NO. 93-244
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
ELMER R. BALDRIDGE,
Petitioner and Appellant,
-vs-
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ROSEBUD COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT #19, COLSTRIP, MONTANA
and NANCY KEENAN, Superintendent of
Public Instruction,
Respondents and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Charles F. Moses; Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Charles E. Erdmann; Erdmann Law Offices, Helena,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 23, 1993
Decided: March 10, 1994
Filed:
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court, Yellowstone County, affirming the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction's decision reversing the
Acting County Superintendent's order to reinstate the
Petitioner/Appellant Elmer Baldridge (Baldridge) with pay. We
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We determine that this case turns upon a single issue--whether
the District Court correctly affirmed the decision of the State
Superintendent reversing the decision of the County Superintendent
and upholding the decision of the Board of Trustees.
Baldridge was employed by the Respondent Board of Trustees of
Rosebud County School District # 19, Colstrip, Montana (Board), as
a tenured teacher of the sciences. On approximately March 30,
1988, an incident occurred in Baldridge's classroom which led to a
complaint by parents in the form of a written letter received by
the principal of Colstrip High School, Eileen Pearce (Pearce).
The incident, referred to as the "glove incident," was
reported in the parents' complaint letter to the principal as
follows:
At the beginning of second period Chemistry II
class, March 30, 1988, the teacher, Mr. Baldridge, was
looking at some lab equipment on the counter by the sink.
He picked up a rubber glove, put it on his hand, raised
his hand up and said to the students, "Any female
volunteers from the audience?"
Pearce interviewed students from the class and on April 13,
1988, wrote a letter to Baldridge stating that he should be
suspended with pay pending an investigation into the incident. She
2
also sent a copy of the letter to the district superintendent
Harold Tokerud (Tokerud).
Tokerud wrote a letter to Baldridge on April 14, 1988, stating
that he was being suspended with pay pending a complete
investigation. Tokerud then hired Paul Stengel, a retired
Superintendent of Schools at Custer County, to investigate the
incident.
On April 29, 1988, Tokerud notified the Chairman of the Board
of Trustees that he had suspended Baldridge with pay and had
conducted an investigation into the "glove incident." The letter
stated that:
I find I must recommend the dismissal of Mr. Baldridge
pursuant to Section 20-4-207, MCA for unfitness,
incompetence, and violation of the adopted policies of
the trustees.
Tokerud also listed 12 incidents, including the "glove
incident," and stated that these incidents not only showed
unfitness to teach and incompetence, but were also violations of
5 49-z-307, MCA, 5 49-3-205, MCA, Article II, Section 4 of the
Montana Constitution and certain policies of the Colstrip Schools.
On May 16, 1988, a special board meeting was convened to
conduct a hearing on the recommendation to terminate Baldridge.
Both Baldridge and the Board were represented by counsel. Argument
and evidence were presented culminating in the Board's vote to
accept the district superintendent's recommendation to dismiss
Baldridge.
The Board's decision was appealed to Acting County
Superintendent of Schools for Rosebud County, Shirley Barrick
3
(Barrick) on May 24, 1988. A hearing was held on August 22, 1988,
at the Rosebud County Courthouse. Baldridge filed a Motion to
Dismiss and a Motion for a Continuance. The Motion for a
Continuance was denied, Baldridge filed an immediate appeal to the
State Superintendent, and the hearing was recessed.
The case was remanded back to Barrick, and a second hearing
was held on May 30, 31, and June 1, 1989. Barrick issued her
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order on November 16,
1989, ordering Baldridge's reinstatement with pay. Barrick found
errors in due process committed by the Board in handling the
action. In addition, her Conclusion of Law #2 stated that:
[t]his Acting County Superintendent does not approve
of the conduct displayed by the Petitioner on March 30,
1988 but all other accusations heard in hearing were
hearsay and interpretations without any previous written
documentations in personnel file or on evaluations.
The Board again appealed to the State Superintendent, Nancy
Keenan (Keenan), who vacated Barrick's judgment and remanded the
case with instructions for reconsideration. Barrick was directed
to consider all evidence before her and make a determination as to
whether Baldridge was terminated for good cause. Keenan stated
that Barrick only considered evidence surrounding the "glove
incident," and did not assess the credibility of the witnesses nor
did she weigh the evidence concerning the other alleged
inappropriate comments and jokes testified to at the hearing.
