construing a statute, it
must be read as a whole, and terms used in the statute should not
be isolated from the context in which they are used by the
Legislature. McClanathan v. Smith (1980), 186 Mont. 56, 61, 606 P.2d
507, 510. Furthermore, a statute must be construed according to
the plain meaning of the language used therein. Norfolk Holdings, Inc.
v. DepamentofRevenue (1991), 249 Mont. 40, 43, 813 P.2d 460, 461.
Section 87-3-142(3), MCA, prohibits a person from disturbing
another individual engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal
with intent to dissuade the individual or otherwise prevent the
taking of the animal. The term "wild animal" is defined to mean
"any game animal, fur-bearing animal, or predatory animal," and a
''takingft is defined to include "pursuit, hunting, trapping,
shooting, or killing of a wild animal on land upon which the
affected person has the rigfit or privilege to pursue, hunt, trap,
shoot, or kill the wild animal." Section 87-3-141, MCA.
The plain language of the statute, considered in light of
these limiting definitions, makes clear that the statute's
proscriptions reach only activities which occur in the field during
an otherwise lawful hunt. While the disturbance which is
prohibited may, under other circumstances, result from a verbal
utterance, it makes no difference what the content of the verbal
utterance is. The language of the statute does not support the
assertion that the statute is aimed primarily at pure speech and
expressive conduct conveying only an anti-hunting sentiment. The
disturbance could just as well be caused by shouting "fire!"
Lilburn disagrees that the statute regulates primarily conduct
and claims that the Legislature's inclusion of the word "dissuade"
demonstrates that the intent of the statute is to proscribe only a
very small class of expression which is uttered or carried out with
the intent to dissuade a hunter from taking an animal. He contends
it is the Legislature's use of the term "dissuade" that renders
this a content-based regulation.
The Supreme Court has provided clear guidelines for
distinguishing a content-neutral regulation from one which is
impermissibly content-based:
The principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys. The government's purpose is the
controlling consideration. A regulation that serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others. [citation omitted].
Wardv. RockAgainstRacism (1989), 491 U . S . 781, 791, 109 S. ct. 2746,
2754, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 675. The determination of whether a
regulation is content-based turns not on whether its incidental
effects fall more heavily on expression of a certain viewpoint, but
rather on whether the governmental purpose to be served by the
regulation is not motivated by a desire to suppress the content of
the communication. C t o Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Znc. (1986), 475 U. S.
iy f
41, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29. Therefore, even if a statute
has a discriminatory impact, it can be determined to be
content-neutral if its objective neither advances nor inhibits a
particular viewpoint.
Neither of the parties dispute the fact that safety and an
orderly regulation of hunting are legitimate state goals. This
Court has made clear that "[i]n the area of wildlife regulation, it
is sufficient to state the Legislature may impose such terms and
conditions as it sees fit, as long as constitutional limitations
are not infringed. Statev. Jack (l975), 167 Mont. 456, 460, 539 P.2d
726, 728.
Here, the legislative history demonstrates a motivation for
adoption of this statute which is unrelated to the suppression of
speech based on content. The Legislature was aware that
confrontations between hunters and opponents of sport hunting,
particularly with respect to the controversial bison hunts, could
occur in the field when hunters were armed and actively pursuing
their prey. It was recognized that this posed a-serious danger to
both the hunters and those interfering with their activities.
Contrary to the court s conclusion that the legislation was
obviously content-based because it was prompted by past activities
opposing the bison hunts, the legislative history supports a
conclusion that the motivation was to prevent violent
confrontations and to prevent interference with lawful activities.
Moreover, we do not find any support in the legislative history for
the contention that this was an attempt to silence the views of
those opposed to the bison hunt or other types of sport hunting.
It was recognized that persons opposed to sport hunting had the
right to express their views, but that there were other forums more
suited to political discourse.
While Lilburn asserts that the use of the word udissuadel*
relates the statute entirely to speech and expressive conduct, we
note that the Legislature did not use the word "dissuade" in
isolation. Reading the statute as a whole, it is clear that the
conduct proscribed is the "dist~rbance~~ a hunter engaged in a
of
lawful activity, when it is dona with the intent to either dissuade
the hunter or to prevent the taking of the animal. The fact that
speech or actions may disturb a hunter is not dependent on the
content of what is expressed, or whether it i s prompted by an
anti-hunting sentiment. A person could blurt out anything at the
moment a hunter is trying to shoot, and this could l1disturbWthe
hunter by distracting him or her, or by scaring the animal away.
The content of what was said would be irrelevant. Or, persons
could attempt to prevent the taking of the animal for reasons other
than opposition to hunting, such as a desire to shoot the animal
themselves. Furthermore, in either of these instances, before the
conduct would be culpable, the necessary scienter would have to be
proven.
We recognize that the consequences of this statute may fall
more heavily on persons opposed to hunting than on those with
different viewpoints, but this does not by itself render the
statute content-based. The existence of a content-neutral
motivation for the statute is all that is required under Ward and
Renton to refute the characterization that the statute impermissibly
regulates speech or conduct based on the message conveyed. We are
satisfied that such a motivation exists in this instance.
Therefore, we reject the District Court's conclusion that the
statute is content-based.
Even though we disagree with the District Court's rationale
for a holding of overbreadth, we realize, as conceded by the State,
that there may be instances where protected expression or pure
speech may violate the statute. However, before invalidating the
statute on the basis of overbreadth, we must consider the
limitations set forth in Broadrick to determine if the possible
unconstitutional applications are real and substantial when judged
in relation to the plainly legitimate scope of the statute.
Lilburn contends that there are a significant number of
situations where the law could be applied in an unconstitutional
manner and urges the Court to "use our imagination to think of the
various ways the statute might be applied against speech or
expressive conduct." However, the test is not whether
hypothetical remote situations exist, but whether there is a
significant possibility that the law will be unconstitutionally
applied. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
Based on our conclusion that the plain language of the statute
is directed primarily at conduct and if at speech, then without
regard to its content, we conclude, in the absence of evidence
otherwise, that Lilburn has not shown that any overbreadth of the
statute is "substantial . . . judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep.I' Broadrick, 413 U. S. at 615.
Finally, we address the District Court's comparison of the
Montana statute to a Connecticut hunter harassment statute which
was held unconstitutional on the basis of overbreadth. Dormanv. Satti
(D. Conn. 1988), 678 F. Supp. 375, affpd, 862 F.2d 432 (2nd Cir.
l988), cert. denied (1989), 490 U.S. 1099, 109 S. Ct. 2450, 104
L. Ed. 2d 1005.
The Federal District Court, when it rejected Lilburn's
constitutional challenge, noted that Montana's hunter harassment
statute is distinguishable from the Connecticut statute, and does
not unconstitutionally interfere with free speech. In Dorman, the
statute reached conduct which interfered with both the actual
taking of game and with "acts in preparationn for the taking of
game. The court held that the statute could legitimately proscribe
interference with "lawful taking," but not "acts in preparation":
So long as the legislature elects to permit hunters to
pursue their activity on property, during times, and
under circumstances set aside for that purpose, it may
also regulate the conduct of nonhunters in those
contexts. Considerations of safety, alone, would justify
such regulation, even if it impinges incidentally upon
protected speech. On the other hand, the propriety of
hunting and taking wildlife is a fair subject for
spirited debate. Once a hunter is outside the scope of
his g*lawfulhunt" he is no different from any other
unreceptive listener who must, "in vindication of our
liberties,Ir be Ifexposed to the onslaught of repugnant
ideas." [Emphasis added].
Dorman, 678 I?. Supp. at 383.
The statute at issue in this case, 5 87-3-142 ( 3 ) , MCA, is
clearly limited in scope to activities which interfere with persons
actively engaged in the lawful taking of an animal and does not
suffer from the same overbreadth as the statute in Dorman.
We hold that 5 87-3-142 (3), MCA, is not unconstitutionally
overbroad. To the extent that the statute may reach
constitutionally protected expression, we conclude, as did the
Supreme Court in Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16, that whatever
overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis
of the fact situations where the statute is assertedly being
applied unconstitutionally.
ISSUE 2
Is 5 87-3-142, MCA, void because of vagueness in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
The District Court also invalidated the hunter harassment
statute on the basis of vagueness. The court concluded that
several key terms are left undefined, and that the statute
impermissibly leaves to the discretion of law enforcement and the
courts, without specific statutory guidance to law enforcement
officers or the public at large, what type of conduct is
prohibited.
In VZage of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. ( 1982 ) , 455
U.S. 489, 497, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371, the
Supreme Court set forth guidelines for analyzing a facial challenge
on the basis of overbreadth and vagueness. When such a challenge
is raised, a court must first determine whether the enactment
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
Here we have concluded that the statute does not, and that the
overbreadth challenge must fail. The Supreme Court has also made
clear that if the challenged statute is reasonably clear in its
application to the conduct of the person bringing the challenge, it
cannot be stricken on its face for vagueness. Hoffman Estates, 455
U.S. at 494-95. "One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies
may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. Parker v Levy
.
(1974), 417 U.S. 733, 756." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7.
In this instance, regardless of the hypothetical situations
that may exist, Lilburntsconduct was unquestionably proscribed by
the hunter harassment statute. Lilburn intentionally twice stood
between Slemmer and the targeted bison, directly in the line of
fire, in order to prevent the animal from being shot. It is
difficult to conceive of an argument that Lilburn did not I1disturbtt
Slemmer while Slemmer was engaged in the lawful taking of a wild
animal with the intent to prevent or dissuade him from making the
shot.
We conclude that Lilburn does not have standing to raise a
facial vagueness challenge. The court's order with respect to the
issue of vagueness is reversed on this basis.
We reverse the District Court's conclusion that the statute
under which Lilburn was charged is impermissibly overbroad and
vague, and vacate the court's dismissal of the charges brought
against Lilburn. Furthermore, although Lilburn's constitutional
challenge focused only on subsection (3) of the statute, the
language of the District Court's order invalidated 5 87-3-142, MCA,
in its entirety. We find no basis in the record for the court's
determination that the remaining sections of the statute are
constitutionally deficient. We, therefore, reverse the order of
the District Court with regard to all parts of 5 87-3-142, MCA.
This case is remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
June 9, 1994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, t the
o
following named:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General
Chris Tweeten, Deputy
Justice Bldg.
Helena, MT 59620
Mike Salvagni
Gallatin County Attorney
615 S. 16th Ave., Rm. 100
Bozeman, MT 59715
Noel K. Larrivee
h i v e Law Offices
334 E. Broadway
Missoula, MT 59802
Richard Ranney
WILLIAMS & RANNEY, P.C.
P. 0. Box 9440
Missoula, MT 59807
Lon J. Dale, Esq.
MILODRAGOVICH, DALE & DYE P.C.
P.O.Box 4947
Missoula, MT 598064947
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA