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No. 99-655
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 38
298 Mont. 279
995 P. 2d 455
ANTHONY EVANS,
Petitioner,
v.
MONTANA ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, FLATHEAD COUNTY, and THE
HONORABLE KATHERINE CURTIS, Judge thereof,
Respondents
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Writ of Supervisory Control
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Julianne Hinchey; Hinchey Law Offices, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
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Tom Esch, Flathead County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted: January 20, 2000
Decided: February 11, 2000
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
¶1.Youth-Petitioner Anthony Evans (Evans) has made an
application to this Court for a Writ of Supervisory Control
directing the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead
County, to grant Evans' motion to suppress and to dismiss
the case against him pending in Flathead County Cause No. DJ-
99-092 (A). We grant the petition for supervisory control
and accept original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Article VII, Section 2(2) of the Montana Constitution and
Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P. We hold that the District Court erred
in denying Evans' motion to suppress and order that the
court grant said motion. We decline to direct the District
Court to dismiss the proceedings against Evans on the record
before us, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
Issues
¶2. Whether this Court should exercise jurisdiction in this
matter.
¶3. Whether the District Court erred in denying Evans'
motion to suppress.
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¶4. Whether, upon suppression of the confession, the case
against Evans should
be dismissed.
Standards of Review
¶5.The standard of review of a district court's denial of a
motion to suppress is whether the court's interpretation and
application of the law is correct. State v. Hubbel (1997),
286 Mont. 200, 207, 951 P.2d 971, 975 (citation omitted).
¶6.The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal
case is a question of law which we review de novo. See, e.
g., State v. Reams (1997), 284 Mont. 448, 450, 945 P.2d 52,
54 (citation omitted).
Factual and Procedural Background
¶7.On July 7, 1999, the Flathead County Sheriff's Office
began investigating the drowning death of Megan Lamanna
(Lamanna) of Hungry Horse, Montana, who had been reported
missing the previous day. The Sheriff's Office received
information that fourteen-year-old Evans had been observed
talking with Lamanna on the day of her disappearance and
decided to interview Evans. Deputy Meyers and another
officer went to Evans' residence and left a note for Evans'
mother, Tresa Snyder (Snyder), and stepfather, Robert
Snyder, requesting they contact Meyers because he needed to
"talk to Anthony ASAP." Snyder contacted Meyers on July 8,
1999 and set up an appointment for her to bring Evans to the
Sheriff's Office the following day. When Snyder and Evans
missed this appointment, another officer went to the Snyder
home and made arrangements with Snyder for an appointment on
July 13, 1999.
¶8.Snyder later testified that she brought Evans to the
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Flathead County Sheriff's Office because the officers had
requested it and because she felt that people were unfairly
accusing her son of Lamanna's death and she wanted to get
the matter cleared up. She asserts that she did not feel as
if she had a choice whether to bring Evans to the Sheriff's
Office.
¶9.Snyder and Evans were separated when they arrived at the
Sheriff's Office on July 13, 1999. Deputies Meyers and
Parker first questioned Snyder for approximately thirty
minutes. The officers did not tell Snyder whether or not
Evans was a suspect in Lamanna's death. They did not inform
Snyder of Evans' right to remain silent or his right to an
attorney. Snyder and Evans were not given an opportunity to
talk before Evans was questioned; thus, Snyder was not able
to discuss Evans' right against self-incrimination and right
to counsel or waiver thereof with her son.
¶10.Deputy Meyers led Evans to a 9'x9' windowless
interrogation room through what he later described as a sort
of "rat maze." There, Evans was advised of his Miranda
rights. He signed a waiver of his Miranda rights outside of
the presence and without consent of his mother and without
an opportunity to discuss his rights or waiver thereof with
counsel. Evans was then interrogated by Meyers and Parker,
wearing badges and weapons, for approximately two and one-
half hours. During this time, the door to the interrogation
room remained shut. Evans did not leave the room during the
entire two and one-half hours, although the officers took
occasional breaks. The officers did not tell him he could
leave nor give him the opportunity to consult with his
mother. During the course of the interview, Snyder requested
contact with Evans on a couple of occasions, but was denied
contact with her son.
¶11.During the interview, Myers misled Evans into believing
that the police had fingerprints from Lamanna's body and
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would check them against Evans'. Evans adamantly denied
involvement in Lamanna's death and only stated that he was
responsible for her death toward the end of the two and one-
half hour interview after the officers had repeatedly told
him he had "more to tell them."
¶12.After admitting that he drowned Lamanna, Evans was
charged with Lamanna's death, arrested, handcuffed, and
escorted to juvenile detention. He was not given an
opportunity to speak with his mother. Evans has been in
custody at the Juvenile Detention Center in Kalispell,
Montana since his arrest.
¶13.Evans filed a motion to suppress his confession in
District Court on the basis that his waiver of rights while
in custody, without consent of his parent or advice of
counsel, was invalid under § 41-5-331, MCA, and that his
confession was not knowing and voluntary. Evans also moved
to dismiss the case against him for lack of evidence.
Following a hearing, the court denied Evans' motions,
concluding that Evans was not in custody during the
interview and that his confession was given voluntarily.
Discussion
¶14. Whether this Court should exercise jurisdiction in this
matter.
¶15.We are reluctant to exercise supervisory control as it
is an extraordinary remedy. See State ex rel. O'Sullivan v.
District Court (1946), 119 Mont. 429, 431, 175 P.2d 763,
764. Supervisory control, however, is appropriate where the
district court is proceeding under a mistake of law and, in
so doing, is causing a gross injustice. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Forsyth v. District Court (1985), 216 Mont. 480, 484,
701 P.2d 1346, 1348; Potter v. District Court (1994), 266
Mont. 384, 388, 880 P.2d 1319, 1322.
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¶16.Here, the District Court is proceeding under a mistake
of law because it concluded that Evans was not in custody
during the interview and that § 41-5-331, MCA, had thus not
been violated. We hold that the statute was violated and
that Evans' confession should have been suppressed. It would
be grossly unjust to subject a fourteen-year-old defendant,
who has already been in custody for approximately six
months, to a trial based on an illegally obtained
confession. The remedy of an appeal would, contrary to the
State's contention, be inadequate under these circumstances.
Given that we have not had prior occasion to apply § 41-5-
331, MCA, and determine whether a youth is "in custody for
purposes of questioning," we determine that supervisory
control is appropriate. We thus grant Evans' petition for
supervisory control and accept original jurisdiction over
this matter pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 2(2), Mont. Const.,
and Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P.
¶17.. Whether the District Court erred in denying Evans'
motion to suppress.
¶18.Section 41-5-331, MCA, provides in relevant part:
Rights of youth taken into custody - questioning - waiver of
rights. (1) When a youth is taken into custody for questioning upon
a matter that could result in a petition alleging the youth is either
a delinquent youth or a youth in need of intervention, the following
requirements must be met:
(a) The youth must be advised of the youth's right against
self-incrimination and the youth's right to counsel. . . . .
(2) A youth may waive the rights listed in subsection (1)
under the following situations: .. . .
(b) when the youth is under 16 years of age and the youth
and the youth's parent or guardian agree, they may make an
effective waiver; or
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(c) when the youth is under 16 years of age and the youth
and the youth's parent or guardian do not agree, the youth
may make an effective waiver only with advice of counsel.
¶19.Our threshold inquiry in determining whether Evans'
confession should have been suppressed is whether Evans was
"a youth taken into custody for questioning" during the
interview, thus triggering the provisions of § 41-5-331,
MCA. To determine whether Evans was in custody during the
interview, we look to whether a "reasonable person" would
have felt free to leave under the following six-factors:
Place of interrogation, time of interrogation, persons
present during interrogation, whether Miranda warnings were
gratuitously given, length and mood of interrogation, and
whether or not the suspect was arrested following
questioning. See State v. Staat (1991), 251 Mont. 1, 6, 822
P.2d 643, 646. The District Court found that Evans and
Snyder voluntarily went to the Sheriff's Office and agreed
to separate interviews. The court concluded that "a
reasonable person in Anthony's position would not have felt
that he was deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."
¶20.Our review of the record shows that Evans was "a youth
taken into custody for questioning" during the interview.
Fourteen-year-old Evans was questioned for two and one-half
hours in a 9'x9' windowless room with shut doors. He was
questioned by two officers wearing visible badges and
weapons without being able to consult with his mother. He
waived his Miranda rights without a chance to discuss his
rights with his mother or counsel. The officers repeatedly
suggested that Evans had "more to tell them" and misled him
into believing the police had fingerprints from Lamanna's
body that could be matched to his. Immediately following the
interview, Evans was arrested. It is difficult to imagine a
more "custodial" setting.
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¶21.Whether the officers felt Evans was in custody or was
free to leave during the interview is irrelevant. See
Stansburg v. California (1994), 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct.
1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (holding that determination of custody
depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation,
not on the subjective views of the interrogating officers or
the person being questioned). Furthermore, although the
State asserts that Evans was free to leave, the officers at
no point during the interview informed Evans that he did not
have to answer questions, that he could talk to his mother,
or that he could leave. A reasonable fourteen-year-old being
questioned about the death of a child under these
circumstances would surely not have felt free to leave.
Under the factors set forth in Staat, we conclude that Evans
was in custody during the interview. Thus any waiver of
rights without the consent of a parent or the advice of
counsel is invalid under § 41-5-331, MCA. The District Court
incorrectly concluded that Evans was not in custody during
the interview and erred in denying Evans' motion to suppress.
¶22.The District Court further erred in concluding that
Evans' confession was voluntary. We have previously held
that a determination of voluntariness must take into account
the totality of circumstances including, among others, the
following factors:
the defendant's age and level of education; the
interrogation technique used by the police; whether the
defendant was advised of his or her Miranda rights; the
defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice
system and police interrogation; the defendant's background
and experience; and the defendant's demeanor, coherence,
articulateness, and capacity to make full use of his or her
faculties.
State v. Loh (1996), 275 Mont. 460, 475-76, 914 P.2d 592,
601-02 (citations omitted). The District Court concluded
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that Evans' confession was voluntary under the totality of
circumstances.
¶23.Evans was fourteen years old with an eighth-grade
education. Evans did not attend school, but was apparently
home schooled or tutored. He was interrogated by two
officers wearing badges and weapons for two and one-half
hours in a 9'x9' windowless room. He was not able to
communicate with his mother prior to or during the
interview. He waived his right against self-incrimination
and right to counsel without the consent of his mother or
advise of counsel, in violation of § 41-5-331, MCA. The
officers used misleading tactics in questioning Evans.
Although Evans had some previous encounters with law
enforcement and interrogation, he had never asserted his
Miranda rights.
¶24.The court's reliance on the fact that Snyder voluntarily
brought Evans to the Sheriff's Office for questioning does
not establish voluntariness in light of the foregoing
factors. Snyder disputes that she voluntarily brought Evans
in for the interview. However, even assuming arguendo that
she did, that would not establish Evans' voluntary
appearance. It is his volition that is at issue, not hers.
The State cannot rely on Snyder's presence in arguing that
Evans voluntarily appeared, and then bypass her consent when
it comes time to obtain a waiver of her son's rights.
¶25.Having considered Evans' confession under the totality
of circumstances, we determine that Evans' confession was
not voluntarily given. The District Court erred in
concluding that the State proved the voluntariness of Evans'
confession by a preponderance of the evidence and in denying
Evans' motion to suppress on this basis.
¶26.. Whether, upon suppression of the confession, the case
against Evans should be dismissed.
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¶27.Evans contends that the case against him should be
dismissed upon suppression of his confession because the
State has no other evidence against him. We cannot, based
upon the incomplete record before us, address the question
of what evidence the State may or may not have against
Evans. Accordingly, we deny Evans' request that we order the
District Court to dismiss the charges against him.
¶28.The Petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control is
granted, the order denying suppression is reversed and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler did not participate.
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