file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
No. 99-499
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 195N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RENEE LAMBERT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (1 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
For Appellant:
Mark English, Deputy Yellowstone County Public Defender,
Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg W. Coughlin, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Michelle Friend, Deputy
Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 13, 2000
Decided: July 18, 2000
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (2 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
1. ¶Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be
filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be
reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter
Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases
issued by this Court.
2. ¶Appellant Renee Lambert (Lambert) appeals from the judgment and order of the
Thirteenth Judicial District Court.
3. ¶We affirm.
4. ¶The following issue is presented on appeal:
5. ¶Whether the District Court erred in denying Lambert's motion to dismiss for lack
of speedy trial.
Standard of Review
1. ¶We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo to determine whether they
are correct. See Steer, Inc. v. Dept. Of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803
P.2d 601, 603. We review a district court's findings of fact to determine whether
they are clearly erroneous. See Interstate Production Credit v. DeSaye (1991), 250
Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287.
Factual and Procedural Background
1. ¶In July, 1998 the State charged Lambert with felony escape. At the time of her
escape, Lambert had been placed at the Butte PreRelease Center while serving a
term of imprisonment with the Montana Women's Correctional Center on
convictions for felony burglary and criminal mischief. On July 23, 1998 the District
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (3 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
Court set trial for November 16, 1998. On the Omnibus Status Report and Order
that was filed in September, 1998, Lambert's counsel placed a handwritten note
stating that "Defendant does not intend to file any motions. Case should be resolved
without a trial." Thereafter, Lambert was apparently moved from the Montana
Women's Prison in Billings to a facility in Gallup, New Mexico. Lambert was not
tried in November, 1998. On November 30, 1998 the District Court filed an order
directing that Lambert be transported from New Mexico to the Montana Women's
Prison. The record does not indicate when Lambert was returned to Montana from
New Mexico. In March, 1999 the District Court set Lambert's trial for May 10,
1999. The District Court's Order stated simply that "[t]his case was one of many to
be tried, but one of the other cases set was tried, making it necessary to reschedule
this case."
2. ¶In April, 1999 Lambert moved to dismiss her case for lack of speedy trial. She did
not receive a trial in May, 1999. In June, 1999 the District Court denied her motion
to dismiss for lack of speedy trial and set her case for trial on June 19, 1999. On
June 17, 1999 Lambert moved the District Court to continue her case for a change in
plea and for sentencing. On June 29, 1999 Lambert pled guilty to felony escape but
reserved her right to appeal the District Court's denial of her speedy trial motion.
The District Court committed Lambert to the Department of Corrections for two
years. From the District Court's Order and Judgment Lambert appeals.
Discussion
1. ¶Whether the District Court erred in denying Lambert's motion to dismiss for lack
of speedy trial.
2. ¶Lambert argues that the District Court erred in denying her motion to dismiss for
lack of speedy trial (hereafter, speedy trial motion). She argues that the delay
between her arraignment and her last trial date in June, 1999 was 328 days,
triggering a speedy trial analysis. We note, however, that Lambert based her speedy
trial motion on the delay between her arraignment and her trial date in May, 1999,
which she asserted was 293 days. Lambert now argues that her trial was delayed
because the State failed to make her available for her trial; she argues further that
she asserted her right to speedy trial in a timely manner. Lambert asserts that the
State has failed to show that she was not prejudiced by the impact of the pretrial
delay on the length of her incarceration, the burdensome nature of her incarceration,
and her parole eligibility. Lambert contends further that she "may not have had a
case with a triable issue and the delay in her trial may not have impaired a non-
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (4 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
existent defense, but the State should not be rewarded for transporting her to New
Mexico[,] causing her to miss her initial trial."
3. ¶The State responds that the District Court correctly denied her speedy trial motion.
The State argues that the correct time period for speedy trial purposes is that
between the time when Lambert was charged by Information and her May, 1999
trial date, the period that Lambert addressed in her motion for speedy trial
(hereafter, the delay). The State concedes that the length of the delay is 293 days,
that this delay triggers a speedy trial analysis, and that the State therefore has the
burden to show "a lack of overall prejudice to the defendant." Nor does the State
dispute that the delay is chargeable to the State and that Lambert made a timely
assertion of her right to speedy trial.
4. ¶The State contends, however, that Lambert suffered no pretrial incarceration as a
result of the escape charge or the delay because she was already incarcerated. The
State asserts that "a denial of parole or [Lambert's] placement in high [prison]
security were most likely administrative consequences of Lambert's escape and not
due to the pendency of the criminal charge." The State asserts further that Lambert's
defense was not prejudiced by the delay. The State argues that "Lambert had no
factual defenses" and notes that her attorney stated on the Omnibus form that the
case would likely be resolved without a trial. Further, the State notes that Lambert
"never contended" that the delay impaired her ability to present a defense.
5. ¶Whether a defendant has been denied her right to speedy trial is a question of
constitutional law. See State v. Small (1996), 279 Mont. 113, 116, 926 P.2d 1376,
1378 (citations omitted). Since 1972, this Court has followed the general guidelines
set forth in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101,
in evaluating claims that a defendant was denied her right to speedy trial under
Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, 213,
516 P.2d 372, 375. In City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965
P.2d 866, we set forth a new method for application of the speedy trial factors in
Barker.
6. ¶Applying Bruce, we agree that the length of the delay in the present case triggers a
speedy trial analysis, as more than 200 days elapsed between Lambert's arrest and
her trial. See Bruce, ¶ 55 (concluding 200 days of delay triggers speedy trial
analysis). We agree with the District Court that the delay of approximately 293 days
is chargeable to the State. Compare State v. Puzio (1979), 182 Mont. 163, 167, 595
P.2d 1163, 1165 (concluding institutional delay is chargeable to the State). Because
the delay attributable to the State is more than 275 days, the State has the burden of
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (5 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
showing that Lambert was not prejudiced by the delay. See Bruce, ¶ 56 (concluding
"when it has been demonstrated that 275 days of delay is [sic] attributable to the
State, the burden should shift to the State to demonstrate that the defendant has not
been prejudiced by the delay"). We note, however, the further conclusion in Bruce
that "[t]he State's proof [that pre-trial delay has not prejudiced a defendant] should
take into consideration, but need not include, all three traditional bases for
prejudice: (a) pretrial incarceration, (b) anxiety and all of its attendant
considerations, and (c) impairment of the defense. . . . Once the State has
demonstrated lack of prejudice based on one or more of these considerations, the
burden will then shift to the defendant to demonstrate prejudice . . . . " Bruce, ¶ 56.
7. ¶As Lambert asserted her right to speedy trial before her trial, she made a timely
assertion of that right. See Bruce, ¶ 57 (concluding defendant must assert right to
speedy trial before commencement of trial).
8. ¶We next consider whether the State has established that Lambert was not
prejudiced by the delay, and "we look to the problems the speedy trial guarantee is
intended to prevent: (1) pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern, and (3)
impairment of defense." Bruce, ¶ 68. Beginning with Lambert's pretrial
incarceration, we address each one of these considerations in turn.
9. ¶Throughout Lambert's pretrial incarceration, she served a prison sentence; her
discharge date was December 5, 1999. The District Court determined and we agree
that Lambert's pretrial incarceration for other charges shifted the burden regarding
prejudice back to Lambert. Lambert argues, however, that the District Court erred in
"discount[ing] that Lambert . . . had been placed in a high security section of the
prison." Lambert also appears to argue that her parole eligibility was prejudiced by
the delay. We agree with the State that "a denial of parole or [Lambert's] placement
in high security were most likely administrative consequences of Lambert's escape
and not due to the pendency of the criminal charge." Lambert's suggestion that her
pretrial incarceration was extended or made more burdensome as a result of the
delay is without support in the record. We conclude that the State has demonstrated
that Lambert was not prejudiced by her pretrial incarceration.
10. ¶We note that on appeal, Lambert does not claim that she suffered anxiety and
concern as a result of the delay. We therefore decline to address this consideration
under Bruce.
11. ¶Finally, we address whether the delay impaired Lambert's defense. As previously
noted, Lambert argues that she "may not have had a case with a triable issue and the
delay in the trial may not have impaired a non-existent defense, but the State should
not be rewarded for transporting her to New Mexico[,] causing her to miss her initial
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (6 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm
trial." Lambert does not claim, however, that the delay impaired her defense. Rather,
the gist of her argument is that the State has an affirmative duty to try cases
speedily; this argument begs the question whether the delay impaired her defense. In
the absence of a claim that the delay impaired her defense, and in light of her
counsel's concession on the Omnibus form that the case would be resolved without a
trial, we conclude that the delay did not impair Lambert's defense.
12. ¶We hold that the District Court did not err in denying Lambert's motion for speedy
trial.
13. ¶Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-499%20Opinion.htm (7 of 7)3/29/2007 10:42:49 AM