No. 02-308
Tf{E S";PRE".;IE COURT OF: I~tiE m T E OF hlOx~rAA%Jr\
S
2003 M'f 10
!Y 1 LIE XIATTER OF THE C['STODY
AED PAREIVTAL. RIGHTS OF
M.A.D. and C.D.,
Youths In Need Of Care
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark,
Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge Presiding
COGNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Peter Bov~ngdon.Assistant Public Defender, Helena, Montana
For Respondents:
Honorable R4ske hlcGrath, r\ttorney General. Jlm Il'heehs, Asb~siant
Attorney General. Heicna, Vontana
Leo Gallagher, County .kttorneq; Carolyn A Clemens, Deputy
County Attorney, Helena. Montana
Randl M Hood, Chief Public Defender, Helena, Montana (For Youths)
Subnnttcd on Br~efs Ociobcr 17, 2002
Decided. January 23,2003
Filed:
Jastice \V. Williain idcaphart delivered the iipinion o f t i i c C:our~.
4; 1 .Appeiiani. LP.i?., natural moihii- of 2;i.A.l). and C.D..
appca!s ilic District Court's
Orders of J:rntiary 20, 20112,and Fehrnary 15: 2002, terminating her parenra? rights. We
afirrn.
72 The sole issue raised on appeal is whether tlie District Court abused its discretion in
terminating D.D.'s parental rights.
Background
*3 In March 2000. D.D. was cited for endangeri~ig welfare of her children. Police,
the
in search of a juvenile offender with a serious criminal record, entered D.D.'s home kvhcre
they found one child chew 111gor: a clgarcttc and the other c h ~ l d
eatlng n~~tshells the floor.
off
Thc ch~ldren
were three and h e )ears old at the tlmc. D.D u a s not at home, anti the adults
i n the residence tvere sleeping. 1j.D. had previo~~sly cited for child eizdangerment in
heel1
Ohio for leaving M.A.D. and C.D. alone when they were one and three pears old.
$4 The police referred the incident to the Montana Dcpartnlcnt of Health and Human
Services (the Department), which begam an investigation. Social lvorkers from the
Ilepartmc~itlearned that the olclest child, 'L1.A.D.; had bccn sexually n~olested a male
by
whom D.D. had let stay in the home. .4nother man staying with D.D. had kicked M.A.D.
across the living room floor.
*5 plan with D.D. ?'he plan
In April 2000, the tlepal-tment entered into a trcatme~it
reyu~rcd j 11..rfshc had to leabe the ehildlcn, to place them with he1 stepmother and father
L
The plan also required D.11. to screen visitors to hcr home, kcgin corrnseiing, cornplcte a
chcmicid iiepcncicncy evaluation, attend parenting classes. find ernpioyrni:ni, and p r o m
efr
sevcral other rasks.
76 Shortly after entering into the first treatment pian, D.D, requested that thc children
be placed in foster case because she believed both she and her cl~ildrenwere in danger.
Illtimately, after a series of unsuecessfiii treatment plans, the Department filed a petition ibr
tire termination of D.D.'s parental rights. Shortly thereafter, i1.D. moved to LL'yoming to
"start a new life,'' and in July 2001. she relinquished 11er parental rights; however, she later
retracted the relinquishment.
"'II
7 A hearing on the termi~ratioll D.D.'s parcntal rights was heid in Noi~cn~ber
of 2001.
Dean Ckegg, a clisiical psychologist who had interviewed D.D., testi6ed that D.D. had a
below-average I.Q. of 84, and that she probably had a learning disorder which lecl her to
choose associates unwisely atid limited her ability to end relationships kvhert necessary.
Gregg further testified that D.D. was not familiar m-ith children's normal tlcvelopsncntal
stages and that her treatment would be lengthy, from two to four years, given that she was
neither insightful nor motivated.
"8
ti M.A.D.'sprimaryther:~pist at intermountain i::hiidr-en'sIIome: :Ilal-garelAnn S t i n ~ a t ~ ;
also testified. At the time of the hearing, M.A.D. had been at Intermountain for approxi-
mately three months. Stimatz believed that M.A.D. Irad been sexiially abused and that he had
a history ofphysical abuse. She testified that b4..4.D. resisted nurture rind care, did not trust
adults, was aggressive with both aciults and children, and had acted our sexually with both
his yourlgcr brother and another boy in his foster "Ro:ne. Slle a!so testified that ti,.A,B.'s
acquaintances haci been
showed that he was left unattended at rimes and that 13.D.'~
I~istory
violent to\vard him. She testified that his bchaiior was typical o f children who had been
sexually abused. Stimatz believed that, in order for D.D. hake a role in his life, she would
to
have to be willing to work with his therapists; however. in the three months that M.A.D. had
been at intermountain, D.D. hadonly contacted Intermonntain once. Stimatznoted that D.D.
