No. 00-780
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 4 1
ATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DWAYNE KELLAMES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Russell Fagg, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; John Paulson,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 18, 2001
Decided: March 5, 2002
Filed:
Chicf Justice Karla M. Gray dclivercd the Opinion of the Coiirt.
I Dwayne Kellarnes pled guilty to the offense of robbery. Prior to sentencing by the
Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, he moved to withdraw his plea and
asked that new counsel be appointed to represent him. The District Court denied both
motions, sentenced Kellames and entered judgment. Kellames appeals and we affirm.
72 We address the following issues:
73 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Kellames' motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?
74 2. Did the District Court err in determining Kellames' complaints about his counsel
were not seemingly substantial?
BACKGROUND
75 In June and July of 1999, the State of Montana charged Kellames with felony theft,
burglary, and three counts of robbery stemming from a series of crimes against casinos and
an auto leasing business in Billings, Montana. The District Court appointed the Yellowstone
County Public Defender Office (YCPDO) to represent him.
76 On October 26, 1999, Kellames and the State entered into a plea agreement under
which Kellames agreed to plead guilty to one charge of robbery and the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges. In entering his guilty plea, Kellames admitted that on June
25, 1999, he threatened a casino employee with immediate bodily injury if she did not
PI-ovidchim with thc cash from hcr cash rcgistcr. Thc District Co~lrt
acccpted Kcllames'
guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.
77 After the change ofplea hearing, Kellames contacted his attorney about withdrawing
his guilty plea. Counsel advised him that he should not, and could not, withdraw his plea.
A conflict of interest then arose between the YCPDO and Kellames, when Kellames
provided information to law enforcement implicating other public defender clients in drug
crimes. Consequently, the District Court appointed substitute counsel David Duke to
represent Kellames.
78 Kellames told Duke about his desire to withdraw his guilty plea and Duke filed a
motion to withdraw the plea. After the court denied the motion, Kellames filed a motion for
new counsel and to withdraw his plea and wrote a letter to the presiding judge in which he
made specific complaints about the YCPDO and Duke. On July 26,2000, the District Court
held a hearing--at which Kellames represented himself--to determine if Kellames' complaints
were seemingly substantial, thereby justifying appointment of additional counsel for a
hearing on the merits of the complaints. After the hearing, the District Court determined
Kellames' complaints were not seemingly substantial. It subsequently sentenced Kellames
to 40 years in prison. Kellames appeals, represented by the Appellate Defender Office.
DISCUSSION
79 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Kellames' motion to withdraw
his guilty plea?
1 A district court may, for good cause, pcrniit a plea of guilty to bo withdrawn and a
plea of not guilty to bc substituted. Section 46-16- 1 O5(2), MCA. A guilty plea is valid only
if it represents a "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice among the alternative courses
of action open to the defendant." State v. Keys, 1999 M T lO,y 12,293 Mont. 81,7 12, 973
P.2d 8 12,7 12 (citations omitted).
8 11 This Court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for
abuse of discretion. State v. Bowley (1997), 282 Mont. 298, 304, 938 P.2d 592, 595. In
determining whether good cause existed and whether the court abused its discretion, we
consider three factors: (1) the adequacy of the district court's interrogation at the time ofthe
plea regarding the defendant's understanding of the consequences of the plea; (2) whether
the ptea was the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for
dismissal of another charge; and (3) the promptness with which the defendant attempted to
withdraw the plea. Keys, fl 1 1 (citation omitted). We will
deem a guilty plea involuntary when it appears that the defendant was laboring
under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake, or serious mental
condition that the possibility exists he may have pled guilty to a crime of which
he is innocent.
Keys, fl 12 (citation omitted). Any doubt regarding whether a guilty plea was voluntarily or
intelligently made must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Keys, 7 12 (citation omitted).
