NO. 95-467
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RUDY STANKO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable Robert P. Goff, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Rudy Stanko, Pro Se; Laurel, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;
Patricia J. Jordan, Assistant Attorney
General; Helena, Montana
Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney;
Jeff Mora, Deputy County Attorney;
Great Falls, Montana
.,.,
Submitted on Briefs: October 31, 1996
Decided: December 17, 1996
;j;; ! r ,'.
Filed:
Justice Charles E. Erdmann delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public
document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing
Company.
Rudy Stank0 appeals from the jury verdict and sentence entered
by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, convicting
him of operating as a livestock dealer without a license, a
misdemeanor, pursuant to 5 81-8-271, MCA. We affirm.
The issues on appeal are as follows:
1. Did the exclusion of two defense witnesses on relevancy
grounds violate Stanko's rights of compulsory process and due
process?
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the conviction?
3. Did the District Court err in admitting evidence of a
warning ticket issued two days prior to the offense?
4. Did the District Court err in admitting Stanko's
statement that he had taken the cattle out of state?
5. Was a probable cause determination required for the
District Court to hear Stanko's appeal from Justice Court?
FACTS
Rob Tierney is a district investigator for the Department of
Livestock in Billings. Tierney first met Rudy Stank0 on March 26,
1993, at the Billings Livestock Commission where Stank0 informed
2
Tierney that he was dealing in livestock. Tierney informed Stank0
that he could not operate as a livestock dealer without being
licensed by the State. After Tierney personally observed Stank0
buying cattle, he issued Stank0 a warning notice dated March 29,
1993. At that time, Stank0 requested a real ticket so that he
could challenge the system.
Tierney later served Stank0 with a citation charging him with
buying cattle at Western Livestock Auction on March 31,~ 1993,
without a dealer's license. Tierney delivered the citation to
Stank0 during the first week of April 1993. At that time, Stank0
indicated he would "test the system" and acknowledged that Stank0
Farms, of Gering, Nebraska, was owned by him and his w-wife.
Stank0 also stated that he had purchased the cattle and taken some
of them to Laurel and some to Long Prairie and Scotts Bluff,
Nebraska.
Stank0 was subsequently issued a notice to appear.in Justice
Court on a misdemeanor charge of buying cattle without a dealer's
license, pursuant to § 81-E-271, MCA. On December 9, 1993, he was
tried by a jury and found guilty.
Stank0 appealed his conviction to the District Court where he
was tried de nova. In that proceeding, the State filed notice
pursuant to State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957 (as
modified in State v. Matt (1991), 249 Mont. 136, 814 P.2d 52), that
it intended to introduce the March 29, 1993, warning ticket Tierney
had issued to Stanko. The State intended to use the warning ticket
to prove knowledge, purpose, and absence of mistake. Following a
3
pretrial hearing on the matter, the District Court determined that
the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid.
Stank0 filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that § 81-8-271, MCA, was unconstitutional for a number of reasons,
and that the statute was discriminately enforced. The State filed
a motion in limine to exclude all testimony tending to show that
other individuals or organizations are not prosecuted under the
statute and that other persons or organizations, namely the
National Farmers' Organization (NFO), are not subject to its
provisions. The State relied on the fact that the court had
previously stated at the omnibus hearing that such testimony and
evidence was irrelevant to the present matter and therefore
inadmissible. The District Court denied Stanko's motions to
dismiss and granted the State's motion in limine. Stank0 then
filed an interlocutory appeal with this Court which we dismissed as
being premature and unauthorized by the Montana Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See Mont. Sup. Ct. Order No. 94-555 (February 28,
1995).
A jury trial was conducted on August 10 and 11, 1995. At the
close of the State's case, Stank0 moved for a directed verdict,
which the court denied. Stank0 then made an offer of proof
regarding the proposed testimony of two witnesses, Les Graham and
Joyce Riles. The court heard testimony from both individuals out
of the presence of the jury and concluded it would not allow either
Graham or Riles to testify before the jury because their testimony
was irrelevant. At that point, the defense rested its case and
4
Stanko renewed his motion for a directed verdict, which the court
denied.
The jury returned a guilty verdict. Stanko moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the court denied. The
District Court sentenced Stanko to pay a fine in the amount of
$1000 with $750 suspended. This appeal followed.
ISSUE 1
Did the exclusion of two defense witnesses on relevancy
grounds violate Stanko's rights of compulsory process and due
process?
Stank0 argues that when the court excluded the testimony of
Graham and Riles, he was prevented from presenting his case on the
alleged unconstitutionality of 5 81-a-271, MCA, and the Department
of Livestock's discriminatory enforcement of the statute. Graham
was a long-time employee of the Department of Livestock and was the
director of the Department from 1983 to 1991. Riles was a member
of the NFO and was prepared to testify about the NFO exemption and
how they operate without a dealer's license.
We first note that with respect to Stanko's claim that
5 81-8-271, MCA, is unconstitutional, this Court has already ruled
on this issue in a prior action involving Stanko. See State v.
Stank0 (1996), 275 Mont. 532, 913 P.2d 1259. In that matter, we
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, and therefore Stanko's
argument on that ground in the present action is without merit.
The district court has broad discretion to determine whether
or not evidence is relevant and admissible. State v. Hall (lYYO),
5
244 Mont. 161, 169, 797 P.2d 183, 188. & also Rule 401,
M.R.Evid. The district court's determination of the relevance and
admissibility of evidence is subject to review only for abuse of
discretion. State v. Hage (19931, 258 Mont. 498, 504, 853 P.2d
1251, 1255.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the accused compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor. This right is a part of due process that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to provide. Washington v.
Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14, 18-19. In addition, the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process ultimately governs the state's rules
of evidence. The defendant must be afforded a fair opportunity to
defend against the state's accusations. Chambers v. Mississippi
(19731, 410 U.S. 284, 294. Nevertheless, the defendant's right to
present evidence is not absolute. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the following
five-factor analysis to determine whether the exclusion of evidence
reaches constitutional proportions: (1) the probative value of the
evidence; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of
evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole
evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it
constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. See Tinsley v.
Borg (9th Cir. 1990), 895 F.2d 520, 530. The court must also
consider the purpose of the state's evidentiary rule and give due
weight to the substantial state interest in preserving orderly
trials, in judicial efficiency, and in excluding unreliable or
6
prejudicial evidence. Perry v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1983), 713 F.2d
1447, 1452-53.
Graham testified out of the presence of the jury that he did
not know what the Department of Livestock was doing with regard to
enforcement of the statute in 1993 since he was no longer with them
at that time. Graham and Riles testified that the NFO was a
collective bargaining organization that sells only its members'
cattle. However, the record fails to indicate there was any
evidence presented to show that Stank0 was a member of the NFO or
any other collective bargaining unit or organization entitled to be
exempt from the operation of the statute.
Graham further testified that before the statute was amended,
the Department of Livestock would permit a small rancher to
purchase cattle for his own lot out of state, but that such a
practice would not be permitted under the current statute. Tierney
corroborated this fact when he testified that the law would now be
enforced against such a buyer. There was no testimony which
supported Stanko's argument that the law is randomly enforced
against small, out-of-state ranchers.
We determine that Graham's and Rile's testimony had no
probative value on the central issue in the case. The testimony
was offered to prove that the NFO was not required to be licensed
under the Montana Livestock Marketing Act. However, an exemption
for NFO members has no bearing on this case since Stank0 failed to
prove he was a member the NFO or any marketing organization
claiming an exemption from the statute. Moreover, the State has a
strong interest in preserving orderly trials, in judicial
efficiency, and in excluding evidence irrelevant to the issues. In
this case, the State's interest clearly outweighs the lack of
probative value that the evidence Stank0 intended to present to the
jury would have had.
We therefore conclude that the District Court did not violate
Stanko's constitutional right to compulsory process and due
process, or otherwise abuse its discretion when it prevented the
jury from hearing the testimony from Graham and Riles.
ISSUE 2
Was there sufficient evidence to support the conviction?
Stank0 argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support the conviction. He specifically contends
that the State did not prove that he purchased cattle for
interstate shipment.
When the issue on appeal in a criminal case is whether there
was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict, the standard of
review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Licht (1994), 266 Mont. 123, 131, 879 P.2d 670,
675 (citing State v. Lyons (1992), 254 Mont. 360, 363, 838 P.2d
397, 399).
Section 81-8-271, MCA, provides that a person shall not
operate as a livestock dealer without a license. Section
81-8-213 (6), MCA, defines "livestock dealer" as a person engaged in
8
the business of purchasing livestock for immediate resale, for
interstate shipment, or on a commission or fee basis.
In the present case, the State's proof focused solely on
Stanko's purchase of cattle for interstate shipment. Tierney
testified that upon purchase of cattle, the destination of the
cattle must be listed on the documentation and the purchaser may
not divert the cattle to another destination without seeking prior
approval from the Department of Livestock. Tierney stated that the
cattle cannot be released from the market until the documentation
is completed and the cattle are paid for. Jody Stortz, the office
manager and custodian of records at Western Livestock Auction,
introduced the purchase sheets for the cattle purchased by Stank0
Farms of Gering, Nebraska.
Mark Bridges, the administrator of the Department of
Livestock's Brand Enforcement Division, introduced into evidence
the market release forms. The destination listed on all of the
forms was Gering, Nebraska. Faye Olson and Kent Kerchal of Western
Livestock Auction both testified that on March 31, 1993, they
observed Stank0 buying cattle using the bidding number 70. Kerchal
testified that the cattle were released to Gering, Nebraska. Daryl
Facken testified that he was working for Stank0 in March 1993, and
confirmed that he had signed the check which paid for the cattle.
Moreover, Stank0 admitted to Tierney that he had taken some of the
cattle out of state. Moreover, the warning ticket Tierney gave
Stank0 on March 29, 1993, was introduced to show Stanko's knowledge
of the licensing requirement and that he knowingly violated the
9
statute by purchasing the cattle with the intent to ship them out
of state. Tierney testified that he checked on Stanko's status and
found that he was not licensed as a dealer in Montana.
We determine that in this case any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt and therefore conclude that there was substantial
evidence to support the conviction.
ISSUE 3
Did the District Court err in admitting evidence of a warning
ticket issued two days prior to the offense?
Stank0 argues that the District Court erred by allowing the
warning ticket he had received for acting as an agent for a
livestock dealer in Billings to be admitted into evidence
When a district court determines whether evidence concerning
past acts is admissible under Rule 404 (b) , M.R.Evid., it is
governed by the following four-prong test set forth in MattI
-
referred to as the "Modified Just Rule:"
simili;), The other crimes, wrongs or acts must be
(2) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must not be
remote in time.
(3) The evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity with such
character; but may be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
(4) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
10
misleading of the jury, considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
u, 814 P.2d at 56.
We review evidentiary rulings made by the district court to
determine whether the court abused its discretion. State v.
Gollehon (1993), 262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257, 1263. In the
present case, the State properly provided just notice to Stanko
that it intended to introduce the warning ticket into evidence.
The warning was for acting as an agent for a livestock dealer
without a license, and the charged offense was for a similar
offense, i.e., purchasing cattle for interstate shipment without a
license. The prior act is sufficiently relevant to show knowledge
of the license requirements.
The warning ticket was certainly not remote in time and it was
offered for the limited purpose of showing the absence of mistake,
knowledge or purpose of the defendant. The evidence was not
lengthy and it would not have confused or misled the jury.
Furthermore, the record indicates that the District Court properly
instructed the jury concerning the limited purposes for which the
evidence was being admitted. We therefore conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the March 29, 1993,
warning ticket into evidence.
ISSUE 4
Did the District Court err in admitting Stanko's statement
that he had taken the cattle out of state?
11
Stanko argues that his admissions to Tierney that he had taken
the cattle out of state are not admissible because a warning
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, was not given.
Miranda requires that the State may not use a confession
resulting from "custodial interrogation" unless the proper warnings
have been given. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Custodial
interrogation requires questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444.
This Court has set out the following six factors to determine
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave and therefore
not be placed under custodial interrogation:
[Pllace of interrogation, the time of interrogation,
persons present during interrogation, whether Miranda
warnings were gratuitously given, the length and mood of
interrogation, and whether or not the suspect was
arrested following questioning.
State v. Staat (19911, 251 Mont. 1, 6, 822 P.Zd 643, 646 (quoting
State v. Lapp (1983), 202 Mont. 327, 331, 658 P.2d 400, 403).
In the present case, the record does not indicate that Stanko
was interrogated or placed into a custodial situation. Tierney
testified that he personally served Stank0 with a notice to appear
in Justice Court. Stank0 was not arrested or taken into custody
and he was free to go at any point during the conversation with
Tierney. Thus, a Miranda warning was not required at the time
Stank0 made his statements to Tierney.
12
We therefore conclude that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion when it allowed Stanko's statement that he had taken
the cattle out of state to be admitted into evidence.
ISSUE 5
Was a probable cause determination required for the District
Court to hear Stanko's appeal from Justice Court?
Stanko relies on § 46-11-201, MCA, to argue that the District
Court was required to make an independent judicial determination
of probable cause at a preliminary hearing. That statute, however,
applies to a motion for leave to file an information. In this
case, the complaint was filed in Justice Court and Stank0 appealed
his conviction to the District court. A probable cause
determination is not required for an appeal from a Justice Court
conviction.
Affirmed.
Justice
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December 17, 1996
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Rudy Stank0
1315 Allendale Road
Laurel, MT 59044
Jeff Mora
Deputy County Attorney
121 4th Street North
Great Falls, MT 59401
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, A.G.
, Assistant Attorney General
Justice Building
Helena, MT 59601
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME ( :OURT
STATE OF MONTANA
BY:
Dep
State v. Stanko
Combined Opinion