NO. 95-093
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
DAVID C. HOLMBERG and KAROL M. HOLMBERG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICHARD A. STRONG, STRONG'S CRANE SERVICE, INC., :
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.
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RICHARD E. LUTTON and CROWN PARTS AND MACHINE, ~ ~ %'ffaTE?QP NIBHPPM "
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Defendants,
RICHARD E. LUTTON and CROWN PARTS AND MACHINE, INC.,
Cross-claimants & Appellants,
v.
RICKARD A. STRONG and STRONG'S CRANE SERVICE, INC.,
Cross-Defendants & Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Russell K. Fillner, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
James L. Jones, Dorsey & Whitney,
Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Michael W. Tolstedt, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull,
Fulton, Harman & Ross, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 8, 1995
Decided: August 3, 1995
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaint iffs , David C . Holmberg and Karol M. Holmberg, filed
a complaint in the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial
District in Yellowstone County against the defendants, Richard A.
Strong, Strong's Crane Service, Inc., Richard E. Lutton, and Crown
Parts and Machine, Inc., in which they alleged that the defendantst
negligently injured David and that they were jointly and severally
liable for the couple's damages. Richard E. Lutton and Crown Parts
and Machine, Inc. (referred to collectively as Crown Parts),
cross-claimed against Richard A. Strong and Strong's Crane Service,
Inc. (referred to collectively as Strong's), for contribution. The
District Court granted Strong's motion for summary judgment and
held that Strong's was not liable to Crown Parts for contribution.
Crown Parts appeals from the District Court's judgment and order.
We affirm the District Court.
The issue on appeal is:
Did the District Court err when it granted Strong's motion for
summary judgment?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 13, 1991, David Holmberg was driving his vehicle
west on Highway 87 when he stopped his vehicle in order to make a
left hand turn. Before he turned, David was hit from behind by a
truck driven by defendant Richard E. Lutton and owned by defendant
Crown Parts. Prior to the collision, Richard A. Strong was driving
a crane owned by Strong's in an easterly direction, and while
turning right off Highway 87, allegedly caused the boom of the
crane to encroach into the westbound lane, distracting Lutton and
contributing to the accident.
On February 10, 1994, Holmbergs filed a complaint against
Richard A. Strong, Strong's Crane Service, Inc., Richard E. Lutton,
and Crown Parts and Machine, Inc. Their complaint alleged that the
defendants negligently caused David's injuries and were jointly and
severally liable. On February 28, 1994, Crown Parts filed its
answer and a cross-claim against Strong's for contribution. On
March 4 , 1994, Holmbergs and Crown Parts filed a joint motion for
the District Court's approval of their settlement agreement,
dismissal of Holmbergs' complaint, and permission for Crown Parts
to proceed with its cross-claim. On March 17, 1994, Holmbergs
signed a settlement agreement with Crown Parts. That same day the
District Court approved the settlement and dismissed with prejudice
Holmbergs' complaint against all defendants, but allowed Crown
Parts to proceed with its cross-claim.
In October 1994, Strong's moved for dismissal of Crown Parts'
claim by summary judgment. In December 1994, the District Court
granted Strong's motion and held that because Holmbergs had
released all tort-feasors from liability, Strong's and Richard
Strong are not parties against whom recovery is allowed pursuant to
5 27-1-703, MCA, and Sprinklev. BurlingtonNorthern (1989), 236 Mont. 383,
769 P.2d 1261. Therefore, the court held that Crown Parts had no
right of contribution against Strong's or Richard Strong.
DISCUSSION
Did the District Court err when it granted Strong's motion for
summary judgment?
Our inquiry on review of an order granting summary judgment is
identical to that of the district court. Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West
(l994), 264 Mont. 441, 444, 872 P.2d 330, 331. Summary judgment is
proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
,
Rule 56 (c) M.R.Civ.P.; Spain-Morrow, 872 P.2d at 331-32
Crown Parts requests that we reverse the District Court's
judgment and, in so doing, expressly overrule Sprinkle. We decline
to do so.
Montana has altered the common law and recognizes a statutory
right to contribution. Section 27-1-703,MCA. In Senate Bill 212,
the Fifty-Fourth Montana Legislature amended § 27-1-703, MCA, so
that it now provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3),
whenever the negligence of a party in any action is an
issue, each party against whom recovery may be allowed is
jointly and severally liable for the amount that may be
awarded to the claimant but has the right of contribution
from any other person whose negligence may have
contributed as a proximate cause to the injury complained
of.
. . . .
(4) On motion of any party against whom a claim is
asserted for negligence resulting in death or injury to
person or property, any other person whose negligence may
have contributed as a proximate cause to the injury
complained of may be joined as an additional party to the
action. For purposes of determining the percentage of
liability attributable to each party whose action
contributed to the injury complained of, the trier of
[#I 2. Can defendant # 1 continue its action for
contribution against defendant # 2 under Montana law?
Sprinkle, 769 P.2d at 1261. The certified question in Sprinkle is
identical to the issue on appeal in this case.
Relying on principles set forth in Deere, we held that:
Regardless of the change in positions here as between the
joint tortfeasors, the principle announced in Deere
remains the same. The plaintiff's case has ended and the
nonsettling tortfeasor is not one "against whom recovery
is allowed." As we said in Deere, supra, that statutory
language excludes from any duty of contribution a party
against whom recovery is not allowed.
Sprinkle, 769 P.2d at 1263
In this case, Holmbergs filed their complaint and named Crown
Parts, as well as Strong's. Crown Parts filed its claim for
contribution from Strong's. Crown Parts and the Holmbergs jointly
sought the District Court's order which approved their settlement
and dismissed Holmbergs' complaint against "all Defendants . .
with prejudice." Although the settlement agreement did not include
Strong's as a releasee, the recitals indicate that Holmbergs agreed
to "settle and dismiss all claims they have or may have as against
all parties who caused their injuries," indicating that Holmbergs
intended to release Strong's
The fact that Holmbergs initially named all defendants in
their complaint does not distinguish this case from Sprinkle. As in
Sprinkle, Crown Parts obtained a general release of all claims,
including claims against Strong's. Crown Parts sought contribution
from Strong's and Strong's moved for summary judgment. Recognizing
that Sprinkle was nearly identical to this case, the District Court
granted Strong's motion.
Crown Parts urges that we reverse Sprinkle because it is contrary
to the plain statutory language of § 27-1-703, MCA, legislative
intent, public policy encouraging settlement, and language from
this Court's recent opinion in Linderv. MissoulaCounty (1992), 251 Mont.
292, 824 P.2d 1004. Crown Parts also relies on cases from other
jurisdictions and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor's Act
(UCATA).
We disagree with Crown Parts' reliance on cases from other
jurisdictions because each case is based on a state statute with
statutory language that differs from § 27-1-703, MCA, and because
Sprinkle already applied the relevant language of Montana's
contribution statute in the present context, based on the plain
language of the statute. We also disagree with Crown Parts'
reliance on the UCATA because Montana has not adopted the UCATA.
As we recognized in Sprinkle, reliance on the UCATA has created
difficulty in jurisdictions which have adopted comparative
negligence. Therefore, in Sprinkle, 769 P.2d at 1263-64, we declined
BN's suggestion that we follow the UCATA.
Neither is Crown Parts ' argument based on Linder persuasive.
The plaintiff in Linder contracted tuberculosis and filed a
negligence claim against Missoula County, alleging that the County
did not adequately monitor a tubercular who moved to Missoula
County. Missoula County filed a third-party claim against the
State of Montana in which it sought contribution. Linder, 824 P.2d
at 1005. The State moved for summary judgment on the basis that
the relevant statute of limitations precluded the plaintiff from
suing the State. Therefore, the State argued, it was "a party
against whom recovery is not allowed," pursuant to 5 27-1-703,MCA.
Linder, 824 P.2d at 1007.
