Wells v. Young

No. 00-832

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2002 MT 102

JON C. WELLS and CANDY A. WELLS,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

M. DUANE YOUNG and NANCY YOUNG,
husband and wife,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Big Horn,
The Honorable Blair Jones, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellants:

Martha Sheehy, Sheehy Law Firm, Billings, Montana

For Respondents:

Jeffrey J. Oven, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, P.L.L.P.,
Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: August 23, 2001

Decided: May 15, 2002

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 M. Duane Young and Nancy Young (“the Youngs”) appeal from the

July 25, 2000, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of

the Montana Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County,

permanently enjoining flood irrigation practices on their property.

Additionally, the Youngs appeal from the District Court’s October

4, 2000, Order denying their Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., motion to

alter or amend the judgment. We reverse.

¶2 We find one issue dispositive of this appeal:

¶3 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it

permanently enjoined lawful flood irrigation practices on the

Youngs’ property?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 The Youngs own thirteen acres of real property near Hardin,

Montana, which they purchased in 1988. Floyd Warren, Inc.,

leases approximately four acres of the Youngs’ property for crop

production. The Youngs and their predecessors in interest have

irrigated the four acre parcel for decades. Actual irrigation of
the property is sporadic due to the lack of water and the type of

crop selected for production. The annual income derived by the

Youngs from crop production on their irrigated parcel of property

is approximately $400.00.

¶5 In 1992, Jon C. Wells and Candy A. Wells (“the Wells”)

purchased real property and built a home adjacent to the Youngs’

irrigated parcel of property. Between the summer of 1994 and the

fall of 1998, the Youngs’ property was flood irrigated three times.

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 On each occasion, the Wells thereafter experienced flooding in the

crawl space of their home. The Wells filed suit against the Youngs

in the District Court claiming damages in excess of $80,000.00

based on tort theories of negligence, nuisance, and trespass. In

addition, the Wells sought a permanent injunction prohibiting

future flood irrigation on the Youngs’ property.

¶6 Following a bench trial, the District Court entered its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 25, 2000.

The specific findings of the District Court are critical to our

analysis and will therefore be explained in some detail.
¶7 The District Court found that the flood irrigation practices

employed on the Youngs’ property are “typical of the practice of

irrigators who utilize flood irrigation on crops.” Moreover, the

District Court determined that it is unlikely that the flood

irrigation practices conducted on the Youngs’ property caused a

rise in groundwater so substantial as to cause the flooding

experienced by the Wells. The District Court found that the “most

plausible and credible explanation” of the flooding experienced by

the Wells is the existence of a subsurface pathway or conduit,

“most likely” an abandoned United States Bureau of Indian Affairs

(“BIA”) ditch, extending from the head ditch on the Youngs’

property to the Wells’ home. Despite entering the prior findings,

the District Court also found that the “saturation of the soils

around the Wells’ residence and the entry of water into the Wells’

crawl space occurred as a result of the flood irrigation practices

used in irrigating the Youngs’ field in 1994 and in 1998.” The

District Court determined that the conduit or possibly other

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conditions responsible for the water flooding the Wells’ property

existed prior to the Wells’ purchase of the property and the

construction of their home.

¶8 Since the irrigation practices on the Youngs’ property

predated the construction of the Wells’ home, the District Court

reasoned that § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, precluded the Wells from

recovering damages. Under this analysis, the Wells could not

recover on their trespass actions pursuant to § 85-7-2212(2), MCA.

Similarly, the District Court concluded that the Wells’ nuisance

claim was barred by § 27-30-101(3), MCA. The District Court

disposed of the negligence claim by focusing on the Wells' failure

to establish that the Youngs’ flood irrigation practices breached

the standard of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in

flood irrigation.
¶9 Nonetheless, the District Court permanently enjoined the

Youngs from irrigating their property. The District Court

determined that future irrigation without modification to the head

ditch would result in “an unreasonable and substantial risk of

continuing harm and irreparable injury to the Wells’ property.”

Consequently, the District Court concluded that the imposition of a

permanent injunction preventing flood irrigation on the Youngs’

property was justified until said irrigation practices did not

result in the saturation of soil on the Wells’ property and the

entry of water into the Wells’ home.

¶10 After entry of the District Court’s July 25, 2000, Order, the

Youngs moved the District Court to alter or amend its judgment

pursuant to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P. The Youngs requested that the

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permanent injunction be vacated based upon the court’s

determination that their irrigation practices were lawful. On

September 25, 2000, the District Court conducted a hearing on the

Youngs’ motion. On October 4, 2000, the District Court entered its

Order denying the Youngs’ motion.

¶11 The District Court relied on our decision in Madison Fork

Ranch v. L & B Lodge Pole Timber Products (1980), 189 Mont. 292,

615 P.2d 900, to support its conclusion that injunctive relief is

available as a remedy to enjoin lawful activity when equity so

warrants. The District Court noted that our holding in Madison

Fork relied strictly on equitable principles of law and did not

cite § 27-19-102, MCA. Nonetheless, the court determined that its

imposition of the permanent injunction in this case comported with

the procedures outlined in § 27-19-102, MCA. The court found that

the continued use of flood irrigation on the Youngs’ property would

result in immediate, irreparable and substantial harm to the Wells’

home, and thus the need to protect the Wells from substantial loss

which they may potentially endure as a result of the irrigation.

The court noted that the Youngs net only nominal income from such

irrigation. The Youngs appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The grant or denial of an injunction is within the discretion

of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of

that discretion. Engel v. Gampp, 2000 MT 17, ¶ 33, 298 Mont. 116,

¶ 33, 993 P.2d 701, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). Moreover, the

granting of an injunction is an equitable remedy. Talley v.

Flathead Valley Community College (1993), 259 Mont. 479, 491, 857

5
P.2d 701, 708 (citation omitted). Therefore, we review both

questions of law and questions of fact arising upon the evidence

presented in the record to determine if the court abused its

discretion. See Section 3-2-204(5), MCA. Also see Boz-Lew

Builders v. Smith (1977), 174 Mont. 448, 452, 571 P.2d 389, 391.

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 DISCUSSION

¶13 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it

permanently enjoined lawful flood irrigation practices on the

Youngs’ property?

¶14 The District Court determined that the imposition of a

permanent injunction was warranted in this case pursuant to § 27-

19-102, MCA, and as a matter of equity. Accordingly, we must

decide whether the District Court abused its discretion when it

permanently enjoined flood irrigation practices on the Youngs’

property as both a matter of law and equity. We will first examine

whether the District Court complied with the procedures stated in §

27-19-102, MCA, and then, in turn, address whether the District

Court abused its discretion in its efforts to achieve an equitable

result.
¶15 The Youngs claim that neither law nor equity permits the

imposition of a permanent injunction precluding lawful irrigation

practices. The Youngs contend that the trial court applied an

incorrect legal standard when it permanently enjoined their

irrigation practices, which it initially determined were lawful and

did not cause the Wells’ damages. The Youngs assert that the

applicable Montana statute governing the imposition of permanent

injunctions, § 27-19-102, MCA, requires a breach of an obligation

as a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent injunction. The

Youngs point out that the District Court did not expressly find

that they breached a duty or an obligation owed to the Wells.

Likewise, the Youngs argue that a breach of the duty imposed by §

28-1-201, MCA, not to damage the property of another, cannot be

7
implied from the court’s findings. The Youngs maintain that if

such a finding were implied, it would conflict with the court’s

explicit findings and conclusions that: (1) they did not breach the

standard of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in flood

irrigation, (2) the Wells’ trespass and nuisance actions are barred

by § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, and (3) the flooding experienced by the

Wells was caused by an underground conduit constructed by the BIA.

¶16 The Wells respond that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion, under legal or equitable grounds, when it imposed a

permanent injunction. While they do not dispute that a breach of

an obligation is a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent

injunction pursuant to § 27-19-102, MCA, they assert that the

statute serves only as “mere guidelines” to a district court when

issuing permanent injunctions pursuant to its equitable powers.

