97-241
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
No. 97-241
______________
GREGORY LLOYD INGRAHAM, )
)
Petitioner, )
) OPINION
v. ) and
) ORDER
STATE OF MONTANA, )
)
Respondent. )
______________
Gregory Lloyd Ingraham (Ingraham) is incarcerated at the Montana State Prison
as a result of his conviction on July 19, 1996, of the offenses of negligent
homicide, a
felony, in violation of 45-5-104(1), MCA; criminal endangerment, a felony, in
violation
of 45-5-207(1), MCA; and criminal trespass to property, a misdemeanor, in violation
of 45-6-203(1), MCA. He had consumed alcohol prior to the acts giving rise to the
convictions. Ingraham presently is before this Court on his application for writ of
habeas
corpus, requesting review of the denial by the Twentieth Judicial District Court,
Lake
County, of his motion to continue bond pending appeal.
The sole issue before us is whether the District Court abused its discretion in
denying Ingraham's motion to continue bond pending appeal.
The procedural steps via which Ingraham's request is before this Court have
been
detailed in a number of previous orders by the Court and by Justice Terry N.
Trieweiler.
Those orders, entered in this cause number and in cause numbers 97-076 and 97-271,
recount in detail Ingraham's efforts--vis-a-vis habeas corpus and appeal--to obtain
review
of the District Court's denial of his motion to continue bond pending appeal; we
need not
recount those details here. Suffice it to say that, after months of procedural
entanglements, the matter is now before this Court for review pursuant to Ingraham's
application for writ of habeas corpus.
Ingraham had been admitted to bail pending trial after being charged with the
three
offenses referenced above on October 17, 1995. The District Court continued his
bond
pending sentencing after the July 19, 1996, jury verdicts finding him guilty of the
two
felony and one misdemeanor offenses. The District Court sentenced Ingraham in open
court on November 18, 1996, and remanded him to the custody of the Lake County
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Sheriff for transport to the Montana State Prison. The court subsequently entered a
written judgment and commitment.
Immediately after sentencing, Ingraham moved the District Court for
continuation
of bond pending appeal. The District Court heard oral argument on the motion on
December 3, 1996, and Ingraham and the State of Montana (State) filed proposed
findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter, the District Court entered its findings
of fact,
conclusions of law and order denying the motion to continue bond pending appeal based
on its determination that it was unable to find that, if released, Ingraham was not
likely
to pose a danger to the safety of any person or the community.
The availability of bail pending both trial and appeal is governed by statute in
Montana. With regard to bail pending appeal, 46-9-107, MCA, provides:
The court shall order the detention of a defendant found guilty of an offense
who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence or a revocation hearing
or who has filed an appeal unless the court finds that, if released, the
defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any person
or the community.
In other words, a convicted criminal defendant is not to be admitted to bail unless
the
trial court finds that he or she is not likely to either flee or pose a danger. We
review
a district court's decision denying an application for bail pending appeal for abuse
of
discretion. Moore v. McCormick (1993), 260 Mont. 305, 306, 858 P.2d 1254, 1255.
In this case, the District Court entered findings of fact and, on the basis of
those
findings, determined that it was unable to find that, if released, Ingraham was not
likely
to pose a danger to the safety of any person or the community. Ingraham contends
that
the court's ultimate determination is an abuse of discretion because it is not
supported by
the evidence and findings as a whole. We observe at the outset that none of the
District
Court's purely factual findings are challenged as unsupported by the record.
Ingraham
challenges only the weight given to, or the inferences drawn from, certain of those
findings. Specifically, he contends that the District Court's focus on matters
predating
alcohol treatment Ingraham received at the Menninger Clinic (Menninger) after his
convictions and its failure to give more weight to a report by Dr. Richard Irons (Dr.
Irons) from Menninger constituted abuses of discretion.
Before addressing the specific contentions advanced by Ingraham, it is
appropriate
to review undisputed findings of fact relating to the District Court's denial of his
motion
to continue bail pending appeal. Ingraham was involved in a fatal vehicle accident,
prior
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to which he had been drinking, in 1993; no charges were brought against him as a
result
of the accident. In July of 1995, he was involved in an alcohol-related domestic
violence
incident which resulted in a criminal charge to which he subsequently pled guilty.
As a
result of the charge, Ingraham spent a number of days in the Talbott Marsh Treatment
Center (Talbott Marsh) in Georgia in early August. On August 9, 1995, Talbott Marsh
recommended that he abstain from alcohol and seek treatment from Menninger.
In October of 1995, Ingraham was charged in the instant case with the offenses
of
negligent homicide, criminal endangerment and criminal trespass to property arising
out
of a fatal vehicle accident prior to which he had been drinking. He had not
followed the
Marsh Talbott recommendations that he abstain from alcohol and seek treatment at
Menninger prior to the accident. He was released on bond on condition that he not
drink
alcohol.
During the several weeks following his release on bond pending trial, Ingraham
consumed alcohol daily while staying with friends. In February of 1996, he
apparently
drank prior to picking up a date and drove in a manner that frightened her. He
continued
to drink wine throughout the evening and the date felt he had had a sufficient
quantity of
alcohol to necessitate her operating his vehicle when they left the restaurant where
they
had dinner. In April of 1996, two Shopko pharmacy employees noticed the odor of
alcohol on Ingraham's breath when he picked up prescriptions there.
Ingraham's trial in the instant case occurred in July of 1996. He was found
guilty
on July 19, 1996, and bond was continued, on the same conditions, pending
sentencing.
In August, the State received police reports from the Missoula Police
Department
documenting incidents of Ingraham drinking while subject to bond requirements.
During
the initial interview for preparation of the presentence investigation report
required by
statute, Ingraham told the probation officer that, since the accident, his only
consumption
of alcohol was one beer the following day. During a later interview, he was
confronted
with the statements of his dinner date and admitted that he had consumed wine during
that
date in February of 1996.
Ingraham was treated at Menninger for alcohol dependency and bipolar affective
disorder, type II, from September 9 through November 1, 1996. In a report to
Ingraham's counsel for purposes of sentencing, Menninger's Dr. Irons reported that,
during Ingraham's time there, he came to develop what the treatment team believed was
genuine remorse for his lack of responsibility in operating a vehicle while under the
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influence of alcohol. Based on its experience with him, the team did not see him as
a
danger to the public "if he is not under the influence of alcohol while driving a
motor
vehicle, and compliant with psychotropic medications." Dr. Irons also believed
Ingraham
would comply with measures that could be put in place to assure abstinence from
alcohol
and other mood-altering substances.
On the face of it, the abovementioned facts are sufficient to support the
District
Court's determination that it could not find that, if released on bond, Ingraham was
not
likely to pose a danger to any person or to the community. The facts demonstrate
serious
incidents involving alcohol consumption by Ingraham prior to this case; a failure to
abstain from alcohol and seek treatment even after being advised to do so by Talbott
Marsh; an alcohol-related fatal vehicle accident which resulted in the charges on
which
this case is based; a number of violations of the bond condition that he not consume
alcohol; and his initial falsehood to the probation officer writing the presentence
report
that he had not consumed any alcohol since the day after the accident.
Against this backdrop, Ingraham contends that his treatment at Menninger, after
his conviction, and Dr. Irons' report are more reliable indicators of his present
condition
and risk if released on bond pending appeal than his pretreatment behavior. Stated
differently, he asserts that the District Court was compelled to give more weight to
the
facts that he sought treatment after conviction and that Dr. Irons believed he was
not a
risk than to the other evidence before it. We disagree.
"Discretion" connotes that part of the judicial function which decides questions
according to the particular circumstances of the case, uncontrolled by fixed rules
of law.
State ex rel. Leach v. Visser (1988), 234 Mont. 438, 447, 767 P.2d 858, 863 (citation
omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily
without
conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason. Investigative Records of
City
of Columbus Pol. Dept. (1995), 272 Mont. 486, 488, 901 P.2d 565, 567 (citation
omitted). In addressing discretionary matters such as a motion for bond pending
appeal,
a court's application of conscientious judgment necessarily involves weighing
evidence
and making reasonable inferences therefrom in order to assess a likelihood of
danger.
Thus, the question for this Court is not whether we would have reached the same
decision
but, rather, whether the District Court abused its discretion in reaching the
decision to
deny Ingraham's motion for bond pending appeal.
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On this record, it is clear that the District Court could have chosen to give
additional weight to the Menninger treatment and Dr. Irons' report as the most recent
evidence regarding Ingraham and his potential risk of danger to others if released
pending
appeal. The District Court was not required to do so, however, and this is
especially true
given the equivocal nature of Dr. Irons' report. As noted above, the treatment team
did
not see Ingraham as a danger to the public "if he is not under the influence of
alcohol
while driving a motor vehicle. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Dr. Irons
"believed"
that Ingraham would be compliant with any measures put in place to assure Ingraham's
abstinence from alcohol.
While Ingraham may well have significant rehabilitation potential and might--if
and
when given the chance--comply with requirements that he abstain from alcohol, neither
Dr. Irons' report nor any evidentiary showing can guarantee such results in
advance. He
clearly did not abstain during the time such abstention was a court-ordered
condition of
bail. Nor is the treatment team's view that Ingraham is not a risk to the public
"if" he
does not drive a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol necessarily comforting
given
Ingraham's alcohol-related history. Given the record in this case, we conclude that
the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give more weight to the
Menninger treatment and report than to Ingraham's pre-Menninger conduct. To conclude
otherwise would force trial courts to grant bond pending appeal in every case where a
convicted defendant obtained a generally supportive posttrial report based on
subjective
beliefs and predictions of future behavior. Neither 46-9-107, MCA, nor our abuse
of
discretion standard contemplates such a requirement.
Ingraham also contends that the District Court erroneously abstracted a risk of
present danger from the alcohol-related domestic violence incident which occurred in
July
of 1995. It is true that the court mentioned that incident several times in its
findings of
fact. Some of those references were in a purely historical context and in relation
to
Ingraham's resulting trip to Marsh Talbott and the Marsh Talbott recommendations that
Ingraham abstain from alcohol and seek treatment at Menninger, which recommendations
were not followed in the two months after they were made and before the fatal
alcohol-
related accident underlying the present proceedings. In assessing the risk of
danger to
persons and the community if Ingraham were released on bond pending appeal, however,
the court clearly gave more weight to Ingraham's several violations of the bond
condition
that he abstain from alcohol and to his posttrial falsehood to the probation officer
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about
drinking while released on bond than it gave to the domestic violence incident.
Ingraham also argues briefly that the bond condition that he abstain from
alcohol
entirely during his release on bond pending trial and sentencing was
unconstitutional and
that violation of such an unconstitutional bond condition cannot constitute a proper
basis
for denying bond on appeal. It does not appear that he raised this--or any other--
objection to the abstention condition at the time it was imposed, or at any time
thereafter, in the District Court. Indeed, his proposed findings and conclusions
regarding
his motion for bond pending appeal propose that the same abstention condition be
continued. Ingraham having waived this objection by failing to raise it in the
District
Court (see 46-20-104(2), MCA), we decline to address this argument further.
Finally, Ingraham contends that, because at least one issue in his pending
appeal
creates a strong likelihood that this Court will reverse his convictions, equity
and fairness
require that he be released on bond pending appeal. We disagree. As discussed
above,
46-9-107, MCA, governs the availability of bond pending appeal. Nothing in that
statute refers to the likelihood of success on appeal. Nor does Ingraham cite to any
authority under which the likelihood of success on appeal is an appropriate
consideration
in either an initial determination of a motion for bond pending appeal or a review
by this
Court of a district court's initial determination. Moreover, adopting Ingraham's
approach
would require this Court to determine in advance of the arrival of the appeal whether
there is a likelihood of success in the appeal and, if so, the magnitude of that
likelihood.
Not only is such a determination a practical impossibility, it would necessitate an
advisory
opinion by this Court. We do not issue advisory opinions. State ex rel. Fletcher v.
District Court (1993), 260 Mont. 410, 419, 859 P.2d 992, 997.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Ingraham's motion for continuation of bond pending appeal and, accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Ingraham's application for writ of habeas corpus is
DENIED.
DATED this 24th day of July, 1997.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage has recused himself from this matter.
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Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs.
I concur fully in our opinion and order. I write separately only to address the
"procedural entanglements" which preceded this decision. As stated, our orders in
cause
numbers 97-076 and 97-271 detail the tangled and lengthy history of Ingraham's
attempts
to obtain our review of the trial court's denial of his motion to continue bond
pending
appeal. These procedural contortions arose for a very simple reason. This Court
has no
statutory authority to review a district court's denial of bail pending appeal
either by
direct appeal or via a petition for writ of habeas corpus. While our decisions in
Bretz
v. Sheriff of Lewis and Clark County (1975), 167 Mont. 363, 539 P.2d 1191, and Moore
v. McCormick (1993), 260 Mont. 305, 858 P.2d 1254, appear to provide authority for
what we are doing here, in truth, that authority or, rather, our lack of authority,
was
never at issue in either of those two cases. In the case at bar we have disposed of
Ingraham's habeas corpus petition by reviewing the trial court record and the court's
decision for abuse of discretion simply because both the Defendant and the State have
agreed that we should proceed in that fashion--not because the law authorizes us to
do so.
Under 3-2-212, MCA, and under the statutory scheme set out at Title 46,
Chapter 22 of the Montana Code this Court and individual members of this Court can--
and, in my view, must--deal with habeas corpus petitions as original proceedings when
those are filed here. In situations such as the one at issue, our decision to grant
or deny
habeas relief must, of necessity, be based on a factual record. In the context of an
original proceeding we have only two ways to accomplish that. Either we develop our
own record by holding an evidentiary hearing ourselves or we must assign that task to
another district court. The latter approach will invariably be necessary, as this
Court, as
an appellate court, is not structurally set up to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Unfortunately, as this case ably demonstrates, having to deal with habeas petitions
in this
fashion is highly inefficient, time consuming, wasteful of judicial resources and
ill serves
the accused, the courts or the criminal justice system.
As both Ingraham and the State appear to concede, appellate review of the trial
court record and decision to deny bail pending appeal for abuse of discretion is the
obvious best approach in cases such as this. The habeas corpus statutes should be
amended by the next legislature to provide authority for this procedure to the end
that the
fiasco which has characterized this case will not again be repeated.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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