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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 217
No. 99-443
295 Mont. 540
986 P.2d 1089
___________________________________
GREGORY J. JELLISON, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
) AND
MIKE MAHONEY, Warden, ) O R D E R
Montana State Prison, )
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________
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¶1 Gregory J. Jellison (Jellison) petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus. The State
of Montana (the State) has filed a response opposing Jellison's petition.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 On July 3, 1998, 122 inmates at the Montana State Prison participated in a sit-down
demonstration in the High Security yard of the prison, adjacent to the high security
gymnasium. When the demonstration began at 2:30 p.m., Jellison was exercising in the
gymnasium. Although other inmates in the gymnasium approached prison guards and
requested and were permitted to exit out the back door so as to avoid becoming involved
in the inmate demonstration, Jellison failed to show concern over participating in the
demonstration or request that he be permitted to exit via the back door. Jellison exited the
main door of the gymnasium and participated in the demonstration. During the course of
the demonstration, Jellison repeatedly disobeyed correctional officers' direct orders to
return to his cell and also made numerous demands that administrators repeal several new
policies instituted within the prison. Jellison remained at the demonstration area until
10:00 p.m.
¶3 All of the 122 inmates who participated in the demonstration were provided with
disciplinary notices and scheduled for hearings. Prison staff served Jellison with a Notice
dated July 3, 1999, which stated that prison officials had decided to take disciplinary
action against Jellison for numerous violations of prison rules during the demonstration.
The Notice also informed Jellison that a hearing would be held on July 8, 1999, and that
Jellison would be permitted to "present evidence and witnesses" on his behalf. Jellison
signed the Notice upon receipt. Due to the number of scheduled hearings, staff constraints,
and an emergency lock-down on July 8, 1999, Jellison's disciplinary hearing was
continued until a later date.
¶4 Upon completion of a majority of disciplinary hearings following the demonstration,
Unit managers were instructed to begin classification determinations for those inmates
who had participated in the demonstration. On or about July 24, 1999, prison staff
performed a re-classification of Jellison and recommended placement in administrative
segregation. However, prison staff mistakenly believed that Jellison's disciplinary hearing
had already been held. When presented with his re-classification order to review and sign,
Jellison refused to comply. Jellison appealed his classification to prison authorities. His
appeal was granted because prison authorities discovered that Jellison's re-classification by
Unit staff had been based on erroneous information. Thus, prison staff immediately
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withdrew Jellison's re-classification upon discovering the mistake.
¶5 Jellison's hearing was rescheduled to July 14, 1999, but was continued because Jellison
requested witness statements from specified individuals. On July 28, 1999, Jellison's
disciplinary hearing was held. Jellison claimed in defense that he was not a willing
participant in the demonstration. However, the hearings officer had failed to obtain
statements from some of Jellison's witnesses and refused to postpone the hearing again to
obtain such statements. Based on the evidence before him, which included an infraction
report, investigative findings, and incident reports, the hearings officer issued a written
Decision finding Jellison guilty of participating in the demonstration and violating prison
rules. Jellison was disciplined with a total of 35 days detention.
¶6 On August 6, 1999, prison staff completed a Reclassification Instrument and
Classification Summary of Jellison and assigned him to Administrative Segregation with a
recommendation that Jellison be reviewed in 90 days with a view towards maximum
custody placement. Jellison petitions from the Decision and his custody re-classification.
Discussion
¶7 In essence, Jellison requests relief on two grounds: (1) due process; and (2) cruel and
unusual punishment. He argues that due process was violated because the premature re-
classification of his custody status prior to his disciplinary hearing rendered that
proceeding fundamentally unfair, and because the hearing officer's failure to secure all
requested witnesses resulted in the denial of exculpatory evidence.
¶8 Due process is a flexible concept, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, and,
therefore, the process due an individual varies according to the factual circumstances and
the nature of the right at stake. Sage v. Gamble (1996), 279 Mont. 459, 464-65, 929 P.2d
822, 825. As the State emphasizes, when considering the due process rights of inmates, it
is exceedingly important to remember that prison disciplinary actions "takes place in a
closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the
criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so." Wolff v. McDonnell
(1974), 418 U.S. 539, 561, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2977, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 954. The liberty interest
of a duly convicted inmate is, therefore, minimal indeed.
¶9 As the United States Supreme Court has recently pronounced, the liberty interest of an
inmate "will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the
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sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process
Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner (1995), 515 U.
S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 430. As examples of forms of
restraint which would implicate the due process rights of an inmate, the U.S. Supreme
Court cited admission to a mental hospital and involuntary admission of psychotropic
drugs. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. at 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d at 430. However,
discipline in segregated confinement, while "concededly punitive" in nature, does not
generally rise to the level of an "atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86, 115 S.Ct. at 2301, 132 L.
Ed.2d at 431. Nor does custody classification generally implicate a liberty interest
sufficient to give rise to due process protection for an inmate. See Meachum v. Fano
(1976), 427 U.S. 215, 224-25, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451, 458-59.
¶10 Here, Jellison was given written notice of his alleged infractions of prison rules,
granted a hearing at which he was permitted to present evidence and witnesses, made a
statement on his own behalf and presented a defense at the hearing, and provided with a
written decision by the hearings officer outlining the basis for the decision. This was more
than sufficient to satisfy the due process rights of an inmate. While Jellison claims that the
hearing was rendered unfair by virtue of the premature re-classification of his custody
status, which he suggests amounted to a predetermination of his guilt, there is no evidence
in the record that the mistake in classification rendered the subsequent hearing
fundamentally unfair. Indeed, Jellison's erroneous re-classification was immediately
withdrawn by prison officials upon discovering the mistake and then performed anew after
the disciplinary hearing was completed and Jellison found guilty. There is no indication
that the premature re-classification "tainted" the disciplinary hearing, as Jellison claims.
¶11 Concerning Jellison's claim that he was denied the right to present exculpatory
witnesses, we note that prison hearings officers are "required," per internal prison
operating rules, "to collect the witness statements" whenever "the inmate is in temporary
lock-up." In this case, it appears that the hearings officer failed to get specific witness
statements that Jellison had requested while he was in temporary lock-up. Although
statements were obtained from some of Jellison's proposed witnesses, we do not
countenance the apparent failure of prison authorities to follow their own internal rules.
Jellison alleges that statements from other inmates would have been exculpatory because
they would have shown that he did not want to take part in the demonstration. However,
Jellison provides this Court with no basis for believing that the specific witnesses would
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have presented exculpatory testimony. He does not identify whether the witnesses were in
a position to have observed Jellison being forced to participate in the demonstration, nor
does Jellison identify what the substance of their testimony would be. Without more, this
Court determines that there is no merit to Jellison's claim. Based on the record before us, it
is clear that Jellison was presented with an opportunity to not participate in the
demonstration, by exiting out the back door of the gymnasium, but chose to instead exit
out the main door and join in the demonstration. In short, there is no evidence that Jellison
was forced to participate.
¶12 Jellison also argues that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in
violation of Article II, Section 22 of the Montana Constitution and the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, due to the fact that prison officials were aware that
inmates were planning a demonstration sometime in July of 1999. Jellison claims, in
particular, that the hearings officer who presided over his disciplinary hearing failed to
attempt to stop the demonstration, thereby exhibiting "deliberate indifference" which
resulted in Jellison becoming unwillingly involved in the demonstration. However, as the
State points out, the type of "deliberate indifference" which violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is "obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good
faith . . . ." Whitley v. Albers (1986), 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d
251, 260-61. Thus, prison officials are accorded " 'wide ranging deference' " in adopting
and executing policies to preserve internal order and discipline among the inmates,
including "prophylactic and preventative measures intended to reduce the incidence" of
breaches of prison order. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22, 106 S.Ct. at 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d
at 262.
¶13 Here, the State indicates that, while the hearings officer was aware of rumors of a
prison demonstration, he knew nothing about the specific details relative to the time,
place, or the participants of the planned demonstration. Thus, we cannot conclude, given
the wide ranging deference which we must accord prison officials to adopt policies and
take preventative actions, that the hearings officer's mere awareness of rumors
demonstrates "obduracy and wantonness" in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. More importantly, we agree with the State that the record shows
Jellison ultimately chose to participate in the prison demonstration, and was not forced to
do so. Therefore,
¶14 IT IS ORDERED that Jellison's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
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¶15 The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to Petitioner personally and to
counsel of record for the State.
¶16 DATED this 14th day of September, 1999.
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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