No. 01-315
IX Till3 SL7PRELfI: COliRT 01: THE ST,-ZTE OF MON-riINA
2003 "~rr
28
L.
RON;\L D J ROOT,
Deknda~it i\ppcllant.
and
APPEAL FROM: District Court of tile Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-00-933
G.
Honorable Do~iglas t-larkin, Judge Presiding
Far i2ppellant
F
W~lltarn t-fooks. Attorney at Lam. tlclena, Montana
For Respondent:
I-lonorablc Mike McCrath, Attor~iey General; Carol I. Sch~nidi.
Assistarlt Attor~iey
(;cneral, Helena, Montana
Fred Van Valltenburg, County httoriley, RZissoula, Monta~ia
Decided: ikbruarj 20; 200.3
iirrl Ricc delivered the Opinion of the Coon.
Just~cc
$1 Ronald J. Xoot (Roo:) appads :?om ihc order entered by ihc Foirrih .iudici:ii District
Court, Missoilla Couniy, dismissing his pirtition for postconviction relict 'We afinn.
"I /Although Root raises several issues on appeal, we find the follo:\.ir~g issric to he
iiispositive: Did the District Court err in dismissing the petition or1 the ground that it was
time barred'
BACKGROUND
13 The facts relating to the tin~elinessof Root's second petition are undisputed. On
March 12, 1097. Root was found guilty of the c h a r ~ of sexual intercourse x\-ithout consent.
e
a felony, following a jriry trial. He appealed, and this C o u ~affirmed his conviction in an
l
opinion issued on August 30, 1999. See Sftrte 1'. Roof,1999 MT 203,296 ktont. I : 987 P.2d
1140.
54 On January 18: 2000, Root, then proceedingpro se, filed apetition for postconviction
relief, asserting several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finding that the petition
conclusi\~ely
demonstrated that Root was not entitled to relief, the District Court distiiissed
the petition on March 3, 2000: without ordering a response fiorn the State. Root appealed
that dismissal to this Court.
55 On %lay23.2000, we issued an interlocutory ortier appointing counsel on appeal fix
[toot, noting that Root was incarcerated in a correctional facility that did not have an
adcqiiatc legal library. On .June 21, 2000, Root, through h i s appointed counsel, 111oved to
voluntarily dismiss his appeal, which w a s granted by this Court.
-.
ej
i6 Koor, by his appointed counsel, t'hcr~filec?a second petition fur postconviction relief
itr rhc District court on Dcccmber 4 2000, again claiming that he had rcceil~ed
. i?effi:-i'i:ciii-c
assistance of counsel during his trial. After ordering tllc Slate to respond. the ilistrict Coiir:
dismissed Root's second petition, concluding, on the basis of 55 46-21- 102 and -105, i\'lC:.A9
that thc petition vias time barred. mas barred under proxxsrons gcnerning ~ccortdoi
subseqcitt petitions; and was procedurally barred because lioot could have raised his c!aims
iii earlier proceedings. Because cve find the timeliness issue to be dispositiue, cvc do not
idd dress the other grounds upon which the District Court dismissed Root's petition.
STANDARD OF RE\ IEN
77 This Court re~~iems
a district court's denial oTa pctilion for postcoi~vietlonrclicfto
dctern~inc
whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
conclusions of !an are correct. Stutc~ fVrlgitt, 2003 MT 282,307 Vont. 340.42 P 3d 753.
v
1 (ere, the 1)istnct Court's findings of fact are not challenged. and our re\ le\r 1s confined to
the correctness of the 1)istrict Court's conclusions of I:LU
1
'8 Section 46-21-102. MC 2, states as f o l l o ~ s .
(1 ) Except as provided in subsection ( ) a petition forthc rclicfrcfcrrcd
2;
to in 46-21-101 may he filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the
conviction becornes final. :2 conviction becomes final for purposes ofthis
chapter when:
(aj the time for appeal to the MonVana supreme court cxpires;
(b) if an appeal is taken to the bionta~~luasupreme court, the tinie for
petitioning the Gnited States supreme court for review expires; or
(cj if review is sought in the United States supreme court. on the date
titat that court issues its final order in the case.
(2) A claim that al'?egcsthe cxistencc of newly discovered e\~idcricc
that, ifproved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish
that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for wllich tire
petitioner was convicted. may bc raised in a petition filcd within I year of the
(fate on which the conviction beeo~i~es or the date on which the petitioner
final
discovers, orrea~ttnably should have discovered3the existence ofthc cvidencc.
is
-~vhichever later.
"j The Distr~ct
Court noted that pursuant to L'ntted States Supreme Court Rules, Root
had 00 dajs from the entry of our decis~onin hts appeal. or until Nokember 30, 1999, to
petttton for wnt of certlorart rn the Cn~ted
States Supreme f ourt. See Rule 1 1, Rules of the
Supreme Court of tlre llnited States; Stnte v. Ahc, 2001 M7' 260. 7, 307 Mont. 233. j' 7.37
P.3d 77, ' i 7. Then, in accordance with 4 46-21-1 02(l j(b), MC.4, which deems convictioiis
to be final ivhen tile tirnc expires for petitioning the United Siatitcs Supreme Court, and
pursuant to the one-yea, limitacton pcrlod problded In 4 46-21-l02(1), MCA. rhc Dtstrrct
Co~irt
found that Root had until Xovember 30, 2000, to file his petition for postconviction
therefrom that Root's first petttton, filed on January 18,
relref. The Dtstrlct Court concl~ided
2000, was timely, but that his second petition, filed December 4. 2000, was untimcly, and
therefore barred under the statute.'
10 In Root's view. the District Court erred in applying the one-year limitatioii period to
his second postconviction petition because the onc-year period applies only to an initial or
original pctition. His brief statcs:
, .
fhc District Court erred slightly- in its calculation of the 90-day period. Sineiy days ilom
i\ugust 30, 19W'i;is not Xo\reniber 30. 1999; but rather Xove17iher28. 1999. I h e one-ycar pcriod for
tiling a pctition for postconviction relief thus ran until November 28>2000. Ilo\vever. this error ai'fcctc
neithcr tlrc Diitrici C'our:'~ decision 110s thc outcome on appeal
-I .hc one-year liniitations pcriod docs not apply to an~enbecl
petitions or second
or successivc petitions for relief. Phese petitions are not mentioned in $46-2 i-
102, XZC-A; and are addressed in 446-21-105, MCA. This latter statute
contains express provisions for the setting of a deadlinc for f%ng an amended
petition. In short, nothing in the provisions of these statutes suggests, let alone
re~~ircs, the one-year limitations period applies to anything other rltan the
that
initial petition for relief. This does not mean that a petitioner can file petitions
utl nrrusenm. A second or successive petition is subject to the waiver and
"good cause" exception doctrines addressed in $46-21-105. %'LCA4.
711 1 relied upon by Root, 3 46-21-105(1), AICA, proc~des:
The pro.r~siorl
( I )(a) All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under 46-2 1 - 10 1
must be raised in the original or amended original petition. The original
petition may be amended only once. At the request of the state or on its own
n~otion, court shall set a deadline for the filing of an amended original
the
petition. If a hearing will be held, the deadline must be reasonably in ildvance
,
of the hearing but may not be less than 30 days prior to the date of the hearing.
(b) The court shall dismiss a second or subsequent pctition by a person
xvl~o has filed an original petition unless the second or subsequent petition
raises grounds for relief that could not reasonably have been raised in the
original or an amended original petition.
711 2 In his argument quoted above, Root incorrectly ltnnps amendedpetitions together with
second or subsequent petitions. "Amended" petitions and "subsequent" pctitlons are
different in nature and are goberned by drfferent statutoryprovisrons. Amended pet~tions
are
governed bq 6 46-21-1 05(l)(a), MC'A, a h ~ c h
contemplates that a petztlon nlay be amended
d~tring course of an ongoing proceeding that was timely initiated. The provision allows
the
a district court to set a deadline for filing an amendcdpetition. Ihese petitions are referenced
in $ 40-2 I - 105(l)(b): MCA, as "arnended original" petitions
'113 1-Iowcver,Root did not file an amended original petition? anci thns, the tin~eliness
oi'
herc tl'e tlictefore do not address whether the
an amended petrt~on not before the Co~trt
1s
1 Root filed a second pctition for postconviction re!iei- which is go\-csl~cil $36-21-
by
1 5 1 . % I . I'hc provision rn:~nd:itesthat a distrci court "shall dismiss" a scconci or
subscqrrei~t
petition "ui~lcssthe second or subscquelit petition raises grounds for rclicf thiit
could not reasonably have been raised in the original or an at-nended original peiition," Root
Comrnents to 3 46-21-105. MCA. in explanation ofthis provision's
offers tlic Com~i?ission
application:
'The object of this sectiol~ to eli~iiillate iit~neccssar-yburden
is the piaceci
upon tlic courts by repetitious or specious petitions. it is highly desirable illat
a petitioner be rccluired to assert all his claims in one pctition. Gftless good
cause is show11why he did not assert all his claims in the original petition: his
-
failure to so assert tlie111constitutes it M-aivcr. 1 he ~ v a y lcft open, however,
3
is
for a subseyuent petitioli if the court finds grounds for relief tl~at could not
reasonably have been raised in the original pctition.
qj15 Root argues that the plain meaning of $5 46-21-!02(1) atld -105(2), kICA, restricts
application of the one-year limitation pcriod to initial or original petitions. L-rereasons tint
only by tile need to demonstrate that the clams
second or subsequent pctltio~ls ltm~ted
are
therein "could not reasonably ha\;e been raised in rlze original pctition," undcr the standards
I Wc disagree. '4 reading o f tile statutes gctverrling posrco~ivictionproceedings in their
cntircty convinces us that $16-2 02(1), LICA, applies a onc-year pcriod of 1i:nitation o n
1-1
the initiation CISall postcon\-iction proceedings. includir~gtl~osciilitiatcd by second o .
r
subsccjuent petitions. Section 40-2 1-1 01, MCSI\, sets hrth rhc relief a\-ailable in
postcoitviction procecdings, which necessarilg~inc'ludcs scco~ld suhscyucnt proceedings.
or
Section 4 - 2 I-!CB2, MVA, states that "'a petirioil h r thc relief rekrred to in 4 - 2 1 -1 01 nlaq-
be filed a? any time hithin 1 year" of tlie conviction becoming final. Section 46-21-103,
L:l,IC:A, provides that "[t]he proceeding for relief undcr 46-21-101 must be comrncnced by
filing a verified petition with the clerk of the appropriate conrt." Section 46-21 -104; MCA,
requires that "[tlhe petition for postconviction relief must: . . . (b) identify any previous
proceedings that the petitioner may have taken to sceurc relief front the conviction." Thus,
a proceeding seeking relief available under 3 40-21-101, MC:.%, nmust meet all the
requirements set forth in these pro~iisions,including, for purposes here, the filing. in the
appropriate court, of a verified petition which identifies all previous posteon\-iction
proceedings, lvithin one year of the conviction becoining final. The statutes do not exempt
second or subsequent petitions from any of these requirements. Rather, 3 46-21-105, MCA,
imposes an additional requirement: that a second or subsequent petition, in order to avoid
ciismissal, must also dclnonstrate good cause why its claims were not asserted in the original
petition.
17 Root's proffered interpretat~on% ould lead to absurd results. Iftile one-year l~mitat~on
1
provision did not apply to subsequent petitions, an original petition filed aftcr expiration of
the one-?car limitation period ~vould time baned, but would nonetheless open the door to
be
the filing of a second petition which t v o ~ ~be linliteci only by thc need to demonstrate whj:
ld
thc claims therein were Itor raised in thc original, time-Darreci petition. This result, though
possible under Root's intcrprciatiol~. -!car-ly not coriten~platcd ihr plain \vorcIirrg o f t h e
is by
sraintes.
9; 18 'l'iie postconviction statutes do provide a narrow exception to the one-year limitatioil
period, Section 36-21-102(2), MCA, allows a petition which alleges newly discovered
evidencc to be tiled one year after the eviderice was discovered; or "reasonably should have
[been] discovered." This indicates that the Legislature contemplated the filing of petitions
beyond the one-year period following conviction and provided a narrow exception therefor.
tlere, Root has not alleged that the time for filing is extended eitlicr by this statutory "newly
discovered evidence" prob~ision, the "miscarriage of justice" exception premised upon
nor
convietioil of one w11o is actually innocent. See Slirte v. IZe(icr.c~i,~j. 99 MT M5,33,294
1'1
Mont. 252, '!
33,980 P.2d 022.1j 33. Tlius. the statuloryprovisions as interpreted herein arc
eontroll~ng.
10 Thc f>lstrtct Court's d~sm~ssal the petlt~onis iiffirined
of
L e concur:
V