No. 94-520
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH OF D.H.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,
The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Allen Smith, Jr., and Lonnie Olson, Mental
Disabilities Board of Visitors, Montana
Advocacy Program, Warm Springs, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General,
Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney
General, Helena, Montana
Mike McGrath, Lewis and Clark County
Attorney, Vicki Frazier, Deputy County
Attorney, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 2, 1995
Decided: April 11, 1995
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
On September 13, 1994, the Lewis and Clark County Attorney's
Office filed a petition in the District Court for the First
Judicial District in Lewis and Clark County, in which it alleged
that D.H. was seriously mentally ill and requested that the
District Court enter an appropriate treatment order pursuant to
§ 53-21-127, MCA. Later that day, the District Court ordered that
D.H. be involuntarily committed to the custody of the Montana
Department of Corrections and Human Services for placement in the
Montana State Hospital at Warm Springs for a period not to exceed
90 days. D.H. appeals from the District Court's order. We reverse
the order of the District Court.
The following issue is dispositive on appeal:
Were the procedural safeguards imposed by statute followed
prior to the District Court's order which committed D.H. to the
State Hospital?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 11, 1994, D.H. voluntarily entered a support
center at St. Peter's Hospital in Helena, where he had sought
treatment on prior occasions for symptoms of paranoid
schizophrenia. The following day, while D.H. was at the hospital,
a hospital employee, Carol Fraser, filed a mental evaluation report
and requested that a petition be filed to commit D.H. to a mental
health facility.
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On September 13, 1994, the Lewis and Clark County Attorney's
Office filed a petition in District Court in which it requested a
commitment order. Attached to the petition was Frazer's evaluation
of D.H. That same day, the District Court appointed an attorney to
represent D.H., ordered that an initial appearance be made by D.H.,
and found that probable cause existed to believe that D.H. was
seriously mentally ill.
At or immediately following the initial appearance, the court
issued another order in which it related that D.H. had appeared and
was advised of his constitutional rights, as well as the effect of
the petition, and directed that a hearing be held at 2:35 p.m.,
five minutes after the initial appearance. In that order, the
court also appointed a "friend" of the respondent, and ordered
Robert E. Brown, a professional person of D.H.'s choice, to examine
him. Finally, the court stated that Fraser's report attached to
the petition was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
§ 53-21-123, MCA.
The hearing to consider the merits of the petition was held
immediately following the initial appearance. Frazer was the only
witness called to testify.
Following the hearing, the District Court ordered that D.H. be
committed to the Montana State Hospital for a period not to exceed
90 days. This appeal is brought on D.H.'s behalf by attorneys for
the Mental Disabilities Board of Visitors.
DISCUSSION
Were the procedural safeguards imposed by statute followed
prior to the District Court's order which committed D.H. to the
State Hospital?
The issue in this case involves the application of Montana
statutes to undisputed facts. We review a district court's
application of the law to determine whether the district court was
correct. Barthulev. Karman (Mont. 1994), 886 P.2d 971, 975, 51. St.
Rep. 1423, 1425.
D.H. contends that because the District Court ignored
procedural requirements related to civil commitments, its
commitment order should be reversed. The State concedes that the
procedural issue raised by D.H. is controlled by our recent
decision in MatterofR.M (Mont. 1995), 889 P.2d 1201, 52 St. Rep. 68.
However, during the briefing stages of this case, the parties did
not have the benefit of that result.
Montana has enacted specific procedural safeguards which must
be complied with as part of any effort to involuntarily commit any
person. See generally Title 53, Chapter 21, MCA. Pursuant to
§ 53-21-121, MCA, a county attorney may file a petition for
commitment of a person alleged to be seriously mentally ill upon
receipt of a written request from a person with direct knowledge of
relevant facts. Once presented with a petition, a district court
must first consider whether probable cause exists to support the
petition. Section 53-21-122(2) (a), MCA. If probable cause exists,
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the court must immediately appoint counsel for the respondent and
hold an initial hearing. At the initial hearing, the respondent
must be advised of his or her constitutional rights and the
substantive effect of the petition. Section 53-21-122(2) (b) (i),
MCA. Finally, the court is required to appoint a professional
person to examine the respondent, appoint a "friend" for the
respondent, and set a date and time for a hearing on the petition.
Section 53-21-122(2) (b) (ii), MCA.
Section 53-21-123(l), MCA, states that following an initial
hearing, and without unreasonable delay, the respondent shall be
examined by the appointed professional person who shall report to
the county attorney and the court. If the appointed professional
person recommends dismissal, the court should ordinarily dismiss
the petition. Section 53-21-123(2) (a), MCA. If the professional
person finds that commitment proceedings should continue, the
scheduled hearing should be held. Section 53-21-123(2) (b), MCA.
As we recognized in MatterofRM, "'Montana's civil commitment
laws are to be strictly followed.'" MutterofRM, 889 P.2d at 1204
(quoting MatterofU (1988), 231 Mont. 353, 355, 753 P.2d 319, 320
(citations omitted)). We also noted that these procedural
safeguards are of critical importance because of the "'calamitous
effect of a commitment [,I’ including loss of liberty and damage to
a person's reputation." Matter of R.M., 889 P.2d at 1204 (quoting
MatterofShennum (1984), 210 Mont. 442, 450-51, 684 P.2d 1073, 1078).
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In this case, the District Court failed to strictly follow the
statutory procedures for a civil commitment set forth at
§ 53-21-123, MCA, which require that, following the initial
hearing, the respondent be examined by the professional person
appointed at the initial hearing, and that that person immediately
notify the county attorney of his or her findings and file a
written report with the court. Contrary to § 53-21-123, MCA, the
court relied on Frazer's examination of D.H. which was performed
before the commitment proceeding was initiated.
The State contends that D.H. waived his right to challenge
procedural flaws on appeal because he did not object on that basis
in the District Court. We rejected that argument in MatterofR.M,
889 P.2d at 1204-05, and held that because substantial rights of an
individual are involved in a civil commitment proceeding, the
general rule relied on by the State is inapplicable. Matter of R.M ,
889 P.2d at 1205 (citing MatterofNB. (1980), 190 Mont. 319, 323, 620
P.Zd 1228, 1231).
We hold that the District Court erred when it failed to comply
with the specific requirements of § 53-21-123, MCA, and for that
reason reverse its order which committed D.H. to the State
Hospital. Because of this holding, we conclude it is unnecessary
to consider the remaining issues raised on appeal.
J stice
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We concur: