IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
SUSAN M. JOHNSRUD,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
JAMES C. JOHNSRUD,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead,
Honorable Ted 0. Eyrnpus, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Dean K. Knapton, Attorney at Law, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Paula M. Johnson, Attorney at Law, Whitefish, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 24,2000
Decided: March 27,2001
Filed:
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
71 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as
a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
72 The marriage of James C. (Jim) and Susan M. (Sue) Johnsrud was dissolved in the
Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County. Jim appeals from the court's determina-
tions of certain property values, its award of maintenance to Sue, its calculation of child
support, and its award of attorney fees to Sue. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
73 Jim first argues that the District Court erred in denying his motions for further
evidentiary hearings following the delay between the trial before a special master in January
of 1997 and the District Court's decree of dissolution andjudgment in May of 1999. Jim also
complains that the court used different valuation dates for different items of property. In
particular, he challenges the values assigned to the marital home, a Toyota pickup truck,
savings, a snow blower, his pensions, a 401(k) account, lake property, a van damaged
between the dates of trial and judgment, and debts paid off between the dates of trial and
judgment.
74 We will not disturb discretionary trial court rulings like equitable marital estate
distribution and valuation of marital property unless the court abused its discretion. In re
Marriage of Foreman, 1999 MT 8 9 , l 14,294 Mont. 181 , l 14,979 P.2d 1 9 3 , l 14. The
district court may adopt any reasonable valuation of property supported by the record. In re
Marriage ofRobinson (1994), 269 Mont. 293,296,888 P.2d 895,897. Further, the parties'
in-court stipulations as to property values are binding. In re Marriage of Simms (1994), 264
Mont. 317, 326, 871 P.2d 899,904.
75 The parties agree that the District Court included the $1,000 value of their snow
blower twice in the list of property and values awarded. It was both subsumed in the line
item "camper, boat, guns, tools & gear" and listed as a separate line item. Both of these line
items were awarded to Jim. Given the $276,925 value of the marital estate, we conclude this
minor error does not require a redistribution of the marital estate. Therefore, we remand this
case with instructions that the District Court delete the separate line item for the snow blower
from the list of marital assets in the special master's findings and conclusions adopted by the
court.
76 As to Jim's other valuation- and distribution-related arguments, our review of the
record establishes no abuse of discretion by the District Court. The parties' in-court
stipulations concerning pension values and treatment of the marital home were honored.
Despite the lapse of time involved in these proceedings, Jim has not established changes in
property values to an extent that the denial of his request for additional evidentiary hearings
was an abuse of discretion.
77 Jim next asserts the statutory findings under 5 40-4-203, MCA, on which Sue was
awarded $800 per month in maintenance are clearly erroneous and based on the court's
attempt to equalize income. In findings adopted by the court, a special master found that Sue
did not receive enough income-producing property to provide for her reasonable needs and
would not be able to support herself through her current job skills which enabled her to earn
$1,000 to $1,200 per month. Substantial evidence supports the findings and they are not
otherwise clearly erroneous. Nor does the maintenance award equalize the parties' incomes.
78 We next consider Jim's argument that the District Court erred in calculating child
support. Under Montana's child support guidelines, child support calculations must include
deduction fiom a parent's income of amounts that parent is required to pay as maintenance.
In this case, child support calculations properly included a deduction from Jim's income of
$800 per month, reflecting the ordered maintenance. On that basis, Jim was ordered to pay
$872 per month in child support for the parties' minor son, until June of 1998, when the son
anticipated graduation fiom high school.
79 Jim complains that, in addition to the $800 monthly maintenance included in the
calculation of child support, he was ordered to pay Sue $1,039 per month to cover mortgage
payment on the marital home, which had been listed for sale. The parties had stipulated that
until the home was sold, Sue and their minor son would live there. The court characterized
these payments fiom Jim to Sue as maintenance. The payments were not, however, deducted
from Jim's income as maintenance in child support calculations, and Sue was given an
allowance in child support calculations for housing expenses. Jim characterizes this as
"double-dipping."
710 Trial courts must follow the Montana Supreme Court Guidelines for Child Support
as well as the administrative rules and statutes concerning the same, and must make specific
findings to support any variances from the guidelines. Section 40-4-204(3), MCA; In re
Marriage ofKovarick, 1998 MT 33,7 39,287 Mont. 350,139, 954 P.2d 1147,a 39. The
standard of review relating to a determination of child support is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in its calculation and award. In re Marriage of Craib (1994), 266 Mont.
483,490,880 P.2d 1379,1384.
71 1 The District Court set forth in its findings the reasons for the provisions regarding the
mortgage payments. Jim was clearly the only party with sufficient income to make the
payments, which would be required only until the marital home was sold. Designation of the
payments as maintenance was a tax benefit for both parties. Additional benefits would
accrue to both Jim and Sue upon sale of the home in increased equity to be split equally
between them. On this record and under these circumstances, we conclude that the District
Court's failure to include the amount of the mortgage payments as maintenance in child
support calculations effectively resulted in a variance from the child support guidelines. The
variance was supported by specific findings and, therefore, no abuse of discretion has been
shown.
712 Jim also summarily argues that the court erred by failing to hold Sue in contempt for
making harassing phone calls to him and by awarding her attorney fees. Our standard of
review of a trial court's failure to find a party in contempt is whether the court blatantly
abused its discretion. In re Marriage o Baer, 1998 MT 29,y 45,287 Mont. 322,Y 45,954
f
P.2d 1125, f[ 45. We review an award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage o Schmiedling, 2000 MT 237,
f 7 22,301 Mont. 336,Y 22,9 P.3d 52,v 22. In his
summary arguments on these points, Jim has established no abuse of discretion.
713 As a final matter in this case, Sue requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rule
32, M.R.App.P. Rule 32 allows for the award of damages for an appeal taken without
substantial or reasonable grounds. We conclude Jim raised arguable points in his appeal and,
therefore, we decline to award Rule 32 damages.
714 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the purpose described in f[ 5
above.
We concur:
Justices /