No
No. 98-455
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 127
294 Mont. 461
982 P.2d 453
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SHAWN R. McBRIDE,
Defendant and Appellant.
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No
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
Honorable Maurice R. Colberg, Jr., Judge Presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jack E. Sands, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Sheila Kolar, Deputy County Attorney,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 13, 1999
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No
Decided: June 3, 1999
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, denied Shawn R.
McBride's motion to suppress certain evidence seized from his person. McBride
appeals. We reverse and remand.
¶2. The issue is whether probable cause and exigent circumstances supported police
officers' entry into McBride's residence without a warrant and without permission.
¶3. On February 27, 1998, sixteen-year-old runaway A.H. made a telephone call to
her father from a house rented by Shawn McBride in Billings, Montana. A.H.'s
father discerned the location from which A.H. was calling via the caller identification
feature on his telephone.
¶4. A.H.'s father called the local police department and reported the location of his
runaway daughter. He told the officer that there was also another runaway at that
address and that A.H. was there in violation of her probation. He asked that police
officers be sent to the address "pronto." A.H.'s father went to the address along with
the two responding police officers and a police "ride along."
¶5. When he approached the front door of the house, Billings Police Officer Randy
Helderop saw no signs of ongoing criminal activity. He knocked on the door but no
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one answered. He knocked again and turned the door knob, whereupon the door
cracked open. Inside, McBride saw Officer Helderop through the crack and tried to
shut the door. Officer Helderop prevented McBride from doing so by pushing on the
door, which swung open.
¶6. When the door opened, Officer Helderop saw McBride, who appeared to be
under the age of 21, with a beer in his hand. Officer Helderop asked McBride if he
could come in and talk, and McBride said, "No." Officer Helderop nevertheless
entered the house.
¶7. Once inside, Officer Helderop could see a young woman, later identified as A.H.,
sitting in the living room. McBride and another young man in the room admitted
that they were under the age of 21, and Officer Helderop cited them for being minors
in possession of alcohol. Officer Helderop ran a warrant check on all of the persons
in the house and discovered an outstanding arrest warrant on McBride, whom he
then placed under arrest.
¶8. Officer Helderop transported McBride to the Yellowstone County Detention
Facility. There, during an inventory search, methamphetamine was discovered in a
folded paper bindle inside a cigarette pack in McBride's pocket.
¶9. Prior to trial, McBride moved to suppress statements he made and the evidence
seized from him on February 27, 1998. He argued that Officer Helderop's
warrantless entry into his residence to search for a runaway was impermissible. The
prosecutor argued that the entry into McBride's residence was permissible because
the police officers were attempting to investigate and search for a runaway under
their duty to protect and serve the public. After a hearing, the District Court denied
the motion to suppress. McBride pled guilty to possession of dangerous drugs and
possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal the court's decision
on his motion to suppress.
Discussion
¶10. Did probable cause and exigent circumstances support police officers' entry into
McBride's residence without a warrant and without permission?
¶11. This Court's standard of review of a denial of a motion to suppress is twofold.
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We review findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous, and
conclusions of law de novo. State v. Vickers, 1998 MT 201, ¶ 10, 964 P.2d 756, ¶ 10, 55
St.Rep. 859, ¶ 10. In the present case, the facts relating to Officer Helderop's entry
into McBride's home are undisputed. In dispute are the validity of the District
Court's legal conclusions that those facts constituted probable cause and exigent
circumstances justifying entry without a warrant.
¶12. Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II,
Section 11 of the Montana Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches and seizures conducted inside a home are per se
unreasonable, subject to a few narrowly drawn exceptions. State v. Wakeford, 1998
MT 16, ¶ 21, 287 Mont. 220, ¶ 21, 953 P.2d 1065, ¶ 21.
¶13. In order to justify a warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement argued before the District Court, both exigent
circumstances and probable cause must be established. Wakeford at ¶ 22. The State
bears a heavy burden of showing the existence of exigent circumstances by
demonstrating specific and articulable facts in support thereof. Wakeford at ¶ 24 .
¶14. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within an officer's personal
knowledge or imparted to the officer by a reliable source are sufficient to justify a
belief in a reasonable person that the suspect has committed an offense. State v. Dow
(1992), 256 Mont. 126, 129, 844 P.2d 780, 782-83. At the time he entered McBride's
home, Officer Helderop had no evidence that a suspect therein had committed an
offense; in fact, he did not even know McBride was there. Officer Helderop had no
indication that a felony was being committed; no crimes of violence were committed
or threatened during any of the events surrounding the investigation of this matter;
and he had observed no suspected illegal activity at the house. A.H.'s father testified
at the suppression hearing that he did not relate to the officers that his daughter was
being threatened or held against her will. He also testified that he had no reason to
believe that McBride or any person in McBride's house had caused his daughter to
be absent from home.
¶15. Based on the evidence produced at the suppression hearing, the facts and
circumstances within Officer Helderop's personal knowledge or imparted to him by
a reliable source were not sufficient to justify in a reasonable person a belief that
McBride had committed any offense. We conclude that there was no probable cause
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for Officer Helderop to forcibly enter McBride's home.
¶16. Further, there were no exigent circumstances to support a compelling need for
official action without first securing a warrant. Exigent circumstances are those
circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to believe that prompt action,
such as entry, is necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons,
the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. Wakeford at
¶ 24.
¶17. In this case, there was adequate time to secure a warrant before entering
McBride's home--it was in the middle of a working day and Officer Helderop was in
radio contact with police headquarters. There was no suspected danger to the girl in
the house. Officer Helderop testified that he did not call for additional backup and
did not even check with police headquarters about getting a search warrant before
entering McBride's home.
¶18. The State argued before the District Court and again argues on appeal that
there was always a fear that A.H. might try to run out of McBride's house. However,
Officer Helderop was specifically asked at trial, "Did you have any evidence that
anybody was about to run?" He answered, "Not that I recall, no." The facts as
elicited at the suppression hearing in this case do not meet the standard of specific
and articulable facts required to justify a finding of exigent circumstances under
Wakeford.
¶19. On appeal, the State also argues that warrantless entry into McBride's home
was justified under the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement.
Although this theory was not argued at trial, the State urges that this Court should
not reverse the decision of a district court if that court reached the right result, even
if for the wrong reason. See State v. Huether (1997), 284 Mont. 259, 264, 943 P.2d
1291, 1294.
¶20. A number of jurisdictions have recognized and applied the emergency doctrine
exception. See Mincey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57
L.Ed.2d 290, 299-300. Montana, however, has not yet recognized this exception to the
warrant requirement. More importantly, the State did not raise the theory of the
emergency doctrine exception at the suppression hearing in the District Court. We
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decline to address the application of such a doctrine on appeal where neither party
raised the issue at the trial level. See State v. Anderson, 1999 MT 60, ¶25, ___ P.2d
___, ¶ 25, 56 St.Rep. 252, ¶ 25.
¶21. In summary, the District Court's conclusions that probable cause and exigent
circumstances supported the police officers' warrantless entry into McBride's home
were wrong. We therefore reverse the order of the District Court denying McBride's
motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of that warrantless entry.
¶22. This case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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