No. 01-672
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 125
RICHARD FLIEHLER,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
Respondent and Appellant,
and
GREG CASEY/THE RESTAURANT
INSTALLATION COMPANY,
Employer.
APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, State of Montana
The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Daniel McGregor, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Gary D. Seaman, Seaman Law Firm, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 21, 2002
Decided: June 11, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Richard Fliehler filed a claim with the Uninsured Employers’
Fund (the “UEF”), which denied the claim. Fliehler then filed a
Petition for Trial in the Workers’ Compensation Court (the “WCC”).
The WCC found that Fliehler was entitled to compensation benefits
and costs from the UEF. The UEF filed this appeal and we affirm.
¶2 The following issue is dispositive of this appeal:
¶3 Did the Workers’ Compensation Court err in concluding that
Fliehler was an “employee or worker in this state” as defined by §
39-71-118(10)(a), MCA (1997)?
BACKGROUND
¶4 Greg Casey owns a business named The Restaurant Installation
Company, which installs restaurant kitchens. On April 23, 1999,
Fliehler suffered an injury when he fell off a ladder during his
employment with Casey. The accident took place at a job site in
Tulsa, Oklahoma.
¶5 Since 1997, Casey has resided in a home outside Big Fork,
Montana. His work crew, including Fliehler, also reside in the Big
Fork area. Because Casey considered the members of his work crew
to be independent contractors, he did not maintain workers’
compensation coverage for his business.
¶6 Typically, when a restaurant designer notified Casey that a
job was available, Casey would gather his crew and drive to the
site. This normally involved an initial departure from the Big
Fork area. Occasionally, however, Casey and his crew would travel
from one out-of-state job site to the next. They would travel
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together in a pickup truck owned by Casey. The truck is also where
they permanently kept all of the tools necessary for their jobs.
¶7 In the two years before Fliehler’s injury, Casey installed
kitchens primarily for three restaurant chains: Marie Callender’s,
East Side Mario’s and McGrath’s Fish House. Casey’s work projects
took place in several western states, including Idaho, Oregon,
Washington, California, Texas, Colorado and Oklahoma. He never
undertook any projects in Montana, and he testified that the
majority of his jobs were in California.
¶8 Fliehler filed a workers’ compensation claim with the UEF,
which denied coverage because of a lack of medical information.
Fliehler then filed a Petition for Trial in the WCC. While
Fliehler was able to provide medical information establishing that
he was injured, the UEF countered that Montana law did not govern
Fliehler. Specifically, the UEF argued that Fliehler was not an
“employee or worker in this state,” pursuant to § 39-71-118(10)(a),
MCA (1997).
¶9 The WCC concluded that Fliehler was an employee of Casey,
rather than an independent contractor. The WCC further concluded
that Fliehler was an “employee or worker in this state” and thus
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits and costs from the UEF.
The UEF then sought to amend the WCC’s findings and conclusions
through a post-trial motion. The WCC denied the UEF’s motion and
issued its “Order Amending Findings of Fact.” The UEF then filed
this appeal.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Because the parties do not dispute the relevant facts, this
appeal presents only a question of law. We review a Workers’
Compensation Court’s conclusions of law to determine if they are
correct. See Russette v. Chippewa Cree Hous. Auth. (1994), 265
Mont. 90, 91-92, 874 P.2d 1217, 1218.
DISCUSSION
¶11 Did the Workers’ Compensation Court err in concluding that
Fliehler was an “employee or worker in this state” as defined by §
39-71-118(10)(a), MCA (1997)?
¶12 The UEF argues that the WCC erred in concluding that the
Montana Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) applied to Fliehler.
In deciding that the Act did apply to Fliehler, the WCC had to
determine whether Fliehler’s “employment duties” were “primarily
carried out or controlled within this state.” Section 39-71-
118(10)(a), MCA (1997). While the parties agreed that Fliehler
primarily performed his employment duties outside Montana, they
disputed where Casey “primarily controlled” these duties. The WCC
ultimately concluded that Casey primarily controlled Fliehler’s
employment duties within Montana. The UEF now argues that the WCC
improperly interpreted the term “primarily controlled” in reaching
its conclusion.
¶13 Statutory interpretation is a “holistic endeavor” that must
consider the statute’s text, language, structure, and object. See
S.L.H. v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund, 2000 MT 362, ¶ 16, 303
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Mont. 364, ¶ 16, 15 P.3d 948, ¶ 16 (citing United States Nat'l Bank
v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. (1993), 508 U.S. 439, 455,
113 S. Ct. 2173, 2182, 124 L. Ed. 2d 402, 418 (quotations
omitted)). When construing a statute, our goal is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislative intent. See § 1-2-102, MCA; S.L.H.,
¶ 16. If the words of the statute are clear and plain, we discern
the intent of the legislature from the text of the statute. See
S.L.H., ¶ 17; Western Energy Co. v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 1999
MT 289, ¶ 11, 297 Mont. 55, ¶ 11, 990 P.2d 767, ¶ 11. We will also
read and construe the statute as a whole to avoid an absurd result
and to give effect to a statute’s purpose. See S.L.H., ¶ 17;
Skinner Enters. v. Lewis & Clark County Bd. of Health (1997), 286
Mont. 256, 276, 950 P.2d 733, 745.
¶14 The UEF urges us to interpret “primarily controlled” as the
location where Casey performed most of the day-to-day management of
his employees. The parties agree that Fliehler conducted his
“employment duties,” namely the carpentry and metalworking
activities involved in installing kitchens, outside Montana.
Casey’s day-to-day management of these activities, according to the
UEF, took place outside Montana. For these reasons, the UEF argues
that Casey’s primary control of Fliehler’s employment duties
necessarily took place outside Montana. We disagree.
¶15 Although Casey’s management of Fliehler’s day-to-day kitchen
installation duties may have taken place outside Montana, Casey
also controlled Fliehler’s employment activities within Montana.
Casey’s principal place of business was in Big Fork. While Casey
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performed no jobs in Montana, Montana was the state where he hired
his crew, where they left for their jobs and where they returned to
live between jobs. Casey also kept his truck and tools at his
residence in Big Fork between jobs. Occasionally Casey would
receive the plans for his next job at his home in Big Fork. In
addition, Casey paid Fliehler in Montana the day after they
returned from a job.
¶16 As the WCC noted, “there was no singular point of control in
the sense that all of [Fliehler’s] duties were controlled from
Montana, or that all of his duties were controlled at non-Montana
job cites.” When faced with multiple locations where Casey
controlled Fliehler’s employment duties, the WCC was correct in
comparing all of Casey’s activities at these various locations and
concluding that the primary, principal and ultimate control over
Fliehler’s work took place in Montana. For these reasons, we
conclude that the WCC was correct in concluding that Casey
primarily controlled Fliehler’s employment duties in Montana.
¶17 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ JIM RICE
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