itadnot requested to see her children when she %as in Helena for the ternhation hearing and
that she had visited with her children only once in thc five months prior to the hearing.
ql9 I
\ social worker for the Department, who had worked extensively with D.D. testified
that D.D. had faiied to complete any of lter treatnieut plans. %,%i!e over the course of 18
montl~s
D.D. had obtained some evaluations, she had eo~npletcd
neither the therapy nor a
psychosexual evaluation as outlined in the plans. The social worker also testified that she
believed that D.D. still did not understand how to protect the children.
710 D.D. testified on her own behalf at the lieari~ig. She explained that she was Inore
stablc since n~o\-ing Wyoming, that she had a steady job, that she livcd with a man who
to
worked reg~ilarl:;; and that she could get proper daycare for both her cliildrcn,
'11 1 ,After reviewing the testimony, the District C:ourt ordered the termination of t).Il.'s
parental rights 011 January 29,2002. An amended order ofterrtiination followed a f e ~ -
wccks
latcr. ln both, the District Court h u n d that "[tjhc problen~s
which existed in March 2000.
which lcd to the dccision oiDPfiJHS to ask for custody ofthe youths still csist at this litnc,"
and (hat '"ji;.(>.] is not likely i o co~l-tpletc [irea-irncnij plans within a rt.asi;nab!c time.
hcr -9
D.D. filed this timely appeal.
Standard of Review
ri12 We rckiew a irial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion.
See I re C X , 2001 MT 187,l 9. 306 Pvlont. 238, rj 0 . 32 P.3d 754,T ")citing
n In rP.J.i\4.J.,
I999 MT 277; 7 10: 200 Mont. 510, 7 16, 989 P.2d 840, 16). The test for an abuse of
discretion is "whcthcr the trial court acted arbitrarily, without employinent of conscientious
judgment, or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice." It! re C.'.I1.>
9. 'Phe standard of review of a trial caul-t's findings of fact in a parental termination case
is whether the findings in question are clearly erroneous. See CLIiztter of/'.E. (19977), 282
Mont. 52, 56,9334 P.2d 206,200; 12,lnttcrof,J. I,., I1.L. ijri~IA.C;.
(1996), 277 MOII~.
283,287,
922 P.2d 450,461. The standard of review o f a trial court's conclusions of law in such eases
is whether its conclusions are correct. See \/lutti?r of'l'.E., 282 Mont. at 56-57, 934 P.2d at
200; jZluftcr ofJ.L., 277 Mont. at 287, 922 P.2d at 461.
11 3
' Seetton41-3-600, MCA, n h l c l ~
applics to the tet-rnniation ofparental rtghts, pro\ldes
in pertinent part as follows:
'i'he co~trt
may order a termination of the parent-child legal relationship upon
a finding that . . . the follotving circumstances exist: . . . (i) the child is an
adjudicated youth in need of care and both of the following exist: . . . (ii) the
conduct or-condition of tire parcnts rcndcring the111 i i n l j t is unlikciy to change
within a reasonable timc.
i).D.argues illat the District Coun abused i i s discretion in fiilding that "[tjlic problems ,which
existed in March 2000 . . . still exist at this time," and that -'she is nor likely to complcte her
[treatment]plans within a reasonable time." These findings imply that subsection (f)(,ii)of
$41-3-6!!9, MCi\, that the "conduct or co~idition"
rendering her r~niit unlikely to change
was
in a reasonable time, was satisficd. D.D. argues that the District Court erred because thc
"conduct or condition" rendering her unfit in March 2000. her lack of stability, no longer
exists as she now leads a "stable" and “child-centered" life in LVyorning.
714 !-(owever,D.D.'s argument ignores the contrary tesiirilony oEa clinical psychologist,
a therapist, and a social worker. Their testimony illeluded the obscrcation that I3.D. had not
completed any of her treatment plans and that she had essentially refused to obtain rt~ental
health and alcohol counseling. Certainly, the fact that D.D. haci not completed a treatment
plan within a year and a half indicates that D.D. is unlikely to complete one within a
reasonable time and, consequently, the condt~ct
rendering her unfit is sintilarly unlikely to
change ivithin a reasonable tirnc. We hold that the District Court based its findings on
substantial credible eikkmce. 'Therefore; we affirm the District (-ourt's termiilation ofD.D.'s
parental rights.
/
Justice
V i e concur: