No. 95-184
IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel. CELIA COBBS,
Relator and Appellant,
NOV 2 1 ~~~$
v.
MONTANADEPARTMENTOF SOCIAL AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lincoln,
The Honorable Robert S. Keller, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Allan M. McGarvey, McGarvey, Heberling,
Sullivan & McGarvey, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Cary B. Lund, Legal Counsel, Department of
Public Health and Human Services,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 24, 1995
Decided: November 21, 1995
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant, Celia Cobbs, filed an application in the
District Court for the Nineteenth Judicial District in Lincoln
County for a Writ of Mandate that would have directed the
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) to disburse
funds from the Industrial Accident Rehabilitation (IAR) Account for
her rehabilitation expenses, as authorized by the Department of
Labor. The District Court concluded that SRS had no clear duty to
disburse the funds, and that Cobbs' exclusive remedy was provided
by law. Therefore, the court denied her application. Cobbs
appeals from the order and judgment of the District Court. We
reverse.
The issue on appeal is:
Does the State Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services owe a clear legal duty to distribute funds from the
Industrial Accident Rehabilitation Account when the Montana
Department of Labor authorizes the distribution pursuant to
5 39-71-2001, MCA (1993)?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Celia Cobbs is an injured worker entitled to workers'
compensation benefits. She is unable to return to her former job
because of a work-related injury. She had a dispute with her
employer's insurer over her right to rehabilitation benefits and
filed a petition in the Workers' Compensation Court to resolve that
dispute. After a trial, she settled her claim by agreeing upon a
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rehabilitation plan with her employer's insurer. The plan called
for payment from the IAR Account in the amount of $680.75 for
tuition and fees, together with $250.00 per semester for books and
materials during a two-year course of study at Flathead Valley
Community College. The State Department of Labor, Employment
Relations Division, and the Workers' Compensation Court approved
the plan.
On January 13, 1994, the Department of Labor wrote to SRS and
authorized the expenditure of funds from the IAR Account for the
tuition, books, and materials described in the rehabilitation plan.
The authorization specified that it was for expenditure of funds
and that Cobbs was not seeking rehabilitation services. SRS,
however, refused to disburse funds from the IAR Account based on
its conclusion that Cobbs did not qualify for that Department's
rehabilitation services.
Cobbs then applied to the District Court in Lincoln County for
a peremptory Writ of Mandate to compel the Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services to distribute funds pursuant to her
rehabilitation plan. Cobbs contended in District Court that the
IAR Account was established exclusively for workers' compensation
claimants and that while the funds may be used to provide
rehabilitation services through SRS pursuant to § 39-71-1003, MCA,
the funds could also be used pursuant to 5 39-71-2001(l) (d), MCA
(1993), when the Department of Labor authorizes use of the funds
for expenses related to a private rehabilitation plan.
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The District Court concluded that the IAR Account is
statutorily dedicated to payment for rehabilitation services for
injured workers provided by the State of Montana's vocational
rehabilitation program, and that because Cobbs was not a client of
that program she was prohibited from receiving funds from the
Account. The District Court also held that 5 39-71-1003, MCA,
provides that 5 53-7-106, MCA, is Cobbs' exclusive remedy for
denial of SRS services.
On appeal, Cobbs points out that she did not seek rehabilita-
tion services or payments pursuant to 5 39-71-1003, MCA. She
agrees that she does not qualify for those services, but contends
that she is entitled to rehabilitation expenses which are related
to her privately developed plan pursuant to 5 39-71-2001(l) (d), MCA
(1993).
DISCUSSION
Does the State Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services owe a clear legal duty to distribute funds from the
Industrial Accident Rehabilitation Account when the Montana
Department of Labor authorizes the distribution pursuant to
5 39-71-2001, MCA (1993)?
The issuance or denial of a writ of mandate is a matter of
legal interpretation which we will review to determine whether the
district court's legal interpretation is correct. Phillips v. City of
Livingston (1994), 268 Mont. 156, 161, 885 P.2d 528, 531. A two-part
standard applies to the issuance of a writ of mandate. State ex rel.
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Chisholmv. DistrictCourt (1986), 224 Mont. 441, 443, 731 P.2d 324, 325.
The writ is available when the party who requests it is entitled to
the performance of a clear legal duty by the party against whom the
writ is sought, and where no speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available. Section 27-26-102, MCA; see
Stateexrel. Gallowayv. CityofGreatFalls (1984)) 211 Mont. 354, 358, 684 P.2d
495, 497.
A negative answer to the first question bars the issuance
of the writ, and, irrespective of the answer to that
question, an affirmative answer to the second, divests
the court of authority to issue it.
Chisholm , 731 P.2d at 325.
On appeal, Cobbs contends that the District Court's denial of
her application was incorrect on both grounds. First, Cobbs
contends that SRS has a clear legal duty to disburse the funds from
the IAR Account. Second, Cobbs asserts that the SRS appeal process
pursuant to § 53-7-106, MCA, is inapplicable because she did not
seek SRS services.
Cobbs contends that SRS has a clear legal duty to disburse
funds pursuant to § 39-71-2001, MCA (1993), which authorizes
privately developed rehabilitation plans, and therefore, that the
District Court abused its discretion when it failed to find a clear
legal duty on the part of SRS and denied the writ. SRS asserts
that application for SRS services pursuant to § 39-71-1003, MCA, is
the only route to the IAR funds, and therefore, that all recipients
of IAR Account monies must independently be eligible clients of SRS
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rehabilitation programs. We conclude that SRS's position, which
was adopted by the District Court, is inconsistent with statutory
law.
The SRS is statutorily required to provide "vocational
rehabilitation" and "vocational rehabilitation services" pursuant
to the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796.
These services must be provided to anyone who qualifies pursuant to
SRS criteria found at § 53-7-105, MCA. Vocational rehabilitation
must also be provided by workers' compensation insurers to
claimants who, by virtue of a work-related injury, are "physically
unable to work at the job the worker held at the time of injury."
Section 39-71-2001(l) (b), MCA (1993). This is a different standard
than the standard by which eligibility for SRS services is
determined.
The IAR Account is provided for at 5 39-71-1004, MCA. It is
funded by self-insured employers, Plan II insurers, and the
Department of Labor. Its purpose is to pay rehabilitation expenses
of injured workers. Subsection (4) specifically provides that
"[n]o part of the funds . . . shall be used in payment of
administrative expenses of the department or department of social
and rehabilitation services." Section 39-71-1004(4), MCA (1993).
When we construe a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained
therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has
been inserted." Section l-2-101, MCA. The Court is to effectuate
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the intent of the Legislature, and if the Legislature's intent can
be determined from the plain meaning of the words used in a
statute, the courts may not go further and apply any other means of
interpretation. Clarkev.Massey (Mont. 1995), 897 P.2d 1085, 1088, 52
St. Rep. 538, 54 0 (citing Tongue River Elec. Co-op. Y. Montana Power Co. ( 19 8 1) ,
195 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864).
Section 39-71-2001(l) (b), MCA (19931, provides that an injured
worker who "is physically unable to work at the job the worker held
at the time of the injury" is eligible for rehabilitation benefits.
The Legislature enacted 5 39-71-2001, MCA, in 1991 when it amended
the Workers' Compensation Act by passing HB 837 which, among other
changes, enacted Title 39, Chapter 71, Part 20, "Rehabilitation
Benefits." Section -2001(l) (d) of the newly enacted part further
provides that:
(1) An injured worker is eligible for rehabilitation
benefits if:
(d) a rehabilitation plan between the injured worker and
the insurer is filed with the department [of Labor and
Industry]. If the plan calls for the expenditure of funds
under 39-71-1004 [the Industrial Accident Rehabilitation
Account], the deuartment shall authorize the department of
social and rehabilitation services to use the funds.
Section 39-71-2001(l) cd), MCA (1993) (emphasis added).
This statute explicitly provides for the development of a
rehabilitation plan which may call for "the expenditure of funds"
from the IAR Account. Section 39-71-2001(l) cd), MCA (1993), also
specifically directs that the "department shall authorize" the use
of the funds for the rehabilitation plan.
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SRS's argument to the contrary assumes that only its agency
can provide rehabilitation services to injured workers. However,
the plain language of 5 39-71-1014, MCA, indicates that vocational
services, including the development of a formal rehabilitation
plan, may be delivered exclusively by a private rehabilitation
provider. For example, that statute provides:
(1) Rehabilitation services are required for disabled
workers and may be initiated by:
(a) an insurer by designating a rehabilitation
provider and notifying the department;
i2j . Rehabilitation
. services provided under this
part [of the Workers' Compensation Act] must be
delivered:
(a) throuqha rehabilitation counselor certifiedbv
the board of rehabilitation certification;
(b) bv a vocational rehabilitation counselor
employed by-the department of social and rehabilitation
services; or
Cc) bv both.
Section 39-71-1014, MCA (emphasis added).
The plain language of 5 39-71-1014, MCA, allows workers'
compensation claimants to receive vocational rehabilitation from
certified private rehabilitation providers instead of, or in
addition to, SRS services. Moreover, rehabilitation provider is
defined as:
[Al rehabilitation counselor certified bv the board for
rehabilitation certification and desisnated bv the
insurer to the deoartment or a department of social and
rehabilitation services counselor when a worker has been
certified by the department of social and rehabilitation
services under 39-71-1003.
Section 39-71-1011(5), MCA (1993) (emphasis added).
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A "rehabilitation counselor certified by the board for
rehabilitation certification" is not necessarily an SRS counselor,
but may be a private counselor. See § 39-71-1011(l), MCA (defining
board of rehabilitation certification).
Thus, the plain language of 55 39-71-lOll(5) and -1014, MCA,
establishes that an injured worker may receive vocational
rehabilitation solely from a private provider, without using SRS
counselors. Furthermore, there is no requirement that injured
workers seek services from SRS--although vocational services may be
provided to injured workers' compensation claimants by SRS.
Therefore, §§ -1011(5), -1014, and -2001, when read together,
require the conclusion that funds from the IAR Account are
available for rehabilitation expenses when a "rehabilitation plan"
has been developed by the insurer, claimant, and rehabilitation
provider and filed with the Department of Labor, not just when SRS
"services" are provided. Privately developed rehabilitation plans,
as authorized by 5 39-71-2001, MCA (1993), would be rendered
meaningless and impossible if this Court was to interpret
5 39-71-2001, MCA (1993), in a way that gave SRS a right to deny
benefits to workers based on criteria other than those listed in
the Workers' Compensation Act. If approval was required, whether
or not the insurer and the claimant agreed to a "rehabilitation
plan," the expenses could not be paid unless the claimant also
developed a rehabilitation plan as a client of SRS. The filing of
the rehabilitation plan with the Department of Labor would be a
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useless exercise if the worker was required to reapply for services
as an SRS client and develop a new rehabilitation plan through
SRS's rehabilitation "services." Moreover, the Department of
Labor's "authorization" of the expenditure of funds from the IAR
Account would have no meaning if, regardless of such authority, the
claimant was still required to apply for rehabilitation services
through SRS. Finally, the IAR Account would serve no function for
workers' compensation employers, insurers, and claimants if it was
solely utilized for clients of SRS.
The Legislature does not perform useless acts. Kish v. Montana
StatePrison (1973), 161 Mont. 297, 301, 505 P.2d 891, 893. Therefore,
we conclude that § 39-71-2001, MCA (1993), does afford independent
access to the IAR Account for payment of expenses related to a
worker's rehabilitation plan developed by the insurer, claimant,
and private rehabilitation provider and filed with the Department
of Labor. This access is in addition to, and independent from, the
payment of expenses pursuant to § 39-71-1003, MCA. Furthermore,
the Department of Labor's authorization, pursuant to § 39-71-2001,
MCA (1993), creates a clear legal duty on the part of SRS to
disburse those funds.
We conclude that Cobbs also meets the second requirement for
a writ of mandate because no speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law was available to her.
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