LONA E\'kRETT,
Petitloner arid Respondent.
and
ARTHUR EL'ERETT, CLERK CI" BUPRE##,e%~ @ g i i -
STATE 0 7 w p ~ + b i e #
Respondent and Appellant
APPEAI.. FROM: District Court ofthe Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the Coullt); oFFlathead,
Honorable Katherine R. Curtis, Judge Presiding
COUNSbl. OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Peter F. Carroll, Attorney at Lam,, Kal~spell,
Mol~tana
For Respondcnt:
Robert B. Alllson. Attorney at L.am1, Kallspell. Montana
Filed:
C:kicCi~isticeKarla M. Grilp delivered lhc Opinion of the C:ourt.
hi Pursiiant to &ition I, Paragraph 3jcj: "voni-ana Supreme Coui-i 19% it~ntcrnal
Operating Ru!cs. the fol!owirrg decisiori shall not bc cited as precedent. It shall be filed as
a pubhe document rth the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported b j case t~tlc,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publ~sh~ng
Company and to
West Croup in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court
72 Arthur Everett (Arthur) appeals from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of i a\%,and
Order Uodtfyrng Support entered by the Ele~enth
Jud~ctal
Dtstnet Court, Flathead County,
on the 11iot101~ modifq child support filed by L,ona Ebcrett (LLona),hls former spouse. We
to
affirm on the three issues Arthur raises on appeal
73 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by including Arthur's overtime pay in
determining his child support obligation'?
g3 Arthur has remarried since his marriage to L,ona was dissolved and has a minor child
within that marriage, He is c~nployed an agent by the Federal Rurcau of Investigation and
as
his earnings include automatic overtime pay in an amount fixed at 25 percent of base wage.
'The District Court included that autoniatic overtime pay in Arthur's gross earnings for
purposcs of calculating his child support obligation to L,ona for their two sons who reside
with her. Arthur asserts error.
75 ,Arthur correctly contends that under Rule 37.62.106(5), ARM, part of the illontana
Uniform Child Support Guidelines pursuant to which child support must be determined,
overtime inccme for a person with a subsequei~t
family is presumed to be for thc use of the
subsequent family. From that premise, he asserts that thc Distrjct Court was required to
cxcllidc his fixed and ailtomatic ovcrtirne pay* based on his base bvage, from his gross
earnings in calculating child support in the present case. We disagree.
76 The rule at issue docs not define "overtime," In interpreting statures and
administrative rules in such a situation, Lte give words their plain meaning. See Richter v.
Rose, 1098 MT 165,1!7 21-22,289 Mont. 370,111\21-22,062 P.2d 583,77 21-22. Black's
L,aw Dictionary I 130 (,7thed. 1'909) defines overtime as "[tlhe hours worked by an employec
in excess of a standard day or week" and "[tlhe extra wages paid for excess hours worked."
Applying these definitions to the record before us regarding Arthur's o\-ertime,it is clear that,
while termed "overtime," Arthur's increase in salary in the amount of 25 percent ofhis base
wage i s not over-time as that term is commonly used and understood. First, Arthur is a
salaried employx, not one pard by the hour. As such, he works the hours requlred rather
than a fixed number of hours per day or week. Consequently, he does not uork hours ~n
excess of a standard day or u-eek and is not paid the extra amount for such excess hours
worked. On this record, the District Court's implicit determination that no actual overtime-
as contemplated by Rule 37.62.106(5). ARM is at issue here 1s not erroneous
1
'7 Moreover, the only~
reasonable rationale behind thc administrative rule's presumption
that earnings from traditional ovcrtime are for a subsecluent family is that the overtime has
been undertaken because necessary or appropriate for the nceds of the subsequent family.
This rationale also does not "fit" with the kind of ovei-time at issue here, Arthur's fivcd and
automatic o erttme apparently has been part of h ~ salary, elen though as an add-on. for the
\ s
3
entire period of his ernployrr~enr an FBI agent, including the time during which he and
as
Lana were rnanied, Thus, this "overtitne" clearly is in the nature of permanent and ongoing
salary which meets the "income froni salaries" portion of rhc definition of income available
for child support set forth in Rule 37.62.106(2)(a), ARM.
'8 For these reasons, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
irtcluding Arthur's "overtime" pay in determining his child support obligation
1:9 2. Did the District Court err in failing to take Arthur's visitation-related expenses into
account in calculating his child suppol* obligation?
f 10 hearing, Arthur 11vedin 1.0s Angeles, Californ~a,
At the time of the modificat~on and
Lona and their sons lived in Flathead County, Montana. The Montana Unifonn Child
Support Guidelines provide for an adjustment to aparent's income for child support purposes
when trabel by the parent or the child to attain the goals of a parenttng plan exceeds 2.000
miles in a calendar year. See Rule 37.62.130(11, ARM. Arthur contends he is cnt~tled
to
such a travel adjustment.
1 The travel adjustment is calculated using either the parent's ann~tal
milcage driven to
exercise parenting or the annual cost oftransportation by means otlicr than automobile. Rule
37.62.130(3), ARM. Arthur's brief to this Court refers to his amended child support
guidelines worksheet submitted to the District Court as support for a travel adjustnlcnt to his
Income.
712 Arthur's atncnded \\orksheet documents h ~ travel expenses to parent hts sons for the
s
year 1009. A r t h ~ did not attend the hearing, and offered no evidence to indicare his 1999
~r
travel expcnses rcprcscntcd typical annual expenses. I'hc ilistrict Court found that Arthur
periods in 1999 and s h o ~ ~bc creditcd S3iN tolvard arreamges in child
had three visiti~t~on ld
suppon for "extraordinary visitation expcnscs" for that year.
4 13 The District Court also found that as of January of 2000. the parties had agrce&~-in
ihc
court-ordered mediation in which they resolved parenting issues-that Lona \v-ouldtransport
the children to Spokane, Washingtosl, to fly to California to visit with Arthur, and would
return to Spokane to p ~ c k
them up at the end of the k~ssts.The court found, based on that
agreement and the expense ~neurredby Loila to meet those obligations, that a travel
adjustment to Arthur's c h ~ l d
support obligat~on .r isitation cxpenscs beyond the year I909
for
was onwananted.
114 Gi\.en Arthur's failure to produce docun~entationto support a travel adjustment
beyond the year 1909, along with the evidence of the parties' resolution of transportation
issues in mediation, we conclude the District Court did not err in failing to take Arthur's
visitation-related expenses into account in calculating his child support obhgation.
715 3, Did the District Court ahrtse its discretion in making the nlodified child support
retroactive to April of 1999?
716 Arthur states he was not served with notice of the request to modifk~child
support until
May 5, 1999. Citing the 5 40-4-208(1), MCA, requirement that a court ma>/makc modified
support effective only aRer actual notice of thc motion to modify, he asserts that retroactivity
of his modified child support obligation to April of 1909 is improper. He also appears to
argue that the facts of this case do not support a rctroaetive modification of child support.
"11 7 1-ona's rni?tioe for modification iricludcd her counsel's affidavit stating e copy lllereof
nas rntliled to Adhur in California on March 25, 1999. The motion lvas filcd with thc Clerk
of the District Court on blerch 25, 1999. 'The record suggests that Arthur rchsed to
ackno\vledge scwice ofthe mailcdrnotion and establishes that personal service was obtaincd
by a process server on May 8, 1999, when Arthur was in Montana.
7/18 Kotw~thstanding "actual notice" requirement co~ttaincd
the in 5 40-4-208(1), LfCA,
me have relied on the filing date of a motlon to modify as an appropnate effective date for
modified support. See 44arringe ofKovnsll(S995), 270 Mont. 517.525.893 P.2d 860,865.
Oil the facts of this case?iolcluding the short period oftime over which Arthur is quarreling
and the fact that hc presuntably could have delayed actual notice by personal service
indefinitely by simply avoiding Montana, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused
its discretion in making the modified child support retroactive to April of 1999.
9 As to Arthur's second argument, he cites no authority pursua~~t which the facts of
to
this case fail to support retroactive modification. As a result, he has failed to comply with
the Rule 23(a)(l), h4.R.App.P.. requ~rement
that arguments on appeal be supported "m~th
citations to the authorities . . . relied on." As a result, we decline to address this argument
further.
7120 Affirmed.
We concur: