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No. 00-777
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2001 MT 160
TRAVIS HAUSCHULZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL LAW FIRM,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable G. Todd Baugh, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Travis Hauschulz, Boise, Idaho (pro se)
For Respondent:
Mark T. Errebo, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 29, 2001
Decided: August 14, 2001
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Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Travis Hauschulz (Hauschulz), a prisoner in Idaho, filed this civil complaint for legal
malpractice against the Michael Law Firm (Michael), arising out of Michael's
representation of him in criminal proceedings in Montana. The District Court dismissed
the complaint when Hauschulz did not appear at the hearing, finding that Hauschulz stated
no actionable claim. Hauschulz appeals. We reverse and remand.
¶2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in dismissing the
civil action for malpractice for Hauschulz' failure to state any claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Facts
¶3 Travis Hauschulz was charged with criminal mischief, resisting arrest, and family
member assault in Billings. While awaiting his trial date, he was extradited to Idaho on
unrelated charges and incarcerated there. In his absence, Hauschulz' grandfather retained
Michael to represent Hauschulz in the Billings criminal proceedings, which Hauschulz
would be unable to attend due to his incarceration. According to Hauschulz, Michael was
instructed to move the court to dismiss the criminal charges unless Montana was willing to
extradite Hauschulz. If the State did decide to extradite Hauschulz, Michael was to move
to reset the trial. Instead, Hauschulz alleges, Michael showed up on the trial date,
professed not to know where his client was, and negotiated a plea agreement on behalf of
Hauschulz which Hauschulz never authorized. Michael has not disputed these contentions.
¶4 Upon learning of Michael's actions, Hauschulz filed a pro se civil action against
Michael, alleging due process and equal protection violations, and requesting dismissal of
the criminal charges, monetary damages, damages for the constitutional violations, and
repayment of $300 that his grandfather was forced to pay from a bond. After the case was
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filed, Hauschulz tried to reach the District Court so that he could be present for pre-trial
proceedings by telephone or via some mode of transportation. He also asked the District
Court to appoint counsel for him. The District Court denied his request for counsel, and
never communicated with Hauschulz concerning his other requests. Hauschulz was
therefore not represented either in person or by counsel at pre-trial proceedings.
¶5 At the pre-trial hearing, Michael moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
District Court found the motion well-taken, determining that no damage was alleged, and
that no relief could be given. The District Court judge reasoned:
[Hauschulz'] civil case is, from the pleadings and the offer of proof, is obvious that
the plea bargain was reached as an alternative to allowing the City Court to proceed
to try the defendant in absentia. The - oh, all of this stems from the defendant's not
appearing at his trial, so all of this that has occurred in this case is the defendant's
fault for not being at his own trial.
It would appear that the defense attorney got him a better deal than he would have
otherwise - would have been entitled to, so it does not appear that there are any
damages that could be awarded to the plaintiff pursuant to anything Mr. Michael did
in this case.
Discussion
¶6 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in dismissing
Hauschulz' civil action for malpractice for the failure to state a claim for which relief
could be granted.
¶7 A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief. Trankel v. State Dept. of Military Affairs (1997), 282 Mont.
348, 350, 938 P.2d 614, 616. In Lockwood v. W.R. Grace & Co. (1995), 272 Mont. 202,
207, 900 P.2d 314, 317 we stated:
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., has the effect of admitting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. In considering the motion, the complaint
is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact
contained therein are taken as true.
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¶8 The determination that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is a conclusion of law. Trankel, 282 Mont. at 351, 938 P.2d at 616. This Court
reviews a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation
of the law is correct. Trankel, 282 Mont. at 351, 938 P.2d at 616. This Court will affirm
the dismissal only if we find that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of facts
which could be proven in support of the claim. Trankel, 282 Mont. at 350-51, 938 P.2d at
616 (citation omitted).
¶9 Hauschulz argues that Michael breached his duty of care as an attorney when he
disregarded his instructions, and entered a guilty plea on Hauschulz' behalf to the criminal
charges without consulting with him or obtaining authority to enter a plea. Michael does
not dispute Hauschulz' facts. Instead, he argues that the malpractice case was properly
dismissed. He reasons that the District Court had no authority to dismiss the criminal
conviction, as Hauschulz requested, or to grant money damages. Michael claims that no
actionable claims were provable at trial, because none were alleged. We disagree.
¶10 We note that Hauschulz has asked for relief arising out of the criminal conviction, and
that he also seeks damages for attorney malpractice. We cannot address the voluntariness
issues relating to Hauschulz' criminal conviction in this proceeding. A request for relief
from the criminal conviction would be properly brought in a separate action. However, it
is clear that if the facts are as Hauschulz has stated, he could be entitled to some of the
relief requested in the action for malpractice.
¶11 To recover damages in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish each of the
following elements: first, that the professional owed him a duty of care; second, that the
professional breached this duty by a failure to use reasonable care and skill; third, that he
has suffered an injury; and finally, that the professional's conduct was the proximate cause
of the injury. Merzlak v. Purcell (1992), 252 Mont. 527, 529, 830 P.2d 1278, 1279.
¶12 The first element is clearly satisfied. It is undisputed that an attorney-client
relationship existed between Hauschulz and Michael. Although Hauschulz' grandfather
contacted Michael and paid the legal fees, Michael accepted the case and went into court
professing to represent Hauschulz. Michael does not dispute this.
¶13 The second element requires Hauschulz to establish that Michael breached his duty of
care through his failure to use reasonable care and skill. Michael argues that it was
necessary to enter a guilty plea on Hauschulz' behalf because Hauschulz failed to attend
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his trial. Hauschulz, however, was clearly precluded from attending the trial by his
incarceration in Idaho. This was the reason for Michael's retention in the first place, and
for Hauschulz' request that Michael demand extradition or seek dismissal, or in the
alternative, move to postpone the trial. Hauschulz alleges that Michael never contacted
him either on or before the trial date to discuss the charges or the decision to enter a plea.
Michael's failure to consult with his client prior to entering a guilty plea on his behalf
could clearly be construed as a failure to use reasonable care and skill.
¶14 The third and fourth elements, that the plaintiff could have suffered an injury as a
result of the breach, are stated as well. Michael argues, and the District Court agreed, that,
whatever fault there may have been in Michael's representation of Hauschulz, the guilty
plea entered by Michael could have caused Hauschulz no harm. We disagree. Although
Hauschulz does not have to serve any additional prison time as a result of his conviction
on these charges, there are arguably genuine consequences to the conviction. Hauschulz
was deprived of his constitutional right to a trial, he lost the prospect of having the
Billings' charges dismissed for the State's refusal to extradite him, and he suffers from
having additional criminal convictions on his record which may prompt enhanced criminal
penalties in the future. Harm is at issue.
¶15 Our review is limited to the question of whether the District Court erred in dismissing
Hauschulz' malpractice action for failure to state any claim upon which relief could be
granted. We conclude that Hauschulz has stated a sufficient claim to survive a Rule 12(b)
6, M.R.Civ.P., challenge, as Hauschulz may be able to prove a set of facts in support of his
malpractice claim which would entitle him to relief. Trankel, 282 Mont. at 350, 938 P.2d
at 616. We therefore hold that the District Court erred in dismissing Hauschulz'
malpractice claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and we
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because of the
unique circumstances of this case, we urge the District Court to give Hauschulz time to
properly re-plead his case, and either find an attorney to represent him in this action, or
indicate to the court when he will be able to prosecute the complaint pro se.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
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/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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