No. 01-887
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 196
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FARREL FERRIN, individually and as
parent and guardian of ALAN FERRIN, a minor,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark,
Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ward E. Taleff, Alexander, Baucus, Taleff, Paul & Young, PLLC,
Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Lyman H. Bennett III, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 4, 2002
Decided: September 5, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Farrel Ferrin, individually and as parent and guardian of his
son, Alan Ferrin, appeals from the First Judicial District Court’s
denial of his motion for summary judgment and its grant of summary
judgment to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. We
affirm.
¶2 The following issue is raised on appeal:
¶3 Did the District Court err in concluding that Alan Ferrin’s
personal injuries were not caused by an accident resulting from the
use of Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 The essential facts of this case are undisputed. In 1995,
Farrel Ferrin (Ferrin) discussed purchasing Carl Wajahuski’s
(Wajahuski) .30/.30 caliber rifle for his son Alan Ferrin (Alan).
At the time, Alan was 12 years old. As part of the purchasing
process, the Ferrins and Wajahuski arranged a hunting trip so that
Alan could hunt deer with the rifle. On October 22, 1995, the
Ferrins drove from their residence in Helena, Montana, to
Wajahuski’s mother’s residence in Townsend, Montana. Upon the
Ferrins’ arrival, Wajahuski informed them that he had arranged a
hunt on private land near Harlowton, Montana, and that they would
travel together in Wajahuski’s vehicle from Harlowton to the
hunting site. Wajahuski owned a 1990 Ford Nissan pickup truck that
was insured by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (State Farm).
¶5 Wajahuski drove his truck to Harlowton and the Ferrins
traveled in their own vehicle. When Wajahuski and the Ferrins
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arrived in Harlowton, the Ferrins parked their vehicle and the
parties rode together in Wajahuski’s truck. Upon arriving at the
property where they intended to hunt, they drove around in search
of deer. Wajahuski eventually spotted some deer below a ridge, and
he instructed the Ferrins to exit the truck and walk downhill while
he and his mother circled behind in his truck in order to help load
any deer that were shot or to pick up the Ferrins if they were
unsuccessful. The deer were approximately 200 to 250 yards from
the truck.
¶6 Alan carried Wajahuski’s .30/.30 rifle. At the time, it was
loaded with some ammunition that Wajahuski had personally reloaded
and some factory-loaded ammunition. After walking about 25 to 50
yards, Alan raised the rifle and fired. He missed his first shot,
and he ejected the shell and loaded another cartridge. As Alan
fired a second shot, the rifle exploded and nearly severed one of
his hands. Ferrin shouted for help and Wajahuski returned. The
men loaded Alan into Wajahuski’s vehicle and drove him to a
hospital in Harlowton. Alan was subsequently flown by helicopter
to Billings, Montana, for further treatment.
¶7 On December 14, 1999, Ferrin, individually and as parent and
guardian of Alan, filed a complaint in the Eighth Judicial District
Court, Cascade County, alleging that Wajahuski was liable for
Alan’s injuries because he had negligently reloaded the round of
ammunition which caused the rifle to explode in Alan’s hands.
¶8 On March 27, 2000, State Farm filed a declaratory judgment
action in the First Judicial District Court. It contended that
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there was a controversy over whether its automobile insurance
contract with Wajahuski provided liability coverage with respect to
any claims for bodily injury asserted by Ferrin. Both State Farm
and Ferrin filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of
whether Alan’s injuries were caused by an accident resulting from
the use of Wajahuski’s truck.
¶9 The District Court held that they were not, and it denied
Ferrin’s motion for summary judgment and granted State Farm’s
motion. Ferrin appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment
rulings is de novo, and we apply the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.,
criteria as the district court. Wendell v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 1999 MT 17, ¶ 9, 293 Mont. 140, ¶ 9, 974 P.2d 623, ¶ 9
(citation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., summary
judgement is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
¶11 The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of
law. Pablo v. Moore, 2000 MT 48, ¶ 12, 298 Mont. 393, ¶ 12, 995
P.2d 460, ¶12 (citation omitted). This Court reviews a conclusion
of law to determine whether it is correct. Pablo, ¶ 12 (citation
omitted).
DISCUSSION
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¶12 Did the District Court err in concluding that Alan Ferrin’s
personal injuries were not caused by an accident resulting from the
use of Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle?
¶13 The insurance policy issued to Wajahuski by State Farm
included the following provision:
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We will:
1) Pay damages, including punitive or exemplary damages,
which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because
of:
A. Bodily injury to others; and
B. Damage to or destruction of property including loss of use
Caused by accident resulting from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of your car; . . .
¶14 In Wendell, an uninsured motorist case, we concluded that the
phrase “arising out of the use” is ambiguous, and we adopted an
expansive, fact-intensive test to determine whether injuries “arise
out of the use” of an uninsured vehicle. We held that, for
purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, an insured’s injuries
“arise out of the use” of an uninsured vehicle if the injuries
originate from, or grow out of, or flow from the use of the
uninsured vehicle. Wendell, ¶ 54. The parties and the District
Court applied the Wendell test in this case even though it is not
an uninsured motorist case and even though a different insurance
contract phrase is at issue: whether injuries were caused by an
accident “resulting from the use” of a vehicle.
¶15 We conclude that the Wendell test is applicable here. First,
from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence but not
trained in the law or insurance business, the phrase “resulting
from the use” is equally as ambiguous as the phrase “arising out of
the use” which we considered in Wendell. Like the phrase “arising
out of the use,” the phrase “resulting from the use” is reasonably
subject to more than one interpretation. See Wendell, ¶ 53.
¶16 In interpreting an ambiguous phrase, we are guided by general
principles regarding contract law as applied to insurance
contracts. Pablo, ¶ 17. If the terms of an insurance policy are
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ambiguous, obscure, or open to different constructions, we construe
the terms in a light most favorable to the insured or other
beneficiary, particularly if an ambiguous provision attempts to
preclude the insurer’s liability. Pablo, ¶ 17.
¶17 While we considered the remedial purposes of uninsured
motorist coverage in formulating the Wendell test, we conclude that
the test need not be confined to cases involving only uninsured
motorist coverage. The principles of construction governing
ambiguous insurance contract terms and phrases remain the same
whether the case involves an insured motorist or an uninsured
motorist.
¶18 Indeed, our Wendell decision cited other jurisdictions which
have recognized that the reasoning with respect to uninsured
motorist claims applies as well to other clauses in an insurance
policy. In Wendell, we adopted the test set forth in Insurance Co.
of N. America v. Dorris (Ga. App. 1982), 288 S.E.2d 856. See
Wendell, ¶ 54. In Dorris, the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted the
“originate from, or grow out of, or flow from” test from a case
involving personal injury protection coverage–not uninsured
motorist coverage. See Dorris, 288 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Stevens (Ga. App. 1977), 236
S.E.2d 550, 551). The Dorris court reasoned that although the
Stevens case involved personal injury protection coverage, its
holding regarding the sufficiency of a causal connection between an
injury and use of a vehicle was “nonetheless relevant for purposes
of contractual interpretation.” Dorris, 288 S.E.2d at 858.
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¶19 Additionally, in Wendell we discussed with approval General
Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Olivier (R.I. 1990), 574 A.2d 1240.
Wendell, ¶¶ 43-44. In Olivier, an uninsured motorist case, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the reasoning behind
affording a broader meaning to the phrase “arise out of the use”
would likewise apply to the medical-payments portion of the
insurance policy at issue. Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1243.
¶20 Accordingly, we hold that the expansive, fact-intensive test
that we adopted in Wendell to determine whether injuries “arise out
of the use” of an uninsured vehicle is also applicable to determine
whether bodily injury was caused by an accident “resulting from the
use” of an insured vehicle.
¶21 Ferrin contends that Alan’s personal injuries were caused by
an accident resulting from the use of Wajahuski’s vehicle as set
forth in Wajahuski’s insurance policy and that State Farm is thus
liable for the damages Alan suffered. He argues that the word
“use” as well as the phrase “resulting from the use,” are ambiguous
and must be construed, under Montana law, against the insurer and
in favor of the insured. Citing Georgeson v. Fidelity & Guaranty
Ins. Co. (D. Mont. 1998), 48 F.Supp.2d 1262, and Fire Ins. Exchange
v. Tibi (D. Mont. 1995), 51 F.Supp.2d 1065, Ferrin claims that
because the use of Wajahuski’s vehicle was integrally related to
Alan’s activities and injuries at the time of the accident, Alan’s
injuries originated in, grew out of, or flowed from the use of
Wajahuski’s vehicle.
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¶22 In Tibi, a rifle discharged inside a vehicle used for a guided
antelope hunt when Tibi moved his personal belongings from the
front seat of the vehicle to the back seat. Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at
1068-69. A hunt participant standing outside near the vehicle was
shot and injured. Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1069. Tibi’s insurance
company filed a declaratory action alleging that its policy did not
provide coverage to Tibi for the incident because the injuries
sustained did not arise out of the use, loading or unloading of an
insured vehicle. Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1070. A Montana federal
district court concluded that it was reasonable and foreseeable
that weapons and other hunting gear would be placed in and moved
during the course of a hunting trip. Because the injury occurred
while a firearm and/or hunting gear were relocated in the vehicle
so that Tibi could sit in the vehicle for the trip home, the court
held that the requisite causal connection existed between the
accident and the use of the vehicle. Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1073.
¶23 In Georgeson, a telecommunications employee was killed in a
fall from a utility pole while stringing cable, one end of which
was attached to a spool resting on a company truck’s trailer.
Georgeson, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1263. Again, a question existed as to
whether the accident was caused by the use of the uninsured
vehicle. Georgeson, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1265. A Montana federal
district court held that because the company truck was used to
transport cable to work sites and was used to raise and tension the
cable as it was hung on utility poles, a causal connection existed
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between the underlying accident and Georgeson’s use of the company
truck and trailer. Georgeson, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1267-68.
¶24 State Farm contends that Alan’s personal injuries were not
caused by an accident resulting from the use of Carl Wajahuski’s
insured motor vehicle. State Farm argues that although the Wendell
test is expansive and fact-intensive, it requires that the
connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury sustained
be more than “remote or tenuous.” State Farm maintains that to
conclude that Alan’s injuries resulted from the use of Wajahuski’s
vehicle “would be to determine that liability coverage exists in
any accident situation with the slightest connection to a vehicle.”
¶25 The District Court agreed and concluded that Alan’s personal
injuries were not caused by an accident resulting from the use of
Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle. The court reasoned that
while it might have been reasonable and foreseeable that the rifle
Alan was using would be placed in and moved about the vehicle as in
Tibi, it was neither reasonable nor foreseeable that the firearm
would contain allegedly negligently reloaded ammunition which would
cause the gun to explode and injure Alan after he exited the
vehicle and was 25-50 yards away from the vehicle when he fired the
gun. We hold that the District Court reached the correct
conclusion when it determined that this was not the type of
accident which could reasonably be expected to occur as the result
of using a vehicle for purposes of a hunting trip. Likewise, we
hold that the District Court properly concluded that although the
hunting party used Wajahuski’s vehicle as part of their hunting
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trip, the use of the truck was not integrally related to the
incidents surrounding the accident as was the vehicle in Georgeson.
¶26 The other cases Ferrin cites are also inapposite. In each of
them, the accidents in question would not have occurred without the
use of the vehicle. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael
(Colo. 1995), 906 P.2d 92 (underinsured motorist coverage applied
when employee’s injuries arose out of his use of the company truck
as a barricade and warning device); Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. (Me. 1987), 521 A.2d 308 (insurer liable
for injuries incurred when removing loaded shotgun from automobile
on hunting trip); Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Transit
Co. of Louisiana (Miss. 1941), 1 So.2d 221 (insurer required to
defend suit for death of bus passenger resulting from pneumonia
allegedly contracted when bus broke down and passenger forced to
walk in inclement weather); State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v.
District Court (1940), 110 Mont. 250, 100 P.2d 932 (insurance
policy covering the loading and unloading of an automobile covered
injuries incurred during unloading of beer truck).
¶27 Here, on the other hand, the accident with the rifle could
have occurred without the use of Wajahuski’s vehicle. As such,
this is more akin to the circumstances of Farmers Union Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Blair (1991), 250 Mont. 52, 817 P.2d 1156. In Blair, a
passenger removed a loaded revolver from a friend’s car, went into
the house and, while removing the revolver from his pants,
accidentally shot another man. Blair, 250 Mont. at 53, 817 P.2d at
1157. The district court held that since the shooting accident
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occurred inside a house during a party after the passenger had left
the car, the accident did not arise from the use of the vehicle.
Blair, 250 Mont. at 56-57, 817 P.2d at 1159.
¶28 Here, as in Blair, the accident could have occurred in any
location, regardless of where the rifle was stored or how the
hunters reached their destination. The fact that the truck was
used to transport the hunters and assist in the hunt simply
provides no connection between the use of the truck and the
explosion of the rifle. Had Alan walked to the hunt carrying the
rifle or engaged in target practice in his backyard, the rifle
still would have exploded.
¶29 We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that
Alan Ferrin’s personal injuries were not caused by an accident
resulting from the use of Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle.
Accordingly, State Farm was entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law.
¶30 Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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