Keenan further directed Barrick to consider testimony from all
students based on their own perceptions and knowledge. Finally,
Keenan stated that there was no evidence to show that written
documentation of disciplinary measures was required by the Board
4
prior to dismissal.
In Barrick's second findings of fact, conclusions of law and
order, dated April 17, 1991, she again ordered that Baldridge be
reinstated with pay. She again determined that the Board violated
§ 20-4-207(3)(a), MCA, and did not afford Baldridge due process.
This decision did not differ greatly from Barrick's first opinion,
although some findings of fact and conclusions of law, none
substantial, were added to the second opinion.
The Board again appealed to Keenan who reversed Barrick's
order. Keenan determined that "[n]o rights of Baldridge have been
prejudiced by the procedural actions." She also found that Barrick
continued to ignore the directive to consider the testimony of the
students derived from their personal knowledge and perceptions.
Xeenan stated that the incidents cited by Tokerud did occur
according to her review of the transcript, but "[iIt remained to be
determined whether they were sufficient to reach a standard of good
cause for dismissal." She concluded that the decision as to
whether there was good cause to dismiss a teacher should be left to
the officials at the local level. Here, "the Colstrip Board of
Trustees, after hearing, decided that the behavior exhibited by
Baldridge was not acceptable in their district." She continued,
"[clonclusions of Law #3 and #4 are arbitrary and capricious.
Therefore, the decision of the acting county superintendent
contains no conclusion of law which supports her decision to
reverse the decision of the board of trustees. The acting county
superintendent has abused her discretion."
Baldridge appealed Xeenan's decision to the Thirteenth
5
Judicial District Court, which affirmed. In its finding of fact
#lO, the court found that "[o]n January 10, 1992, the State
Superintendent found that 'good cause' existed for the termination
of Baldridge and reversed the County Superintendent's decision."
It further determined that a review of the whole record
demonstrated that the incidents at issue did occur. The court then
made the following conclusions of law which apply to the present
discussion:
. . .
2 . This Court's role in reviewing an administrative
decision is to review the whole record to determine if
the administrative findings were clearly erroneous or if
the County and/or the State Superintendent's Conclusions
of Law constitute an abuse of discretion. Section 2-4-
704(2), MCA, Booth v. Arqenbriqht, 225 Mont. 272, 731
P.2d 1318 (1987); Harris v. Trustees, 241Mont. 274, 786
P.2d 1164 (19901.
3. In reviewing the whole record, it is evident
that the State Superintendent's findings, that the School
Board followed the proper procedure to terminate
Baldridge, is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or
capricious. In fact, there is substantial evidence in
the record to support these findings. At all stages in
these proceedings, Baldridqe has been afforded
substantial due process and hence the alleged procedural
errors are immaterial as both the School Board and the
District Superintendent had the power to proceed and
there is no violation of Baldridge's due process
guarantees.
4 . The State Superintendent found that the County
Superintendent's conclusions 3 and 4 were arbitrary and
capricious and therefore constituted an abuse of
discretion. She further found that without these
conclusions the decision and order of the County
Superintendent must be reversed. These findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
5 . Neither the State Superintendent nor this Court
has substituted their judgment for that of the County
Superintendent as to fact, but has reviewed the whole
record and determined that the administrative, findings
were V1clearly erroneous."
Finally, the court concluded "that the decision of the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction in this cause is, AFFIRMED and
6
that the decision of the board of trustees is, UPHELD." This
decision is the subject of the instant appeal.
In Throssel v. Board of Trustees (1991), 248 Mont. 392, 396,
812 P.2d 767, 769, we set forth our standard of review for
contested cases involving teacher dismissals as follows:
Our function as an appellate court reviewing an
administrative decision is not to substitute our judgment
for that of the County [or State] Superintendent but
rather to review the whole record to determine if the
administrative findings are clearly erroneous or if the
County Superintendent's [or State Superintendent's]
conclusions of law constitute an abuse of discretion.
The proper standard of review for administrative findings of
fact is, indeed, to determine whether they are clearly erroneous,
but in Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803
P.2d 601, we correctly determined that our standard of review for
agency conclusions of law would be whether the agency's
interpretation of the law was correct. We stated that "[t]he
reasoning for simply determining if the [agency's] conclusions are
correct is that no discretion is involved when a tribunal arrives
at a conclusion of law--the tribunal either correctly or
incorrectly applies the law." Steer, Inc., 803 P.2d at 603. We
hereby clarify Throssel and will apply the Steer, Inc. standard to
our review of conclusions of law in contested cases between school
districts and teachers.
INTRODUCTION
As stated above, this case turns on a single issue--whether
the District Court correctly affirmed the decision of the State
Superintendent reversing the decision of the County Superintendent
and upholding the decision of the Board of Trustees. This review
7
must involve a discussion of the State Superintendent's review and
her ultimate decision as well as the County Superintendent's
decision. Having carefully reviewed the record and applied the
proper standard of review, we conclude: first, the District Court
erred in affirming Keenan's decision; second, Keenan also erred
when she substituted her own judgment for that of Barrick in
drafting her decision: and third, Barrick erred when she did not
follow the remand instructions from Keenan's decision of September
26, 1990 wherein Keenan vacated Barrick's first decision because
the county superintendent's findings of fact were not "sufficiently
certain to enable [Keenan] to ascertain with reasonable certainty
the factual basis and legal principle upon which the County
Superintendent acted." Accordingly, we remand this case to the
District Court with instructions to remand the case to the State
Superintendent. The State Superintendent must then remand the case
to the County Superintendent with directions that she must
carefully consider this case and draft findings of fact,
conclusions of law and an order as mandated in 5 2-4-623, MCA, and
Rule 10.6.119, ARM. We now discuss the various levels of review
and decision-making presented here and define the appropriate
parameters for each decision issued.
DISCUSSION
I THE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT'S (Barrick's) ORDER
A county superintendent's review of the trustees' decision to
terminate a teacher must fall within the requirements set by 5 2-4-
623, MCA, part of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 2-4-623(l), (2) and (3), MCA, provides that:
8
(1) A final decision or order adverse to a party in
a contested case shall be in writing or stated in the
record. A final decision shall include findings of fact
and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of
fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be
accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the
underlying facts supporting the findings.
(2) Findings of facts shall be based exclusively on
the evidence and on matters officially noticed.
(3) Each conclusion of law shall be supported by
authority or by a reasoned opinion.
However, in the instant case, Barrick's decision does not follow
the requirements of 5 2-4-623, MCA. Keenan, in her decision on
appeal, states that Barrick, upon remand, did not comply with the
mandate of Rule 10.6.119, ARM, (which follows 5 2-4-623, MCA,) to
issue "findings of fact accompanied by a concise and explicit
statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings based
exclusively on the evidence and supporting authority or reasoned
opinion for each conclusion of law." We agree.
Several of Barrick's findings of fact are no more than
conclusory statements, not supported by a concise and explicit
statement of the underlying facts, as required by rule and statute.
None of her conclusions of law are supported by authority or
reasoned opinion. Clearly, the County Superintendent did not
follow the proper statutory or administrative requirements and did
not fulfill her responsibility to produce a well-reasoned final
order, citing specific facts to support her conclusions of law. It
is impossible to assess whether she erred in concluding that the
Trustees did not follow due process in suspending and dismissing
Baldridge and that Baldridge should have been reinstated in his
teaching position, because she did not support her conclusions of
law with authority or reasoned opinion based upon specific facts.
9
We do not comment upon whether due process was followed by the
Board nor do we pass judgment on whether Baldridge should have been
terminated. We merely hold that the County Superintendent did not
comply with the appropriate statutory and administrative
requirements in writing her opinion. She did not follow Keenan's
instructions on remand. Barrick's second opinion is no better than
her first. The opinion is therefore invalid.
II THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT'S (Keenan's) DECISION
The state superintendent's review of a county superintendent's
decision must be conducted pursuant to Rule 10.6.125, ARM. Rule
10.6.125, ARM, is almost identical to § 2-4-704, MCA, which
establishes the standard of review for district courts. Rule
10.6.125, ARM, provides:
10.6.125 APPELLATE PROCEDURE - STANDARD OF REVIEW
(1) The state superintendent of public instruction shall
be subject to the standard of review as set forth below
and shall be confined to the record established at the
factfinding hearing.
(2) In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the county superintendent not shown on the record,
proof thereof may be taken by the state superintendent.
(3) The state superintendent, at his/her discretion
or upon request, may hear oral arguments and receive
written briefs.
(4) The state superintendent may not substitute
his/her judgment for that of the county superintendent as
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The
state superintendent may affirm the decision of the
county superintendent or remand the case for further
proceedings or refuse to accept the appeal on the grounds
that the state superintendent fails to retain proper
jurisdiction on the matter. The state superintendent may
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order are:
iej 'clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record:
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by
10
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion;
(g) affected because findings of fact upon issues
essential to the decision were not made although
requested.
Xeenan erred in reversing Barrick's opinion, not because
Barrick was correct in her conclusions, but because Barrick failed
to follow statutory and administrative mandate in drafting her
decision. Basically, Keenan could not review Barrick's decision in
accordance with ,the requirements of Rule 10.6.125, ARM, because
Barrick's decision was itself so deficient. Keenan should have
again remanded to Barrick.
However, instead of remanding, Keenan, herself, determined
that the Board substantially complied with due process and that
l*[n]o rights of Baldridge . . . [were] . . . prejudiced by the
procedural actions." Keenan also concluded that Barrick abused her
discretion because her decision contained no conclusions of law
which would support her decision to reverse the Board of Trustees
decision to terminate Baldridge.
In drawing the conclusions above, Keenan substituted her
judgment for that of Barrick. Rule 10.6.125, ARM, provides that
"[t]he state superintendent may not substitute his/her judgment for
that of the county superintendent as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact." Beaverhead Cty. High Sch. D. (1989), 236
Mont. 532, 534-535, 771 P.2d 137, 138. See also Frazer School
Dist. No. 2 v. Flynn (1987), 225 Mont. 299, 302, 732 P.2d 409, 411.
Keenan found Bar-rick's findings of fact to be inadequate so she
determined independently that the Board followed due process when
it terminated Baldridge and that Baldridge should not be
11
reinstated. Keenan could not have arrived at her conclusions
without substituting her judgment as the initial finder of fact for
that of Barrick, in violation of Rule 10.6.119, ARM and $j 2-4-623,
MCA. As Keenan herself acknowledged, Barrick's findings of fact
were not comprehensive enough for review; essentially, Barrick's
decision was non-reviewable because she did not fully comply with
the appropriate statute and rule setting forth the requirements for
a county superintendent's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Barrick did not comply with Keenan's first remand instructions.
We appreciate Keenan's frustration in reviewing for the second
time on appeal, a decision that was as woefully deficient as the
first. That frustration, however, must be outweighed by the
necessity for each level of review to comply with the statutes and
rules applicable ,to that level. In order for Keenan to comply with
Rule 10.6.125, ARM, she must order Barrick to comply with Rule
10.6.119, ARM and 5 2-4-623, MCA. Keenan's only proper recourse in
the present case was to again remand the case to Barrick with
instructions to draft findings of fact accompanied by a concise and
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings
and conclusions of law supported by authority or a reasoned
opinion. The county superintendent must first do her job before
the state superintendent can do hers.
III THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
Keenan's decision was appealed to the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court. A review by a district court of a state
superintendent's decision is governed by 5 2-4-704, MCA, which
provides in pertinent part:
12
standards of! review. (1) The review shall be conducted
by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the
record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the agency not shown in the record, proof thereof
may be taken in the court. The court, upon request,
shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.
(2) The court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of
the agency or remand the case for further proceedings.
The court may r e v e r s e o r modify the decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced
because:
(a) the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
ivj 'clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record:
(vi) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion; or
(b) findings of fact, upon issues essential to the
decision, were not made although requested.
The District Court stated in its conclusion of law #3:
In reviewing the whole record, it is evident that the
State Superintendent's findings, that the School Board
followed the proper procedure to terminate Baldridge, is
not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious. In fact,
there is substantial evidence in the record to support
these findings. At all stages in these proceedings,
Baldridge has been afforded substantial due process and
hence the alleged procedural errors are immaterial as
both the School Board and the District Superintendent had
the power to proceed and there is no violation of
Baldridge's due process guarantees.
Additionally, the court's conclusion of law #4 provided as follows:
The State Superintendent found that the County
Superintendent's conclusions 3 and 4 were arbitrary and
capricious and therefore constituted an abuse of
discretion. She further found that without these
conclusions the decision and order of the County
Superintendent must be reversed. These findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The conclusions of law stated above discuss the court's review of
the State Superintendent's decision. The court determined that
there was substantial evidence to support Xeenan's findings and
13
that they were not clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious.
However, as we stated recently in Trustees, Carbon County School
District No. 28 v. Spivey (Mont. 1993), __ P.2d -, -r 50
St.Rep. 1664, 1667:
[IIn order to review the decision of the state
superintendent and ensure that she has correctly reviewed
the county superintendent's decision, the district court
must review the findings and conclusions of the county
superintendent. The district court must decide whether
the county superintendent's findings and conclusions were
supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence
in the first instance in order to determine whether the
state superintendent reviewed and correctly affirmed or
reversed the decision of the county superintendent.
In the instant case, the District Court did not properly review
Keenan's decision because it did not base its review on whether the
county superintendent's findings of fact and conclusions of law
were supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in
the first instance. The district court must review the state
superintendent's decision by focusing on the county superinten-
dent's findings and conclusions to determine if they are supported
by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and by then
ensuring that the state superintendent's decision correctly
affirmed or reversed the county superintendent. Different
statutory and administrative mandates apply to the county
superintendent as the initial fact-finder and to the state
superintendent's level of review. The district court must ensure
that the appropriate statutes and rules are complied with at each
level.
When the county superintendent fails to comply with the
applicable statute and rule in drafting her findings of fact,
14
conclusions of law and order, neither the state superintendent nor
the district court can "review" those findings of fact, conclusions
of law and order and still comply with the requirements of the
rules and statutes applicable to their levels. If a "review" is
conducted under such circumstances, either the state superintendent
or the district court or both wind up acting as the initial fact-
finder, and the whole statutory appeal process collapses like a
house of cards.
If, because the county superintendent's decision is
inadequate, the district court cannot conduct a meaningful review
of that decision so as to determine whether the state
superintendent conducted a proper review, then the district court
must remand the case to the state superintendent. The state
superintendent, in turn, must remand to the county superintendent
with instructions to draft and issue findings of fact, conclusions
of law and order in compliance with the applicable statutes and
administrative rules.
In the instant case, we cannot assure Baldridge that he has
received his "day in court" when Barrick did not comply with
statutes and administrative rules governing her findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order. Therefore, this case is remanded to
the Thirteenth Judicial District Court with instructions to remand
the case to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction who will
remand the case to the County Superintendent, who in turn will be
charged with complying with the statutes and rules applicable in
drafting her decision as discussed above. The county
superintendent assigned this case must provide underlying facts to
15
support the findings of fact and ensure that the conclusions of law
are supported by authority or reasoned opinion.
We hold, therefore, that the District Court erred in affirming
the State Superintendent's decision. In so doing, we close with an
observation.
While the appeal procedure in contested cases between teachers
and school districts is, obviously, determined primarily by the
legislature, this case serves as a perfect example of why that
procedure in Montana should be the subject of future, careful
legislative scrutiny. The present process, commencing with the
initial decision of the board of trustees, through de novo hearing
and review by the county superintendent, through administrative
review by the state superintendent, through judicial review by the
district court, through final appeal to this Court, is technical,
cumbersome, time-consuming, costly, frustrating and inefficient.
The differing, technical statutory and administrative
requirements at the various levels are, in themselves, confusing
and difficult enough to comprehend. That, however, combined with
the fact that the abilities, training and experience of county
superintendents and their access to legal counsel fully familiar
with school law vary widely, almost assures error at some level of
the appeal process. Simply put, the current procedures serve no
one well--neither teachers, school boards and administrations,
county and state school authorities, nor the judicial system. And,
with the present move across the State to cut costs by shifting
county superintendents' duties to other local government officials,
an already unworkable situation will likely be made even worse.
16
See also Yanzick v. School Dist. No. 23, Etc. (1982), 196 Mont.
375, 641 P.2d 431.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
We concur:
17
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler specially concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the State
Superintendent exceeded her scope of review by making factual
determinations, and that the District Court erred by affirming the
decision of the State Superintendent.
I dissent from that part of the majority decision which
concludes that this case should be remanded to the County
Superintendent for further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
After reviewing the issues presented to the County
Superintendent, I conclude that her findings were sufficient to
explain her conclusion that Elmer R. Baldridge should be reinstated
and would, therefore, simply reverse the District Court and order
entry of judgment consistent with the County Superintendent's
decision.
The only issue which the County Superintendent was called upon
to decide was whether remarks which Baldridge was alleged to have
made in the presence of students constituted good cause for his
termination pursuant to § 20-4-207, MCA. That section provides
that a teacher may be dismissed prior to the expiration of his
contract for **immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of
the adopted policies of such trustees."
In this case, the sole basis for allegations that Baldridge
acted in a way to support his termination pursuant to that statute
were complaints by a group of students that he made inappropriate
18
complained about Baldridge were associated with the School Board
and were not credible: and (3) Baldridge had no other blemishes on
his record which justified his termination.
While the majority is critical of the technical adequacy of
the County Superintendent's findings and conclusions, it should be
kept in mind that the hearing process before a county
superintendent was never intended to be the equivalent of a trial
before a district court. Neither should county superintendents,
who are not normally trained in the law, be held to the same
standards of draftsmanship that we expect from district judges.
The review process by a county superintendent, or in this case, an
acting County Superintendent, is simply designed to provide a
local, expeditious opportunity for an independent third party to
resolve the frequent disputes which can arise between school boards
and their employees.
our concern when reviewing a decision of a county
superintendent should simply be whether the factual basis for the
decision is clear and supported by the record, and whether the
decision is correct or incorrect as a matter of law. After
reviewing the record, I conclude that the basis for the County
Superintendent's decision is clear, that her factual findings are
not clearly erroneous, and that her decision was not incorrect as
a matter of law.
Therefore, I would affirm her decision and remand this case to
the District Court for entry of judgment consistent with the County
20
remarks or gestures in the presence of them and other students.
During the course of the hearing, Baldridge either denied making
the remarks and gestures, or explained that his remarks were
intended to mean something other than they were interpreted to mean
by the students who complained. The County Superintendent was
basically called upon to resolve conflicting testimony between
Baldridge and several complaining students. It is clear from the
following findings that those conflicts were resolved in
Baldridge's favor:
7. That the Petitioner was known to be *Ia thorn in
the side" of the district superintendent and the board of
trustees because he often challenged the discrimination
against Native American students and because he chaired
the CFA grievance committee in a number of successful
complaints.
8. That the students who testified for the
Respondent side seem to be part of a "clique" of friends,
two of whom are children of school board members. This
in addition to the conduct of the daughter of the
complaining parents seems to make their testimony
somewhat skeptical.
9. That the Petitioner has an excellent reputation
as a teacher and has had only one negatory comment on an
evaluation which stated that he should be more "tactful
in his correspondence with the superintendent."
It is clear from these findings that the County Superintendent
found insufficient credible evidence to find or conclude that there
was "good cause" for Baldridge's termination.
While the findings and conclusions are not as comprehensive as
they could be, the points they make are clear: (1) the School
Board had an ax to grind with Baldridge; (2) the students who
19
Superintendent's decision that Baldridge should be reinstated to
his position.
21
March 10, 1994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Charles F. Moses’
MOSES LAW FIRM
P.O. Box 2533
Billings, MT 59103
Charles E. Erdmann
ERDMANN LAW OFFICES
P.O. Box 5418
Helena, MT 59604
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE”OF MONT+,