No. 0 . 5 028 Tk{E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE CIi: ?vlO"uTA? MCA ( I 9 O f ) ;(2)hold thc dispositional hcaring witirirr 30 days ofadjudicating the cllildren youths iii need of care pursuant to 9 41-3-404(4)(b), MCIP (1997); (3) show that rcliirning the children to P.E. would crcirte a substantial risk of harm to the children or dctrimcnt to the children's physical or emotional well-beings in granting ternporary legal custody to UPHEIS as required in $ 41-3-406(2), MCA (1997); (4) provide reasonable services to F.E. to rehabilitate him and avoid removal of the children in accordance with $41-3-403(2). MCA (1997); ( 5 ) state the reasons why the cliildren were not returned home when extending required in 5 41 -3-406(6), MCA ( 1997); (6) hold the pentlancncy ternporary legal c~~stodyas plan hearing no later than twelve months after the initial order was issued purswant to $41-3- 41 2, MCA (1997); and (7) investigate the homes of extended family rnembers and place the children with exte~ided Fdmily as required in 5 41-3-101(4), MCA (1997). (11 8 Additionally, F.E. argues that the proceeding was made fundamentally unfair by the admission of "unsubstantiated sexual abuse allegations" against him. F.E. contends that the Department improperly introduced the testimony of Kaloni Taylor, Mi.E.'s therapist, urho testified that Mi.E. told her that "daddy" taught her about touching private body parts, that "my daddy touched Iny pee pee" and that "my mom had sex with me." According to F.E., this testimony polluted the entire proceedings and influenced the District Court's decision to terminate his parental rights. !/I- . ,his appeal is the first time F.E. has rztised any of these issues. The lkpanmcnt issues i n the Disrici Court is a ivaiver w-hich bars hi111 argues that F.E.'s failure to raisc ti~ese fron~ raising the claims on appeal. ";0 This Court has consistelitly held that it will not col~sider issues raised for the first timc on appeal. In re D.H., 2001 b1T 200.7 41, 306 Mont. 278, 41, 33 P.3d 616, "lit; 111vc A.rV.. 2000 :MT 35,298 Mont. 237,995 P.2d427; It1 re J.hf.J., 1999 MT 277,296 Mont. 510. 989 P.2d 840; I2 reK.H., 1999 MT 128,294 Mont. 466,981 P.2d 1190; In re S.M., 1999 M'P 1 36,293 Mont. 294, 975 P.2d 334; In re K.B.O. (1996), 277 Mont. 272,921 P.2d 268. "As a general rule, we do not consider an issue presented for the first time on appeal because it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." I r e . . 4 In order to preserve a claim or objection for appeal, an appellant must first raise that specific claim or objection in the district court. Srnfe 11, Beltson. 1099 MT 324,j ' 19,297 Mont. 321: 1 l9?902 P.2d 83 1 , (j 10. 1 1 1 the 1 ease of If1 re M. 2002 MT 126,310 Mont. 103,49 P.3d 31, this Court determined IK1 that when an appellant argues he was deprived of a fundanles~tally pt-oeedurc. "it [is] Fdir necessary that he make the same argument to the District Court." In r.e M. 7 22. In that PV., case, the appellant argued on appeal that the district court failed to hold a pemlaneney plan hearing within the statutory deadline, but failed to properly raise that issue in the district court. Thus, we declined to address the issue on appeal. I,ikcwise, in the case of ln re Il.N,, the appellants argued for the first time on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order a less restrictive aiternativc to tenninarion ofparenVal rights. Because this argumcnt was never presented to the districr court, \\-c declined to address thzr n?aitcr 0x1 appcal. In i-e D.N. 41 . :q T 721 By failing to raisc his objections in the District Court, F.E. has failed to properly preserve these issues for appeal and has waived his right to have these issues considercd by this Court. '722 F.E. does not contest the Department's assertion that he failcd to preserve his issues by raising them in the District Court. Rather, he contends that this Court should overlook that failure and hold that the Department must strictly comply with statutory procedures; whether or not a parent makes objection to assertcdproccdural violations in the district court. and should declare void any proceeding which does not satisfy every statutory requirement. Such a ruling, argues F.E., would "[ensure] that the process is in fact fair and that the State does not abuse its very substantial power in removing children and terniinating families." 723 The requirement that litigants object to asserted statutory violations in the district court serves purposes greater than simply preserving issues for appeal. A district court cannot correct statutory deficiencies if those concerns are not brought to its attention during the course of the proceeding, and for that reason, we have held that a district court will not be faulted for failing to address such issues. Iiz re D.N., 71 41, and In re J.lbi'.J., i' 31. To impleme~rta contrary policy in child cases, as F.E. urges, would encourage litigants to withhold objections in the district court, instead of appropriately raising issues during ihc course ofthe proceedings, Numerous cases would be reversed on issues never considered b the district court, and the integrity oftbc disirict court proceedings would bc undemi:~ed. y The Department would be required to re-initiate protcciive proceedings for the inxolveci children, and the prolonged litigation resulting therefrom tvould directly conflict with the primary consideration which the law gives to the child's best interest, and the requirement that child cases be expedited, so that cases can be resolved, and children can be provided permanent, caiing home environments as soon as possible. We decline such an invitation. 7124 Based on the forgoing, this Court declines to consider F.E.'s ciainis, and concludes that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating F.E.'s parental rights. Its decision is affirmed. 1Ve concur: