State v. Butler

No

No. 98-134

294 Mont. 17

977 P. 2d 1000

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1999 MT 70

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES R. BUTLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,

In and for the County of Silver Bow,

The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding.

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COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Michael W. Clague, Public Defender, Butte, Montana

For Respondent:

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Robert
M. McCarthy, Silver Bow County Attorney, Samm Cox, Deputy Silver Bow County Attorney, Butte, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: October 29, 1998

Decided: April 6, 1999

Filed:

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__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1. Pursuant to § 41-5-206, MCA (1997), James R. Butler, a youth, was charged in
District Court with the crimes of attempted deliberate homicide and attempted
robbery. The Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, denied Butler's
motion requesting it to declare § 41-5-206, MCA (1997), unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated his right to due process by allowing the prosecution to file an
information directly in District Court rather than youth court without first affording
him a hearing. The District Court subsequently entered a judgment of conviction
against Butler based upon his pleas of guilty. Butler appeals. We reverse and
remand.

¶2. The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court violated Butler's right to
due process of law, as guaranteed by Article II, Section 17 of the Montana
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when
it allowed the prosecution to file an information in District Court pursuant to § 41-5-
206, MCA (1997), without first affording Butler a hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3. On October 25, 1997, the Butte Silver Bow Law Enforcement Agency arrested
Butler for attempting to rob a convenience store and shoot the store clerk. Butler was
sixteen years old. On October 27, 1997, the youth court held a hearing as required by
§ 41-5-332, MCA, and it determined that there was probable cause to believe that
Butler was a delinquent youth and that he should be retained in custody at the
juvenile detention facility pending further proceedings.

¶4. The next day, October 28, 1997, the prosection filed a motion in District Court
pursuant to § 41-5-206, MCA (1997), requesting leave to file an information in
District Court charging Butler, as an adult, with attempted robbery, in violation of §
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45-5-401(1)(b), MCA, and attempted deliberate homicide, in violation of § 45-5-102,
MCA, and § 45-4-103, MCA. The District Court granted the motion. It found
probable cause to believe that Butler had committed the acts with which he was
charged and that considering the severity of the acts and the interests of community
protection, the case should be filed in District Court rather than youth court. The
court did not hold a hearing prior to reaching its decision. Butler was not
represented by counsel and had no opportunity to challenge the prosecution's
allegations. Instead, the court based its findings solely upon the prosecution's
affidavit. The District Court subsequently appointed a public defender to represent
Butler, and the prosecution filed the information.

¶5. On December 11, 1997, Butler and the prosecution filed a pretrial agreement
wherein Butler agreed to plead guilty to attempted robbery and attempted deliberate
homicide, but reserved his right to challenge and appeal procedural pretrial issues.
In return, the prosecution agreed to recommend that Butler be committed to the
Montana Department of Corrections for 30 years. The prosecution further agreed to
recommend that the Department place Butler in the Pine Hills Correctional Facility
until his 18th birthday, after which Butler would be screened for placement in the
Boot Camp Program. Finally, the prosecution agreed that the court should retain
limited jurisdiction over the case until Butler had successfully completed the Boot
Camp Program, at which time Butler could petition the court for a review of his
sentence.

¶6. Butler filed a motion on December 16, 1997, requesting the District Court to
declare § 41-5-206, MCA (1997), unconstitutional and to order that his case be
disposed of in youth court. The court denied the motion, stating that the issue
relating to the constitutionality of the statute should be decided by the Montana
Supreme Court. The District Court sentenced Butler as an adult in accordance with
the terms of the pretrial agreement. From this judgment, Butler appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. Resolution of this issue involves a question of constitutional law. The standard for
reviewing conclusions of law is whether they are correct. Roosevelt v. Montana Dept.
of Revenue, 1999 MT 30, __ Mont.__, ¶ 25, __ P.2d __, ¶ 25, 56 St. Rep. 125, ¶ 25
(citation omitted).

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¶8. All legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. The party challenging the
constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt. Roosevelt, ¶ 26 (citations omitted).

OVERVIEW OF THE YOUTH COURT ACT

¶9. We begin our analysis with a brief historical overview of the relevant provisions
of the Youth Court Act. Prior to 1997, a youth could not be criminally prosecuted as
an adult unless the youth court transferred jurisdiction over the case to the district
court. Section 41-5-206 (5), MCA (1995). The Act provided that if the youth was
charged with unlawful conduct that constituted a specific crime listed in the statute
when the youth had attained a specified age, the State could file a petition in the
youth court requesting the court to transfer the case to district court. Section 41-5-
206, MCA (1995). Once the State filed the petition, the youth court had the discretion
to decide whether to transfer the case. In exercising its discretion, the Act required
the youth court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was
probable cause to believe that:

(i) the youth committed the delinquent act alleged;

(ii) the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the community require treatment of
the youth beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; and

(iii) the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, or premeditated manner.

Section 41-5-206(1)(d), MCA (1995). In addition to the foregoing, the youth court was
entitled to consider the following factors when making its decision:

(a) the sophistication and maturity of the youth, determined by consideration of the youth's
home, environmental situation, and emotional attitude and pattern of living;

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(b) the record and previous history of the youth, including previous contacts with the
youth court, law enforcement agencies, youth courts in other jurisdictions, prior periods of
probation, and prior commitments to juvenile institutions.

Section 41-5-206(2), MCA (1995). If, however, the youth was 16 years of age or older,
and if the youth was charged with conduct that would constitute deliberate homicide,
mitigated deliberate homicide or attempt of either of those crimes, the Act provided that
the youth court "shall" grant the State's motion to transfer the case. Section 41-5-206(3),
MCA (1995).

¶10. In 1997, the Montana Legislature amended the Youth Court Act. Instead of
allowing the youth court the discretion to transfer jurisdiction over certain cases to
the district court, it now provides that the prosecution may file a motion directly in
district court requesting leave to file an information in the district court to criminally
prosecute the youth as an adult. Section 41-5-206, MCA (1997).

¶11. The prosecution's discretion to file such a motion, however, is not without limits.
It can file such a motion only if the youth has attained a certain age and only if the
youth is alleged to have committed one of the offenses listed within the statute at that
age. Section 41-5-206(1), MCA (1997). If the youth is seventeen years of age and is
alleged to have committed one of the offenses listed, the prosection "shall" file such a
motion. Section 41-5-206(2), MCA (1997). In this case, the provisions the prosecution
relied on when it requested leave to file an information against Butler are as follows:

Filing in district court prior to formal proceedings in youth court. (1) The county attorney
may, in the county attorney's discretion, file with the district court a motion for leave to file an information
in the district court if:

(a) the youth charged was 12 years of age or older at the time of the conduct alleged to be
unlawful and the unlawful act would if it had been committed by an adult constitute:

....

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(iv) the attempt, as defined in 45-4-103, of . . . deliberate . . . homicide; or

(b) the youth charged was 16 years of age or older at the time of the conduct alleged to be
unlawful and the unlawful act is one or more of the following:

....

(iv) robbery as defined in 45-5-401[.]

Section 41-5-206(1)(a)(iv) and (b)(iv), MCA (1997).

¶12. The Act further provides:

The district court shall grant leave to file the information if the court finds that there is
probable cause to believe that the youth has committed the alleged offense and that,
considering the seriousness of the offense and in the interests of community protection, the
case should be filed in the district court.

Section 41-5-206(3), MCA (1997).

¶13. Although the prior version of the Act required the youth court to hold a hearing
prior to transferring the case to District Court (unless the youth was 16 years old and
was charged with deliberate homicide, mitigated homicide or attempt), the amended
version of the Act is silent as to whether the district court must hold a hearing prior
to rendering its decision. However, the District Court in this case interpreted the Act
to mean that such a hearing is not required.

¶14. Finally, the Act provides that the youth court has "exclusive original
jurisdiction" in all proceedings under the Montana Youth Court Act, except for
cases filed in district court under § 41-5-206, MCA, and other situations not relevant
here where the youth court shares concurrent jurisdiction with other courts. Section
41-5-203, MCA (1997). Once the prosection actually files an information in district

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court, "jurisdiction of the youth court over the youth with respect to the acts alleged
in the information" is "terminated." Section 41-5-206(4), MCA (1997).

DISCUSSION

¶15. Did the District Court violate Butler's right to due process of law, as guaranteed
by Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, when it allowed the prosecution to file
an information in District Court pursuant to § 41-5-206, MCA (1997), without first
affording Butler a hearing?

¶16. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of the law." Article II, Section 17 of the Montana
Constitution similarly provides that "[N]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."

¶17. Butler contends that § 41-5-206, MCA (1997) of the Youth Court Act violates his
right to due process under both the federal and the state constitutions, because it did
not require the court to hold a hearing prior to allowing the prosecution to file an
information in the District Court. In support of his position, he relies primarily on
the United States Supreme Court decision in Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S.
541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.

¶18. In Kent, the juvenile was accused of committing robbery and rape. The juvenile
court in the District of Columbia waived jurisdiction over the juvenile and directed
that he be held for trial for the alleged offenses as an adult in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. In so doing, the juvenile court judge did not hold a
hearing; did not rule on various motions filed by the juvenile's counsel; did not
confer with the juvenile, his parents or his counsel; and did not make any findings or
reasons for the waiver. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546, 86 S.Ct. at 1049-50, 16 L.Ed.2d at 89.
After the case was transferred to District Court, a grand jury indicted the juvenile
for eight counts, including two counts of housebreaking, robbery and rape, and one
of housebreaking and robbery. Kent, 383 U.S. at 548, 86 S.Ct. at 1051, 16 L.Ed.2d at
90. The juvenile moved the District Court to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction was invalid. The court denied the
motion, and on a subsequent appeal after his conviction, the United States Court of

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Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Kent, 383 U.S. at 549-50, 86 S.Ct. at 1051,
1052, 16 L.Ed.2d at 90-91.

¶19. After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. It noted
that the decision to transfer the case to District Court was as potentially important to
the juvenile as the difference between five years' confinement if the case was handled
by the juvenile court, and the death sentence, if the case was processed through the
District Court. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d at 95. The
Supreme Court concluded that it was "clear beyond dispute that the waiver of
jurisdiction is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important statutory
rights of the juvenile." Kent, 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d at 94. It
stated:

[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous
consequences without ceremony -- without hearing, without effective assistance of
counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing
with adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner.

Kent, 383 U.S. at 554, 86 S.Ct. 1053-54, 16 L.Ed.2d at 93. The Supreme Court therefore held that the juvenile's
due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated. It
stated that "as a condition to a valid waiver order, [the juvenile] was entitled to a hearing, including access by his
counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and
to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision." Kent, 383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d at
95.

¶20. In the case before this Court, the State concedes that under Kent and its
progeny, the due process requirements of the federal constitution guarantee a youth
a hearing prior to removing a case from the juvenile justice system. However, it
contends that the hearing requirement is limited to those situations in which the state
has a judicial waiver statutory scheme for bringing a youth into adult court.
According to the State, each of the fifty states employs one of three distinct statutory
mechanisms by which a youth is removed from the civil arena of youth court and
placed into the criminal arena of adult court. See, generally, State In Interest of A.L.
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), 638 A.2d 814, 817-18 (describing these three
mechanisms). The first mechanism, judicial waiver, is one in which the court
exercises its discretion to place a juvenile in the adult court system. The State
contends that this is the type of system used in the Kent case, this is the type of

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system Montana used prior to the 1997 amendments to the Youth Court Act, and this
is the only system which requires a hearing according to Kent. The other two
mechanisms, known as the "legislative offense exclusion" and "prosecutorial waiver"
mechanisms, have been enacted over the last few decades due to a national trend in
which states have abandoned the rehabilitation model for dealing with youth
offenders in favor of more punishment-oriented systems which facilitate the criminal
prosecution of youths who commit serious crimes. See State In Interest of A.L., 638
A.2d at 818. Under the legislative offense exclusion system, the state legislature omits
certain categories of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Under the
prosecutorial waiver mechanism, the statute provides for concurrent jurisdiction
between juvenile and criminal courts, and the prosecutor, not the judge, has the
discretion to determine in which forum to charge the youth.

¶21. The State concedes that if a Montana court had discretion to determine whether
the youth's case should be processed by the youth court system or the adult criminal
system, then Kent would control and Butler would be entitled to a hearing. However,
the State argues that after the 1997 amendments to the Youth Court Act, Montana
now has a prosecutorial waiver mechanism. It argues that under § 41-5-206, MCA
(1997), the prosecution has the sole discretion to determine whether to file an
information in the district court charging the youth with a crime.

¶22. The State further reasons that because the decision rests with the prosecutor
and not the court, due process does not guarantee the youth a right to hearing, no
matter how "critical" the prosecutor's decision is to the youth's life. The State
justifies its position that a hearing is required only when the court, but not the
prosecution, exercises its discretion by pointing to the following excerpt:

"Judicial proceedings must be clothed in the raiment of due process, while the processes of
prosecutorial decision-making wear very different garb. It is one thing to hold, as we have,
that when a state makes waiver of a juvenile court's jurisdiction a judicial function, the
judge must cast about the defendant all of the trappings of due process, but it does not
necessarily follow that a state or the United States may not constitutionally treat the basic
question as a prosecutorial function. . . . [T]he character of the proceeding, rather than its
consequences to the accused, are largely determinative of his rights. . . . [T]he guaranty of
a hearing found in the due process clause of the Fifth [and Fourteenth] Amendment[s] has
traditionally been limited to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. It has never been held
applicable to the processes of prosecutorial decision-making."

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State v. Angel C. (Conn. 1998), 715 A.2d 652, 666 (citing Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d
334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 183, 38 L.Ed.2d 116 (1973)).

¶23. We cannot accept the State's position, even assuming we accept the State's
framework for analyzing this very important issue. The State's entire argument is
premised upon its insistence that Montana's statute leaves it solely within the
prosecution's discretion to determine whether to place a youth in the adult criminal
system. However, the plain language of the statute states otherwise.

¶24. The Act provides that it is within the prosecution's discretion to move the
district court for leave to file an information in the district court if the youth has
attained a certain age and is alleged to have engaged in certain unlawful conduct at
that age. Section 41-15-206(1), MCA (1997). However, the prosecution's discretion
ends at that point. The ultimate decision rests with the district court which must
make specific findings that (1) there is probable cause to believe that the youth has
committed the alleged offense, and that (2) considering the seriousness of the offense
and in the interests of community protection, the case should be filed in the district
court. Section 41-5-206(3), MCA (1997).

¶25. It is no answer to simply state that language requiring the District Court to
make these specific findings is superfluous because the legislature already set forth
which offenses are serious offenses that jeopardize the community protection. The
plain language of the Act specifically provides that it is the court itself that must
make such a finding. Section 41-5-206(3), MCA (1997). Any other interpretation
would render the language in that provision meaningless, contrary to this Court's
obligation to interpret the Act in a manner that will give each provision meaning and
effect. Section 1-2-101, MCA.

¶26. Accordingly, we conclude that Montana does not have a pure prosecutorial
waiver system as the State contends. Instead, the decision as to whether there is
probable cause to believe that the youth committed the offense and whether the
seriousness of the offense and the interests of community protection are such that the
case should be brought within the district court rests with the district court. The
court's decision in this regard is as potentially important to a youth as the difference
between being detained until he is 25 years' of age if the case is processed in youth
court, and losing his life if the case is processed in district court. Section 41-5-208,
MCA (1997) and § 45-5-102(2), MCA. In Montana, as in the District of Columbia in

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the Kent decision, this decision is critically important. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct.
at 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d at 94.

¶27. As the State has acknowledged, all "[j]udicial proceedings must be clothed in
the raiment of due process . . . . [and] the judge must cast about the defendant all of
the trappings of due process." Angel C, 715 A.2d at 666 (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court has held that due process requires the court to hold a hearing. Kent,
383 U.S. at 557, 86 S.Ct. at 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d at 95. In this case, the court based its
decision solely upon the affidavit of the prosecution. Butler did not have the
opportunity with the assistance of counsel to challenge the prosecution's allegations
that there was probable cause or that the seriousness of the crime or the interests of
community protection required an information to be filed in District Court. We
conclude that this failure violated his due process rights under the federal
constitution.

¶28. In support of its position, the State also points to this Court's decision in Matter
of Wood (1989), 236 Mont. 118, 768 P.2d 1370. The version of the statutory provision
at issue in Wood provided that:

The court shall grant the motion to transfer [the case from juvenile court to district court]
if the youth was 16 years old or older at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and
the unlawful act would constitute deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102, mitigated
deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-103, or the attempt, as defined in 45-4-103, of
either deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide if the act had been committed by an
adult.

Wood, 236 Mont. at 120, 768 P.2d at 1371-72 (citing § 41-5-206(3), MCA (1987)).

¶29. In Wood, we held that the failure of § 41-5-206(3), MCA (1987), to provide a
youth with a hearing prior to transferring his case to district court did not violate his
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Wood, 236 Mont. at 123, 768 P.2d at 1373. The State contends that
Wood controls the disposition of this case. In contrast, Butler alternatively argues
that Wood is distinguishable or should be overruled. We conclude that Wood is
inapposite.

¶30. The provision at issue in Wood fell within the "prosecutorial waiver"

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mechanism whereby transfer was automatic upon motion of the prosecutor and
involved no judicial decision-making. The case before the Court today, however,
involves a statutory provision that the legislature has significantly amended since the
Wood decision. As explained earlier, the revised provision now requires the district
court to make specific findings. Section 41-5-206(3), MCA (1997). As such, those
findings must be made in a manner that satisfies the constitutional requirement of
due process and fairness.

¶31. Finally, the State cites numerous cases which it contends supports its position
that Montana's Act is a prosecutorial discretion statute. However, in each of those
cases, the statutes at issue were similar to the provision at issue in Wood, in that they
either provided for automatic transfer of a case to the adult criminal court where the
youth had attained a certain age and was alleged to have committed a certain crime,
or they provided for automatic transfer upon motion by the prosecution. Those
statutes did not provide for any judicial decision-making as does Montana's statute.
See, e.g., People v. Hughes (Colo. Ct. App. 1997), 946 P.2d 509, 513 (statute allowed
prosecutor to file an information in the district court based solely upon the age and
alleged offense), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1369, 140 L.Ed.2d 517, overruled on other
grounds by Valdez v. People (Colo. 1998), 966 P.2d 587; Hansen v. State (Wyo. 1995),
904 P.2d 811, 816 (allowing cases to be commenced in district court based upon age
and alleged offense and in certain circumstances other factors to be considered solely
by the prosecutor); Angel C., 715 A.2d at 662 (statute was "an automatic, mandatory
transfer statute with the transfer based exclusively on the age of the defendant and
the offense charged").

¶32. Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the District Court violated Butler's right
to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution when it allowed the prosecution to file an information in District Court
pursuant to § 41-5-206, MCA (1997), without first affording Butler a hearing. There
is no need, however, to declare the entire provision unconstitutional as Butler
requests. Instead, we simply hold that due process requires the district court to hold
a hearing when rendering a decision under § 41-5-206(3), MCA (1997).

¶33. Because we hold that the federal constitution guarantees a youth a right to a
hearing prior to allowing the prosecution to file an information in the district court,
we need not address whether Montana's counterpart affords more protection in
certain circumstances.

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¶34. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

We Concur:

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ JIM REGNIER

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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