State v. Hamilton

No. 02-135

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2002 MT 263

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL D. HAMILTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Treasure,
The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

George T. Radovich, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; John Paulson,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Gary Ryder, Treasure County Attorney, Hysham, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: June 13, 2002

Decided: November 26, 2002
Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Following his conviction for driving under the influence of

alcohol (DUI) in Treasure County Justice Court, the Defendant,

Daniel D. Hamilton, appealed to the District Court for the

Sixteenth Judicial District in Treasure County where he received a

nonjury trial de novo. Following that trial, he was again

convicted of DUI. Hamilton appeals his conviction. We affirm the

judgment of the District Court.

¶2 Hamilton raises two issues on appeal. We restate the issues

as follows:

¶3 1. Did the District Court err when it admitted evidence of

blood test results that were gathered approximately three

hours after the alleged illegal act occurred?

¶4 2. Was the evidence before the District Court sufficient to

support Hamilton’s DUI conviction?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶5 Hamilton was injured in a single car accident while traveling

on Horse Creek Road in Treasure County, Montana, sometime before
12:50 a.m. on July 3, 2001. The road was wet and consisted of

three compacted wheel tracks, separated by loose gravel, with

barrow ditches on both sides. Hamilton attempted to navigate

around a parked vehicle, which occupied part of the roadway, by

switching from the right and center travel lane to the left and

center travel lane. He lost control of his truck in the loose

gravel and rolled his vehicle into the ditch on the right-hand side

of the road.

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¶6 Treasure County Sheriff, Steve Wilkins, was notified of the

accident at approximately 12:50 a.m. and arrived at the scene at

about 1:30 a.m. When he arrived at the scene, he found Hamilton in

the overturned pickup truck, conscious and complaining of neck

pain. Wilkins observed that Hamilton smelled of alcohol but found

no alcoholic beverage containers in the truck. When asked by

Wilkins, Hamilton admitted that he had been drinking at the Spring

Creek Bar earlier that evening. An ambulance carrying two

Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) arrived around 2:05 a.m. Both

EMTs noted that Hamilton smelled of alcohol and testified to that

effect at trial. Montana Highway Patrol Officer Jeff Sorenson

arrived at the accident at 2:10 a.m. and began to conduct an

accident scene investigation. Sorenson estimated that Hamilton was

traveling approximately 40 miles per hour prior to the accident

based on “drag marks” and damage to the vehicle. He was of the

opinion that Hamilton was driving too fast for the conditions.
¶7 After being extracted from the vehicle by the “Jaws of Life,”

Hamilton was taken to the Hardin Hospital for treatment. The EMTs

reported that Hamilton was conscious, disoriented as to time and

place, and exhibited abnormal behavior en route to the hospital.

Montana Highway Patrol Officer Steve Weisnewski greeted Hamilton at

the hospital at around 3:10 a.m. and noted that Hamilton smelled of

alcohol and had bloodshot and glossy eyes. Hamilton gave a blood

sample at 3:54 a.m., which was sent to the Montana Crime Lab for

analysis. Over three hours had passed since the Wilkins initially

responded to the accident. The Lab determined that Hamilton had a

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Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) of 0.26 at the time the blood was

drawn.

¶8 Following Hamilton's conviction in Justice Court and appeal to

the District Court, a non-jury trial was held on April 25, 2001.

The State offered testimony from seven witnesses during its case.

Sheriff Wilkins, the two EMTs, and Officer Weisnewski testified

that Hamilton smelled strongly of alcohol on the evening in

question. Lynn Kurtz, an expert from the Montana Crime Lab,

testified that while he could not be certain what Hamilton’s BAC

was when he was driving before the accident, Hamilton had to have

consumed a large quantity of alcohol before the accident in order

to have a BAC of 0.26 three hours later.
¶9 On November 29, 2001, the District Court issued its Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and found Hamilton guilty of

driving while under influence of alcohol pursuant to § 61-8-401,

MCA. Hamilton was sentenced to six months in jail, with all but

one day suspended, ordered to pay a $500 fine, and ordered to

complete an alcohol treatment program.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary ruling for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Enright, 2000 MT 372, ¶ 21, 303

Mont. 457, ¶ 21, 16 P.3d 366, ¶ 21. A district court has broad

discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and

admissible, and absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not

overturn that court’s ruling. Enright, ¶ 21. We review the

sufficiency of evidence to support a guilty verdict in a criminal

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case to determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 289, ¶ 41, 291 Mont.

501, ¶ 41, 969 P.2d 925, ¶ 41.

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 DISCUSSION

ISSUE 1

¶11 Did the District Court err when it admitted evidence of blood

test results that were gathered approximately three hours after the

alleged illegal act occurred?

¶12 Hamilton contends that the District Court abused its

discretion when it admitted results of the blood test taken at the

Hardin Hospital at 3:54 a.m. as evidence. He maintains that the

three hours that elapsed between the time he was in physical

control of his truck and the time the blood was drawn violated the

requirement that a blood sample be taken “within a reasonable time

of the alleged act.”
¶13 In Montana, it is unlawful for a person to drive a motor

vehicle on public roadways while under the influence of alcohol.

Section 61-8-401(1), MCA. The results of a blood test that is

taken within a reasonable time of the alleged act give rise to an

inference of intoxication at the time of the act. Section 61-8-

401(4), MCA. This Court has not had the opportunity to consider

what constitutes a “reasonable time” pursuant to § 61-8-401, MCA.

¶14 When interpreting statutes, this Court’s only function is to

give effect to the intent of the Legislature. State v. McNally,

2002 MT 160, ¶ 19, 310 Mont. 396, ¶ 19, 50 P.3d 1080, ¶ 19

(citations omitted). While legislative intent must first be

determined from the plain meaning of the words in the statute, when

the plain meaning of a statute is subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation, we will examine the legislative history

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to aid our interpretation. McNally, ¶ 19 (citations omitted).

Moreover, in determining legislative intent, this Court will

construe criminal statutes “with a view to effect their object and

promote justice.” McNally, ¶ 19 (citing State v. Goeble, 2001 MT

73, ¶ 17, 305 Mont. 53, ¶ 17, 31 P.3d 335, ¶ 17) (citations

omitted).

¶15 In 1997, Montana’s DUI statutes were amended in response to

disparate district court interpretations of when blood tests were

admissible as evidence that a person was operating a motor vehicle

under the influence of alcohol. Section 61-8-401(4), MCA (1995),

prior to its amendment provided:
(4) Upon trial of any civil or criminal action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been
committed by any person driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, the concentration of alcohol
in the person at the time alleged, as shown by
analysis of the person’s blood, urine, or breath,
shall give rise to the following inferences . . . .

Literal interpretation of the statute by some district courts

created an impossible obligation for the arresting officer. While

delay between the time a person was in control of his or her

vehicle and the time a blood test was administered was inevitable,

strict interpretation of the pre-1997 language could preclude a

blood test taken 30 minutes after a person was stopped because the

test would not literally establish what a person's BAC was at “the

time alleged.”

¶16 The Legislature amended the problematic language in 1997 to

provide as follows:

(4) Upon trial of any civil or criminal action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been

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 committed by any person driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, the concentration of alcohol
in the person at the time of a test, as shown by
analysis of a sample of the person’s blood or
breath drawn or taken within a reasonable time
after the alleged act, gives rise to the following
inferences:

. . . .

(c) If there was at that time an alcohol concentration

of 0.10 or more, it may be inferred that the person

was under the influence of alcohol. The inference

is rebuttable.
Section 61-8-401(4), MCA (amending § 61-8-401(4), MCA (1995)).

¶17 The Senate Judiciary Committee's notes express that the

language was intended to prevent the exclusion of blood test

results simply because time had elapsed between the alleged act and

the test. Specifically, the notes refer to adverse court rulings

which suppressed blood tests that were taken more than two hours

after arrest for the alleged act. The plain language and Senate

Judiciary Committee's notes indicate that the Legislature intended

to create a broad and flexible statute, and left determination of
what constitutes “within a reasonable time after the alleged act”

to the discretion of the courts. Furthermore, defining “reasonable

time” broadly effectuates the statute’s object of keeping drunk

drivers off Montana’s roads and promotes justice. Therefore, we

hold that the statute requires a court to look at the totality of

the circumstances to determine whether a blood test was taken

within a reasonable time of the alleged act. Those circumstances

must necessarily include the foundation laid to establish the

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probative value of the test results and the purpose for which the

results are admitted.

¶18 In this case, Hamilton was involved in a single-car accident

on a rural road and treatment of his injuries took priority over

establishing the level of his intoxication. The “Jaws of Life”

were required to extricate Hamilton from his vehicle. Once

removed, he was taken to the hospital for treatment of his broken

neck. When Hamilton arrived at the hospital, two hours had passed

since Wilkins responded to the accident, and one and one half hours

had passed since he first arrived on the scene. The blood test was

taken forty minutes after Hamilton arrived at the hospital, as soon

as it was practicable under the circumstances.
¶19 During cross examination, Kurtz admitted that various factors

such as fatty foods in the stomach, the amount of alcohol consumed,

when alcohol was consumed, and a person’s drinking history can

effect the absorption rate of alcohol. He opined that these

factors make determination of Hamilton’s exact BAC at the time he

went off the road impossible to calculate. Hamilton suggests these

factors, in combination with the three hour time lapse, make the

blood test unreliable. However, it is important to keep in mind

the purpose for which the test results were admitted by the

District Court. The District Court made the following finding

number 11 based on Kurtz's testimony:

Lynn Kurz, a forensic scientist with the Montana Crime
Lab, testified to the test and indicated that although,
because of many unknown variables, one cannot extrapolate
backwards to determine a defendant's blood alcohol level
at the time of the accident, since Mr. Hamilton was
incapacitated from approximately 1 a.m. to the time of
the test at 3:54 a.m., he would have had to have consumed

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 a large amount of alcoholic beverages prior to 1 a.m. in
order to be at .26 at 3:54 a.m. Mr. Kurz also testified
that an individual's blood alcohol usually peaks within a
half hour to an hour and a half following consumption.

Based on that finding, the District Court concluded that the

evidence was admissible for the

following purpose:

16. The results of the test are relevant under Rule 402,
M.R.Evid., because the test results, in conjunction with
the other evidence, shows that Mr. Hamilton had had a
great deal to drink prior to his accident, and this makes
it more likely that his ability to drive was impaired as
a result of such drinking which is an issue in the case.
17. While the State has not been able to show that Mr.
Hamilton had any particular blood alcohol level at the
time of the accident or when driving immediately
preceding the accident, the State has shown that Mr.
Hamilton had a good deal to drink prior to the accident.
. . .

¶20 Rule 401, M.R.Evid., provides: “Relevant evidence means any

evidence having any tendency that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” Evidence is relevant if it will

have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving

the proposition for which it is offered. State v. Duffy, 2000 MT

186, ¶ 43, 300 Mont. 381, ¶ 43, 6 P.3d 453, ¶ 43.

¶21 Because the test was not unreasonably delayed by the

investigating officers, under the circumstances in this case, and

because the test results were not used to draw any inference

regarding Hamilton's blood alcohol level at the time of his

accident, but instead were considered by the District Court for

the limited purpose set forth in Finding No. 11, which purpose was

fully supported by the foundational testimony, we conclude that the

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District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting and

considering that evidence even though gathered approximately three

hours after the act complained of.

¶22 Furthermore, the results of the blood test, which indicated

that Hamilton’s BAC was at 0.26, when considered in combination

with Kurtz's foundational testimony, tended to make it more

probable that Hamilton was under the influence of alcohol when

operating his vehicle and was relevant despite the fact the test

was taken three hours after the accident. We hold the District

Court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the blood test

was relevant and admissible evidence.
ISSUE 2

¶23 Was the evidence before the District Court sufficient to

support Hamilton’s DUI conviction?

¶24 Hamilton maintains that the District Court abused its

discretion when it based his conviction on the evidence of the

blood test alone. He brings to our attention multiple

inconsistencies between Officer Sorenson’s and Officer Weisnewski’s

testimony and inconsistencies between the District Court’s findings

and the record. However, we conclude, based on the scope of our

review, that the cited inconsistencies are irrelevant.

¶25 The court heard four witnesses testify that Hamilton smelled

strongly of alcohol; Sheriff Wilkins testified that Hamilton

admitted he had been drinking prior to the accident; Officer

Sorenson testified that Hamilton appeared to be intoxicated at the

hospital; Hamilton demonstrated unusual behavior in the ambulance;

Kurtz testified that Hamilton would have had to consume a large

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amount of alcohol prior to the accident to have a BAC of 0.26 at

3:54 a.m.; and Hamilton was unable to negotiate a parked car on the

side of the road. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence

before the District Court to support Hamilton’s conviction for

driving while under influence of alcohol.

¶26 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE

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