No. 03-229
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 262
JAMES R. GREGG, et al.; DOUGLAS L. OLIVER, et al.; MARK
VANNYHUIS, et al.; DAVID R. LAUBER, et al.; KAY DEAN DENNING, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
THE WHITEFISH CITY COUNCIL and THE
CITY OF WHITEFISH,
Defendants and Respondents and Cross-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead, Cause Nos. DV-99-037, 99-038, 99-039,
99-040 and 99-041
The Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
William E. Astle, Astle & Astle, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
John M. Phelps, Hedman, Hileman & Lacosta, Whitefish, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 30, 2003
Decided: September 21, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice John Warner delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 James R. Gregg is one of 277 property owners (Property Owners) who collectively
appeals from an order of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, upholding
the proceedings of the City of Whitefish (City) to annex their property. The City cross-
appeals the District Court’s order holding the Property Owners properly sought court review
of the annexation proceedings. We affirm.
¶2 We address the following issues:
¶3 1. Did the District Court err in concluding a recorded waiver of protest to annexation
executed by a previous landowner is a covenant running with the land that precludes a
current landowner from protesting annexation?
¶4 2. Did the District Court err in concluding the City could require consent to
annexation for continued receipt of utility services by enacting City of Whitefish Resolution
98-43?
¶5 3. Did the District Court err in concluding that in following City of Whitefish
Resolution 98-43, the City could imply consent to annexation from Property Owners who
continued to receive utility services after the City gave notice requiring them to disconnect
the utilities?
¶6 4. Did the District Court err in concluding the Property Owners could secure judicial
review of the City’s annexation procedures under § 7-2-4741, MCA, even though a majority
did not successfully protest the annexation under § 7-2-4710, MCA?
¶7 5. Did the District Court err in concluding the City met the statutory annexation
requirements of Title 7, Chapter 2, Part 47?
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶8 During the final four months of 1998, the City took steps to annex six residential areas
contiguous to existing City boundaries. In order to stop the annexations, a majority of
property owners in each of the areas protested under § 7-2-4710, MCA. However, after the
protests were submitted, the City invalidated a number of the protests on certain grounds,
two of which are at issue here. First, the City invalidated protests if a previous landowner
had waived the right to protest annexation and the waiver was properly recorded with the
county clerk and recorder.1 Second, the City implied consent to annexation and invalidated
protests from property owners who failed to arrange to disconnect from the City water and
sewer services after notice of such requirement from the City. After discounting protests,
the City determined that a majority of property owners failed to protest in five of the areas,
while one of the areas successfully protested the annexation. Of the landowners in those five
areas, approximately 78% are on City water or sewer or both, and the majority have been on
the City’s system for at least 37 years. These five areas were then annexed pursuant to City
Ordinance No. 98-11. The City also adopted an Extension of Services Plan and addressed
the annexation of each area pursuant to statute.
¶9 In January 1999, a majority of the property owners in the five annexed areas filed five
separate lawsuits challenging the process of annexation and the sufficiency of the City’s
Extension of Services Plan. Upon stipulation of the parties, the five cases were consolidated
into one. The Property Owners complained in two counts that give rise to this appeal. Count
1
The Property Owners do not contest the City properly invalidated protests from
current property owners who signed waiver of protest agreements.
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I alleged the City improperly invalidated a number of their protests to annexation. Count II
alleged the City’s annexation Extension of Services Plan failed to meet specific requirements
of Title 7, Chapter 2, Part 47. In response, the City asserted, in part, that if a given Property
Owner’s protest to annexation was invalid, that property owner could not then request
judicial review of the City’s subsequent annexation proceedings. Therefore, the City
asserted that because a majority of Property Owners failed to protest annexation, the majority
required for judicial review was not met and the Property Owners had no standing to assert
Count II. The parties stipulated to various facts and submitted the issues to the District Court
for decision.
¶10 Regarding Count I, the District Court held the City properly invalidated both the
protests of landowners whose predecessors in interest had waived the right to protest and the
protests of landowners whose consent the City deemed was implied because they did not
make plans to disconnect from City water and sewer.
¶11 The court held the right to protest annexation was separate from the right to request
judicial review. Therefore, the court held the Property Owners could still request judicial
review of the City’s compliance with Title 7, Chapter 2, Part 47, as alleged in Count II
because a majority of property owners were joined in the suit. Regarding Count II, the
District Court reviewed ten separate challenges to the City’s annexation procedures and held
the City properly met the statutory requirements of each one.
¶12 The court then upheld all five annexations.
¶13 The Property Owners now appeal the rulings invalidating their protests and the rulings
upholding the annexations under Title 7. The City cross-appeals the ruling allowing the
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Property Owners to request judicial review of the statutory annexation requirements. Further
facts are discussed below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 Section 7-2-4742, MCA, provides for court review of whether statutory annexation
procedures were followed and requirements met. To seek the District Court’s review under
§ 7-2-4742, MCA, the parties stipulated to numerous facts and then simultaneously
submitted “trial” briefs on the issues and then both submitted “reply” briefs. In those cases
reviewing the propriety of municipal actions under § 7-2-4742, MCA, the proper procedure
would be for a party to move for summary judgment if that party believes there are no
genuine issues of material fact.
¶15 As to our review of whether the City’s annexation procedures and plans were in
conformity with the law, the parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. The
Property Owners assert the District Court and this Court must strictly construe the statutes
when reviewing whether an annexation was proper. They cite Pool v. Town of Townsend
(1920), 58 Mont. 297, 191 P. 385; Gregory v. City of Forsyth (1980), 187 Mont. 132, 609
P.2d 248; and Nilson Enter., Inc. v. City of Great Falls (1980), 190 Mont. 341, 621 P.2d
466, in support of their strict construction argument. In addition, the Property Owners argue
that even though the City is a charter government with self governing powers, the statutory
directives of § 7-1-114(1)(a) & (2), MCA, and § 7-2-4742, MCA, limit the City’s authority
so it must strictly comply with all portions of the annexation statutes.
¶16 The City asserts that because it is a self-governing municipality, it is entitled to a
presumption that its actions were proper and reasonable doubts are to be resolved in its favor.
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Art. XI, Sec. 6, Mont. Const.; § 7-1-106, MCA. In addition, the City cites State ex rel. Swart
v. Molitor (1981), 190 Mont. 515, 621 P.2d 1100, to argue that although the City must
comply with the annexation statutes as indicated by § 7-1-114, MCA, it may act where the
statutes are silent. Under Schanz v. City of Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 328, 597 P.2d 67, and
§ 7-2-4743, MCA, the City argues its annexation ordinances, like legislative enactments, are
entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. Finally, the City asserts two of the cases cited
by the Property Owners, Gregory and Nilson, do not stand for strict and complete
compliance, but instead stand for substantial compliance.
¶17 In Gregory, a case in which the City of Forsyth argued the method provided for
annexation of territory to a municipality was not exclusive, we stated:
The general rule is that municipal boundaries may be extended only as
prescribed by law. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 7.14 at 317 (3rd
rev. ed. 1979). Since the jurisdiction of a city to extend its boundaries is a
special power, conferred by the legislature, a substantial compliance with all
the mandatory requirements of statutory law is essential. McQuillin, supra, §
7.29 at 422; Pool v. Town of Townsend (1920), 58 Mont. 297, 304, 191 P. 385,
386.
Gregory, 187 Mont. at 135, 609 P.2d at 250. Thus, we concluded the only way to extend
municipal boundaries was that provided by statute. The standard requiring substantial
compliance with mandatory statutes was established.
¶18 In Nilson, the City of Great Falls annexed land without filing either a land description,
a certificate of ownership, or an owner’s consent to annexation, as specifically required by
statute. The Gregory standard of substantial compliance was reaffirmed by inserting the
above quotation. Then, the Court went on to say:
Moreover, we reaffirm this Court's decisions in Pool, Balock and Gregory,
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supra. When statutory language provides the manner in which a city or town
may annex a portion of contiguous property, it must completely and strictly
comply with the statute's requirements. Annexation, and the taxation
implications that accompany it, should not be approached lightly. The
procedure should not be haphazard. Although Gregory reaffirmed the rule of
substantial compliance, the complete failure to secure the documents necessary
to the proper annexation of property is not substantial compliance. The
complete disregard of the mandates of what is now section 7-2-4403, MCA,
was an error fatal to the City's power to annex.
Nilson, 190 Mont. at 347, 621 P.2d at 470. Thus, as the City of Great Falls did not comply
at all with the mandatory requirements of the annexation statute, and the owner of the
property did not consent to the annexation, it was declared void. In this context, the words
“completely and strictly” were added in discussing the standard of substantial compliance
with the annexation statutes.
¶19 Both Gregory and Nilson involved facts where the respective cities did not follow a
mandatory statutory procedure at all. Thus, in those cases both of the phrases “substantial
compliance” and “completely and strictly comply” were appropriate. In this case the City
did comply with each and every one of the statutory mandates as we discuss below. It is the
degree of such compliance that is called into question by the Plaintiffs.
¶20 The municipal annexation statutes contain numerous and detailed requirements for
a city to annex property. Some of these, especially those concerning plans for the future,
charge city planners to make subjective value judgments and statements of opinion. The
cardinal considerations for requiring substantial compliance with the annexation laws are
public notice and participation, particularly for those affected by a proposed annexation.
Gregory, 187 Mont. at 136, 609 P.2d at 251. If all of the substantive and procedural
requirements of the annexation statutes are included and complied with by a municipality in
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the annexation procedure, the law will necessarily have been followed. And, in addition, if
each of the statutory mandates that contain a subjective component are considered and
included in the required plans, i.e., substantially complied with, those citizens whose
property is in the annexed area, as well as the residents of the entire city, will have notice
and the opportunity to participate. We hold compliance with the annexation statutes must
be complete and municipalities must follow all of the directives of the statutes. Compliance
must be substantial where a statute requires a municipality to exercise discretion in making
its planning decisions. If there are no disputed issues of fact, this Court will review a district
court’s decision on whether there was compliance with the law de novo.
III. DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE
¶21 Did the District Court err in concluding a recorded waiver of protest to
annexation executed by a previous landowner is a covenant running with
the land that precludes a current landowner from protesting annexation?
¶22 Under Montana’s statutory scheme for annexation of land adjoining a city, a
landowner has the right to protest a proposed annexation. This right is codified at § 7-2-
4710, MCA, which reads:
Protest. (1) For a period of 45 days after the public hearing provided for in
7-2-4707 through 7-2-4709, the governing body of the municipality shall
accept written comments approving or disapproving the proposed annexation
from real property owners of the area proposed to be annexed.
(2) If a majority of the real property owners disapprove of the proposed
annexation in writing, further proceedings under this part relating to the area
or any part of the area proposed to be annexed may not be considered or acted
upon by the governing body on its own initiative, without petition, for a period
of 1 year from the date of disapproval.
At the same time, a municipality may require consent to annexation as a condition of
8
initiating service to a parcel of land. Section 7-13-4314, MCA, provides:
Annexation as a requirement for receiving service. Any person, firm, or
corporation receiving water or sewer service outside of incorporated city limits
may be required by the city or town, as a condition to initiate such service, to
consent to annexation of the tract of property served by the city or town. The
consent to annexation is limited to that tract or parcel or portion of tract or
parcel that is clearly and immediately, and not potentially, being serviced by
the water or sewer service.
¶23 In 1966, the City adopted a policy requiring that in order to receive City water and
sewer utilities a landowner outside City boundaries had to agree to waive their right to
protest a later annexation by the City. The waivers used by the City are entitled either
“Consent to Annex Agreement” or “Waiver of Protest Agreement” (collectively referred to
as waiver of protest agreements or waivers). Despite the difference in title, both waiver of
protest agreements read as follows:
That for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar and other good
and valuable consideration ($1.00 o.v.c) to us in hand paid, and certain
premises, mutual terms, covenants, provisions, conditions, and agreements, we
do hereby waive any and all right to protest which we may have in regard to
any attempt made or to be made by the City of Whitefish, Montana, to annex
to and make a part of the said City of Whitefish, and incorporate within its
boundaries the following described real property situated in the County of
Flathead, State of Montana, to-wit: . . .
We do hereby further agree that this covenant shall run to, with, and be
binding upon the title of the said real property, and shall be binding upon our
heirs, assigns, successors in interest, purchasers, and any and all subsequent
holders or owners of the above-described real property.
These waivers were properly recorded after being executed by previous landowners. The
waivers were used by the City to invalidate protests submitted by current Property Owners.
As a result, two of the areas no longer had a majority of property owners protesting
annexation and the City annexed those areas.
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¶24 The District Court concluded the waivers constitute covenants running with the land
because the waivers were for the direct benefit of the property itself. The District Court also
stated the statutory right of protest is premised on property ownership and that when such
right was waived and recorded, it runs with the land. Finally, the District Court noted the
consent requirements of § 7-13-4314, MCA, allow a city to extend water and sewer service
to a specific tract of land if the owner of the land consents to annexation. The court held that
because this statute is also tied to a specific parcel of land based on ownership, the waivers
constitute a covenant that runs with the land.
¶25 On appeal, the Property Owners argue the statutory right to protest in § 7-2-4710,
MCA, resides with the current landowner and therefore a recorded waiver executed by a
previous landowner cannot invalidate a protest to annexation. They argue the statutory
consent to annexation authorized by § 7-13-4314, MCA, only applies to the initiation of
service and therefore cannot transfer to subsequent purchasers. The Property Owners again
cite Pool, Gregory, and Nilson, to assert that in order for such a waiver to be valid, the
Legislature must expressly authorize municipalities to record these waivers by enacting
another annexation statute.
¶26 The City argues such waivers are valid and binding on subsequent owners of the
property because the waivers were executed by the previous owners to secure a benefit for
the land, because the waivers were properly recorded, and because the language of the
waivers indicates an intent that subsequent purchasers of the land be bound by the waiver.
Finally, the City argues if future purchasers are not bound by the covenants, the entire
process of development and subdivision of land would break down and property would have
10
to be annexed one parcel at a time.
¶27 Molitor addressed an analogous situation in which a self-governing county enacted
an ordinance requiring the payment of a fee to the examining land surveyor. Molitor, 190
Mont. at 520-24, 621 P.2d at 1103-05. The plaintiff asserted that under § 7-1-114, MCA,
a self-governing entity must follow the state planning and zoning laws and therefore, the fee
was improper because those laws did not expressly provide for such a fee. We disagreed,
holding § 7-1-113, MCA, allows a self-governing entity to act even where there are
controlling state laws as long as the local government’s actions are not inconsistent with or
“lower or less stringent” than state requirements. We held § 7-1-103, MCA, and § 7-1-106,
MCA, both require that we give self-governing powers a broad interpretation.
¶28 The same reasoning applies to this case. Section 7-1-114(1)(a), MCA, requires the
City to comply with the state annexation laws. Section 7-13-4314, MCA, allows the City
to require consent to annexation for supplying its utility service. The waiver of protest
agreements are executed to obtain this consent. Recording the waivers in order to create
covenants that run with the land and bind subsequent purchasers is not inconsistent with or
less stringent than the state requirements. The purpose of § 7-13-4314, MCA, is to ensure
that property owners outside a municipality can request utility service and to ensure that a
local government can later require annexation in exchange for its utilities. Creating a
covenant that runs with the land furthers these purposes. The alternative would be to require
utilities to be disconnected every time a property changes hands so that the City can again
require consent to annexation for its utilities under § 7-13-4314, MCA. Such a result is not
contemplated by the statutory language of § 7-2-4710, MCA, or § 7-13-4314, MCA.
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¶29 The Property Owners argue there is no statutory authority for such covenants. We
disagree. Section 70-17-203, MCA, provides that “Every covenant . . . which is made for
the direct benefit of the property or some part of it then in existence, runs with the land.”
The plain language of this statute indicates the present waivers are allowed as they directly
benefit the property. Hampton v. Lewis & Clark County, 2001 MT 81, ¶ 25, 305 Mont. 103,
¶ 25, 23 P.3d 908, ¶ 25. Therefore, the waivers are proper because the waivers directly
benefit the property and are not inconsistent with or “lower or less stringent” than the state
annexation requirements. We note here the Property Owners focused only on their statutory
argument that the annexation statutes do not allow for such covenants. They did not argue
the waivers do not meet all the necessary elements of a covenant running with the land.
Therefore, we need not assess all the elements of covenants running with the land.
¶30 In sum, the District Court properly concluded the waiver of protest agreements
recorded by the City constitute covenants that run with the land that comply with the state
annexation statutes. These covenants are binding on subsequent purchasers including the
Property Owners joined in this case. Therefore, the City properly invalidated protests from
these Property Owners and two of the areas annexed by the City did not have a majority of
property owners protest the annexation.
ISSUE TWO
¶31 Did the District Court err in concluding the City could require consent to
annexation for continued receipt of utility services by enacting City of
Whitefish Resolution 98-43?
¶32 A number of tracts in the areas to be annexed have been receiving utility services
since before 1966 when the waiver of protest agreements were initiated. In order to address
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the continuation of services to property that receives water and sewer utilities from the City,
the City adopted Resolution 98-43 (the Utility Rule) in September 1998. The Utility Rule
provides that upon notice to the property owner, the City can imply consent to annexation
if the property owner continues to use the utility services. The rule reads in part as follows:
The City may, at any time, require a property owner’s consent to annexation
as a condition of continued sewer and/or water service. When the City
determines to require such consent from a particular property owner, the City
may notify the property owner, in writing, that the City seeks such consent,
and that if such consent is not given, the City will require that the property
owner discontinue receiving sewer and water service. . . . If . . . the property
owner has not, within ten (10) days, made firm written arrangements to
discontinue sewer and water service, then the City shall be entitled to treat the
property owner as having consented to annexation of his or her property upon
expiration of such 10-day period. . . . If the property owner consents to
annexation [by failing to make arrangements to disconnect], then the City shall
be entitled to disregard any protest that such property owner makes to a
proposed annexation of his or her property.
This rule is based on 46 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 12 (1995) (AG Opinion) which held that
municipalities can establish rules requiring consent to annexation for continuing service.
¶33 Pursuant to the Utility Rule, the City gave notice to the affected Property Owners that
it would imply their consent to annexation if they failed to make written arrangements to
disconnect from the City’s utilities. Although numerous Property Owners protested the
annexations in writing, few made arrangements to disconnect their utilities. Because they
did not make arrangements as required by the Utility Rule, the City invalidated these protests
and implied consent to annexation. When these protests were subtracted by the City, none
of the five areas had a majority of landowners protest annexation.
¶34 The District Court held that § 7-13-4314, MCA, and the AG Opinion properly
supported the City’s position that consent to annexation may be required for receipt of
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continued utility service.
¶35 Analogous to their first argument, the Property Owners assert § 7-13-4314, MCA,
does not provide statutory authority for the Utility Rule and that the City cannot by virtue
of the rule equate receipt of services to consent to annexation. Further, the Property Owners
disagree with the AG Opinion that a municipality can require consent to annexation as a
condition of continued receipt of services. The City argues it properly relied on the AG
Opinion when it adopted the Utility Rule.
¶36 The District Court is correct. The AG Opinion concludes a municipality “may adopt
a rule for the operation of its municipal sewer and/or water utility requiring a property
owner’s consent to annexation as a condition of continued sewer and/or water service.” This
conclusion is based on § 69-7-201, MCA, which governs the operation of public municipal
utilities. This statute reads:
Rules for operation of municipal utility. Each municipal utility shall adopt,
with the concurrence of the municipal governing body, rules for the operation
of the utility. The rules shall contain, at a minimum, those requirements of
good practice which can be normally expected for the operation of a utility. .
. . The rules shall outline the utility's procedure for discontinuance of service
and reestablishment of service as well as the extension of service to users
within the municipal boundaries and outside the municipal boundaries. The
rule shall provide that rate increases for comparable classifications and zones
outside the municipal boundaries may not exceed those set within the
municipal limits under the provisions of this chapter.
As the Attorney General noted, the provisions of this statute indicate a legislative intent to
give municipalities broad authority to adopt rules for the operation of water and sewer
utilities.
¶37 Specifically, § 69-7-201, MCA, makes clear a municipality has authority to establish
14
rules regarding users outside its boundaries. Further, the “requirements of good practice
which can be normally expected for the operation of a utility” must, by necessity, include
rules governing continued use. Therefore, § 69-7-201, MCA, gives a municipality authority
to set rules for continued use of its utilities by users outside its boundaries. So, § 7-13-4314,
MCA, allows a municipality to require consent to annexation in order to initiate service, and
§ 69-7-201, MCA, allows a municipality to make rules regarding the discontinuance and
reestablishment of service. Therefore, a municipality may require consent to annexation for
continued use as well as initial use.
¶38 Rules of statutory construction support this interpretation. We interpret related
statutes to harmonize and give effect to each. Chain v. Mont. DMV, 2001 MT 224, ¶ 15, 306
Mont. 491, ¶ 15, 36 P.3d 358, ¶ 15. Different language is to be given different construction.
In re Kesl's Estate (1945), 117 Mont. 377, 386, 161 P.2d 641, 646. Given these rules, the
phrase “extension of service” in § 69-7-201, MCA, does not have the same meaning as the
word “initiate” in § 7-13-4314, MCA. In addition, we avoid statutory construction that leads
to absurd results if a reasonable construction will avoid it. Chain, ¶ 15. By allowing a
municipality to demand consent to annexation as a requirement of continued service, all
parties avoid the duplicative and unnecessary step of discontinuing service if the landowner
wishes to continue to receive service and consent to annexation. At the same time, a
landowner who does not want to consent to annexation can simply make arrangements to
disconnect from service. We affirm the District Court’s determination that the City complied
with the state annexation statutes when it adopted the Utility Rule in Resolution 98-43 and
thereby required consent to annexation as a condition of continued service.
15
ISSUE THREE
¶39 Did the District Court err in concluding that by following City of Whitefish
Resolution 98-43, the City could imply consent to annexation from
Property Owners who continued to receive utility services after the City
gave notice requiring them to disconnect the utilities?
¶40 Under the Utility Rule set out above, after notice property owners must make “firm
written arrangements to discontinue sewer and water service” if they do not wish to consent
to annexation. If a property owner fails to do so, “the City shall be entitled to treat the
property owner as having consented to annexation.” Further, the City is entitled to
“disregard any protest” submitted by such a property owner.
¶41 The District Court held that because § 7-13-4314, MCA, does not require a specific
type of consent such as express, written or implied, implied consent was a valid form of
consent. The court also held implied consent was proper under § 28-2-503, MCA.
¶42 The Property Owners argue there is no statutory authority for implying consent to
annexation under the annexation statutes. They also assert that under the contract statute
regarding voluntary acceptance of a benefit codified at § 28-2-503, MCA, there can be no
meeting of the minds given that the Property Owners submitted written protests. Finally, the
Property Owners argue ambiguity and confusion in the City’s letters prevented any meeting
of the minds that would validate implied consent by the Property Owners. The City argues
the implied consent provided for in the Utility Rule is allowed by § 28-2-503, MCA.
¶43 As already decided above, the Utility Rule properly requires consent to annexation
for continued service. The rule simply establishes a procedure which puts the burden on the
property owner to make written arrangements to disconnect if they wish to express their
16
protest to annexation. Contrary to the Property Owners’ argument, there is statutory
authority for this approach. Pursuant to § 7-2-4710, MCA, a property owner’s consent to
annexation is implied if they fail to file written protest. Indeed, a property owner must file
written protest under § 7-2-4710, MCA, in order to be counted towards a majority protesting
annexation. Section 7-2-4710, MCA, and the Utility Rule simply embody the procedure that
once proper notice is given, both action and inaction constitute a decision. Finally, as the
District Court noted, nothing in the language of § 7-13-4314, MCA, requires a specific type
of consent regarding annexation. Therefore, the Utility Rule’s procedure which implies
consent from failure to submit written arrangements to disconnect upon notice from the City
is acceptable.
¶44 The Property Owners’ argument that no meeting of the minds occurred under § 28-2-
503, MCA, misses the point. While it is true that implied consent can form a contract under
Montana law as indicated by § 28-2-503, MCA, this statute is inapplicable here as the City
was not seeking to form a contract with the Property Owners. The City was simply giving
the Property Owners notice regarding their options. Indeed, no meeting of the minds was
ever to occur and no contract was ever to be formed. Finally, any ambiguities in the letters
from the City are irrelevant because no contract was to be formed. The Property Owners do
not assert the letters failed to inform them that written arrangements to disconnect were
required.
¶45 We conclude the City’s procedure to imply consent as allowed in the Utility Rule is
a proper method to determine if a property owner wishes to continue receiving City services
or, in the alternative, wishes to protest annexation. We affirm the District Court’s conclusion
17
the City properly invalidated protests from users who did not make arrangements to
disconnect from the City’s utilities. Therefore, none of the five areas annexed by the City
had a majority of property owners protest the annexation.
ISSUE FOUR
¶46 Did the District Court err in concluding the Property Owners could secure
judicial review of the City’s annexation procedures under § 7-2-4741,
MCA, even though a majority did not successfully protest the annexation
under § 7-2-4710, MCA?
¶47 The City argues the Property Owners cannot challenge the remaining annexation
proceedings because a majority of property owners did not successfully protest. The District
Court disagreed with the City and concluded:
The right to protest under Section 7-2-4710, M.C.A., and the right for judicial
review for failure of the governing body to comply with the statutory
procedures and requirements under Section 7-2-4741, M.C.A., are separate
and distinct rights. Section 7-2-4710, M.C.A., provides that a majority of the
real property owners who validly protest may stop or block annexation.
Section 7-2-4741, M.C.A., is available after annexation and allows a majority
of the property owners to seek judicial review to force or compel the municipal
governing body to comply with statutory procedures. The relief available to
[the Property Owners] is controlled by Section 7-2-4742, M.C.A., and appears
to be limited to forcing conformance by the governing body. Since the rights
are separate and distinct, clearly, failure to exercise the right to protest and a
waiver of the right to protest, would not waive any property owner’s right to
seek judicial review.
¶48 The City asserts the Property Owners subject to a waiver of protest agreement cannot
challenge the annexation because they bargained away that right in exchange for city
services. The City also argues the Property Owners who were deemed to have consented to
annexation under the Utility Rule cannot challenge annexation because they impliedly agreed
to accept city services in exchange for their consent.
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¶49 The City also argues it is unfair to allow a property owner to consent to annexation
to receive the City’s services and then allow that same person to reverse their position and
file suit against the annexation. The City argues if such action is allowed, municipalities will
have to annex one property at a time in order to avoid costly litigation. The City asserts there
is no societal benefit in making annexation even more difficult than it already is because
municipalities still have to comply with Title 7. The City points out after discounting these
Property Owners, there is no longer the required majority for judicial review under §
7-2-4741, MCA.
¶50 The Property Owners assert the District Court properly determined the right to request
judicial review under § 7-2-4741, MCA, is separate from the right to protest annexation
under § 7-2-4710, MCA.
¶51 The right to protest under § 7-2-4710, MCA, is set out above. Section 7-2-4741,
MCA, reads:
Right to court review when area annexed. (1) Within 30 days following the
passage of an annexation ordinance under authority of this part, either a
majority of the real property owners of the area to be annexed or the owners
of more than 75% in assessed valuation of the real estate in the area who
believe that they will suffer material injury by reason of the failure of the
municipal governing body to comply with the procedures set forth in this part
or to meet the requirements set forth in 7-2-4734 and 7-2-4735, as applied to
their property, may file a petition in the district court of the district in which
the municipality is located seeking review of the action of the governing body.
We interpret related statutes to harmonize and give effect to each and to avoid absurd results.
Chain, ¶ 15. To hold that property owners must meet the protest requirements of § 7-2-4710,
MCA, in order to request judicial review under § 7-2-4741, MCA, would fail to give effect
to the separate language of § 7-2-4741, MCA. Such a holding would also mean newly
19
annexed citizens of a municipality could not make sure the municipality substantively and
procedurally complied with the annexation statutes. Such results are not in accord with the
statutes.
¶52 Regarding the waiver of protest agreements, the language clearly indicates the
Property Owners waived the right to protest, not the right to request judicial review. The
waivers read:
[W]e do hereby consent to and waive any and all right to protest which we
may have in regard to any attempt made or to be made by the City of
Whitefish, Montana, to annex to and make a part of said City of Whitefish,
and incorporate within its boundaries . . . . [Emphasis added].
Protest, as is indicated by § 7-2-4710, MCA, can be made before an annexation occurs. In
contrast, the language of § 7-2-4741, MCA, indicates the right to request judicial review is
activated after a municipality completes an annexation. Therefore, although the waiver of
protest agreements unconditionally waived protest rights, the owners simply made no
agreement regarding their right to demand judicial review.
¶53 We disagree with the City’s assertion that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
implied in every contract requires the Property Owners to refrain from interfering with
annexation in any way. This obligation cannot be so broadly construed as to waive a
statutory right to judicial review.
¶54 Regarding the consent implied by continued use under the Utility Rule, as discussed
above in ¶ 44, we disagree that any contract regarding annexation was formed. The “offer”
to continue service in exchange for consent was not an offer to enter into a contract, but was
a means to inform the Property Owner how to register a valid protest. Therefore, these
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Property Owners did not waive their right to judicial review.
¶55 The judicial review allowed by § 7-2-4741, MCA, is how residents confirm the City’s
actions in annexing their homes comply with the law. We note the City does not dispute the
Property Owners met the other requirements of § 7-2-4741, MCA. Therefore, we affirm the
District Court’s determination that although the Property Owners did not stop the annexation
process under § 7-2-4710, MCA, they properly petitioned to assure the City met statutory
annexation requirements of Title 7, Chapter 2, Part 47.
ISSUE FIVE
¶56 Did the District Court err in concluding the City met the statutory
annexation requirements of Title 7, Chapter 2, Part 47?
¶57 The Property Owners contend the City’s Extension of Services Plan (Plan)
specifically violates the requirements of § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(i), MCA; § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(ii),
MCA; § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(iii), MCA; § 7-2-4731(1)(b), MCA; § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA; § 7-2-
4732(1), MCA; § 7-2-4732(2)(b), MCA; § 7-2-4732(2)(c), MCA; § 7-2-4732(3), MCA; §
7-2-4732(4), MCA; and § 7-2-4733, MCA. The Property Owners’ challenge is the same
with respect to the five areas to be annexed. Although we address each statute specifically
below, we note, as did the District Court, the Property Owners essentially wish to establish
the City may not annex their properties unless the entire City pays for the extension of new
water and sewer mains. As discussed more fully below, because the City has already
planned and provided for sufficient water and sewer capacity for the annexed areas, because
the City’s policy to require private parties to pay for main extensions is allowable under §
76-3-510, MCA, and because the Plan sets forth how new mains can be provided, we hold
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the City’s annexation Plan substantially complies with state statute.
¶58 We address the statutes out of numerical sequence, in order to more clearly present
the parties’ arguments.
A. Does the Plan include the statement regarding the extension of
municipal services required by § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA?
¶59 Section 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA, reads:
Plans and report on extension of services required. (1) A municipality
exercising authority under this part shall make plans for the extension of
services to the area proposed to be annexed and shall, prior to the public
hearing provided for in 7-2-4707 through 7-2-4709, prepare a report setting
forth its plans to provide services to such area. This report shall include:
....
(c) a statement setting forth the plans of the municipality for extending to the
area to be annexed each major municipal service performed within the
municipality at the time of annexation.
The parties stipulated that the only municipal services at issue are water mains, sewer mains
and roads, and that all other municipal services are adequately provided for in the Plan.
¶60 The Plan and the Addendum to the Plan (Addendum) document the extensive water
and sewer mains and roads that already exist within the annexed areas. These water and
sewer mains already exist in the annexed areas because the City has been extending its
municipal services to properties outside its boundaries for over 80 years. Regarding
anticipated municipal service needs for those properties within the annexed areas that do not
have access to existing mains, the Plan states that construction of any new water or sewer
mains will be paid for by the private party desiring the development. This has been the
City’s policy both within and outside City boundaries since 1977. The Plan also states the
City has no plans to extend any new services into the areas to be annexed because the need
22
for any additional water and sewer mains and roads will be initiated and driven by private
demand and therefore cannot be predicted by the City. In addition, the Plan notes the City
is not aware of any requests for and does not propose any capital improvements over the next
five years that would be funded by a Special Improvement District (SID). Finally, the Plan
notes that properties within the annexed areas that are currently served by their own wells
and septic systems will remain on those systems until upgrades become necessary.
¶61 The parties stipulated the City’s water plant and sewer plant capacities are already
large enough to serve all properties in the annexed areas. In addition, the parties stipulated:
It is a reasonable possibility that one or more individual properties within the
five annexed areas, as a result of future development of individual property
within those annexed areas, developed to densities authorized by present
Whitefish zoning, will necessitate the extension of the Whitefish municipal
water [and sewer] mains, within five years from the date of the annexation of
the five areas.
The parties also stipulated it would cost approximately $2.275 million to extend water and
sewer mains to reach every property in all five of the annexed areas.
¶62 In holding the Plan meets the requirements of § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA, the District
Court concluded:
[A] substantial number of lots within the five areas to be annexed already
receive City water and sewer, or else have private water and septic systems.
Those lots which are not currently receiving City water and sewer may
connect at any time, and the City water and sewer facilities have adequate
capacity to service those additional lots. The City has no plans to extend
services in those annexed areas, as the services presently exist or are not being
requested.
¶63 The Property Owners assert that because the City stipulated there is a reasonable
possibility construction of water or sewer mains will be necessary within the next five years,
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the Plan does not comply with § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA, when it states the City has no plans
for the extension of these services. They argue a statement that present services are
sufficient is not enough to meet the statute’s requirements. The Property Owners also argue
the statute does not exempt its requirement for a plan when part of the area to be annexed
already receives municipal services, when part of the area to be annexed is on a private well
or septic system, or for when no one is requesting additional service. The Property Owners
essentially argue the City must, as a part of its annexation plan, specifically show how water
and sewer mains will be extended to all unserved properties within the annexed areas.
¶64 The City argues the Plan conforms to § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA, because it states in the
Addendum the City has no plans to extend services at this time in each area. The City also
asserts the Plan conforms to the statute because the Plan also states that if properties are
developed, the mains and streets will only be extended when private parties request and pay
for an extension. The City notes its longstanding policy, in accord with § 76-3-510, MCA,
that developers and property owners who wish to extend a main are responsible for its cost
whether inside or outside City boundaries. The City also points out that because of the
existing extensive urban development in the areas to be annexed, water and sewer mains are
already in place through or beside much of each area. Regarding roads, the City notes the
Plan states the City will assume maintenance of all existing roads in the annexed areas.
Finally, the City asserts it cannot predict future extensions because as the Plan states, new
mains and roads are initiated by private demand.
¶65 We hold the Plan substantially complies with § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA. Even though
the City agrees it is reasonable to expect that private landowners in the annexed areas may
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develop their property so that water or sewer main extensions become necessary in the near
future, the statute does not require the City to address each specific property within the
annexed area. Rather, the statute requires the City to set forth the City’s plans for the
extension of municipal services into the area. In this case, the City’s plan regarding new
water and sewer mains and roads is that the City does not intend to undertake any new
construction unless requested and paid for by a landowner. This approach, when considered
along with the agreed fact that the City now has adequate water and sewer plants,
substantially complies with the statute for a number of reasons.
¶66 First, the City’s policy to require private parties to pay for new water and sewer mains
and roads is permissible under § 76-3-510, MCA, which allows local governments to require
developers to pay for the extension of capital facilities. Given this policy, the City does not
initiate development, nor does the City finance development. Rather, such construction is
only undertaken when a private property owner decides to request it and pay for it. Although
the City can assist in the financing of construction by setting up a SID so local landowners
can pay the costs over time, the Plan mentions the City is not currently aware of any requests
for a SID.
¶67 Second, to the extent the City can influence the decisions of local landowners within
the annexed areas on whether to develop their property such that new main extensions and
roads are required, the Plan illustrates the City has already done so. The Plan includes the
comprehensive City-County zoning applicable to land within one mile of the City boundary
and the planning district applicable to land within four and one-half miles of the City
boundary. The Plan also discusses the City’s predictions and preferences regarding when
25
and where growth will occur. This discussion addresses each possible development direction
north, south, east and west of the City and also discusses the reasons for the existing
development.
¶68 Third, because of the extensive development that already exists within the annexed
areas in this case, this situation is distinguishable from annexation of a newly proposed
subdivision. In the latter situation, the plans for the extension of services into the annexed
areas would be coordinated with government approval of the subdivision itself as directed
under Title 76.
¶69 Finally, as the parties stipulated, the City already has sufficient water and sewer
capacity to serve each property in the newly annexed areas. This stipulation is critical
because it indicates the City has in fact already addressed a very expensive component of
extending new municipal services into the annexed areas. Therefore, no plan for expanding
the City’s overall water and sewer capacity is necessary in the Plan.
¶70 In sum, contrary to the Property Owners’ argument, § 7-2- 4731(1)(c), MCA, does
not require the City to extend services. Rather, it requires the City to set forth its plans as
to how new services will be extended to the annexed area so that the public is informed
before the hearings required by §§ 7-2-4707-4709, MCA. The City’s Plan in this case
complies with § 7-2-4731(1)(c), MCA, because it properly sets forth the City’s plans for the
extension of new water, sewer, and road services.
B. Does the Plan provide for future development in conformance with § 7-
2-4732(2)(b), MCA?
¶71 Section 7-2-4732(2)(b), MCA, reads:
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[The Plan shall] provide for future extension of streets and of major trunk
water mains, sewer outfall lines, and other utility services into the area to be
annexed, so that when such streets and utility lines become necessary and are
constructed, property owners in the area to be annexed will be able to secure
such services, according to the policies in effect in such municipality for
extending such services to individual lots or subdivisions.
¶72 The District Court held the Plan meets this statute because it sets out the City’s policy
to extend water and sewer mains only when the property owner pays the cost. The court also
noted it would be unfair to current City residents if the City were to change this policy as the
policy has always applied within City boundaries.
¶73 The Property Owners again argue the Plan fails to meet the statute. They argue the
specific statutory language requires the Plan to provide plans for when future utility lines
“become necessary” even if not currently necessary. The Property Owners again point to the
stipulation between the parties that it is probable new water and sewer mains will be needed
within five years.
¶74 The City argues the Plan complies with the statute because the policy for future
extensions is in line with the current policy to require the property owner to pay for the
extension. The City also argues because it has water and sewer capacity to serve the
annexed areas and a grid of mains beside or through the annexed areas that can be accessed
for future development, its Plan complies with the statute.
¶75 We hold the Plan substantially complies with § 7-2- 4732(2)(b), MCA, because it says
that future development will have to meet the current “policies in effect” for extension of
services and the policy is stated. In other words, the policy for landowners inside and
outside the City is that new water mains, sewer mains, and roads will be financed by the
27
property owner requesting the construction.
C. Does the Plan include a financing method in conformance with § 7-2-
4732(3), MCA?
¶76 Section 7-2-4732(3), MCA, reads:
A method must be set forth by which the municipality plans to finance
extension of services into the area to be annexed. If the area is serviced
currently by adequate water and sewage services, streets, curbs, and gutters
and no capital improvements are needed to provide adequate services
stipulated by this section and 7-2-4731, the municipality must provide the area
to be annexed with a plan of how they plan to finance other services to be
included within the district--mainly, police protection, fire protection, garbage
collection, street, and street maintenance services, as well as continued utility
service.
¶77 The District Court held the Plan meets this requirement because the areas to be
annexed are currently serviced by adequate water and sewer lines. The court also held the
parties’ stipulations indicated no capital improvements were needed.
¶78 The Property Owners argue the Plan fails to meet this requirement because no
financing method is set forth and because, contrary to the District Court’s holding, capital
improvements will be needed in the future to extend water and sewer mains. The Property
Owners assert the District Court mischaracterized the stipulations of the parties regarding
existing services and ignored the fact that the parties also stipulated there is a reasonable
possibility future development will require the extension of water and sewer mains. The
Property Owners point out that the City stipulated the cost to extend water to all unserved
lots in all five areas would be $966,713 and the cost to extend sewer to all unserved lots
would be $1,308,387. The Property Owners also argue the City should not be able to rely
on the fact that some of the newly annexed properties have their own septic systems or wells
28
in order to avoid addressing plans for the extension of services to those properties that will
need service in the future.
¶79 The City asserts sufficient financing methods are set forth in the Plan. First, the City
points out the Plan provides that new extensions must be paid for by the developer or
property owner. The City also notes it is also part of the Plan to provide for “Latecomers
Agreements” which allow the City to partially reimburse developers’ utility costs from other
properties that connect to a new main extension within ten years. The Plan also allows for
the formation of SIDs to spread the cost of a main extension over all the benefitting
properties. The City argues it now has water and sewer capacity to serve the annexed areas
even with new development. This capacity is currently funded by already established taxes
and fees as set out in the Plan. Finally, the City asserts the Plan also sets out the current
revenue sources for street maintenance.
¶80 We conclude the Plan substantially complies with § 7-2-4732(3), MCA. The Plan sets
forth the City’s plans for financing methods that sufficiently describe how needed
improvements and extensions will be paid for in the annexed areas. Further, we will not
disturb the District Court’s decision that the annexed areas are “serviced currently by
adequate water and sewage services [and] streets” and that no capital improvements are
needed to provide the services stipulated by § 7-2- 4732 and -4731, MCA, because the Plan
makes clear the City has no plans to extend new services as discussed above.
D. Does the Plan include tax burden statements and voting methodology
statements in conformance with § 7-2-4732(4), MCA, and § 7-2-4733,
MCA?
¶81 Section 7-2-4732(4), MCA, reads:
29
In this annexation plan, it must be clearly stated that the entire municipality
tends to share the tax burden for these services, and if so, the area may be
annexed without a bond issue under the provisions of this part.
Section 7-2-4733, MCA, reads:
Vote required on proposed capital improvements. Included within the plan
must be methodology whereby the area to be annexed may vote upon any
proposed capital improvements. Should a negative vote be cast by over 50%
of the residents in the section or sections to be annexed in such election, the
area may not be annexed.
¶82 The District Court held these two provisions must be read together. The court noted
the Plan states the entire City will share in the tax burden for the services that will be
provided. The court went on to hold that in this instance, because no new capital
improvements were proposed in the Plan that would require a bond or a SID, no
methodology for a vote was necessary.
¶83 The Property Owners argue the Plan does not comply with these sections. Essentially,
the Property Owners argue that because the language of § 7-2-4732(4), MCA, requires a
statement that the tax burden for municipal services is shared by the entire community, the
City is responsible for paying for new sewer and water main extensions and new roads. As
a result, the Property Owners assert the City’s policy to require private parties to pay for new
main extensions or roads must be void. Further, they argue the language of § 7-2-4732(4),
MCA, prevents the City from using a SID to fund development because a SID is paid for
only by those properties immediately benefitted by the extended utility mains rather than the
“entire municipality.” They assert the City is evading the law by not proposing any new
capital improvements in order to avoid the statutory requirements.
¶84 In support of their arguments, the Property Owners misquote § 7-2-4732(4), MCA.
30
Their brief states: “The language of § 7-2-4732(4), MCA, requires that the ‘entire
municipality must share the tax burden for the extension of water and sewer mains.’” This
quote is in error because the statute actually reads as set out above.
¶85 The City argues the Plan complies because for each of the areas to be annexed, the
Addendum states the entire community tends to share the tax burden. The City asserts § 7-2-
4732(4), MCA, allows annexation without a methodology for voting because no bond issue
is necessary as no capital improvements were proposed.
¶86 We conclude the City’s annexation Plan substantially complies with subsections 7-2-
4732(4) and -4733, MCA. The Plan and the Addendum describe various funding sources
and methods for financing each of the municipal services. The Plan and Addendum also
describe the City’s method of financing future extensions of water, sewer, and roads by
following the policy that the developer or homeowner pays for the installation when needed.
The Addendum also contains the statement for each annexed area: “Nevertheless, the entire
community tends to share the tax burden for City services.” Further, the Plan states the City
has no plans for specific capital improvements related to the annexations.
¶87 These statements in the Plan make it apparent nothing about the annexations requires
special or new funding sources. Instead, all municipal services provided to the newly
annexed areas, including water capacity, sewer capacity, road maintenance, police and fire
protection, storm drainage, garbage disposal, recreation, and other services, will be paid for
by the general tax burden shared by the entire community. Any new main extensions or
roads must be paid for by the party requiring the new construction. The tax burden for the
continuing cost of all municipal services extended under the Plan is to be shared by all City
31
residents. Therefore, the Plan complies with § 7-2-4732(4), MCA, because it sets forth the
City’s plan for the extension of municipal services such that no special funding sources are
required to accomplish the annexations. As a result, no bond issue was necessary to proceed
with the annexation as allowed under § 7-2-4732(4), MCA. Further, no voting methodology
was required pursuant to § 7-2-4733, MCA, because no capital improvements were proposed
by the City.
¶88 We disagree with the Property Owners’ argument that § 7-2-4732(4), MCA, requires
the City and its current residents “must” pay for new main extensions for annexed residents
because of the Plan’s statement the entire municipality tends to share the tax burden. As
mentioned, the Property Owners misquote § 7-2-4732(4), MCA. “Must” is used in the
statute to indicate the Plan must contain the required statement in order to annex without a
bond issue. “Must” is not used in the statute to indicate the City is required to pay for new
main extensions. Such an interpretation would directly contradict § 76-3-510, MCA.
¶89 Rather, the statute requires a statement the municipality “tends” to share the tax
burden for services. “Tends” as used in the statute gives the City latitude to decide to
finance new construction for newly annexed areas in accordance with § 76-3-510, MCA,
which allows the City to charge individuals for infrastructure needed to specifically benefit
their property. Again, we will not interpret § 7-2-4732(4), MCA, in a way that invalidates
the plain language of § 76-3-510, MCA. Further, the City’s policy to require the party
requesting a new main extension to pay for it does not conflict with this statute because, as
the parties stipulated, the entire municipality still tends to share the tax burden of the overall
water and sewer capacity of the system, which are expensive and continuing components of
32
supplying water and sewer.
¶90 As to the Property Owners’ argument that the City is purposefully subverting the
statute by not planning capital improvements, this argument fails to recognize the City has
acted within its legal authority. Perhaps in hindsight one could argue from a planning
perspective the City should not have extended services to properties without annexing them.
Or perhaps the City should not annex without forming a SID so that all the newly annexed
properties must pay for new main extensions to be installed immediately upon annexation
even if such are not currently needed. However, hindsight does not guide our review. We
only review whether the City’s actions substantially complied with the statute such that its
annexation Plan properly informs the public how the extension of services into the annexed
areas will be both planned and financed. We hold that it does.
E. Does the Plan contain a long range plan as required by § 7-2-4732(1),
MCA?
¶91 Section 7-2-4732(1), MCA, reads:
Contents of plan for extension of services. (1) Specifically, the plans for the
extension of services shall provide a long-range plan for extension of services
and the acquisition of properties outside the corporate limits. This plan must
show anticipated development a minimum of 5 years into the future, showing
on a yearly basis how the municipality plans to extend services, develop and
add sections to the city.
¶92 The District Court concluded the City’s Plan was in compliance stating:
[The Property Owners’ position] flies in the face of present-day city
expansion. [Their] position ignores the fact that development and resulting
annexation are driven by property owners, not by the cities. Whitefish is no
longer “Stumptown,” when the City initiated development; now it is the
landowner, who, wishing to maximize investment in land, is developing the
land and thereafter seeking municipal services. Further, as noted above, the
services in the form of water, sewer, and roads already exist in all the areas to
33
be annexed. There is no extension of services which can occur, beyond the
individual landowner or developer paying to connect with the existing utilities.
¶93 The Property Owners argue there is no long range plan in the Plan and no statement
showing anticipated development five years into the future. They assert the District Court
improperly exempted the City from this unambiguous requirement and that the court’s
holding ignores the statutory directive. The Property Owners also argue that if the statute
no longer fits the times, it is up to the Legislature to change it, not the District Court.
¶94 The City asserts the Plan conforms to § 7-2-4732(1), MCA, because it discusses
factors likely to influence growth over the next five years by including sections entitled
Economic Conditions and Trends, Physical Growth Trends, Impediments to Growth, Growth
Stimulants, Prevailing Growth Patterns, and a map of the Projected Growth Area. The City
also argues the Plan identifies three contemplated annexations that will occur within five
years. Finally, the City argues the District Court correctly noted development and
annexations are currently driven by property owners, not cities.
¶95 We hold the City’s Plan substantially complies with § 7-2-4732(1), MCA, because
it does include careful consideration of future needs. Inter alia, the Plan details two
additional areas that will likely be annexed within five years. In addition, the part of the Plan
discussing growth patterns by direction from the City mentions the City’s preferred growth
areas and notes where water and sewer mains would be most easily extended to facilitate
new growth. This section also mentions that although the City anticipates growth, much of
the growth that is expected to occur beyond the limit of current City services will most likely
occur after more than five years has passed. The Plan also discusses anticipated growth
34
influences over a period longer than five years. Finally, the Plan makes clear the City, in
conformity with a long existing policy, will not extend its services unless such is paid for by
the developer. Therefore, again, to the extent the City can make long range plans without
knowing the plans of private landowners, the Plan does so.
¶96 The District Court is wrong to the extent its holding implies the City can ignore the
statutory mandate because “the times have changed.” However, because the Plan itself
substantially complies with the statute in this instance, we will affirm.
F. Does the Plan include a timetable as required by § 7-2-4732(2)(c),
MCA?
¶97 Section 7-2-4732(2)(c), MCA, requires the Plan to set forth a proposed timetable for
construction to extend streets, water, sewer, or other utility lines if such extension is
“necessary.” The District Court held that no timetable was required because no new utility
extensions were “necessary.” The court noted its agreement with the City that private
development determines when extensions will occur and also noted the City has water and
sewer capacity to meet the needs of the annexed areas.
¶98 The Property Owners argue a timetable is not in the Plan contrary to the plain
language and that because the City acknowledges there will likely be development in the
future, the Plan must have a timetable. They assert that even though development will be
fueled by private entities, the City has an obligation to predict both the location and timing
of this development. They point out the Plan is an informational document for the public
that can be changed as predictions change.
¶99 The City asserts a timetable is only required when extensions are “necessary.” The
35
City asserts because it has no plans for new water or sewer services or for new roads,
extensions are not necessary and therefore a timetable is not necessary. The City argues it
cannot predict future development by private parties more than it already has.
¶100 We hold the Plan does comply with § 7-2-4732(2)(c), MCA, because no timetable
must be included in the Plan when no extensions are “necessary.” Further, as mentioned, to
the extent the City can predict or direct the timing of growth, the Plan does so by referring
to the City’s zoning requirements, by discussing factors influencing growth patterns, and by
discussing possible growth directions outside the City.
G. Does the Plan include maps of the City’s present and proposed
boundaries in conformance with § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(i), MCA?
¶101 Section 7-2-4731(1)(a)(i), MCA, requires the Plan to include a map or maps showing
the present and proposed boundaries of the municipality.
¶102 The Property Owners argue the Plan does not include a map of the present and
proposed boundaries because the maps of the proposed boundaries are not in the Plan itself.
The City asserts maps of the City are in the Plan and the proposed boundaries are shown on
maps in the Addendum which includes a detailed statement for each specific area to be
annexed.
¶103 We hold the Plan complies with § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(i), MCA, because the Plan includes
maps of the City and because maps with a “proposed annexation boundary” for each
annexation area are attached to the Plan in the Addendum so that any member of the public
who wishes to know the proposed boundaries can easily determine such by reference to the
Addendum.
36
H. Does the Plan include maps of the present and proposed streets and
water mains in conformance with § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(ii), MCA?
¶104 Section 7-2-4731(1)(a)(ii), MCA, reads the Plan shall include a map of:
the present streets, major trunk water mains, sewer interceptors and outfalls,
and other utility lines and the proposed extension of such streets and utility
lines as required in subsection (1)(c).
¶105 The Property Owners assert there is no map meeting these requirements. The City
asserts the Addendum maps show the existing streets, water mains, and sewer mains. The
City also argues it did not have to show any proposed streets or utility mains on its maps
because it is not proposing any as the areas to be annexed are already fully developed urban
areas.
¶106 We hold the Plan complies with § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(ii), MCA, because the maps in the
Addendum show the present streets, water mains, and sewer mains for each area to be
annexed. Further, the Plan complies because no new streets or utility mains are proposed
as discussed above.
I. Does the Plan include maps of the general land use in conformance with
§ 7-2-4731(1)(a)(iii), MCA?
¶107 Section 7-2-4731(1)(a)(iii), MCA, reads the Plan shall include a map of “the general
land use pattern in the areas to be annexed.” The Property Owners argue there is no such
map included in the Plan itself and that the District Court erred in relying on the maps in the
Whitefish City-County Master Plan (Master Plan). The City asserts the Plan includes such
a map because Exhibit C to the Plan is labeled with zoning codes that correspond to the City-
County zoning districts applicable to land within one mile of its boundaries. The City also
asserts the Plan explicitly incorporates the Master Plan by reference in the introduction and
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by specific references in the Addendum.
¶108 We hold the Plan complies with § 7-2-4731(1)(a)(iii), MCA, because Exhibit C to the
Plan shows the “Zoning Use Designations.” These designations indicate general land use
by showing already applicable zoning as adopted by Flathead County in coordination with
the City. Further, while we hold there must be some map showing general land use patterns
in the Plan as is done in Exhibit C, we agree with the District Court that the Plan can refer
to the Master Plan for more detailed information.
J. Does the Plan include the statement regarding boundaries required by
§ 7-2-4731(1)(b), MCA?
¶109 Section 7-2-4731(1)(b), MCA, requires the Plan to include “a statement showing that
the area to be annexed meets the requirements of 7-2-4734 and 7-2-4735.” Sections 7-2-
4734 and -4735, MCA, address, as the District Court noted, “the location of the area to be
annexed in relation to the existing city limits” and other boundary requirements. The
Property Owners assert the District Court erred because it concluded the Plan complies with
§ 7-2-4734 and § 7-2-4735, MCA, even if it does not have a specific statement asserting that
it complies as is required by § 7-2-4731(1)(b), MCA. The City argues the Addendum has
such a statement for each of the areas to be annexed. The City further argues that because
§ 7-2-4734, MCA, and § 7-2-4735, MCA, contain at least six requirements, it is impossible
to state complete compliance in one statement. Finally, the City argues it complied with §
7-2-4734, MCA, and § 7-2-4735, MCA.
¶110 We hold the Plan complies with § 7-2-4731(1)(b), MCA, because the Addendum
contains the required statement for each of the annexed areas. Each of the five areas has a
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statement which reads: “CONCLUSION As shown in the preceding text, the area to be
annexed meets the requirements of Section 7-2-4734 and Section 7-2-4735 MCA.”
IV. CONCLUSION
¶111 In sum, the District Court correctly determined the City’s procedures to invalidate
protests based on waiver of protest agreements and based on the Utility Rule are proper.
Further, the District Court correctly determined the Property Owners retained their right to
request judicial review even though they failed to successfully protest annexation. Finally,
the District Court correctly determined the City’s Plan conforms with the requirements of
Title 7, Chapter 2, part 47. Therefore, the annexations at issue are proper and are effective
as provided by statute. We affirm.
/S/ JOHN WARNER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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