96-513
No. 96-513
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
IN RE THE LICENSE REVOCATION OF
JEFFREY H. GILDERSLEEVE
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Steve Fletcher, Bulman Law Associates,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;
Brenda Nordlund, Assistant Attorney General;
Helena, Montana
Tom Orr, Assistant City Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997
Decided: July 17, 1997
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant, Jeffrey H. Gildersleeve, petitioned the District Court for the
Fourth
Judicial District in Missoula County for a hearing at which to consider
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reinstatement of
his motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA. After hearings,
the
District Court upheld the revocation. Gildersleeve appeals. We reverse the
judgment of
the District Court and remand this case to the District Court for proceedings
consistent
with this opinion.
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that Gildersleeve refused to
submit to testing pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA?
2. Did the District Court err when it concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 28, 1995, Officer Jeff Dobie of the Missoula Police Department
arrested Jeffrey H. Gildersleeve for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs
after
Gildersleeve made an illegal left turn. Gildersleeve admitted that he had consumed
one
shot of whiskey. He cooperated with Officer Dobie and performed the field sobriety
tests
which were administered. Officer Dobie contended that because of Gildersleeve's
slurred
speech, red eyes, and poor performance in the field sobriety tests, he arrested him
and
transported him to the Missoula police station, where he asked Gildersleeve to take a
breath test.
The breath analysis results indicated a 0.00 blood alcohol content. Officer
Dobie
then requested that Gildersleeve submit to a blood test. Gildersleeve objected to
the
blood test for ethical reasons, a fear of needles, and a concern that he could
thereby
contract the AIDS virus. The Missoula Police Department does not offer a urine test,
and neither Officer Dobie nor Gildersleeve raised it as an alternative. Pursuant
to 61-8-
402, MCA, Officer Dobie seized Gildersleeve's license and Gildersleeve's driving
privileges were suspended for ninety days.
On September 27, 1995, Gildersleeve filed a notice of appeal of the revocation
of
his license in the District Court pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA. He maintained that he
was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that he did not refuse to
submit to
the blood test. In addition, he informed the District Court of his intent to
challenge the
constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA. After a hearing on November 1, 1995,
the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gildersleeve's
constitutional challenges. After a second hearing on May 31, 1996, the District
Court
concluded that Officer Dobie had reasonable grounds to arrest Gildersleeve and that
Gildersleeve had refused to submit to the blood test.
ISSUE 1
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Did the District Court err when it concluded that Gildersleeve refused to submit
to testing pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA?
The District Court held that it was the burden of the petitioner to prove the
invalidity of his license revocation and that Gildersleeve had not met that burden.
Specifically, with regard to the issue of whether Gildersleeve refused to submit to
a blood
test, the District Court found that he had refused.
The District Court's opinion and order was entered on June 18, 1996. On July
11,
1996, we decided Wessell v. State (1996), 277 Mont. 234, 921 P.2d 264. In Wessell,
the
petitioner was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He
cooperated with the investigating officer and submitted to a breath test, which was
unsuccessful because the testing instrument failed. He was then asked to submit to a
blood test, but declined on the basis that he had a great fear of needles. He
volunteered
to submit to a urine test; however, none was available at the Glendive Police
Department.
Therefore, his license was revoked based on his refusal to submit to the blood
test. The
District Court affirmed the revocation of his license; however, we reversed and held
that:
In the present case, it was not contested that Wessell had a valid fear
of needles which prevented him from being able to submit to a blood test
and therefore we accept this as stipulated. The record shows that he was
willing to consent to a test for alcohol but was prevented from doing so by
a psychological inability to perform resulting from his disabling fear of
needles, which he immediately disclosed to the officer. We determine that
under the facts of this case, this psychological inability to perform the test
is the equivalent of a physical disability which precludes an individual from
participating in or completing a valid test regardless of their willingness.
Wessell, 277 Mont. at 240, 921 P.2d at 267-68.
Although the facts of record in this case are similar to those in Wessell, they
are
not identical. Neither did the parties have an opportunity to present or test
evidence
based on the standard established in Wessell. Finally, the District Court did not
have the
opportunity to consider whether, based on the record in this case, Gildersleeve was
prevented from submitting to a blood test based on a psychological inability to
perform
resulting from a disabling fear of needles.
Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand to that court
for further consideration in light of our decision in Wessell. Either party may
supplement
the record to the extent necessary to assist the court in its determination.
The State contends that as a result of our decision in Wessell this Court has
unintentionally eliminated the petitioner's burden of proving an inability to
perform a
blood test and placed the burden on the State to prove there was no such inability.
The
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State, therefore, urges this Court to reconsider its decision in Wessell and more
clearly
articulate the factors an officer should consider when deciding whether a suspect is
"unable" to perform or submit to a test.
The State's interpretation of Wessell, however, is unsupported by the plain
language in that decision. We clearly noted that in that case it was uncontested
that
Wessell had a valid fear which prevented him from being able to submit to a blood
test.
We accepted that fact as stipulated. There was no reason to discuss the petitioner's
burden, or a shifting of the burden, because the facts were not disputed. The rule
remains, as it has been, that "[t]he burden of proof falls upon the appellant to
prove the
invalidity of the State's action, rather than require the State to justify its act
of revocation.
Jess v. State (1992), 255 Mont. 254, 259-60, 841 P.2d 1137, 1140.
For these reasons, we decline the invitation to reconsider our decision in
Wessell
v. State.
ISSUE 2
Did the District Court err when it concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to
consider
the constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA?
The District Court's determination that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter
is a
conclusion of law. We review conclusions of law to determine whether they are
correct.
Bayleat Law v. Pettit (Mont. 1997), 931 P.2d 50, 52, 54 St. Rep 77, 78.
Section 61-8-403, MCA, which sets forth the scope of review from a driver's
license revocation, states in relevant part:
(4) (a) The court shall take testimony and examine the facts of the
case, except that the issues are limited to whether:
(i) a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person
had been driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon ways
of this state open to the public while under the influence of alcohol, drugs,
or a combination of the two;
(ii) the person was placed under arrest; and
(iii) the person refused to submit to the test or tests.
Section 61-8-403(4)(a), MCA. We have strictly construed this language and held that
the
Legislature clearly intended to limit the issues that a court may consider on appeal
pursuant to the statute. See Thompson v. Department of Justice (1994), 264 Mont.
372,
871 P.2d 1333 (removing from consideration the issue of whether the initial report
was
properly sworn); Blake v. State (1987), 226 Mont. 193, 735 P.2d 262 (denying
authority
to consider the issue of hardship as a mitigating factor in granting a restricted or
probationary license).
The District Court erred, however, when it equated limitation on its authority
to
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consider factual issues other than those specified by statute with limitation on its
authority
to consider the constitutionality of the statue itself. The two exercises of
authority are
inherently different and emanate from distinct sources. The District Court's
authority to
consider the constitutionality of a statute derives from the basic constitutional
notion of
separation of powers, while its authority to review factual issues related to a
driver's
license revocation comes from the Legislature.
"[T]he Constitution vests in the courts the exclusive power to construe and
interpret legislative Acts, as well as provisions of the Constitution." State v.
Leslie
(1935), 100 Mont. 449, 455, 50 P.2d 959, 962. Inherent in this power is the
responsibility to determine whether a particular law conforms to the Constitution.
Powell
v. McCormack (1969), 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491. "[I]t is the
province and duty of the judicial department to determine in cases regularly brought
before them, whether the powers of any branch of the government, and even those of
the
legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in conformity to the
Constitution." Powell, 395 U.S. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 1956, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 508. Thus,
we hold that the District Court erred when it concluded that 61-8-403, MCA, limits
its
jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to that statute.
The State's contention that a declaratory judgment pursuant to 27-8-101 to -
313,
MCA, should constitute Gildersleeve's sole opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality
of the statute is unfounded. Declaratory relief is not meant to displace otherwise
available remedies. In In re Matter of Dewar (1976), 169 Mont. 437, 548 P.2d 149, we
stated:
The purpose of declaratory relief is to liquidate uncertainties and
controversies which might result in future litigation and to adjudicate rights
of parties who have not otherwise been given an opportunity to have those
rights determined. However, it is not the true purpose of the declaratory
judgment to provide a substitute for other regular actions.
Dewar, 169 Mont. at 444, 548 P.2d at 153-54. Here, Gildersleeve has already been
affected by 61-8-402 and -403, MCA, and thus, his challenge to the statute is
appropriately made during the course of his regular appeal pursuant to 61-8-403,
MCA.
Although this Court has the ultimate authority and responsibility to interpret
Montana's Constitution, we are primarily a court of review. State v. Finley (1996),
276
Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208. Furthermore, resolution of this case on a constitutional
basis
should be avoided where it may be unnecessary. In State v. Still (1995), 273 Mont.
261,
263, 902 P.2d 546, 548, we held that:
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This Court has repeatedly recognized that "courts should avoid
constitutional issues whenever possible." Wolfe v. State, Dept. of Labor &
Ind. (1992), 255 Mont. 336, 339, 843 P.2d 338, 340 (citing Ingraham v.
Champion Intern. (1990), 243 Mont. 42, 46, 793 P.2d 769, 771). Certain
constraints govern the Court's power to determine the constitutionality of
statutes. Among those constraints is the principle that we will not rule on
the constitutionality of a legislative act if we are able to decide the case
without reaching constitutional considerations. Ingraham, 793 P.2d at 771;
Wolfe, 843 P.2d at 340 (citing Taylor v. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks
(1983), 205 Mont. 85, 90, 666 P.2d 1228, 1231); see also State ex rel.
Hammond v. Hager (1972), 160 Mont. 391, 400, 503 P.2d 52, 57.
Because of our resolution of Issue 1, and the possibility that Gildersleeve's
appeal
could be resolved without the necessity of addressing the constitutional issues
which have
been raised; and because if it is necessary to address those constitutional issues
which
relate to the constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA, as applied, further
development of the factual record may be appropriate; we decline to address those
issues
at this time, but remand to the District Court for the appropriate resolution of
those
issues, if necessary.
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and this case
is
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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