We rejected the State's position and noted that although both
Linder and Deere involved a plaintiff and two potential defendants,
the
similarity ends [tlhere . . . . In the instant case, the
plaintiffs settled with neither party; this is a stark
difference from the facts of Deere. Clearly, this
difference makes the case at bar distinguishable from
Deere and the cases that follow it. (See Sprinkle v. B.N.
Railroad (l989), 236 Mont. 383, 769 P.2d 1261).
Linder, 824 P.2d at 1007. Therefore, we concluded that the situation
in Linder did not fall within the statutory language of § 27-1-703,
MCA .
We then addressed the statute of limitations argument and
concluded that the statute of limitations in the underlying claim
by the plaintiff did not apply to the contribution claim brought by
Missoula County against the State. In this situation, "an existing
defendant should not be prevented from obtaining contribution from
a non-settling party." Linder, 824 P.2d at 1007-08.
We distinguished Linder from Deere and Sprinkle because the
plaintiffs in Linder did not settle with either defendant. We
conclude that the rule set forth in Sprinkle applies to the facts of
this case.
The relevant statutory language interpreted in Deere, Sprinkle,
and Linder remained unchanged by the Legislature's 1995 amendment in
Senate Bill 212. Therefore, we conclude that Crown Parts' reliance
on public policy favoring settlement is not persuasive, and that
because our decisions simply apply the plain statutory language of
§ 27-1-703,MCA, legislative history is irrelevant to our decision.
Dornv. BoardofTrustees (1983), 203 Mont. 136, 144, 661 P.2d 426, 430.
We affirm the District Court's order and judgment granting
Strong's motion for summary judgment based on our conclusion that
Strong's was not a party against whom recovery is allowed pursuant
to 5 27-1-703, MCA
We concur:
Justices
10
Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring.
I specially concur. The philosophy behind contribution among
tortfeasors is one of promoting settlement. Our holdings in State
ex rel. Deere & Co. v. District Court (1986), 224 Mont. 384, 730
P.2d 396 and Sprinkle v. Burlington Northern Railroad (1989), 236
Mont . 383, 769 P.2d 1261, and now the present case have so narrowed
the circumstances under which a defendant can obtain contribution
that, in the final analysis, we are discouraging settlement. In
Deere we held that when defendant Deere settled with the plaintiff,
Deere bought his peace and could not then be brought back into the
litigation by means of a third party complaint from defendant
Wade's Backhoe.
In Sprinkle we then held that when defendant 1 joins defendant
2 seeking contribution and then settles with the plaintiff,
obtaining a release of all parties, defendant 2 is no longer a
party "against whom recovery is allowed." Accordingly, defendant
1 can no longer pursue his contribution claim against defendant 2 .
Likewise, in the case at hand, defendant Crown Parts had a cross-
claim for contribution pending against defendant Strong when Crown
Parts settled with plaintiff Holmberg. The District Court not only
approved the settlement but also specifically allowed Crown Parts
to proceed with its cross-claim for contribution. The court then
reversed itself when it granted Strong's motion for summary
judgment on the theory that, as a consequence of the settlement,
Strong was no longer a party "against whom recovery is allowed"
under § 27-1-703, MCA. Presumably Crown Parts will not again make
the mistake of unilaterally settling with a plaintiff.
The next logical step in this progression is to take the Deere
scenario a step further. Deere settled at a time when there were
no claims for contribution pending against Deere. We held that
Deere could not be brought back into the litigation after the fact;
that is, after the settlement. What about a defendant who is
subject to an outstanding claim for contribution at the time of
settlement? Under our case law, there appears to be no reason why
that defendant cannot circumvent the claim for contribution by
unilaterally settling with the plaintiff in an amount less than
his/her/its proportionate amount thereby rendering itself a party
"against whom recovery is [not] allowed."
I am concerned that this line of authority seriously hinders
the public policy considerations favoring contribution among
tortfeasors by restricting contribution to situations where
multiple defendants refuse to settle and force the plaintiff to go
to trial. However, short of usurping the legislature's prerogative
and rewriting 5 27-1-703, MCA, I can think of no viable
alternatives. Accordingly, I reluctantly and specially concur in
the result.