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No. 98-589
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 215
295 Mont. 520
986 P.2d 403
GABRIEL PETER INGERSOLL,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli,
The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.
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COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeffrey T. Renz and Jolie Shively, Criminal Defense Clinic,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Carol Schmidt,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
George H. Corn, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 5, 1999
Decided: September 14, 1999
Filed:
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__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. ¶On October 16, 1991, the Ravalli County Attorney filed an information in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, charging Gabriel Ingersoll (Ingersoll)
with the following offenses: (1) possession of explosives, a felony; (2) criminal
mischief, a felony; (3) three counts of criminal mischief, a misdemeanor; and (4)
theft, a misdemeanor.
2. ¶On February 14, 1992, the court issued its sentence and judgment, finding Ingersoll
guilty of the charged offenses and deferring imposition of sentence three years each
for possession of explosives, a felony, and criminal mischief, a felony, with the two
deferred sentences to run consecutively for a total of six years. The court also
deferred sentencing for six months for each of the four misdemeanor charges, to run
consecutively for a total of twenty-four months, all of which were to run
concurrently with the six-year deferred felony sentences. The court attached several
conditions to the deferred sentences, including, among others, the requirement that
Ingersoll pay $431.16 in restitution, a $70 surcharge fee, and $625.50 for the cost of
his public defender.
3. ¶On July 27, 1995, the Ravalli County Attorney filed a petition for revocation of
deferred sentence, alleging that Ingersoll had violated several conditions of his
probation. Ingersoll admitted to the allegations in the petition for revocation. On
December 6, 1995, after a hearing, the District Court found that Ingersoll violated
the terms and conditions of his probation and revoked his deferred sentences. The
court then sentenced Ingersoll to ten years on each of the felonies and six months on
each of the misdemeanors, all to be served concurrently.
4. ¶Ingersoll subsequently applied to the Sentence Review Division of the Supreme
Court of Montana for review of his sentence. The Sentence Review Division
unanimously affirmed Ingersoll's sentence.
5. ¶Ingersoll filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the District Court
lacked statutory authority to impose either consecutive deferred imposition of
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sentences or to defer imposition of his sentence in excess of three years. In ruling on
Ingersoll's petition for postconviction relief, the District Court concluded it did not
have jurisdiction to revoke the deferred sentences for the four misdemeanor offenses
and for the offense of possession of explosives, a felony, because those deferred
sentences had already expired after three years. Accordingly, the court found that
the revocation of those sentences was null and void.
6. ¶The court further concluded that because Ingersoll had a financial obligation
imposed as a condition of his deferred sentences, it had statutory authority under §
46-18-201(2), MCA (1989), to order the three-year deferred sentences on the two
felonies to run consecutively for a total of six years. Therefore, the court concluded
it had jurisdiction to revoke Ingersoll's sentence on the second felony, criminal
mischief. The court recognized that, by statutory definition, a consecutive sentence
does not begin to run until the sentence to which it is consecutive has been satisfied.
The court therefore reasoned that Ingersoll's second deferred sentence for criminal
mischief did not start to run until the first deferred sentence for possession of
explosives expired three years after entry of the sentence and judgment,
approximately five and one-half months prior to the State's filing its petition to
revoke Ingersoll's deferred sentences. Accordingly, the court found that the
revocation of the deferred sentence for criminal mischief as well as the court's
imposition of sentence on that conviction was valid and enforceable.
7. ¶Ingersoll filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's order denying his
petition for postconviction relief.
QUESTION PRESENTED
1. ¶Did the District Court have authority to defer sentencing for Ingersoll's felony
conviction for criminal mischief for a period not exceeding six years?
DISCUSSION
1. ¶The scope of a district court's authority to defer imposition of sentence presents a
legal issue. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the
court interpreted the law correctly. See Delaware v. K-Decorators, Inc., 1999 MT
13, ¶ 27, 973 P.2d 818, ¶ 27, 56 St.Rep. 52, ¶ 27 (citations omitted).
2. ¶Ingersoll argues that a district court must have specific statutory authority in order
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to impose a sentence or any condition of sentence, relying on State v. Nelson, 1998
MT 227, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 15, ¶ 24, 966 P.2d 133,¶ 24. He contends that the District
Court's authority to defer imposition of sentence is found in § 46-18-201, MCA
(1989), and that that statutory provision does not authorize the court to run deferred
imposition of sentences consecutively nor to aggregate deferred impositions for up
to a total of six years.
3. ¶The State contends that § 46-18-201, MCA (1989), allowed the District Court to
defer imposition of sentence for a felony for a period not exceeding three years; and
that under subsection (2), if any financial obligation is imposed as a condition of any
felony sentence, the sentence may be deferred for a period not exceeding six years.
Thus, the State argues that since a financial obligation was imposed as a condition
of sentence, the District Court had authority under subsection (2) to defer sentencing
for the criminal mischief conviction for a total of six years.
4. ¶We agree with the argument advanced by the State. Here, the court required
Ingersoll to pay over $1,000 in restitution, surcharge fees, and repayment of
attorney's fees. Imposition of these financial obligations triggered the application of
subsection (2) of § 46-18-201, MCA (1989). Although the statute did not speak in
terms of having deferred imposition of sentences run consecutively, it did authorize
deferring imposition of a felony sentence involving financial obligations for up to
six years. Whether the district court (1) defers imposition of the felony for six years,
or (2) defers it for three years--to run consecutively after expiration of a three-year
deferred sentence on another charge--makes no difference. In either case, the district
court would have authority to act on a petition to revoke filed some three years, five
months after entry of the judgment on February 14, 1992. We uphold the decision of
a district court, if correct, regardless of the lower court's reasoning in reaching its
decision. See State v. Hagen (1994), 265 Mont. 31, 36, 873 P.2d 1385, 1388-89.
5. ¶Furthermore, as the State points out, the fact that the court deferred each of the two
felony sentences for three years, to run consecutively, instead of ordering two six-
year sentences to run concurrently, inured to Ingersoll's benefit when his deferred
sentence was revoked in November of 1995. As a result of this sentence structuring,
the deferment on the possession of explosives charge had expired after three years,
and he was then only subject to one felony conviction (criminal mischief) instead of
two.
6. ¶We hold that the District Court had statutory authority, as of February 14, 1992, to
impose a deferred sentence for up to six years for Ingersoll's felony conviction for
criminal mischief. Under Rule 5(b), M.R.App.P., Ingersoll had sixty days, or until
April 14, 1992, to appeal the court's statutory authority to impose such a sentence.
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Section 46-21-105(2), MCA, provides that when a petitioner has been afforded a
direct appeal of the petitioner's conviction, grounds for relief that could reasonably
have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised in the original or amended
petition. Ingersoll's failure to appeal on or before April 14, 1992, renders his claim
procedurally barred in a postconviction proceeding. See, e.g., In re Evans (1991),
250 Mont. 172, 173, 819 P.2d 156, 157-58.
7. ¶Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ JIM REGNIER
Justice Karla M. Gray, specially concurring.
1. ¶I agree with the result reached by the Court, but not with its analysis. I would
affirm the District Court on a different basis.
2. ¶It is true, as the State argues and the Court determines, that § 46-18-201(2), MCA,
authorizes a district court to defer imposition of sentence for a period not exceeding
six years when a financial condition has been imposed as a condition of any felony
sentence. However, the District Court clearly did not defer imposition of sentence
for Ingersoll's second felony under that statutory provision in this case. Instead, it
specifically ran that three-year deferred imposition of sentence consecutive to the
three-year deferred imposition of sentence on Ingersoll's first felony. Thus, while
the District Court could have acted pursuant to § 46-18-201(2), MCA, it did not do
so. Furthermore, while the Court is correct that it makes no practical difference
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whether the District Court deferred imposition of sentence on the second felony for
six years or deferred it for three years, and ran it consecutive to the deferred
imposition on the first felony, the question before us is whether the court was
authorized to do what it actually did, not whether it was authorized to achieve the
same effect via a different course of action in sentencing. Moreover, I am concerned
that applying the "right result, wrong reason" approach here effectively results in a
prohibited modification of the sentence after the fact.
3. ¶It is my view, however, that the District Court was authorized to do what it actually
did in this case, namely, to defer imposition of sentence on each felony for three
years and to run those deferred impositions consecutively. Section 46-18-201, MCA
(1989), is entitled "Sentences that may be imposed" and subsection (1)(a) thereof
expressly authorizes a deferred imposition of sentence. (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, § 46-18-401(4), MCA (1989), provides that separate sentences for two
or more offenses must run consecutively unless the court orders otherwise. Thus,
even absent the District Court's express provision that Ingersoll's deferred
impositions were to run consecutively, § 46-18-401(4), MCA (1989), would have
produced that result by operation of law.
4. ¶Ingersoll points out in this regard that § 46-1-201(9), MCA (1989), defined
"sentence" as "the punishment imposed on the defendant by the court" and argues
that punishment means, essentially, imprisonment. As a result, according to
Ingersoll, his deferred impositions of sentence on the felonies were not "sentences"
as that term is used in § 46-18-401(4), MCA (1989). His argument is flawed.
5. ¶First, as mentioned above, the court's authority to defer imposition of sentence is
contained in the general sentencing statute, § 46-18-201, MCA (1989). Moreover,
the definitional statute--§ 46-1-201(9), MCA (1989)--does not define punishment at
all, much less as narrowly as Ingersoll defines it. Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary
1234 (6th ed. 1990), defines punishment in criminal cases as "[a]ny fine, penalty, or
confinement . . . . A deprivation of . . . some right." Where, as here, the deferred
impositions of sentence placed substantial restrictions on Ingersoll and required him,
among other things, to perform community service and make restitution, they
clearly constituted punishment under § 46-1-201(9), MCA (1989).
6. ¶Ingersoll contends, however, that our decision in State v. Rice (1996), 275 Mont.
81, 910 P.2d 245, precludes application of § 46-18-401(4), MCA (1989), here to run
the deferred impositions of sentence consecutively. He argues that, in Rice, we held
that "sentence" was synonymous with "punishment" and, as a result, excluded
deferred sentences. I disagree. We did acknowledge in Rice that the pre-1991
statutory definition of "sentence" was "punishment." Rice, 275 Mont. at 84, 910
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P.2d at 246 (citation omitted). We did not conclude, however, that that definition
excluded deferred impositions of sentence and, indeed, we could not properly have
done so because the pre-1991 statute was not at issue in Rice.
7. ¶I would conclude that deferred impositions of sentence were "sentences" under §§
46-1-201(9) and 46-18-201, MCA (1989), and, as a result, the District Court was
authorized to run the deferred impositions of sentence on Ingersoll's two felonies
consecutively. I would affirm the District Court on that basis.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
Justice James C. Nelson dissents.
1. ¶I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision. I would order Ingersoll's sentence
on criminal mischief be vacated and require that he be released from probation and
further supervision.
2. ¶As the majority points out, under the version of the § 46-18-201, MCA, applicable
to this case (the 1989 version), the trial court could defer sentencing on a felony for
up to three years under subsection 1(a). Section 46-18-201, MCA, also gave the
sentencing court additional authority to defer sentencing on a felony for up to six
years for the purposes of paying restitution, costs, attorney fees, etc. Specifically,
(2) If any financial obligation is imposed as a condition under subsection (1)(a), sentence
may be deferred for a period . . . not exceeding 6 years for any felony, regardless of
whether any other conditions are imposed.
1. ¶In the case a bar, the sentencing court statutorily could have deferred imposing a
sentence for 6 years on each of Ingersoll's felonies to allow for the payment of
restitution. But the court did not impose that sentence. Rather the District Court
specifically deferred sentence for 3 years on each felony.
2. ¶We, nonetheless, affirm because the sentencing court's original deferrals were
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imposed to run consecutively. This is precisely the problem, however. There was no
statutory authority in § 46-18-201, MCA, allowing the trial court to effectively stack
3-year deferred sentences by causing them to run consecutively rather than
(1)
concurrently. Moreover, our determination that the court's sentence was
permissible because the statute did not prohibit consecutive deferrals is legally
unsupportable.
3. ¶Our case law clearly holds that the court derives its sentencing authority from
statute and that it must have specific authority to impose a particular sentence.
Indeed, absent statutory authority, the sentence is void.
It is well-established that a district court's authority to impose sentences in criminal cases
is defined and constrained by statute. State v. Wilson (1996), 279 Mont. 34, 37, 926 P.2d
712, 714. Moreover, "a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of
specific statutory authority." State v. Hatfield (1993), 256 Mont. 340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025,
1029 (citations omitted); Wilson, 279 Mont. at 37, 926 P.2d at 714.
State v. Nelson 1998 MT 227, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 15, ¶ 24, 966 P.2d 133, ¶ 24. See also State v.
Moorman (1996), 279 Mont. 330, 336, 928 P.2d 145, 149 (court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
impose a sentence without statutory authority and sentence imposed in absence of subject matter
jurisdiction is void).
1. ¶In other words, a sentencing court has authority to impose a particular sentence
because the statute specifically allows the sentence. The court derives no sentencing
authority whatsoever from statutory silence prohibiting the sentence. The majority
have simply turned the rule on its head.
2. ¶Accordingly, under the circumstances of the case sub judice, since there was no
statutory authority allowing the sentencing court to stack the deferrals, both of the
deferrals ran concurrently and ran out 3 years after sentencing. Moreover, since the
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to cause the two 3-year deferrals to run
consecutively, the remedy sought under post conviction relief is not procedurally
barred under § 46-21-105. Moorman, 279 Mont. at 336, 928 P.2d at 149.
3. ¶The law requires that we reverse the District Court and order that Ingersoll's
sentence be vacated on the criminal mischief charge and that he be released from
probation and further supervision. We should remand for entry of an order
consistent with that determination. I dissent from our failure to do so.
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/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler and William E. Hunt, Sr., join in the foregoing dissent.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
1. In this regard I also disagree with Justice Gray's contention that § 46-18-401(4), MCA, justifies the
court's stacking of deferrals because "separate sentences for two or more offenses must run
consecutively unless the court orders otherwise." Whether an order deferring a sentence is a "sentence"
is not the relevant inquiry. Clearly, § 46-18-201(1)(a) and (2), MCA, define the parameters of the court's
jurisdiction to defer imposing sentence--3 years is the outside limit, except where a financial obligation
is imposed. Accepting Justice Gray's interpretation at face value, if the defendant was convicted of two
offenses for which no financial obligation was imposed at sentencing, the court could, by stacking the
two 3-year deferrals, nevertheless effectively place the defendant at risk for receiving at least one full
sentence on revocation for a total of 6 years--a "sentence" only permitted if a financial obligation was
imposed. If a financial obligation was imposed, using this same approach, the court could extend the
total deferral exposure to 12 years--2 years longer than the actual term of imprisonment for most
felonies and most certainly 6 years longer than the maximum deferral time allowed by the statute. In
their attempt to uphold a clearly illegal sentence by the trial court, the majority and the concurring
justice have bent the statutory language beyond all recognition.
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