NO. 96-102
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
CATHERINE E. SATTERLEE,
LUMBERMEN'S MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, i,// i j /,j ~~~~~~$~~
BUTTREY FOOD AND DRUG,
Employer.
APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court,
The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Bernard J. "Ben" Everett; Knight, Dahood,
McLean & Everett; Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent:
Thomas A. Marra; Marra, Wenz, Johnson
& Hopkins; Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 12, 1996
Decided: December 10, 1996
Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Catherine E. Satterlee filed a petition in the Workers'
Compensation Court for the State of Montana in which she alleged
that she was totally disabled as a result of injuries sustained
during the course of her employment at Buttrey Food and Drug at its
Anaconda store, but that Buttrey's insurer, Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Company, had wrongfully terminated her disability
benefits. Lumbermen's admitted that Satterlee had been injured
while working for Buttrey, but claimed that she had recovered from
that injury a short time thereafter, and that any present
disability is a result of unrelated mental and physical conditions.
After consideration of evidence presented at trial and by
deposition, the Workers' Compensation Court found that her
disability was not a result of her work-related injury, and denied
disability benefits. Satterlee appeals from that finding. We
reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the Workers'
Compensation Court.
The claimant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Are the Workers' Compensation Court's findings supported
by substantial credible evidence?
2. Did the Workers' Compensation Court err when it denied
Satterlee's requests for an award of attorney fees and the
imposition of a twenty percent penalty in addition to her
disability benefits?
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Catherine Satterlee was born on September 30, 1934. On the
date that her claim came before the Workers' Compensation Court for
trial, she was sixty years old. She did not graduate from high
school, but did receive her graduate equivalency degree. She has
no other formal education.
For fifteen years prior to the date of her work-related
injury, Satterlee worked as a checker for Buttrey Food and Drug at
its store in Anaconda. The evidence was, and the trial court
found, that during that time Satterlee had developed degenerative
arthritis in her cervical spine, but that she experienced no
symptoms or disability from that condition. Until the date of her
injury, she performed her duties, which included stocking shelves,
dusting and cleaning floors, and checking out customers, without
physical limitation. She missed no work due to her underlying
cervical condition.
In May 1990, Satterlee's adult son was killed in an automobile
accident. As a result of that loss, she suffered severe depression
and missed several months of work. However, following treatment
for her condition, which was later diagnosed as post-traumatic
stress disorder, she returned to work in 1991 and worked without
any further loss of time until the date of her injury which is the
subject of this appeal.
On July 25, 1992, while waiting on a customer at Buttrey,
Satterlee bent over and twisted her body in an attempt to rearrange
a forty-five pound bag of dog food so that she could read the price
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label. As a result of that effort, she experienced a pulling
sensation in her left shoulder, followed by pain in that part of
her body, as well as in her neck and down her left arm. She had
experienced no similar pain at any time prior to that incident.
She testified that since that incident she has had continuous pain
in her left shoulder and neck. The Workers' Compensation Court
found her to be a credible witness and did not question her
testimony in that regard.
Following her injury, Satterlee attempted to return to work on
two consecutive days, but could not perform her duties, and has not
worked in any capacity since July 28, 1992.
Since her injury, Satterlee has been seen and treated or
evaluated by numerous physicians. Her injury has been variously
diagnosed as "left trapezius strain," "neck strain," and
"degenerative disc disease and degenerative arthritis of the
cervical spine."
Satterlee was treated with medication and therapy for her
cervical and shoulder pain. However, that treatment has been
unsuccessful.
Satterlee's pain is constant, it causes headaches, which are
present most of the time, and her symptoms are worsened by
activity.
Due to her pain and discomfort, she is no longer capable of
performing most of her household responsibilities. The majority of
her waking hours are spent sitting in a recliner.
4
During 1993, while visiting her daughter in the state of
Washington, Satterlee was examined by a physician who advised
Lumbermen's that whatever soft tissue injury she had sustained at
work should have healed within a six week period, and that any
continuing disability was a result of her preexisting spinal
disease. Following receipt of that correspondence, on February 23,
1993, Lumbermen's terminated Satterlee's total disability benefits.
During 1993, Satterlee's adult daughter died at the age of 33
from cystic fibrosis after she was unable to obtain necessary organ
transplants. During that same year, a foster daughter and her
children died from a fire in their home, and Satterlee's sister was
diagnosed with a terminal brain tumor. Satterlee's preexisting
emotional condition worsened. After further psychiatric
evaluation, she was against diagnosed with major depression and
post-traumatic stress disorder.
Satterlee applied for social security disability benefits, and
was found vocationally disabled by the Social Security
Administration on December 14, 1993. The SSA attributed her
disability to both back pain and severe emotional trauma.
It is, and has been, Lumbermen's position that any physical
disability which resulted from Satterlee's work-related injury was
temporary. Lumbermen's contends that she has fully recovered from
any soft tissue injury and that, even though she experienced no
symptoms from her underlying degenerative condition prior to that
injury, any current pain or physical impairment that she currently
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experiences is strictly a result of her preexisting degenerative
condition. There was medical testimony to support that contention.
Lumbermen's also contends that, to the extent Satterlee is
disabled from gainful employment, the primary factor is not her
physical impairment, but her emotional disorder which developed
subsequent to her work-related injury, and that therefore, it is
not responsible for any disability caused by that disorder.
Satterlee has contended, and continues to assert on appeal,
that she was free of pain prior to her injury, has been unable to
function due to pain since her injury, and that the evidence does
not support any finding other than that she is totally disabled due
to her work-related injury.
The Workers' Compensation Court did not completely accept
either party's argument. Its findings, some of which are designated
as "findings," some of which are included under "conclusions," and
some of which are set forth in its order that denied Satterlee's
post-trial motions, are summarized as follows:
1. Satterlee was a credible witness. (Finding No. 7.)
2. Satterlee was able to perform all of her job duties
during the fifteen years prior to her injury, and testified that
she suffered no neck or left shoulder pain prior to that date.
Medical exams conducted after her injury showed that she suffered
from preexisting cervical disc disease. However, that condition
was asymptomatic prior to her injury. (Finding No. 8.)
3. Although Satterlee's daughter died in the spring of 1993
(Finding No. Zl), the internal medicine specialist from whom she
6
sought treatment for depression beginning on May 10, 1993, noted
that that loss was only the latest in a series of personal losses,
and that her son was killed in an automobile accident two years
prior to her industrial injury. That loss also led to treatment
for depression and insomnia. (Finding No. 22.)
4. On December 14, 1993, the Social Security Administration
concluded that Satterlee was totally disabled because of back pain
and severe emotional trauma. (Findings No. 29 and 30.)
5. When Satterlee testified that she had pain in her left
shoulder, neck, and arm ever since 1992, the Court found her
testimony credible. (Finding No. 33.)
6. Based on the medical testimony, the court was persuaded
that Satterlee's 1992 industrial injury aggravated a preexisting
cervical disease and made her condition symptomatic, triggering
pain and associated muscle spasm. (Finding No. 44.)
7. Even though Satterlee suffers from shoulder and neck
pain, her psychological condition amplifies her pain. (Finding
No. 46.)
8. If motivated, Satterlee could tolerate her pain and work
on a regular basis in either of two positions identified by the
insurer's vocational consultant. (Finding No. 49.)
9. However, the court attributed Satterlee's lack of
motivation to her depression and general mental condition, and
found that, based on the combination of her circumstances, she
would be unable to cope with her pain while working on a regular
basis. (Finding No. 49.) The court was unpersuaded, however, that
absent her personal losses, Satterlee would be unable to cope with
her pain and work. (Finding No. 50.)
10. The court agreed that at the time of trial Satterlee
could not cope with her pain, and therefore return to work.
However, the court was not persuaded that absent the psychological
trauma associated with the death of her daughter and other close
relatives, Satterlee's pain would preclude her from physically
performing either of the two jobs which were medically approved by
Dana Headapohl, M.D. The court did conclude that Satterlee had
valid medical and psychological reasons for her inability to cope
with pain, however, it further concluded that those reasons were
attributable to subsequent unrelated events, and not to her
industrial injury. (Conclusion of Law No. 12.)
11. When the Workers' Compensation Court denied Satterlee's
post-trial motions, it clarified that it did not find Satterlee's
pain to be anything other than as she claimed, but believed that
she truthfully reported her disabling pain. However, it stated
that her underlying psychological condition is amplifying her pain,
and that the losses which have led to her underlying psychological
condition have occurred since her injury. The court recognized
that pain which is amplified by a preexisting psychological
condition is compensable, but in this case, concluded that the
principle events which caused Satterlee's post-traumatic stress
disorder occurred subsequent to her work-related injury.
ISSUE 1
Are the Workers' Compensation Court's findings supported by
substantial credible evidence?
We will uphold the Workers' Compensation Court's findings if
they are supported by substantial credible evidence. Wunderlich v.
Lumbermen’sMutualCas.Co. (1995), 270 Mont. 404, 408, 892 P.2d 563, 566.
Following the entry of judgment for the defendant, Satterlee
moved the Workers' Compensation Court to amend its findings based
on her contention that they were not supported by substantial
evidence. That motion was denied, and her appeal is from the
denial of that motion. Lumbermen's has not cross-appealed, and
therefore, we accept as true those findings which were favorable to
Satterlee. Those findings were that, while Satterlee suffered from
an underlying condition of degenerative disc disease prior to her
work-related injury, she experienced no symptoms from that
condition and was able to perform all of her job duties for fifteen
years. Due to that injury, however, she aggravated the underlying
degenerative disease in her neck, and has experienced continuous
pain and muscle spasm since the date of her injury. The
combination of her pain and her inability to deal with that pain
due to her emotional condition, render her unable to work on a
regular basis. However, absent her underlying emotional disorder,
there are two jobs that Satterlee could perform.
The Workers' Compensation Court correctly concluded that an
employer takes its employee as it finds her, and that if her
9
disability is aggravated by an underlying physical or emotional
condition, that the employer is liable for disability which results
from that aggravation. Shumacher V. Empire Mfg. (197?), I?5 Mont. 411,
413-14, 574 P.2d 987, 988. However, the critical finding, and the
one on which the denial of Satterlee's benefits is based, was the
court's finding that her emotional condition resulted from events
which occurred subsequent to her work-related injury, and that that
condition did not preexist her injury. We must, therefore,
determine whether that finding is supported by substantial
evidence.
In the record, there are only three sources of information
which relate to the onset of Satterlee's post-traumatic stress
disorder. They include the claimant's own testimony at the time of
trial, the medical records of Martin D. Cheatle, Ph.D., and the
medical records of Kenneth C. Olson, M.D.
When asked during trial, Satterlee stated that she believed
her post-traumatic stress symptoms developed in May 1990 when her
son was killed. She stated that she was out of work and involved
in treatment for that condition for eight months after her son's
death, but had been able to return to work following that period of
treatment until this injury occurred.
Dr. Cheatle was the psychologist who evaluated Satterlee for
the St. Patrick Hospital Medical Panel to which she was referred
for evaluation. His records indicate that, although her
psychological condition declined after the death of her daughter,
the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder was first made
10
following the death of her son in 1990, and that her treatment by
psychotherapy first began following that incident.
It was Dr. Cheatle's opinion that Satterlee's persistent
cervical and left shoulder pain, and her ability to deal with that
pain, were complicated by post-traumatic stress disorder and
depression. However, he does not, at any point in his report,
distinguish between the post-traumatic stress disorder that
resulted from the death of her son and any worsening of that
condition which occurred following the death of her daughter.
Dr. Kenneth C. Olson is a psychiatrist to whom Satterlee was
referred for evaluation in August 1993 by Dr. Michael Sadaj, her
attending physician. His report to Dr. Sadaj indicates that the
onset of Satterlee's emotional problems began following the death
of her son in 1990, and that the emotional trauma was so severe
that she lost her memory for a period of eight months. His report
indicates that during his interview of her she cried and expressed
anger when discussing the loss of her son. Similar emotional
reactions are not related to any other event. He diagnosed major
depression with unresolved pathological grief and post-traumatic
stress disorder. Nowhere in his report does he relate those
emotional conditions to events that occurred after Satterlee's
work-related injury. Any inference that can be drawn from his
report suggests that the primary factor related to those mental
disorders is the death of her son, which occurred prior to her
work-related injury.
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There is no other evidence which suggests a cause for
Satterlee's emotional disorder, other than the evidence set forth
above. Therefore, we conclude that there was not substantial
evidence to support the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that
Satterlee's depression or post-traumatic stress disorder was caused
by events which occurred subsequent to her work-related injury.
We have previously held that:
[I]t is well established that an employer takes his
employee subject to the employee's physical and,
logically, emotional condition at the time of his
employment. Birnie \I. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d
13 3 ( 19 5 8 ) ; Peilz v. Industrial Accident Board, 12 7 Mont . 3 16 , 2 6 4
P.2d 709 (1953). An employee who suffers from a
pre-existing condition is entitled to compensation if the
condition was aggravated by an industrial injury. Rumsey
v. Cardinal Petroleum, 16 6 Mont. 17, 530 P.2d 433 (1975); Weakley
11.Cook, 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926 (1952).
Shumacher , 175 Mont. at 413-14, 574 P.2d at 988
The Workers' Compensation Court correctly recognized this rule
of law when, during trial, it stated:
Sounds like we've got the principle that you take the
worker as you find them, so if they are suffering from an
underlying psychological condition and they've got pain
that's triggered, even though that pain continues to be
-- they continue to feel more severe pain than they would
without the psychological condition, this sounds like a
multi-factorial thing. You ' ve got some of the
psychological condition arising before, some after, with
the psychological condition probably amplifying the pain.
It logically follows that if Satterlee's work-related injury
in 1992 aggravated an underlying condition of degenerative
arthritis or disc disease, and she experiences pain from that
aggravation, which is made worse by physical activity, and which
she cannot cope with due to a preexisting emotional condition, such
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as depression or post-traumatic stress disorder, her employer is
liable for the disability which results from that combination of
physical and emotional conditions. In this case, the Workers'
Compensation Court found and concluded that Satterlee was not a
candidate for regular employment due to the combination of her
physical and emotional impairment.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Workers'
Compensation Court to the extent that it denied Satterlee's claim
for total disability benefits, and remand this case to that court
for entry of judgment in favor of the claimant, Catherine
Satterlee.
ISSUE 2
Did the Workers' Compensation Court err when it denied
Satterlee's requests for an award of attorney fees and the
imposition of a twenty percent penalty in addition to her
disability benefits?
Satterlee also contends that Lumbermen's termination of her
total disability benefits was unreasonable and, therefore, that she
is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 5 39-71-611,
MCA (1991), and the imposition of a twenty percent penalty pursuant
to 5 39-71-2907(l), MCA (1991). Based on its conclusion that
Lumbermen's was correct when it terminated her disability benefits,
the Workers' Compensation Court held that the insurer had not acted
unreasonably.
Although we reverse that part of the Workers' Compensation
Court's judgment which denied disability benefits to Satterlee, we
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conclude that there was substantial evidence upon which the court
could have found that the insurer did not act unreasonably when it
terminated her benefits. Specifically, correspondence from
Alvin J. Harris, M.D., dated February 1, 1993, created an issue
with regard to the cause of her continuing physical complaints. We
conclude that it was not unreasonable as a matter of law for the
insurer to rely on that information as the basis for its
termination of benefits. Therefore, the Workers' Compensation
Court's denial of attorney fees and a twenty percent penalty is
affirmed.
This case is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court for
entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
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