NO. 96-453
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
STATE OF MONTANA:
Plaintiff and Respondent,
EDWARD C. BEAUDRY,
Defendant and Appellant
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District;
In and for the County of Fallon,
The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Lorraine A. Schneider; Simonton, Howe & Schneider, Glendive,
Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg Coughlin,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
John Huntley, Fallon County Attorney, Baker, Montana
Submittcd on Briefs: January 23, 1997
APR 1 5 1997 Decided: April 15, 1997
Filed:
C L E R K Of SUPIITME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Edward C. Beaudry (Beaudry) appeals from the judgment entered by the Sixteenth
Judicial District Court, Fallon County, on his guilty plea to the felony offense of possession
of dangerous drugs, having reserved the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. We affirm.
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Beaudry's motion
to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his residence by his probation
officer.
Beaudry was convicted of three counts of felony burglary, two counts of felony theft
and one count of misdemeanor theft in 1993. He received a three-year deferred sentence, and
was placed on probation, in February of 1994. Beaudry's probation included conditions
prohibiting him from using alcohol and using or possessing dangerous drugs and from
entering bars. It also required him, upon "reasonable cause," to submit to a warrantless
search of his person, vehicle or residence by his probation officer.
John Hodge (Hodge) was Beaudry's supervising probation officer. During the time
leading up to the search of Beaudry's residence which is at issue in this case, Hodge learned
of numerous probation violations, as well as additional potential violations, by Beaudry.
Four urine samples taken from Beaudry in 1994 and 1995 indicated that he was using drugs.
Beaudry admitted to Hodge on four occasions between March 8,1994 and June 22,1995 that
he had consumed beer, and Hodge saw Beaudry at bars on two other occasions. In addition,
Beaudry was charged with shoplifting in June of 1995, and subsequently pleaded guilty.
Moreover, Hodge learned that Beaudry had stolen and pawned a .44 caliber handgun. Fallon
County Sheriff Tim Barkley also informed Hodge that a second .44 caliber handgun had been
stolen and that Beaudry was a suspect in that theft.
On October 24, 1995, Hodge conducted a warrantless search of Beaudry's residence
in Baker, Montana, with the aid of a law enforcement officer. Beaudry was not present at
the time of the search and did not consent to it. Hodge discovered dangerous drugs during
the search.
On November 21, 1995, the State of Montana (State) charged Beaudry with criminal
possession of dangerous drugs, a felony. Beaudry pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Beaudry moved to suppress all evidence seized during Hodge's warrantless search of
his residence on the basis that the search violated his constitutional right to privacy and to
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The State acknowledged that the search
was conducted without a warrant, but argued that Hodge had "reasonable grounds" to
conduct the warrantless search. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court made
findings relating to the information Hodge possessed at the time of the search; those findings
indicated that Hodge had evidence of drinking, drugs and theft by Beaudry. On that basis,
the court determined that Hodge had reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence and
denied Beaudry's motion to suppress.
Beaudry subsequently withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the charged
felony offense of criminal possession of dangerous dmgs, reserving the right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. Thereafter, the District Court entered judgment, deferring
imposition of sentence for one year subject to specified terms and conditions. Beaudry
appeals.
Did the District Court e n in denying Beaudry's motion to suppress evidence
discovered during a warrantless search of his residence by his probation
officer?
We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the
court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. We also review whether the findings were
correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Burchett (Mont. 1996), 921 P.2d 854, 856,53
In this case, the District Court denied Beaudry's motion to suppress based on facts and
findings largely undisputed by Beaudry. Specifically,the District Court found that Beaudry's
conditions of probation included prohibitions against entering bars, using alcohol and using
or possessing illegal drugs. The court also found that:
On June 22, 1994, a sample of Mr. Beaudry's urine tested positive for
cannabinoids. On June 9, 1995 a sample of Mr. Beaudry's urine tested positive
for camabinoids. On June 9,1995, Mr. Beaudry was charged with shoplifting.
He subsequently plead guilty. On October 24, 1995, Mr. Beaudry was charged
with the theft of a .44 caliber revolver. He subsequently plead guilty. Prior to
October 24, 1995, Mr. Beaudry had told [Hodge] on more than one occasion
that if he were drinking or using [drugs] that he would shoplift or steal. His
history appears to support that statement. Although as of the time of the
search [Hodge] knew the .44 caliber revolver Mr. Beaudry had stolen from the
Gun Runner Gunshop, had been pawned by Mr. Beaudry, Mr. Hodge also
knew that law enforcement also had a report of a second stolen .44 caliber
revolver in Baker. . . .
The record also reflected that Hodge knew that Beaudry had consumed beer and been in bars
on several occasions. Accordingly, the District Court determined that this underlying factual
foundation
gave this probation officer sufficient grounds to believe that Mr. Beaudry was
back to drinking and doing drugs and stealing to support those activities. It is
not too big of [a] stretch to conclude that evidence of such activities would be
found at Mr. Beaudry's residence. The demonstrated, dynamic correlation of
Mr. Beaudry's thefts with his drug and alcohol use gave this officer reasonable
cause to search his residence for evidence.
It is well-established in Montana that a probation officer may search a probationer's
residence without a warrant so long as the officer has reasonable cause for the search.
Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 (citations omitted). This "reasonable cause" standard, while
substantially less than the probable cause standard required by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, results from the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy
and the probation officer's superior position in determining what level of supervision is
necessary to provide both rehabilitation of the probationer and safety for society. Burchett,
921 P.2d at 856 (citations omitted). "The probation officer must be able to supervise the
probationer, and upon his judgment and expertise, search the probationer's residence. . . ."
State v. Burke (1988), 235 Mont. 165, 171,766 P.2d 254,257.
As noted above, Beaudry does not challenge the bulk of the District Court's findings.
Indeed, he concedes that Hodge had reasonable cause to believe he had violated the
conditions of his probation at various times during the twenty-month period immediately
preceding the search. His sole contention is that there was an insufficient relationship
between his activities and his residence to provide reasonable cause for Hodge's warrantless
search of the residence. We disagree.
For purposes relevant to the issue before us, the facts of the present case are similar
to those we recently addressed in State v. Boston (1995), 269 Mont. 300, 889 P.2d 814,
involving the warrantless search of a parolee's residence and storage garage based on the
lesser "reasonable grounds" standard required for such searches. There, parolee Monte
Chalmers Boston was subject to a "reasonable cause" warrantless parole search identical to
Beaudry's condition of probation. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815. Boston's parole officer, John
Kelly, became aware of evidence linking Boston to an arson fire at the National Center for
Appropriate Technology and indicating Boston's first-hand knowledge of an earlier arson fire
at the Mormon Church. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815.
Kelly authorized a warrantless search of Boston's residence. After learning that
Boston rented a storage garage separate from his residence, Kelly authorized a search of the
garage as well. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815.
Boston subsequently was charged with burglary, theft and arson. Boston, 889 P.2d
at 815. He moved to suppress all evidence taken during the warrantless searches of his
residence and storage garage. Relying on Kelly's testimony about the circumstances
surrounding his decision to authorize the searches, the district court determined that Kelly
had reasonable cause to authorize the searches. Boston, 889 P.2d at 816.
On appeal, we reiterated the considerations underlying the "reasonable grounds"
standard for warrantless searches by probation and parole officers, observing that
probationers and parolees have conditional liberty and a reduced privacy interest.
Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 (citations omitted). Moreover, a probation or parole officer must
be allowed to determine the supervision required and, " 'upon his judgment and expertise,
search the probationer's [or parolee's] residence. . . .' " & Boston, 889 P.2d at 817 (quoting
Burke, 766 P.2d at 257). Kelly had evidence linking Boston to two arsons and, therefore,
"Kelly clearly had reasonable grounds to suspect parole violations which justified the
warrantless searches of Boston's home and storage garage." Boston, 889 P.2d at 817. We
concluded that substantial evidence supported the district court's "reasonable grounds"
finding and affirmed the denial of Boston's motion to suppress. Boston, 889 P.2d at 817.
Here, we are presented with a record of known, as well as reasonably suspected,
probation violations by Beaudry. These undisputed facts, combined with Hodge's expertise,
continued experience with Beaudry and awareness of Beaudry's established and admitted
pattern of stealing and substance abuse, provided Hodge with reasonable grounds to believe
he would find evidence of dmg- or alcohol-related probation violations at Beaudry's
residence. Thus, as in Boston, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the District
Court's finding that Hodge had reasonable cause to search the residence.
Beaudry repeatedly posits that a relationship must exist between the facts constituting
reasonable cause for the search and the place to be searched, citing to a number of cases from
other jurisdictions which--on various factual scenarios--require such a relationship. He
seems to argue &om this starting point that some concrete set of parameters--some "bright
line testu--has been, or must be, established against which the facts of each and every case
involving a warrantless probation search under the "reasonable cause" standard can be
measured with precision to determine whether the search is valid.
While our discussion above reflects our agreement with Beaudry that the facts
justifying the search must bear some relationship to the place searched, that relationship
exists in this case. Assuming that evidence of drug- or alcohol-related probation violations
by Beaudry actually existed, what more--or even equally--likely place for it than at his
residence? No case cited by Beaudry or located by this Court requires that evidence of
probation violations be seen by the probation officer--or by any other person--at the
probationer's residence before a search of the residence can be upheld under the reasonable
grounds test.
Furthermore, with regard to Beaudry's implicit argument that a "bright line test" be
applied to "reasonable cause" warrantless searches, the argument misperceives both the
nature of the reasonable cause test and the rationale for the reasonable cause exception to the
usual warrant requirement for a valid search. The reasonable cause test is, itself, a fact-
driven test inasmuch as the search "should be permitted only if there is an underlying factual
foundation justifying the search[.]" m,766 P.2d at 257. Indeed, the reasonable cause
standard is substantially similar to the "reasonable grounds" language contained in tj 61-8-
403(4), MCA, and we have indicated that determination of whether "reasonable grounds"
exists is a finding of fact based on the totality of circumstances. See Anderson v. State Dept.
of Justice (1996), 275 Mont. 259, 263, 912 P.2d 212, 214. In the context of a motion to
suppress, the district court is the trier of fact and we review the district court's findings under
the clearly erroneous test. See Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856.
Moreover, the rationale for the reasonable cause exception to the usual Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement is that the probation officer's expertise and experience with
the probationer puts the officer in a superior position to determine what level of supervision
is necessary to provide rehabilitation to the probationer and safety for society. Burchett, 921
P.2d at 856. To establish an arbitrary rule of law setting a "floor" against which reasonable
cause searches would be measured would negate the very considerations underlying the
reasonable cause exception to the warrant requirement in the first instance. Burchett,
921 P.2d at 856; Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17; &, 766 P.2d at 256. Whether reasonable
cause existed is, and must remain, primarily a fact-driven test to be determined by district
courts on a case-by-case basis.
Having concluded above that substantial evidence supports the District Court's finding
that Hodge had reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence, we further conclude that the
finding is not otherwise clearly erroneous and that the court's findings were correctly applied
as a matter of law. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying
Beaudry's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
We concur:
Justices
Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case. However, I write separately to clarify what
I believe is an important distinction in the context of probation searches. In addressing
Beaudry's argument that there must be a relationship between the violation alleged and the
place to be searched, the Court states:
While our discussion above reflects our agreement with Beaudry that the facts
justifying the search must bear some relationship to the place searched, that
relationship exists in this case. Assuming that evidence of dmg- or alcohol-
related probation violations by Beaudry actually existed, what more--or even
equally--likely place for it than at his residence?
In the above passage, the Court seems to hold that the necessary "relationship" exists
between the alcohol related probation violations and the place to be searched, that is, the
home. I query whether the alcohol related violations provide a sufficient "relationship" to
justify a search of the home. As the Court points out, the probation officer knew, prior to
conducting the search, that Beaudry had consumed beer and had been in bars on several
occasions. Accordingly, he already had sufficient evidence to revoke Beaudry's parole for
alcohol consumption.
By way of example, if a probationer were to violate the conditions of his probation
by leaving the state, that infraction would not, in my view, provide "reasonable cause" to
search his home. The nature of the violation is such that it does not bear fruit necessitating
a search. Likewise, one need not conduct a search of a probationer's home to substantiate
that he has been drinking in bars. There is no nexus between the offense and the place
11
searched.
On the other hand, theft is an offense for which there is "fruit;" in this case, the second
.44 caliber revolver which had been reported stolen in the Baker area. As the Court points
out, a probation search must be based upon "reasonable cause." State v. Burchett (1996), 277
Mont. 192, 195,921 P.2d 854,856. Further, "reasonable cause" for a probation search, like
"reasonable grounds" for a traffic stop under 3 61-8-403(4), MCA, is a finding based upon
the totality of the circumstances. See Anderson v. State Dept. of Justice (1996), 275 Mont.
259,263,912 P.2d 212,214. "Reasonable cause" is thus an objective rather than a subjective
standard. Anderson, 912 P.2d at 214. Accordingly, although the probation officer did not
specifically focus on the missing revolver as justification for his search, the probation
officer's knowledge of the second stolen revolver was one of many pieces of information
comprising the "totality of circumstances" known to the officer. Knowledge of the missing
revolver must be viewed as part of the larger collection of information which led the officer
to believe that Beaudry was in violation of his probation, thus giving the probation officer
reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence. See Oregon v. Gulley (Or. 1996), 921 P.2d
396,401. I would find the requisite nexus in the fact that Beaudry had stolen one gun in the
Baker area and that another .44 caliber revolver had been reported stolen. In light of the
totality of the circumstances, the search was objectively reasonable.
1
Justice