Trankel v. State, Dept. of Military Affairs

No. 96-026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1997 JAMES B. TRANKEL. Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS, MONTANA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Erik B. Thueson and James T. Towe (argued); Thueson & Lamb; Helena, Montana For Respondents: Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek; Attorney General; James M. Scheier and Thomas G. Bowe (argued); Assistant Attorneys General; Agency Legal Services; Helena, Montana William Gianoulias; Risk Management and Tort Division; State of Montana; Helena, Montana LTC Mike T. McCabe; Staff Judge Advocate; Helena, Montana (for Montana National Guard) Submitted: October 22, 1996 Decided: April 30, 1997 Filed: Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff, JamesB. Trankel, commencedthis action in the District Court for the First Judicial District in Lewis and Clark County to recover damagesfor personal injuries sustained while working on property owned and controlled by the defendant, State of Montana, through its Department of Military Affairs. The Statemoved to dismiss Trankel’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. After considering the arguments of the parties, the District Court concluded that Trankel’s claim was barred by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Feres v. United States (1950), 340 U.S. 135, and our prior decision in Evans v. Montana National Guard (1986), 223 Mont. 482, 726 P.2d 1160. The District Court granted the State’smotion to dismiss. Trankel appealsfrom the District Court’s order granting the State’smotion. We reverse the judgment of the District Court. Trankel raises the following issueson appeal: 1. Can a person who is allegedly injured by the negligence of the State of Montana, acting through its Department of Military Affairs, while in the course of his employment with the United StatesArmy, suethe State of Montana to recover damagesfor those injuries? 2. Did the District Court err when it concluded that the plaintiffs allegations of statutory violations failed to state a claim? 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW The District Court dismissedTrankel’sclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., basedon the court’s conclusionthat it failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. A complaint should not be dismissedfor failure to state a claim unless it appearsbeyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Lockwood v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 202, 207, 900 P.2d 314, 317. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., has the effect of admitting all well-pleadedallegationsin the complaint. In consideringthe motion, the complaint is construedin the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact contained therein are taken as true. Lockwood, [272 Mont. at 207,] 900 P.2d at 3 17 (quoting Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 408, 884 P.2d 761, 762). The determination that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law. We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law is correct. Lockwood, [272 Mont. at 207,] 900 P.2d at 3 17. Common CauseofMontana v. Argenbright (1996), 276 Mont. 382,386,917 P.2d 425,427. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The following facts were allegedin the plaintiffs complaint. For the reasonsset forth above, we assumethat they are true for the purpose of reviewing the plaintiffs appeal. The Army National Guard of the Stateof Montana operatesunder the supervisionand direction of the Department of Military Affairs for the State of Montana which is established pursuant to Titles 2 and 10 of the Montana Code Annotated. 3 JamesB. Trankel enlistedin the Montana Army National Guard on March 28, 1991. However, in 1992,after assumingfull-time employmentin the Guard, he was called to active duty in the United States Army pursuant to Title 10 of the United StatesCode. In early 1992, the Guard begana program known as SouthwestAsia Vehicle Rebuild Program (SWAREB), the function of which was to repair and rebuild vehicles that had been damagedin the Gulf War and then distribute them for use to National Guard units, including Montana’s unit. That program was basedout of facilities at Fort Harrison in Montana. In October 1992, while still in full-time service to the United States Army, Trankel was assigned to that section of the SWAREB program responsible for body repair and undercoating of vehicles. He performed his duties in a building located at Fort Harrison and designatedas the paint and body shop. During the course of his duties, Trankel was required to work with and around toxic and hazardous materials and stand in a pit below the ground surface while spraying these materials on the undersidesof vehicles. However, the facilities were not properly vented and he was not provided with adequateequipment, including respirators and proper clothing. Trankel became drenched with toxic chemicals and inhaled dangerous levels of toxic substancesbecausethe State failed to implement and enforce safe operating procedures. As a result of his exposureto toxic materials, Trankel has been treated for bronchitis and sinusitis, and has suffered permanentphysical injuries, including injury to his brain and internal organs. He contendedthat his injuries were a result of the State’snegligent failure 4 to implement safe operatingproceduresfor the SWARBB activities that were performed on its premises. Trankel also contended, in Counts II, III, and IV of his complaint, that the State violated the Occupational Health Act of Montana found at $5 50-70-l 01 to -118, MCA; the Montana Safety Act found at $5 50-71-101 to -334, MCA; and the Employee and Community Hazardous Chemical Information Act found at §$ 50-78-101 to -402, MCA. The State moved to dismiss Trankel’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., basedon its contention that his claim was barred as a matter of law by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Feres v. United Stutex (1950), 340 U.S. 135, and our prior decisionin Evans v. Montana National Guard (1986), 223 Mont. 482,726 P.2d 1160. It was and is the State’s position that the Feves doctrine bars claims which arise from activities “incident to military service” regardlessof the substantivelaw upon which the claim is based, the status of the plaintiff at the time he is injured, or the statusof the party against whom the claim is made. In addition, it is the defendant’scontention that the acts upon which Counts II, III, and IV were baseddo not provide private causesof action, but can be enforced only by means of the administrative remedies provided for in those Acts. The District Court agreedwith the State. It held that becauseTrankel’s injuries were incident to his service in the National Guard, it is immaterial whether he was serving in a state or federal status at the time of his injuries, and therefore, that his claims were barred by the prior decisionsin Feres andEvans. It also concludedthat the Acts relied on in Counts II, III, and IV do not create private causesof action for recovery of damages,but instead must 5 be enforced by the various agencies to whom responsibility is given within the Acts. Trankel’s complaint was, therefore, dismissedwith prejudice and judgment was entered for the State of Montana. ISSUE 1 Can a person who is allegedly injured by the negligence of the State of Montana, acting through its Department of Military Affairs, while in the course of his employment with the United StatesArmy, suethe Stateof Montana to recover damagesfor those injuries? Essentialto an understandingof Trankel’semployment statusat the time of his injury is an understanding of the statutory framework pursuant to which members of the United StatesArmy Reserve forces are required to serve. The “Army National Guard” refers to the organized militia of the several states. 32 U.S.C. 3 lOl(4) (1994). The “Army National Guard of the United States” is a reserve component of the United StatesArmy. However, its members are required to be members ofthe “Army National Guard.” 32 U.S.C. 5 lOl(5) (1994). The President of the United Statesmay call into “Federal service” members of the Army National Guard of any state when he deemsit necessaryand it is appropriate, based on circumstancesprovided by law. 10 U.S.C. 5 12406 (1994). However, when a member of the “Army National Guard” is ordered to active federal duty, he or she is relieved from duty in the National Guard of his or her state, from the effective date of the order to active duty in the federal military. 32 U.S.C. § 325 (1994). Members of the “Army National Guard of the United States” who have been ordered to 6 active duty become reserves of the Army, 10 U.S.C. 5 12403 (1994), and are, thereafter, subject to the laws and regulations governing the United StatesArmy. 10 U.S.C. 5 12405 (1994). The practical effect of this statutory framework was explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Perpich v. Department of Defense (1990), 496 U.S. 334. There, the Court stated that: Thus, under the “dual enlistment” provisions of the statute that have been in effect since 1933, a member of the Guard who is ordered to active duty in the federal service is thereby relieved of his or her statusin the StateGuard for the entire period of federal service. The unchallenged validity of the dual enlistment system means that members of the National Guard of Minnesota who are ordered into federal service with the National Guard of the United States lose their status as members of the state militia during their period of active duty. If that duty is a training mission, the training is performed by the Army in which the trainee is serving, not by the militia from which the member has been temporarily disassociated. “Each member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United Stateswho is ordered to active duty is relieved from duty in the National Guard of his State or Territory, or of Puerto Rico or the District Columbia, as the casemay be, from the effective date of his order to active duty until he is relieved from that duty.” 32 U.S.C. 3 325(a). [T]he state affiliation is suspendedin favor of an entirely federal affiliation during the period of active duty. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 346-49. We acknowledged the decision in Perpich and the distinction between federal and state status of National Guard membersin Grove v. Montana Amy National Guard (1994), 264 Mont. 498,501-02,872 P.2d 791,793, and Evans v. Montana National Guard (1986), 223 Mont. 482,483-84,726 P.2d 1160, 1161. Therefore, based on the facts assumedto be true in this case, Trankel, at the times relevant to his claim, had no formal affiliation with the Army National Guard for the State of Montana. He was employed by and acting entirely within the scope of his duties for the United StatesArmy. It is, therefore, in that statusthat we must review the authorities relied upon by the parties and the District Court. The Statecontendsthat membersof the federalmilitary cannotbring suit againstother soldiers or military organizationsfor service-relatedinjuries, based on Feres, 340 U.S. 135. It contends that this rule applies regardless of the identity of the tort-feasor, pursuant to United Statesv. Johnson (1987), 48 1 U.S. 68 1; that it applieseven though the claim may be basedon state law, pursuant to Stauber v, Cline (9th Cir. 1988), 837 F.2d 395, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 817; and that we have held that the Fel-esdoctrine bars claims against the National Guard for injuries incident to military service in Evans, 223 Mont. 482, 726 P.2d 1160. The District Court agreed. Trankel, on the other hand, contendsthat Feres andJohnson are not applicableto this case because they are based on claims made pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act at 28 U.S.C. $3 1346(b), 2671 - 80 (1994); St aubey is not applicable becauseit was not based on and did not include an analysis of Montana law; and Evans was wrongly decided and 8 should be reversed. Trankel further contends that sovereign immunity was abolished in Montana in 1972 pursuantto Article II, Section 16, of the Montana Constitution, and that the Legislature hasnot seentit to extend immunity under these circumstances. Trankel further contends that § 10-l-104, MCA, which makes federal laws and regulations applicable to Guard members, provides an exceptionwhere thoselaws or regulationsare inconsistentwith Montana’s Constitution. For purposes of oral argument, and consideration on appealby this Court, this case was combined with Dorothy J Lake, et al. v. State of Montana, Supreme Court Cause No. 96-095, which involves the same issue and the same defendant acting in the same capacity. The plaintiff in that case also contends that to bar a claim against the State for injuries sustainedduring the courseof employment by a person who was not, at the time of injury, employed by the State, would violate Article II, Section 16, of the Montana Constitution. We first considerthe applicability of the federal authorities relied on by the State. All other federal authorities are affirming of Feres. In Feres, the plaintiffs decedent was on active duty in the military service of the United Stateswhen he died from injuries causedby fire in his barracks. The plaintiff alleged, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act found at 28 U.S.C. $5 2671 to 2680, that the Army had negligently quarteredFeresin barracks which it knew or should have known were unsafe. The U.S. SupremeCourt framed the issuein Fevesas follows: “The only issue of law raised is whether the Tort Claims Act extends its 9 remedy to one sustaining‘incident to the service’ what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.” Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 The Court in Feres referred to its task as one of “statutory construction” and ultimately concludedthat sincethe Federal Tort Claims Act extended liability to the United Statesin the same manner that a private individual would be liable, and since there was no historical basisfor imposing liability on a private individual for injuries to a member of the military, there could be no liability pursuant to the Tort Claims Act for injuries incident to military service. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42. In arriving at its conclusion, that Court took into considerationenactmentsof Congresswhich provided no-fault systems of compensationfor members of the military who are injured or killed during the course of their service. The Court concluded: If Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other. The absenceof any such adjustment is persuasive that there was no awarenessthat the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to military service. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. We find the Feres decision inapplicable to the facts of this case for several reasons: (1) Trankel is not suing the United States for his injuries; (2) Trankel’s claim is not brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act; (3) the type of action brought by Trankel against the National Guard is the kind traditionally recognizedby the common law in the Stateof Montana; and (4) although this casedoes not involve state workers’ compensationbenefits, the Montana Legislature has specifically recognizedthat third-party claims may be made by 10 those who receive statutory benefits for injuries sustained during the course of their employment, and has enacted laws to adjust the two types of remedy to each other. See 35 39-71-412 and -414, MCA. The State contends that the Feres doctrine applies to all claims made for injuries which are incidental to military service because the U.S. Supreme Court extended the doctrine to claims for subx’ogation nonmilitary personnel in StencelAero Engineering by Corp. v. United States(1977), 43 1U.S. 666; to claims by military personnelwho are off-duty at the time oftheir injury in United Statesv. Shearer (1985) 473 U.S. 52; and to claims by military servicemen against nonmilitary federal employees in United States v. Johnson (1987), 48 1 U.S. 68 1. However, regardlessof the variation in the circumstancespresented by each of the cited cases,each casewas brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act and is part of the federal caselaw interpreting the scopeof remediesprovided for by that Act. None of the cited casesis relevant to this Court’s interpretation of the remedies provided for by state statutory and caselaw, and guaranteedby our state Constitution. Neither is the State’sreliance on Chappell v. Wallace (1983), 462 U.S. 296, and United Statesv. Stanley (1987), 483 U.S. 669, persuasive. Although the Feres doctrine was appliedby the SupremeCourt in thosecasesto claims which were not basedon the Federal Tort Claims Act, they did involve claims by members of the United States military who allegedthat their superiorshad violated their constitutional rights and42 U.S.C. 55 1985 and 1983, respectively. It is the fnnction of the U.S. SupremeCourt to define and limit the scope of rights afforded pursuant to those constitutional causesof action. However, those decisions 11 have little bearing on the scopeof rights afforded under state law and guaranteedby our state Constitution. The Statealso relies on the Ninth Circuit in Stauber v. Cline (9th Cir. 1988) 837 F.2d 395, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 817. In that case, the plaintiff was employed by the federal government as a mechanic-technician, but like the plaintiff in this case, was also required to be a member of the National Guard as a condition of his employment pursuant to 32 U.S.C. $5 709(b), 709(e)(l) and (2) (1994). The individual defendants were members of the Army National Guard of Alaska who were superior in rank to the plaintiff. The defendantswere suedfor intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel. Stuuber, 837 F.2d at 396. Stauber filed his action in state court. but it was removed to federal district court where it was tried before ajury which returned an award of damagesin his favor. Following that verdict, pursuantto post-trial motions, the district court concluded that all of the parties were National Guardsmen under the direct command of the same U.S. Army lieutenant colonel; that plaintiffs work was incident to military service; and therefore, that his claim was barred by the Feres doctrine. Stuuber, 837 F.2d at 397. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying primarily on those federal decisions previously discussed which were based on federal statutory or common law. There is no mention in the Stauber case whether state or federal substantive law applied, and if the former, what was the substantive law in Alaska upon which the claim was based. Neither is there any analysisin the Stauber caseregarding the applicability of the aforementioned federal authorities to a situation in which a party’s 12 claim is made against a non-federal party and basedon state law. Therefore, we conclude that Stauber is not persuasive regarding Trankel’s rights which are asserted pursuant to Montana law and the Montana Constitution. Finally, the State contends, and the District Court agreed, that Trankel’s claim is barred as a matter of law pursuant to our prior decisionin Evans v. Montana National Guard (1986), 223 Mont. 482,726 P.2d 1160. In Evans, the plaintiff was a member of the Montana Army National Guard who was injured while in State service while attempting to move a Coke machine from one part of a building to another. He suedthe Guard for negligence,and his claim was dismissedby summaryjudgment. Evans, 223 Mont. at 483, 726 P.2d at 1161. We affirmed the District Court. However, our decision was basedon our conclusion that 5 2-9-102, MCA, of the State Tort Claims Act, did not authorize suits against the National Guard. Evans, 223 Mont. at 484, 726 P.2d at 1161. We held that that section authorized suits against “governmental entities” which were defined at $2-9-101(3), MCA, as “the state and political subdivisions as herein defined,” and that the National Guard was not included in the definition ofpolitical subdivisionsfound at 5 2-9-101(5), MCA. Evans, 223 Mont. at 484, 726 P.2d at 1161. We did not addresswhy the National Guard or the Department of Military Affairs for the State of Montana, which was also named as a defendant, were not subject to liability pursuant to that part of 9 2-9-101(3), MCA, which defines “governmental entity” to include “the state.” The state is defined at § 2-9-101(7), MCA, as follows: “‘State’ means the state of Montana or any office, department, agency,authority, or other instrumentality thereof.” 13 “Agency” is defined at 5 2-15-102(2), MCA, to include any “department” or “instrumentality of the executivebranch of stategovernment,” and § 2-15-104(l)(b), MCA, lists the Department of Military Affairs as one of the constitutionally establisheddepartments or entities of the executive branch of government. Therefore, it is beyond question that the National Guard and Department of Military Affairs are governmental entities within the meaning of 5 2-9-101(3), MCA, and our conclusionto the contrary in Evans was erroneous. Therefore, to that extent, our decision in Evans is overruled. The State also cites Evans for the proposition that “[tlraditionally, the federal government and state governments have not been held liable in tort for injuries that rise ‘in the course of activity incident to service.“’ Evans, 223 Mont. at 485, 726 P.2d at 1161. However, that languagefrom Evans is not precedentfor the facts which gave rise to this case for several reasons. First, it was dicta following the actual basisfor our decision which was that the National Guard was not covered by our State Tort Claims Act. Second, it was applied to the facts of that casewhich involved a member of the National Guard on active state duty suing his employer, in effect, for injuries he sustained during the course of his employment. Third, the constitutional basis on which we decidethis casewas neither raised in that case nor would it be applicable to the facts of that case. For these reasons, we conclude that Evans does not resolve the issue raised by this appeal. Trankel cites decisions from the State of Washington in Emsley v. Army National Guard (Wash. 1986), 722 P.2d 1299, and Kirtley v. State (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), 748 P.2d 1128, in support of his right to maintain his causeof action in this case. While those cases 14 do appearon point, it is not necessary we rely on authority from anotherjurisdiction for that our decision. Trankel’s claim is brought in state court pursuant to the State Tort Claims Act and names the State of Montana as a defendant. The question with which we are presented is whether based on state law we would apply the Feves doctrine to Trankel’s claim simply becausehis injury was incident to military service,or whether we are precluded from doing so basedon state law, and specifically, our state Constitution. We conclude that Article II, Section 16, of the Montana Constitution, precludes application of the Fevesdoctrine to the factors in this case. Article II, Section 16, provides as follows: Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person,property, or character. No person shall be deprived of this full legal redressfor iniurv incurred in employment for which another uerson mav be liable exceot asto fellow emuloveesand his immediate emplover who hired him if suchimmediate emulover urovides coverageunder the Workmen’s Comuensation Laws of this state. Right andjustice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay. (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the minutes of the Constitutional Convention that the secondsentence of Section 16 was in responseto our decisionin Ashcruft v. Montana Power Co. (1971), 156 Mont. 368,480 P.2d 812. In that case,the plaintiff was injured while working on behalf of his employer on property owned by the Montana Power Company. He sued the power company basedon his allegation that its negligence causedhis injury. Ashcmft, 156 Mont. at 369,480 P.2d 812-13. On appeal,this Court held that pursuant to 5 92-438, RCM (1947), the power company could not be sued becauseit had required the plaintiffs employer to 15 carry workers’ compensation coverage. Ashcraft, 156 Mont. at 371,480 P.2d at 813. The second sentence of Article II, Section 16, was a responseto that decision based on the delegates’ intent that employeesnot be barred from third-party suits for injuries sustained during the course of their employment. The following minutes from the Constitutional Convention illustrate that point. In his report to the Convention as a whole, DelegateMurray, representing the Bill of Rights Committee which drafted Section 16, gave the following explanation for the second sentenceof that section: Under Montana law, as announcedin the recent decision of Ash&aft VEYSUS Montana Power Company, the employee has no redressagainst third parties for injuries causedby them if his immediate employer is covered under the Workmen’s Compensation law. The committee feels that this violates the spirit of the guaranteeof a speedyremedy for all injuries of person, property or character. It is this specific denial, and this one only, that the committee intends to alter with the following additional wording: “No person shall be deprived of his full legal redressfor injury incurred in employment for which another person may be liable except as to fellow employeesand his immediate employer who hired him if such immediate employer provides coverageunder the Workmen’s Compensation laws of this state.” In other words, the committee wants to insure that the Workmen’s Compensationlaws of the state will be used for their original purpose--to provide compensation to injured workmen--rather than to deprive an injured worker of redressagainstnegligent third parties, beyond his employer and fellow employees, because his immediate employer is covered by Workmen’s Compensation. . To permit no remedy against third parties in caseswhere they employer is covered by Workmen’s Compensationis to encouragepersonswith rundown premises to contract out work without improving the quality of the premises. The committee urges that this is an abuseof the Workmen’s Compensationlaw and constitutes a misapplication of that law to protect personswho are negligent. The committee commendsthis provision to the Convention with the belief that it is an important, if technical, aspect of the administration ofjustice. Those are the remarks which are contained in the booklet. Let me amplify them by saying basically this: we feel that the right to third-uartv action is a right which 16 we should establishin our Constitution. It is a right which working men and women who are unfortunate enoughto be iniured have had for nearlv 80 years in this state. We feel that it was wrongly taken awav from theseaeoule bv the Suweme Court decision which was mentioned. We feel that we aerhaus are legislating in asking that this be written into our Constitution. but we of the committee reallv believe that we are acting in a iudicial manner in asking that it be written in the Constitution for we feel that this Convention. oerhaus.is the court of last resort for iniured working men and women in Montana with resuect to the third-uartv lawsuit. and we recommend that the section be adouted. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1754, March 8, 1972 (emphasis added). The second sentenceof Section 16 was extensively debated. Delegate Habedank moved that it be deleted. That motion was defeated by a vote of 76-14 (Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1759, March 8, 1972), and Section 16 was ultimately approved by a vote of 76-21 (Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII at 2644, March 18, 1972). It is clear from theseConvention Minutes that while the United StatesSupremeCourt used statutory benefits as a basis for denying a service member’s claims for damagesbased on negligence, our constitutional delegatesfelt that the opposite result was appropriate. We have consideredthe impact of Article II, Section 16, on numerous occasionsand, without exception, have held that it precludes limitations on claims by injured employees againstpersonsother than the employee’semployer or fellow employee. SeeFruncetich v. State Camp. Mut. Ins. Fund (1992), 252 Mont 2 15,827 P.2d 1279; Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 21,776 P.2d 488; Webbv. Montana Masonry Constr. Co. (1988), 233 17 Mont. 198,761 P.2d 343; andHayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters (1980), 187 Mont. 148, 609 P.2d 257. In Webb, 233 Mont. at 204, 761 P.2d at 346, we stated that: The secondsentenceof Section 16 speaksloudly and clearly for itself. If there could be any questionabout what the members intended the sentence to mean, the question can be answered by reference to the transcript of the convention. DelegateMarshall Murray, a Kalispell attorney, moved, on behalf of a unanimous Bill of Rights Committee, for the adoption of Section 16, which amendedthe 1889Constitution by adding the workmen’s compensation provision of the secondsentence. We then referred to the samecomments by Murray, which are previously cited in this opinion, Webb, 233 Mont. at 204-05, 761 P.2d at 346-47, and then concluded that: [TJheAshcraj?holding was expresslyand specifically overruled by the people of the state with their approval of Article II, Section 16, of the 1972 Constitution, in which they directed that immunity would be restricted to an “immediate employer who hired” the workmen and who had provided coverage. Webb,233 Mont. at 207,761 P.2d at 349. In Meech, we noted that: The narrow purposethe delegatesascribedto the changein the remedy guaranteeis further reflected in the Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana, Official Text with Explanation, circulated to the voters prior to the vote on adopting the 1972 Constitution. According to the explanation in the voters’ information pamphlet, the amendment “Adds to 1889 constitution by specifically granting to a person injured in employment the right to sue a third party causing the injury, except his employer or fellow employee when his employer provides coverage under workmens [sic] compensation laws.” Meech, 238 Mont. at 40, 776 P.2d at 500 (alteration in original). 18 Finally, in Fmncetich we held that limitations on an injured employee’sright to be fully compensatedfor his injuries in a claim against a third party by allowing subrogation prior to full recovery was precludedby Article II, Section 16. Francetich, 252 Mont. at 224, 827 P.2d at 1285. In languagerelevant to the issuebefore us, we stated that: Section 39-71-414(6)(a), MCA, restricts an injured worker’s right to obtain a full legal redress againstthird-party tortfeasors. The secondsentence of Article II, Section 16, states this cannot be done. The record of the debate at the Convention is clear that this was the delegates’intent in amending the provision. The secondsentenceis mandatory. prohibitive. and self-executing and it urohibits deorivine an emulovee of his full legal redress. recoverable under general tort law. against third aarties. Finally, as noted above, we recognized and explained this very idea in Meech. Fvancetich, 252 Mont at 224, 827 P.2d at 1285 (emphasis added). We reaffirm that pursuant to the second sentence in Article II, Section 16, of the Montana Constitution, any statute or court decisionwhich deprivesan employee of his right to full legal redress, as defined by the general tort law of this state against third parties, is absolutely prohibited. That sentenceis mandatory and self-executing, and leaves no room for erosion basedon what federal courts or the courts of other states would do pursuant to federal laws or the laws of other states. For thesereasons,we concludethat becauseJamesB. Trankel was not employed by the Army National Guard of the State of Montana or the Department of Military Affairs for the State of Montana at the time complained of, his claim against the State of Montana, pursuant to the State Tort Claims Act found at §§ 2-9-101 to -805, MCA, is neither barred 19 by the Feres doctrine, nor our prior decision in Evans. The District Court erred when it concluded otherwise. That part of the District Court’s judgment is reversed. ISSUE 2 Did the District Court err when it concludedthat the plaintiffs allegationsof statutory violations failed to state a claim? The District Court held that Counts II, III, and IV of the plaintiffs complaint, based on the Occupational Health Act, @ 50-70-101 to -118, MCA; the Montana Safety Act found at 3s 50-71-101 to -334, MCA; and the Employee and Community Hazardous Chemical Information Act found at $4 50-78-101 to -402, MCA, respectively, do not provide separate statutory baseson which to recover damagesfor personalinjury. The District Court held that theseacts define various duties of employers which may be relevant in a negligence action, but that since Trankel’snegligenceaction was barred pursuantto Feres and Evans, Counts II, III, and IV were also barred. We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law is correct. Common CauseofMontana v. Argenbright (1996), 276 Mont. 382, 386, 917 P.2d 425,427. Trankel contends that we have previously held that the Safety Act provides an independentbasis for a causeof action to recover damagesin Cain v. Stevenson(1985), 2 18 Mont. 101,706 P.2d 128, andShannon v. HowardS. Wright Construction Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438, and that there is no basis for holding otherwise regarding the other two acts which have the samepurpose and provide similar protections. 20 The State contends that enforcement of the several acts in question is delegatedto various state agencies and that when interpreting similar statutory provisions, the U.S. SupremeCourt has held that federal statutesdid not authorize private causesof action. See Middlesex County SewerageAuth. v. National SeaClammevsAssk (1981) 453 U.S. 1. The State concedes,however, that the statutes may establisha duty for the purpose of proving negligence per se. In Shannon, the plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor who had subcontracted with the general contractor and defendant, Howard S. Wright Construction Co., to perform plumbing and mechanicalwork at the Big Sky Resort. Shannon, 181 Mont. at 27 1, 593 P.2d at 439. Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder while trying to gain accessto the second level of a condominium that was under construction. He sued both Wright Construction and Big Sky Resort. During the jury trial, the district court instructed the jury pursuant to 5 50-71-201, MCA (the Montana Safety Act), that an employer, including the prime contractor, has a duty to provide employeeswith a safe place to work. Shannon, 181 Mont. at 281,593 P.2d at 445. On appeal,the defendantscontendedthat neither of them was an “employer,” as definedby the Safety Act. We held that the “safe place to work” provision of the Safety Act did establish a duty from the prime contractor to employees of subcontractors. Shannon, 181 Mont. at 283, 593 P.2d at 445-46. However, we did not distinguish between the duty which forms the basis for a claim of negligence and a duty which gives rise to an independent statutory causeof action. 21 In Cutn, the plaintiff subcontractedto do electrical work for the defendant during the construction of an apartment building. The defendantwas the owner of the building and the general contractor. The plaintiff fell and injured himself while trying to exit the building without the benefit of steps or a ladder and sued the defendant based on allegations of negligence. Cain, 218 Mont. at 102-03,706 P.2d at 129. From ajury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appealedthe district court’s conclusion that the safe place to work statuteimposed a duty running from the defendantto the plaintiff. The defendantarguedthat pursuant to the Shannon decision, the statutes only applied in situations where the claim is presentedby an employee of a subcontractorandthe generalcontractor had control over the workplace. He contended that it did not apply in this situation where the plaintiff was, himself, the subcontractor. Cain, 218 Mont. at 103,706 P.2d at 130. We held that the duty establishedby 5 50-71-201, MCA, did apply to the subcontractorin that casewhile working for the general contractor. Cain, 218 Mont. at 104-05, 706 P.2d at 131. However, once again, we did not discusswhether the duty created simply served as a basis for a claim of negligence, or gave rise to a separatestatutory causeof action. More recently, in Stratemeyevv. Lincoln County (1996), 276 Mont. 67, 79-80, 915 P.2d 175, 182,we held that the Montana Safety Act establishes duty to provide a workplace a which is safe from mental injury, as well as physical injury. It is not clear from the reported opinion whether Stratemeyer alleged failure to comply with 5 50-7 l-20 1, MCA, as a basis for his negligence claim, or whether he alleged a separate statutory cause of action. However, we stated that: 22 Stratemeyercontendsthat his claim is basedon Lincoln County’s failure to train, supervise,treat and debrief him following the incident. According to Stratemeyer, the traumatic nature and consequencesof responding to the suicide were foreseeable, and post-traumatic stress disorder is a common injury for law enforcement personnel, emergency medical technicians and disaster and emergency services personnel. Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 79,915 P.2d at 182. A reasonableinference from the facts which are reported in the Stratemeyer decisionis that the duty allegedin that caseformed the basis for Stratemeyer’sclaim of negligence. We concludethat there is no prior authority for the position that statutory acts, such as those in question, create independent causesof action aside from their relationship to proof of negligence, and also conclude, based on our prior decision in Pollard v. Todd (1966) 148Mont. 171,418 P.2d 869, that statutory acts,like those included in Counts II, III, and IV of the plaintiffs complaint, establish duties, the violation of which is negligence per se. In Pollard, the plaintiff fell from a make-shift scaffolding constructed to the specifications of his employer, the defendant. Pollard, 148 Mont. at 175,418 P.2d at 871. The defendants were exempt from coverage of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and the plaintiff did not make a claim pursuant to that Act. We held that because of the duties imposed by the “Scaffolding Act,” which was then found at Title 69, Chapter 14, RCM (1947), but is now found at Title 50, Chapter 77, MCA, the Legislature intended an absolute statutory duty upon owners of real estateto protect workmen and others from extraordinary hazardsassociatedwith scaffolds, and therefore, that plaintiff was entitled to an instruction 23 that breach of the statutorily-createdduty was negligenceper se. Pollard, 148 Mont. at 180, 418 P.2d at 873. The acts, which plaintiff allegesin Counts, II, III, and IV of his complaint were violated by the State, provide similar duties which were enactedfor similar purposes. We therefore concludethat the violation of those statutes is also negligenceper se, and that in the appropriate situation the jury should be so instructed. However, we also conclude, as did the District Court, that the Acts in question do not give rise to causes of action independentfrom a claim of negligence. For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the Occupational Health Act, the Montana SafetyAct, and the Employee andCommunity HazardousChemical Information Act did not give rise to independentcausesof action. However, we reverse the District Court’s conclusion that claims of negligence,based on violations of these Acts, are barred by the Feres doctrine, or our decision in Evans, and we furthermore reverse the District Court’s conclusion that the solemeansof enforcementof the duties imposed by these Acts are the administrative remediesprovided therein. The judgment ofthe District Court is reversedand this caseis remandedto the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 24 We Concur: 25 April 30, 1997 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following named: Erik B. Thueson Thueson & Lamb Box 535 Helena MT 59624-0535 William Gianoulias Risk Mgmt. & Tort Div. Box 200124 Helena MT 59620-0124 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General James M. Scheier & Thomas G. Bowe, Assistant Attorneys General 215 N. Sanders Helena MT 59620-1401 LTC Mike T. McCabe Staff Judge Advocate Box 202101 Helena MT 59620-2101 (Attorney for N.G.) ED SMITH CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA BY: OB: Deputy