Moreover, the Wells observe that the District Court necessarily

complied with the procedures set forth in § 27-19-102, MCA, since

it specifically found that the Youngs breached the obligation

imposed by § 28-1-201, MCA, when their irrigation practices caused

“immediate, irreparable, and substantial harm” to the Wells’ home.

Further, the Wells assert that if not expressly stated, an implied

finding exists that the Youngs breached the duty imposed by § 28-1-

201, MCA, as such a finding is consistent with the District Court’s

express findings.
¶17 While the parties agree that a district court must find a

breach of an obligation by the party sought to be enjoined prior to

imposing a permanent injunction, pursuant to § 27-19-102, MCA, they

disagree over whether the District Court expressly or impliedly

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found that the Youngs breached the obligation imposed by § 28-1-

201, MCA. Accordingly, in determining whether the District Court

abused its discretion, we look to the District Court's findings to

determine whether it found that the Youngs breached such

obligation.

¶18 The District Court specifically found in its July 25, 2000,

Order that:

The flood irrigation practice utilized on the Youngs’ field is
typical of
the practice of irrigators who utilize flood irrigation on
crops. [Finding # 13]
The field ditches on the Youngs’ field are of the correct
size, located at
or near the high point of the field which is necessary to
irrigate the field
and situated in a manner to convey water. [Finding # 14]

Expert testimony established that it is unlikely that the
flood irrigation
conducted by Mr. Warren and Mr. Young caused a rise in
groundwater
so substantial as to cause the flooding experienced by the
Wells. The
most plausible and credible explanation of the flooding
experienced by
the Wells is the existence of a subsurface pathway or conduit
from the
head ditch on the Youngs’ property to the home on the Wells’
property.
[Finding # 26]

Conduits can result from decaying tree roots, old utility
paths, and/or
old abandoned ditches. The evidence indicates that all three
possible
sources exist on the Wells’ property. [Finding # 27]

The most likely conduit is an abandoned BIA ditch which runs
to or in
close proximity to the Wells’ home. The BIA ditch was altered
due to
highway construction in 1961 with part of the ditch forming
the head
ditch now on the Youngs’ property and the abandoned portion of
the

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 ditch traveling across the Wells’ property. [Finding #28]

The District Court then expressly concluded in its July 25, 2000,

Order that: (1) the Wells’ trespass actions are precluded by § 85-

7-2212(2), MCA, (2) the Wells’ nuisance action is precluded by §

27-30-101(3), MCA, and (3) the Youngs did not breach the standard

of care of a reasonable farm irrigator engaged in flood irrigation.

¶19 Further, in its October 4, 2000, Order, the District Court

stated:

[T]his Court’s imposition of a permanent injunction comports
with the
procedure outlined in § 27-19-102, MCA. Defendants have a
clear general
duty (as do we all) not to damage the property of another.
See § 28-1-201,
MCA. Under the unique facts of this case, the Defendants
continued use
of flood irrigation upon their field clearly results in
immediate, irreparable,
and substantial harm to the Plaintiffs’ home.

¶20 Clearly, the District Court entered a general finding in its

October 4, 2000, Order determining that the Youngs breached the

duty imposed upon them by § 28-1-201, MCA. In the face of this

general finding, however, the District Court also entered specific

findings and conclusions that the Youngs: (1) did not trespass,

pursuant to § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, (2) did not create a nuisance,

pursuant to § 27-30-101(3), MCA, and (3) conformed to the

applicable standard of care required of them. This leads us to the

inescapable conclusion that the District Court’s general finding

that the Youngs breached the duty imposed by § 28-1-201, MCA,

conflicts with its more specific findings and conclusions. We have

previously held that when a general finding is inconsistent with a

specific finding, the general finding will be rejected. Brubaker

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v. D’Orazi (1947), 120 Mont. 22, 30-31, 179 P.2d 538, 542. Also

see Section 1-3-225, MCA. Hence, we must reject the District

Court’s general finding that the Youngs breached § 28-1-201, MCA.

We conclude, rather, that the District Court abused its discretion

when it imposed a permanent injunction pursuant to § 27-19-102,

MCA, since the District Court entered specific findings and

conclusions that the Youngs’ irrigation practices were lawful and

were not negligently performed.

¶21 We now turn to the question of whether the District Court

abused its discretion, as a matter of equity, when it enjoined

flood irrigation practices on the Youngs’ property. The Youngs

contend that equity follows the law. The Youngs thus argue that,

as a matter of equity, a finding of wrongful activity or the breach

of an obligation is a prerequisite to the imposition of a permanent

injunction since such a finding is required by § 27-19-102, MCA.

The Youngs assert that the District Court abused its discretion

when it permanently enjoined their lawful irrigation practices.
¶22 The Wells argue that the injunction was entirely appropriate

under the circumstances. They assert that the District Court

correctly relied upon our holding in Madison Fork for the

proposition that a court sitting in equity may enjoin conduct

causing irreparable harm, which may be protected in some respects,

if the equities of the particular case warrant injunctive relief.

The Wells claim that the equities in this case, as properly

balanced between the parties by the court, warrant injunctive

relief. Specifically, the Wells claim that the equities clearly

favor them since they will sustain substantial damages to their

11
home if the Youngs’ flood irrigation practices, which net the

Youngs only nominal revenues, are allowed to continue.

¶23 We have held that equity follows the law. See First National

Bank of Twin Bridges v. Sant (1973), 161 Mont. 376, 383, 506 P.2d

835, 840. We stated in Nelson v. Wilson (1928), 81 Mont. 560, 264

P. 679, 683, that:

Indeed, law and equity do not clash. In many cases they are
commingled,
administered together, and the rules of each have a place.
Any idea that the
law judges in defiance of equity and that equity is not bound
by the law is
erroneous. 2 Cooley’s Blackstone (4th Ed.) 430. While this
case is a suit
in equity, brought to obtain equitable relief, in it the law
must be invoked
to determine what rules govern transactions . . . so that both
law and equity
must be regarded.

¶24 The cases cited by the Wells, wherein a permanent injunction

was imposed, follow the principle that equity follows the law.

Prior to the imposition of an injunction in those cases, wrongful

conduct or the breach of an obligation were expressly identified.

See Jefferson v. Big Horn County, 2000 MT 163, ¶ 17 and ¶ 28, 300

Mont. 284, ¶ 17 and ¶ 28, 4 P.3d 26, ¶ 17 and ¶ 28 (injunction

enjoining government’s unlawful imposition of tax vacated after

change in law); Engel v. Gampp, 2000 MT 17, ¶ 58, 298 Mont. 116, ¶

58, 993 P.2d 701, ¶ 58 (encroachment of ditch right in violation of

§ 70-17-112, MCA, enjoined); Ducham v. Tuma (1994), 265 Mont. 436,

442-443, 877 P.2d 1002, 1006-1007 (activity constituting trespass

enjoined); and Butler v. Germann (1991), 251 Mont. 107, 115, 822

P.2d 1067, 1072 (encroachment of ditch right in violation of § 70-

17-112, MCA, enjoined).

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¶25 Moreover, our decision in Madison Fork is distinguishable.

The parties in Madison Fork entered into a contract whereby L & B

Lodge Pole Timber Products (“L & B”) was allowed to cut beetle

infested timber on the Madison Fork Ranch (“the Ranch”).

Thereafter, L & B cut both beetle infested trees and uninfected

trees. The Ranch subsequently notified L & B that they considered

the contract terminated as a result of L & B’s failure to perform

according to the contract terms. The Ranch filed suit and the trial

court issued a temporary restraining order precluding further

harvesting of timber on the Ranch. After a hearing, the court

vacated the temporary restraining order. Shortly thereafter, L & B

logged an additional 15 to 25 acres, including infested and

uninfected timber. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 297, 615 P.2d at

903.
¶26 Following a trial, the trial court found that L & B “failed

and refused to perform certain obligations under the contract” and

concluded that L & B breached the contract. Madison Fork, 189

Mont. at 298, 615 P.2d at 904. The trial court held that an

injunction was proper because the destruction and threatened future

destruction of the standing timber could not be remedied by an

action at law. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 298, 615 P.2d at 904.

On appeal, we held that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it imposed a permanent injunction enjoining L & B

from harvesting both infested and uninfected timber since L & B

breached the terms of the contract. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at

302, 615 P.2d at 906. Further, we held that the injunction was

warranted because L & B entered the Ranch and continued to cut both

13
infested and uninfected timber after receiving notification of

termination of the contract. Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 302, 615

P.2d at 906.

¶27 Unlike Madison Fork, the District Court in this case entered

no specific findings that the Youngs’ conduct was unlawful or that

they breached an obligation. Rather, the District Court

specifically determined that the Youngs’ conduct was lawful and

that the “most plausible and credible explanation” of the flooding

experienced by the Wells resulted from an abandoned BIA ditch.

Therefore, based on the particular facts of this case, we conclude

that the District Court abused its discretion, as a matter of

equity, when it permanently enjoined flood irrigation practices on

the Youngs’ property. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s

imposition of a permanent injunction in this case.
¶28 In passing, we note that the District Court concluded that §

85-7-2212(2), MCA, does not prohibit injunctive relief. Although we

agree that there may be circumstances where injunctive relief may

be allowed, they do not exist here. For example, if an injured

party acquired property before the water seepage existed or began,

or the seepage contained toxic chemicals, injunctive relief may be

appropriate. See Section 85-7-2212(2), MCA. In the matter before

us, however, the District Court found that the Youngs and their

predecessors irrigated the property many years before the Wells

purchased their adjacent homesite. There is likewise no evidence

in the record to suggest that the seepage here contained toxic

chemicals. Under the facts presented here, and as determined by

14
the District Court, we conclude that the court abused its

discretion in issuing the injunction.

¶29 Reversed.

/S/ JIM REGNIER

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/JULIE MACEK
District Court Judge Julie Macek
sitting in for Justice Cotter

15
Justice W. William Leaphart dissenting.

¶30 I dissent. Based upon general equity principles, the

deference afforded to district

courts with respect to equitable relief and our established

precedent, I would hold that the District Court properly enjoined

the Youngs from further damaging the Wells’ home in order to earn

approximately $400 per year.

¶31 Equity principles permit the District Court’s decision under

the facts of this case. The majority relies on the proposition

that equity follows the law and, citing our 1928 Nelson decision,

the notion that law and equity do not clash and are, in many cases,

commingled. I agree with these basic equity tenants. However, I

disagree with the majority’s narrow view of, what I believe, are

courts’ broader equity powers to serve justice when a party lacks a

remedy at law.

¶32 Our early case law recognized a distinction between legal and

equitable remedies. In State ex rel. Lewis and Clark County v.

District Court (1931), 90 Mont. 213, 219-20, 300 P. 544, 546, we
noted that while there are a great many exacting Code provisions

which must be strictly followed as applied to actions at law, there

are others with which the law provisions have nothing to do, except

as equity follows the law, “and the two must not be confused.”

Indeed, in the Nelson opinion cited by the majority, we also

recognized that equity, while guided by rules and precedent, is

“the correction of that wherein the law, by reason of its

universality, is deficient.” Nelson, 81 Mont. at 572, 264 P. at

683.

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¶33 It is equally important to note that injunctive relief, as a

device of equity, is appropriate when it appears that the

commission or continuance of an act will produce irreparable injury

to the party seeking relief. A continuing invasion of a property

right may constitute an irreparable injury. Engel, ¶ 56 (citing

Ducham, 265 Mont. at 442-43, 877 P.2d at 1006). What distinguishes

an injunction from other forms of relief is that it is an equitable

remedy granting prospective, as opposed to retrospective, relief.

Jefferson, ¶ 18. Most importantly, equity dictates that an

injunction be fashioned according to the circumstances of the case.

Talley, 259 Mont. at 491, 857 P.2d at 708 (citing Montana Tavern

Ass’n v. State of Montana by and through Dept. of Revenue (1986),

224 Mont. 258, 265, 729 P.2d 1310, 1315).
¶34 Here, the District Court invoked the law to determine what

rules governed the transactions between the Youngs and the Wells.

It properly determined that, under § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, the Wells

could not maintain an action at law against the Youngs since the

Youngs’ irrigation practices predated the Wells’ interest in their

land. However, as the District Court concluded and the majority

acknowledges, § 85-7-2212(2), MCA, does not preclude the

possibility of injunctive relief to prevent future irreparable

injury to property.

¶35 The majority would restrict injunctive relief to only

situations outlined in § 85-7-2212(2), MCA. That statute, however,

does not address injunctive relief. Rather, it permits an action

at law if an injured party acquired property before the water

seepage existed or began or if the seepage contained toxic

17
chemicals. If a remedy at law exists, equitable relief is

improper. Curran v. Dept. of Highways (1993), 258 Mont. 105, 109,

852 P.2d 544, 546 (if party’s “loss can be compensated, of course,

it is not an irreparable injury.”). As such, contrary to the

majority’s conclusion, an equitable remedy would not likely exist

in these particular situations.

¶36 The majority also concludes that the District Court entered no

specific findings that the Youngs’ conduct was unlawful or that

they breached an obligation and, thus, the court’s reliance on

Madison Fork was misplaced. However, what the majority fails to

address is that the district court in Madison Fork enjoined lawful
conduct when it restrained L & B from harvesting infected timber on

the Madison Fork Ranch. With regard to these trees, there was no

breach of contract or breach of obligation. Yet, we upheld the

district court’s injunction under the facts of that case on the

basis of two general principles: that injunctions must be framed

according to the circumstances of each case and that injunctions

are proper if an act has or will produce irreparable injury.

Madison Fork, 189 Mont. at 302, 615 P.2d at 906.

¶37 In this regard, we have previously upheld injunctive relief

restraining lawful activity. Boyer v. Karagacin (1978), 178 Mont.

26, 32-33, 582 P.2d 1173, 1177 (upheld permanent injunction

prohibiting legal parking of car which blocked access to adjacent

business upon concluding that “ . . . an act, while technically

legal, may be enjoined as a nuisance.”). In disputes among

neighbors, such as the one at hand, we have approved of equitable

measures restricting lawful conduct “for the sake of preserving

18
‘peace and tranquility.’” Engel, ¶¶ 52-53 (lawful user of easement

required to give notice to neighbor by mail or telephone prior to

exercising her right to access easement by vehicle).

¶38 Here, while the District Court found that an abandoned BIA

ditch was most likely responsible for flooding the Wells’ home, it

also found that the Wells experienced flooding only when the

Youngs irrigated their property. Thus, logically, the Court found

that continued irrigation would cause further flooding and

increased damage to the structural integrity of the Wells’ home and

constitute a substantial risk of continuing harm and irreparable

injury to the Wells’ property. In contrast, the court found that

the Youngs irrigated only sporadically and that income the Youngs

derived from crop production was minimal and, in part, unknown.

Thus, the District Court reasoned that the potential damage to the

Wells’ home and property was far greater than the nominal income

the Youngs derived from crop production. Substantial evidence in

the record supports this determination.
¶39 To hold that the District Court abused its discretion in

issuing injunctive relief under these facts is tantamount to saying

that an irrigator may, for no good reason, continue causing

irreparable damage to his neighbor’s home, in perpetuity. It would

be a different situation altogether if the Youngs’ irrigation

resulted in more than nominal income. By carefully considering

the competing interests involved and fashioning injunctive relief,

the District Court did not act on a whim or decide this case in

defiance of the law. Giving due deference to the District Court, I

would affirm.

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 /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler and Justice Jim Rice join in the
dissent of Justice Leaphart.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ JIM REGNIER

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