No. 93-466
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
JULIAN RAMIREZ, JR., Deceased.
BETTY J. RAMIREZ, FEB 2 2 1994
Petitioner and Appellant, J,!? 2 #,,?
GLERII OF S!~pi?:>;;~:c:)uRT
NICHOLAS REID RAMIREZ, STATE 0:: &:aidi ' ~ i . 1 ~
Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Hon. Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Craig W. Holt, Attorney at Law,
Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Damon L. Gannett, Gannett & Ventrell,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 27, 1994
Decided: February 22, 1994
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Betty J. Ramirez petitioned the District Court of the
Thirteenth Judicial District, in Yellowstone County, to admit
letters authored by her deceased son, Julian Ramirez, to probate as
his holographic will. After hearing evidence, the District Court
denied admission of the proposed will to probate. The petitioner
appeals from the order of the District Court. We reverse.
The following issue is presented on appeal:
Did the District Court err when it concluded that the
documents offered as the holographic will of Julian Ramirez were
unsupported by testamentary intent?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Julian Ramirez, Jr., was incarcerated in the Yellowstone
County Detention Facility between November 21, 1991, and
December 3, 1991. During that time, he mailed a one-page,
handwritten letter to his sister, Julie Ramirez, which contained
the following unedited language:
Im gonna stay with mom and help her out mom did alot of
things for me she paid off my car and always got me out
of jail thats why I think mom should have everything if
anything ever happens to me I also think she should have
nicolas because Elaine doesnt take care of him but mom
will take care of him
Between January 27, 1992, and February 28, 1992, Julian was
again incarcerated in the Yellowstone County Detention Facility.
During this time, he wrote another one-page letter to his sister,
Julie. That letter stated in part (also unedited):
Im so tired of living I wish I could just kill myself If
anything ever does happen to me or I do something to
myself tell mom I want her to have everything of mine
Neither letter was dated, but both were signed "Julian Ramirez."
Julian Ramirez died as a result of an automobile accident on
September 21, 1992, at the age of 22 years. At the time of his
death, Julian had one child, a son, Nicholas, who is now three
years old. There is no legal relationship between Julian and the
child's mother, Elaine Coburn.
On December 29, 1992, Betty Ramirez, Julian's mother, filed a
petition for formal probate of will, determination of testacy and
heirs, and appointment of personal representative. She attached as
Julian's holographic will, the second letter he had written to
Julie. Nicholas, through his attorney, objected to the admission
of the alleged will. The District Court held a hearing on the
matter on March 11, 1993. At the hearing, Betty offered the first
letter Julian sent to Julie to supplement the letter she attached
to the formal probate petition. On July 19, 1993, the court issued
its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order, and denied
admission of the letters to probate as holographic wills.
Did the District Court err when it concluded that the
documents offered as the holographic will of Julian Ramirez were
unsupported by testamentary intent?
In a nonjury trial, this Court will not disturb the district
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Rule
52 (a), M.R.Civ.P. ; Flikkema v. Kimm (l992), 255 Mont. 34, 37, 839 P.2d
1293, 1295. Our standard of review for questions of law is to
3
determine whether the district court has correctly interpreted the
law. Schaubv. KtaRichDairy (1989), 236 Mont. 389, 391, 770 P.2d 522,
523. The basis for this standard of review is that no discretion
is involved when a tribunal arrives at a conclusion of law; the
tribunal either correctly or incorrectly applies the law. Flikkema,
839 P.2d at 1295.
There are three requirements for a valid holographic will in
Montana. An individual who is eighteen years or older and is of
sound mind has the capacity to make a will. Section 72-2-301, MCA
(1991). A holographic will meets the formalities of execution if
its material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator and
signed by the testator. Section 72-2-303, MCA (1991). Finally,
the individual must have testamentary intent; he must intend that
the document will dispose of his property after death. SeeEstateof
Coleman (1961), 139 Mont. 58, 359 P.2d 502; In re Van Voastns Estate
(l954), 127 Mont. 450, 266 P.2d 377; In reAugestadns Estate (1940), 111
Mont. 138, 106 P.2d 1087.
There is no dispute that Julian Ramirez had the capacity to
make a will, and the District Court concluded that both letters met
the statutory formalities for the execution of a holographic will.
However, the District Court refused to admit the letters as a
holographic will because the District Court concluded that both
letters and the surrounding circumstances failed to reflect
sufficient testamentary intent.
In previously addressing this issue, this Court has adopted
several well-settled rules. The intention that must be present is
the intention to dispose of property after the testator's death.
Van Vonst, 266 P.2d at 378-79. There is no requirement that the
testator realize that he is making a will, nor are there any
particular words necessary to show a testamentary intent. Van Voast,
266 P.2d at 378. Because it is common for people to preface their
wishes or directions with expressions like "if anything happens to
me," courts have long considered such language to indicate
testamentary intent. Coleman, 359 P.2d at 503.
Whether sufficient testamentary intent is present in an
alleged will should be determined by first looking to the writing
itself. Van Voast, 266 P . 2d at 378. However, if the intent is not
clear from the writing, then the surrounding circumstances may be
considered. Van Voast, 266 P . 2d at 378.
In Augestad, 106 P.2d at 1088, we said that "[tlhere is no
definite fixed rule by which testamentary intent may be gauged.
Each case must stand on its own peculiar facts and circumstances."
There, we held that rather than expressing testamentary intent, the
letter of the decedent expressed an intention, at some time in the
future, to make a will.
The District Court mistakenly concluded that Betty, the
proponent of the will, had the burden to show the existence of
Julianrstestamentary intent. According to 5 72-3-310, MCA, it is
the contestant of a will who has the burden of establishing lack of
testamentary intent. Our review of the record causes us to
conclude that that burden was not satisfied.
In this case, we conclude that both the document itself and
the surrounding circumstances indicate testamentary intent. Julian
was in jail, contemplating his death, and according to his sister,
had asked her to save the letters and tell his mother about their
content. On its face, it is abundantly clear that Julianlssecond
letter to Vzell mom I want her to have everything of mine"
indicates his intent that his property should pass to his mother
upon his death.
We therefore reverse the order of the District Court and
remand this case to the District Court for admission of the
proposed will of Julian Ramirez to probate.
We concur: