96-496
No. 96-496
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
BRIAN SCOTT WEIGLE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli,
The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Julio K. Morales, Morales Law Office, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Jennifer Anders, Assistant
Attorney
General, Helena, Montana; George H. Corn, Ravalli County Attorney,
Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 8, 1997
Decided: November 6, 1997
Filed:
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96-496
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Brian Scott Weigle (Weigle) entered a plea of guilty in the District Court for
the
Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, on two counts of negligent
homicide. He
was sentenced to ten years at Montana State Prison on each count with the sentences
to
run consecutively. Weigle appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to
dismiss
one of the negligent homicide counts or, in the alternative, to order concurrent
rather than
consecutive sentences. We affirm.
We address the following issue on appeal:
Did the District Court violate the prohibition against multiple punishments when
it imposed separate sentences upon Weigle's conviction for two counts of negligent
homicide and ordered that the sentences run consecutively?
Factual and Procedural Background
On May 18, 1995, at approximately 8 p.m., Weigle's pickup truck collided head
on with a passenger car carrying John and Harold Yerian. Weigle was alleged to have
been traveling in the wrong lane of traffic at excessive speeds while under the
influence
of alcohol. The Yerians died as a result of the collision.
Weigle was charged with two counts of deliberate homicide pursuant to õ 45-5-
102, MCA, and, in the alternative, two counts of negligent homicide pursuant to õ 45-
5-
104, MCA. He was also charged with one count of driving under the influence of
alcohol pursuant to õ 61-8-401(a), MCA. Weigle entered not guilty pleas to all of
these
charges. The two counts of deliberate homicide were subsequently dismissed.
On January 11, 1996, Weigle moved the District Court, in the alternative, to
dismiss one count of negligent homicide, deem the two negligent homicide counts to be
alternative counts, or, if he is convicted on both of the negligent homicide counts,
order
his sentences to run concurrently. In an order filed March 5, 1996, the District
Court
denied Weigle's motion.
Thereafter, Weigle filed a motion for change of plea. On May 1, 1996, the
District Court granted his request and allowed Weigle to plead guilty to the charges
in
the form of an Alford plea. Weigle was sentenced on June 5, 1996, to ten years on
each
of the negligent homicide counts. The court ordered that the sentences run
consecutively
and that the last five years of the sentence be suspended. The court also ordered
that
Weigle not be eligible for parole until he has served a minimum of seven years at
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Montana State Prison. Weigle was also sentenced to serve six months in the Ravalli
County jail on the DUI offense. This latter sentence, which was ordered to run
consecutive to the other sentences, was suspended.
Discussion
Did the District Court violate the prohibition against multiple
punishments when it imposed separate sentences upon Weigle's
conviction for two counts of negligent homicide and ordered that the
sentences run consecutively?
District courts have broad discretion in sentencing criminal defendants and we
review sentences only to determine whether the court abused its discretion. State v.
Zabawa (1996), 279 Mont. 307, 316, 928 P.2d 151, 157 (citing State v. Graveley
(1996),
275 Mont. 519, 521, 915 P.2d 184, 186; State v. DeSalvo (1995), 273 Mont. 343, 346,
903 P.2d 202, 204).
Weigle contends that the District Court's imposition of consecutive sentences
violated
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because his convictions for
negligent
homicide arose out of a single act, i.e., running head-on into an oncoming vehicle.
He
contends that the District Court's only option in this case was to impose concurrent
sentences.
In Zabawa, we stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth
Amendment, generally protects against multiple punishments for the same offense as
well
as multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Zabawa, 928 P.2d at 154 (citing
State
v. Nelson (1996), 275 Mont. 86, 90, 910 P.2d 247, 250). The Montana Code Annotated
defines an "offense" as "a violation of any penal statute of this state or any
ordinance of
its political subdivisions." Section 46-1-202(14), MCA.
Weigle twice violated õ 45-5-104, MCA, which provides in pertinent part: "[a]
person commits the offense of negligent homicide if he negligently causes the death
of
another human being." There is no question that, since two people were killed in the
collision, two distinct offenses were committed. "When the same transaction may
establish the commission of more than one offense, a person charged with the conduct
may be prosecuted for each offense." Section 46-11-410(1), MCA.
Weigle asserts that double jeopardy prohibits cumulative punishments unless they
are clearly intended by the legislature and that the Montana Legislature has not
authorized
consecutive sentences for negligent homicides arising out of one single act. Weigle
contends that the policy of lenity requires that this ambiguity be resolved in his
favor.
In Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed.
306, the United States Supreme Court held:
A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal
or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from
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prosecution and punishment under the other.
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309. In the case before
us,
although each count of negligent homicide alleged a violation of the same statute by
the
same act, each count required proof of an additional fact that the other count did
not,
namely, the death of the particular victim. Here, the same act clearly constitutes
two
distinct offenses: (1) negligently causing the death of John Yerian and (2)
negligently
causing the death of Harold Yerian.
Furthermore, Montana law not only authorizes consecutive sentences for multiple
offenses, but presumptively requires them. "Separate sentences for two or more
offenses
must run consecutively unless the court otherwise orders." Section 46-18-401(4),
MCA.
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in imposing consecutive
sentences upon Weigle's conviction for two counts of negligent homicide.
Affirmed.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
We Concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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