NO. 95-105
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-v-
RONALD EVANS,
Defendant/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver bow,
The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeffrey T. Rem, Montana Defender Project,
Univeristy of Montana, School of Law, Missoula,
Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Crew
Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,
Montana; Robert McCarthy, Silver Bow County
Attorney, Brad Newman, Deputy Silver Bow County
Attorney, Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 11, 1995
Decided: July 13, 1995
Filed:
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a designation as dangerous offender by
the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County. We remand
so the court can articulate its reasons for entering this
designation.
The following issues are dispositive of the case:
I. Did the District Court err in relying upon the evidence
found in the case record for its designation of dangerous offender?
II. Did the District Court err in failing to articulate its
reasons for designating Evans a dangerous offender?
On August 30, 1994, a vehicle driven by Ronald Evans (Evans)
veered into the on-coming lane and collided head on with another
vehicle driven by Sonnie Holm (Helm). Helm and another adult
passenger were seriously injured. The passenger's five month old
baby sustained serious head injuries and eventually died as a
consequence of the accident.
Evans, whose blood alcohol was .164 an hour after the
accident, was charged with one count of negligent vehicular
homicide, a felony and two counts of negligent vehicular assault,
a misdemeanor. Evans initially pled not guilty, but later changed
his plea to guilty pursuant to an agreement with the State.
Evans was freed on bond, but following a disturbance in a
vacant lot in Butte, Evans was charged with disorderly conduct and
his bond was revoked. He was remanded to the county jail.
On November 21, 1994, the District Court sentenced Evans to
ten years on the negligent homicide count and six months on each
2
count of negligent vehicular assault, all time to run concurrently.
Evans was also ordered to pay $1,000 fine and $10,000 restitution.
Evans was remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections
with a recommendation that he be placed at the Montana State
Prison. The court also designated Evans a dangerous offender for
purposes of parole eligibility.
Evans filed his appeal on January 12, 1995, appealing his
dangerous offender designation.
I.
Did the District Court err in relying upon the evidence found
in the case record for its designation of dangerous offender?
Appellant argues that the record does not contain sufficient
evidence that he is a dangerous offender. The State disagrees.
Under § 46-18-404, MCA, 'I an individual may be
designated a dangerous offender, if, in the discretion of
the sentencing court, he is determined to represent a
substantial danger to other persons or society; however,
more than a mere recital of the statutory language is
required. . .'I [citations omitted.1 Our review of the
record here indicates that the District Court failed to
articulate its reasons for the dangerous offender
designation. . .
Where the record below reveals substantial evidence
to support a sentencing court's determination that an
offender is dangerous, this Court has remanded the cause
to the district judge for findings to support such a
conclusion.
State v. Belmarez (1991), 248 Mont. 378, 381, 812 P.2d 341, 342-43.
The record here indicates that Evans has a dismal and
extensive juvenile criminal record. At the time of sentencing
Evans was 18 years of age and had already been involved in a
negligent vehicular homicide. The felony occurred because Evans
3
was intoxicated while driving and swerved into the oncoming lane of
traffic.
Further, the record indicates that while out of jail on bail
bond during the vehicular homicide proceedings, he was again
arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The court
indicated that Evans was "incorrigible" and the record bears this
out. Further, the record also reflects that he has not sought help
with his drinking problem, but continues to drink without
considering the consequences of his actions. Nor does he show
remorse for the lives that he negatively impacts. These facts are
contained in the record and the court should have noted them, all
or in part, for its determination that he represented a danger to
society.
We hold that the record contains substantial evidence from
which the District Court could have drawn support for its dangerous
offender designation.
II.
Did the District Court err in failing to articulate its
reasons for designating Evans a dangerous offender?
Evans argues on appeal that the court did not articulate the
reasons that it found him to be a dangerous offender. According to
Evans, the court had to specifically state why it found him to be
a danger to society and could not just mimic the wording of § 46-
18-404(l) (b), MCA.
The State argues that the court's statements were adequate
according to the statute and our case law.
4
Section 46-18-404(l), MCA, states in pertinent part:
(1) . . . ET1 he sentencing court shall designate an
offender a nondangerous offender for purposes of
eligibility for parole under part 2 of chapter 23 if:
(a) during the 5 years preceding the commission of the
offense for which the offender is being sentenced, the
offender was neither convicted of nor incarcerated for an
offense committed in this state or any other jurisdiction
for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess
of 1 year could have been imposed; and
(b) the court has determined, based on any presentence
report and the evidence presented at the trial and the
sentencing hearing, that the offender does not represent
a substantial danger to other persons or society.
This statute governs the designation of both nondangerous and
dangerous offenders. State v. Wing (1994), 264 Mont. 215, 870 P.2d
1368.
In making a dangerous designation, the court should consider
the defendant's persistence in criminal conduct, the defendant's
failure with earlier discipline to deter or reform him and whether
the defendant is a substantial danger to others or society. State
v. Nichols (1986), 222 Mont. 71, 720 P.2d 1157. Also to be
considered is the vicious nature of the crime engaged in.
Belmarez, 248 Mont. at 382, 812 P.2d at 343.
In making the dangerous offender designation, the district
courts must articulate their reasons for imposing a dangerous
designation; a mere recital of the statutory language will not be
sufficient because we cannot review the court's discretion based
upon a mere repetition of the statutory directives. Belmarez, 248
Mont. at 381, 812 P.2d at 343. When a court fails to state its
specific reasons and substantial evidence exists for such a
finding, we will remand the case in order that the court follow the
5
proper procedure. Belmarez, 248 Mont. at 381, 812 P.2d at 343.
Here, the court made the following conclusions in its
judgment:
That Defendant Ronald Evans is a dangerous offender
and is currently a threat to society and confinement in
the Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge, Montana is
necessary and appropriate for the protection of society
and particularly the rehabilitation of the Defendant.
That the Defendant Ronald Evans has been sentenced
to Montana State Prison after this Court has fully
considered the gravity of the offenses, the punishment
permitted by law, the deterrent effect on others, the
protection of society while the Defendant is
incarcerated, and the possibilities, or lack thereof, of
rehabilitation of this Defendant and the Pre-Sentence
Report. The Court has also considered the Motive of the
Defendant in committing the crime, his lack of
cooperation with officials and mitigating circumstances.
The age of the Defendant and the Defendant's prior
criminal record, including his juvenile record, were also
taken into consideration along with the Defendant's
lifestyle and his lack of significant goals or work
history.
This is merely repetition of the elements as stated in statutory
directives and case law. It is not sufficient.
The State argues that this case is analogous to State v.
Buckman (1989), 236 Mont. 37, 768 P.2d 1361. There, the court gave
the following reasons for making the dangerous offender
designation:
The defendant, since he was 18 years old, has been
involved with the criminal law. In 1979, he was given a
three (3) year deferred sentence for auto theft. In
1980, he was convicted, by a jury, of Aggravated Assault
and Aggravated Kidnapping, felonies, and was given two
ten (10) year terms which ran concurrently and was
designated a Dangerous offender. He was released from
the Montana State Prison in February, 1987 and committed
the crime of Deceptive Practices, a felony, by stealing
and using stolen credit cards.
The defendant has demonstrated no evidence or effort
to rehabilitate himself and is addicted to alcohol and
6
drugs. His incarceration is necessary for long term in-
patient treatment for alcohol and drugs and for the
protection of the public.
Buckman, 236 Mont. at 40-41, 768 P.2d at 1363. The Buckman court
gave specific facts taken from the record of the case as reasons
for making its decision. Buckman is not analogous to the case at
hand.
While the court here made its decision "pursuant to Findings
and Conclusions set forth above" such is not sufficient reasoning
for our review.
Remanded for further proceedings cons
We Concur: