No. 93-411
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1994
MABEL MGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
YELMWSTONE COUNTY, METRAPARK
and METRAPARK BOARD.
Defendants and Respondents. CL
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Russell K. Fillner, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry L. Seiffert, Billings, Montana
Gary L. Beiswanger, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Steven J. Lehman, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole
and Dietrich, Billings, Montana
Brent Brooks, Deputy County Attorney, Billings,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 16, 1993
Decided: January 26, 1994
Filed:
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is a claim of wrongful discharge. The District Court for
the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, entered
summary judgment for defendants. We affirm.
The decisive issues are:
1. Did the District Court err in dismissing the complaint
when the motion for summary judgment did not specifically request
that relief?
2. Did the court err in determining that plaintiff Mabel
Logan cannot as a matter of law meet the proximate causation
requirements necessary for recovery?
Mabel Logan began working forthe Yellowstone Exhibition/Metra
(Metra) as a switchboard operator in 1980. In May of 1987, she was
informed that the switchboard position was going to be eliminated
in a reorganization. Logan was discharged from employment at the
Metra on June 30, 1987.
Logan was between jobs for about three weeks. On July 28,
1987, she began working as a control operator at the Yellowstone
County Jail. Her new job at the jail paid ninety cents more per
hour than her former job.
While working at the jail, Logan suffered a repetitive motion
injury to her hands. She filed this action in 1988, claiming that
defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and negligently breached their employment contract in
terminating her employment at Metra. She also claims that the
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Metrapark Commission-Board is an illegal entity whose void acts
entitle her to recovery. She seeks compensatory damages including
loss of PERS, health insurance, and other benefits of employment as
a result of her repetitive motion injury. She also requests
punitive damages. Beginning in September 1991, she has received
temporary total disability benefits through workers' compensation
for her repetitive motion injury.
Defendants moved for summary judgment based upon the record,
which included excerpts from depositions. After briefing and oral
argument, the court entered summary judgment for defendants on all
counts. The court ruled, as a matter of law, that Logan's
discharge from employment at Metra was not the proximate cause of
her injuries, nor were her injuries foreseeable. The court also
ruled that Logan cannot recover for her damages because of the
exclusive recovery doctrine of workers1 compensation law. Further,
the court ruled that neither the dual capacity doctrine nor the
intentional tort exception to the exclusivity doctrine applies.
On the claim of negligent discharge, the court noted Logan's
concession that she does not have a claim due to case law develop-
ments since she filed her complaint. In denying the claim that the
Metrapark Commission-Board is an illegal entity, the court cited
5 7-21-3451, MCA, and this Court's opinion in Koch v. Yellowstone
County (1990), 243 Mont. 447, 795 P.2d 454. The court denied the
punitive damages claim against Yellowstone County on the basis that
Yellowstone County is a governmental entity.
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Issue 1
Did the District Court err in dismissing the complaint when
the motion for summary judgment did not specifically request that
relief?
The brief in support of the motion for summary judgment
concluded:
Plaintiff's Complaint fails on all of its counts because
Plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered any damages
that were proximately caused by her discharge from the
Yellowstone County Metra in 1987. The damages she is
trying to claim arose three years later when she suffered
a repetitive motion injury at her job running the
Yellowstone County jail control board. She has recovered
damages through Montana's workers' compensation law for
that repetitive motion injury. She cannot as a matter of
Montana law establish any proximate cause connection
between her discharge from employment in 1987 and the
damages suffered in her repetitive motion injury in 1990
and after.
Logan cites cases setting forth the rule that a district court does
not have jurisdiction to grant relief outside the issues presented.
See, e.g., In re Custody of C.S.F. (1988), 232 Mont. 204, 755 P.2d
578. However, in this case, the motion for summary judgment on all
issues put squarely before the court the issue of whether the
complaint should be dismissed. We hold that the court did not
exceed the relief requested when it dismissed the complaint.
Issue 2
Did the court err in determining that Logan cannot as a matter
of law meet the proximate causation requirements necessary for
recovery in tort law?
Our standard of review of a summary judgment is the same as
that of the trial court: Based on the record, are there genuine
issues of material fact, and is the moving party entitled to
judgment as a matter of law? Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. ; Knight v.
City of Missoula (1992), 252 Mont. 232, 243, 827 P.2d 1270, 1276-
77. In this case the parties do not disagree on issues of material
fact: instead, their arguments address application of the law to
the facts. Therefore, we proceed to consider whether the defen-
dants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Logan argues that defendants should have foreseen that she
could lose her PERS, health insurance, and other benefits as a
result of the termination of her employment at Metra. She states
that, had she not been wrongfully discharged from her job as a
switchboard operator at Metra, she never would have taken the
Yellowstone County Jail job and suffered a repetitive motion
injury. She therefore claims defendants are obligated for all
damages she has suffered that have not been paid by Yellowstone
County's workers1 compensation carrier. She maintains that the
question of foreseeability is, at minimum, one for a jury.
Because Logan's discharge from employment preceded the
effective date of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Title
39, Ch. 2, Part 9, this action was brought under common law
theories. Breach of the duty to deal fairly and in good faith in
the employment relationship is a tort. Gates v. Life of Montana
Ins. Co. (1983), 205 Mont. 304, 307, 668 P.2d 213, 215. Atort is
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comprised of three basic elements: (1) existence of a legal duty
from defendant to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) the
damage as a proximate result. Joseph v. Hustad Corporation (1969),
153 Mont. 121, 124, 454 P.2d 916, 918. Proximate cause is analyzed
in terms of foreseeability. "A defendant is liable for his
wrongful conduct if it is reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff's
injury may be the natural and probable consequence of that
conduct." Thayer v. Hicks (1990), 243 Mont. 138, 155, 793 P.2d
784, 795.
Whether or not there is substantial evidence to raise an issue
of fact is a question of law for the court and not an issue of fact
for the jury. Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Snider (1991), 247
Mont. 508, 513, 808 P.2d 475, 478; Flansberg v. Montana Power Co.
(l969), 154 Mont. 53, 60, 460 P.2d 263, 267. We agree with the
District Court that the causal connection between Logan's discharge
from employment and her repetitive motion injury is so remote that
the injury cannot reasonably be described as a foreseeable result
of the discharge from employment three years earlier. There is
insufficient evidence in the record to support a reasonable
inference that Logan's injuries were caused by defendants' act in
discharging her from employment at Metra.
We conclude the court properly entered summary judgment for
defendants on the claim of wrongful discharge, due to insufficient
evidence on the causation element. Because we so conclude, we need
not rule on the issues relating to the exclusivity doctrine of
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workers' compensation or the legality of the Metrapark Board. Nor
is it necessary that we rule on the correctness of the court's
separate conclusion that punitive damages are not available against
Metrapark as a government entity.
Aff inned.
We concur:
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissents from the foregoing opinion.
Justice
January 26, 1994
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named..
Teny L. Seiffert, Esq.
316 No. 33rd St.
P.O. Box 31181
Billings, MT 59107
Gary L. Beiswanger, Esq.
P.O. Box 20562
Billings, MT 59104
Steven J. Lehman, Esq.
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich
P.O. Box 2529
Billings, MT 59103-2529
Brent Brooks
Deputy County Attorney
P.O. Box 35025
Billings, MT 59104
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
S T A T OF MONTANA
I
BY:
Depu