712 Kellames contends the District Court's interrogation at the time he changed his plea
was inadequate in that, rather than going over all of his rights with him individually, the court
relied on Kellames' response that he had listened to the interrogation of--and was willing to
givc up the fundamental rights covcrcd with--two dcfcndants who pled guilty to other crimcs
immediately before he entered his guilty plea. Kellarncs points out that this Court cannot
review the colfoquy between the District Court and those defendants because it is not part
of the record on appeal.
713 It is true that the trial court's colloquy with other defendants is not before us.
However, the rights Kellames generally claims were inadequately covered during the court's
pre-plea interrogation of him were listed in the written plea agreement he signed and to
which the District Court referred him during the change-of-plea hearing. More importantly,
Kellames did not include this alleged inadequacy as grounds for the motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in the District Court. This Court does not address issues or theories raised for the
first time on appeal. State v. Osterloth, 2000 MT 129,120,299 Mont. 5 17,720, 1 P.3d 946,
7 20.
714 With regard to the second and third factors from Keys, we observe--as did the District
Court--that Kellames' plea of guilty was given in exchange for the dismissal of four other
felony charges against him. Convictions on those charges could have resulted in multiple
100-year prison terns. The State concedes the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was
prompt.
115 In addition to the three-factor test from Keys, KeIlames claims his pIea was
involuntary because of his mother's influence over him. In both his motion to withdraw the
guilty plea and the hearing on that motion, Kellames stated his attorneys brought his mother
to thc jail to visit him bcforc he signed the plea agreement. Without specifying what, if
5
anything, shc said to h ~ mKcllamcs further statcd his mother broke down in tears during thc
,
visit and--because he is very sensitive to women in his family--he gave in and signcd the plea
agreement.
71 6 Kellames concedes that, in response to the District Court's questioning at the change-
of-plea hearing, he denied he was suffering from a disability, stated he felt no threat or
coercion to plead guilty, and admitted the decision to plead guilty was totally his. In the face
of those assertions, his present claim regarding his mother's influence is unpersuasive. We
conclude that Kellames has not stated a claim of pressure from his mother which rises to the
level of coercion sufficient to render his subsequent responses to questioning in open court
involuntary.
717 Finally, Kellames contends he has a serious mental problem, bipolar disorder, which
requires medication and his counsel failed to so inform the court during the change-of-plea
hearing. Relying on State v. Sanders, 1999 MT 136,n 15,294 Mont. 539,n 15,982 P.2d
1015, 7 15, for the proposition that all doubts about the voluntariness of a criminal
defendant's guilty plea should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits, he contends the
District Court should have held a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because
of his mental disorder. Taking the last portion of Kellames' argument first, we need observe
only that he did not request such a hearing in the District Court.
1 8 Kellames is correct that doubts about the voluntariness of a guilty plea should be
resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. He relies on State v. Eretlz, 1998 MT 197, 290
Mont. 294, 964 P.2d 26, in arguing the existence of such doubt bascd on a "serious mental
6
condition" hcrc, b ~Ereth is readily disting~iishablc.
~ t Thcrc, thc defendant cntcrcd an ill/bri/
plea based on her belief that she may have been repressing memories of committing the
sexual offenses with which she was charged. Ereth, 7 11. She later came to reject that basis
for her plea and moved to withdraw the plea. Ereth, 115. We held that the District Court
abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw her guilty plea, because
we determined the plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Ereth, 7 34.
719 Unlike the record in Ereth, this record contains no indication that Kellames' claimed
mental disorder influenced his plea. Nor did Kellames enter an Alford plea. Kellames
admitted to the District Court that he was not suffering under any disability and that he had
committed the offense of robbery by threatening a casino employee with immediate bodily
injury if she did not give him the cash from the register. His unsupported allegation that a
claimed bipolar disorder requiring medication undercuts the validity of those admissions is
unpersuasive. In short, Kellames has raised no doubt about whether his guilty plea was
voluntarily or intelligently made.
120 In summary, the record before us indicates that the District Court adequately
interrogated Kellames when he entered the plea and that his plea was given in exchange for
the dismissal of other felony charges, and Kellames has produced nothing which creates
doubt that his plea was voluntary. Therefore, we hold the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Kellames' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
1 2 1 Did the District Court err in determining Kellames'complaints about his counsel were
1
not seemingly substantial?
I 1/22 When presented with allegations of incffcctivc assistance of counscl which
purportedly require appointment of new counsel, a district court must make an adequate
initial inquiry into the nature of those complaints and determine if they are seemingly
substantial. State v. Gallagher, 1998 MT 70, 1/ 15,288 Mont. 1 8 0 , l 15,955 P.2d 1371, fi
15 (Gallagher I). If, but only if, the complaints are seemingly substantial, the court must
appoint new counsel to represent the defendant at a hearing on the merits of the motion for
new counsel. Gallagher I,1/ 15 (citation omitted). "In determining whether [the defendant]
presented seemingly substantial complaints about the effectiveness of his counsel, the
District Court should. . . inquire . . . into the complaints and ma[k]e some sort of a critical
analysis at the time the motion [i]s filed." State v. Finley, 276 Mont.126, 143,915 P.2d 208,
2 19 (citation omitted), overruled on othergrounds by State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39,1/ 21,
304 Mont. 215, 7 2 1 , 19 P.3d 817, 1/ 21 (Gallagher II).
1/23 In the present case, the District Court's initial inquiry included a hearing at which the
court heard Kellames' lengthy oral explanation of his complaints about both the YCPDO and
David Duke. Kellames complained that his YCPDO counsel failed to follow up on his
request to seek DNA evidence concerning the crimes with which he was charged; refused to
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and interrogated and harassed his mother. He also
asserted Duke failed to investigate the charges. The court then allowed Duke to make a
statement in response to Kellames' complaints. The court later issued a written order
analyzing the complaints and determining they focused primarily on Kellames' YCPDO
counsel and, in any event, werc not seemingly substantial. On that basis, thc court dcnicd
Kellames' motion for new counsel.
7\24 On appeal, Kellames contends his YCPDO attorneys made a number of promises in
connection with the plea agreement, including that they would present a full case at
sentencing showing that he was not guilty of the charges that were dropped and that they
would represent him before the parole board. While he complains about their failure to
follow through on those promises, that complaint is not relevant here for at least three
reasons: (1) no such promises are contained in the written plea agreement which states
Kellames has been given no other promises in exchange for his guilty plea; (2) Kellames had
a new attorney--not the attorney who made the alleged promises--forhis sentencing hearing;
and (3) a sentencing hearing after the entry of a guilty plea is not an appropriate occasion on
which to make a "full case" concerning one's innocence on charges which have been
dismissed.
125 Kellames also contends the District Court should have held a second hearing on his
claim that Duke's appointment was improperly restricted to sentencing matters only, thereby
restricting Duke's ability to effectively represent him. This claim is disproved by the record.
The court's minute entry regarding the substitution of Duke for Kellames' YCPDO counsel
includes no restrictions on the scope of Duke's appointment. Moreover, Duke filed the
motion to withdraw Kellames' guilty plea, and once the District Court denied that motion,
only the sentencing hearing remained.
I
I Finally, Kel1anlc.s points out Duke did not includc in thc motion to withdraw his guilty
7130
plea any argument that Kellames suffered from a mental disorder. Again, Kellames has
offered nothing to suggest that his ability and competence to enter a voluntary plea were in
any manner affected by the bipolar disorder from which he claims to suffer.
727 This Court has deemed initial inquiries into allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel adequate where the district court considered the defendant's factual complaints
together with counsel's explanations addressing those complaints. See, e.g., State v. Craig
(19951, 274 Mont. 140, 906 P.2d 683; State v. Morrison (1993), 257 Mont. 282, 848 P.2d
514, overruled on othergrounds by Gallagher I1,T 21, The District Court did so here. After
reviewing the record, we hold the District Court did not err in determining Kellarnes'
complaints about his counsel were not seemingly substantial.
728 Affirmed.
We concur: