No. 03-399
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 67
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KELLY DEE MEGARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause Nos. DC 99-05, 99–28, 01-29
Honorable Michael C. Prezeau, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Amy Guth, Attorney at Law, Libby, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy Plubell,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Robert Slomski, Deputy Lincoln County Attorney, Libby,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 21, 2004
Decided: March 23, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Kelly Dee Megard appeals from the order entered by the Nineteenth Judicial District
Court, Lincoln County, which revoked his suspended sentences. We affirm.
¶2 The issue is whether the District Court violated Megard’s due process rights by
admitting telephonic testimony at a hearing on a petition to revoke his suspended sentences.
BACKGROUND
¶3 Megard was incarcerated on three separate felony convictions and sentences, two for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and one for carrying a concealed weapon. Each
sentence contained a suspended sentence with numerous conditions. The conditions
included, in pertinent part, requirements that Megard (1) refrain from violating state or
federal laws; (2) undergo a chemical dependency evaluation and comply with the evaluator’s
recommendations, if his probation officer so required; (3) refrain from the use or possession
of any intoxicants or drugs, except legal nonprescription drugs or those prescribed by a
physician; and (4) submit to random chemical tests of blood, breath, hair or urine, upon his
probation officer’s request. The suspended portions of the DUI sentences also required
Megard to pay fines, fees and surcharges. Megard completed the unsuspended portions of
his sentences and began serving his suspended sentences in January of 2003.
¶4 On March 8, 2003, Lincoln County Sheriff’s Deputy Terry L. Watson responded to
a report of a disturbance and took Megard into custody. The State of Montana subsequently
petitioned to revoke all three suspended sentences, attaching an affidavit of Megard’s
probation officer in support. The petitions alleged Megard possessed beer and vodka, had
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a blood alcohol content of .069, assaulted another inmate at the Lincoln County Detention
Center (LCDC), refused to provide a urine sample requested by his probation officer, failed
to attend chemical dependency counseling as required by his probation officer, and failed to
pay fines, fees and surcharges.
¶5 Megard responded by admitting he violated the condition prohibiting use and
possession of intoxicants and waiving his right to a hearing on that violation. He denied the
rest of the alleged violations. The State later amended its petitions to include allegations that
Megard violated both the prohibition against violating federal and state laws and the
prohibition against possessing unauthorized intoxicants or drugs by consuming methamphet-
amine.
¶6 On April 10, 2003, the District Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for April 30.
On April 15, the State moved to reschedule the evidentiary hearing based on the prosecu-
tor’s unavailability, and advised the court that defense counsel objected to continuing the
hearing to a date later than April 30 due to Megard’s incarceration. The District Court
rescheduled the hearing for April 24, 2003, to accommodate both counsels’ needs.
¶7 Three days before the hearing, the State moved the District Court to allow telephonic
testimony from Watson and LCDC Officer Roy Allen Rowberry because both were attending
courses at the Montana Law Enforcement Academy and were not available to appear in
person. Megard objected, relying on Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid., and Bonamarte v. Bonamarte
(1994), 263 Mont. 170, 866 P.2d 1132. The District Court granted the State’s motion,
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reasoning that Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid., and Bonamarte were inapplicable and that Megard’s
fundamental rights would be adequately protected.
¶8 At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, Megard admitted he possessed and
consumed methamphetamine, thus admitting the two additional violations set forth in the
amended petitions. The State presented testimony from eight witnesses, including Megard’s
probation officer, Megard’s employer, inmates from Megard’s former cellblock at LCDC,
Watson and Rowberry by telephone, and other law enforcement personnel. Megard and his
girlfriend testified on his behalf.
¶9 The District Court found–with regard to the alleged violations not admitted by
Megard–that Megard committed the assault and refused to submit to a urine test, thereby
violating the related conditions of his suspended sentences. It determined the State had not
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Megard failed to comply with his probation
officer’s direction regarding the chemical dependency evaluation or failed to pay his fines,
fees and surcharges while having the capacity to do so. The District Court revoked Megard’s
suspended sentences. Megard appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Asserted violations of the constitutional right of due process present questions of law,
and our review is plenary. State v. Finley, 2003 MT 239, ¶ 10, 317 Mont. 268, ¶ 10, 77 P.3d
193, ¶ 10 (citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
¶11 Did the District Court violate Megard’s due process rights by admitting telephonic
testimony at a hearing on a petition to revoke his suspended sentences?
¶12 When the State files a petition showing probable cause that an offender has violated
a condition of a suspended sentence, a district court may issue an order for a hearing on
revocation and an arrest warrant. Section 46-18-203(1), MCA. At the offender’s initial
appearance, the court must advise the offender of the petition’s allegations, the opportunity
to appear and present evidence, the opportunity to question adverse witnesses and the right
to counsel. Section 46-18-203(4), MCA. If, after a hearing on the petition, the court
determines the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender
violated a condition of a suspended sentence, the court may revoke the suspension. Section
46-18-203(6), (7)(iii), MCA.
¶13 Here, the District Court determined Megard violated the three drug and alcohol
conditions he admitted and, in addition, failed to submit a urine sample upon request and
assaulted another inmate at LCDC. On appeal, Megard does not challenge the in-court
testimony establishing his failure to provide a urine sample. He challenges only the
telephonic testimony supporting the allegation that he assaulted another inmate at LCDC.
¶14 Megard contends that in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, the
telephonic testimony was inadmissible under Bonamarte. He also asserts that Rule 611(e),
M.R.Evid., precluded the use of telephonic testimony at his revocation hearing. Finally, he
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argues that the admission of telephonic testimony violated his right to confront adverse
witnesses. We address each argument in turn.
¶15 Megard first argues the telephonic testimony was inadmissible under Bonamarte.
Absent special circumstances or the parties’ consent, telephonic testimony generally is not
allowed in trials. Bonamarte, 263 Mont. at 177, 866 P.2d at 1136 (citation omitted).
Requiring an individual to testify in person serves six important policies and purposes: (1)
assisting the factfinder in evaluating witness credibility; (2) establishing the identity of the
witness; (3) impressing upon the witness the seriousness of the occasion; (4) assuring the
witness is not coached or influenced during the testimony; (5) preventing the witness from
improperly referring to documents; and (6) providing a right of confrontation when required.
Bonamarte, 263 Mont. at 174, 866 P.2d at 1134 (citation omitted).
¶16 In Bonamarte, we held that a district court abused its discretion in allowing a woman
to testify telephonically in her dissolution proceeding. We reasoned that the telephonic
testimony impaired cross-examination efforts because the woman did not possess pertinent
documents, precluded the court from determining the parties’ relative credibility vis-a-vis
conflicting evidence, and infringed on her spouse’s right of confrontation in civil cases
pursuant to Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid. Bonamarte, 263 Mont. at 175-76, 866 P.2d at 1135.
¶17 Bonamarte is readily distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the witness in
Bonamarte who did not possess pertinent documents and could not testify about them on
cross-examination, both Watson and Rowberry indicated they had their reports and were able
to refer to them. See Bonamarte, 263 Mont. at 176, 866 P.2d at 1135. Rowberry did not
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have in his possession a photograph of Megard’s injury after the jailhouse altercation, but
Megard did not object to the admission of the photograph after another witness identified it.
¶18 Highlighting Rowberry’s statement that he had not previously testified in district
court, Megard argues that the District Court was unable to evaluate Rowberry’s credibility.
In granting the State’s motion to allow telephonic testimony, however, the District Court
observed that
[t]he officers in question are not strangers to any of the participants in the
hearing, including the Court. Personal observation of the witnesses testifying
under oath is not as crucial in this instance as it would be for a jury, new to the
job of judging credibility and unfamiliar with the witnesses.
Megard asserts that the District Court’s familiarity with Rowberry outside the courtroom was
not “good cause” to allow telephonic testimony.
¶19 The issue under Bonamarte is not whether the District Court’s familiarity with
Rowberry established good cause for permitting his telephonic testimony, but whether the
District Court could judge Rowberry’s credibility in relation to that of other witnesses.
Knowledge of a witness’s identity and credentials may constitute a special circumstance
under which telephonic testimony is allowed. Bonamarte, 263 Mont. at 177, 866 P.2d at
1136 (citations omitted). Moreover, although Megard presented conflicting testimony, other
witnesses corroborated Rowberry’s testimony. We conclude the admission of telephonic
testimony did not impede the court’s ability to judge Rowberry’s credibility.
¶20 Megard also asserts that, like the spouse in Bonamarte, he had a right of confrontation
under Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid., which provides the following:
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Confrontation. Except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, these
rules, or other rules applicable to the courts of this state, at the trial of an
action, a witness can be heard only in the presence and subject to the
examination of all the parties to the action, if they choose to attend and
examine.
His contention ignores the exceptions set forth in Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid.
¶21 Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid., applies except–among other things–as otherwise provided
in the evidentiary rules themselves. Rule 101(c)(3), M.R.Evid., expressly provides that the
Rules do not apply to proceedings “granting or revoking probation or parole.” See also State
v. Pedersen, 2003 MT 315, ¶ 20, 318 Mont. 262, ¶ 20, 80 P.3d 79, ¶ 20; State v. Nelson
(1987), 225 Mont. 215, 218, 731 P.2d 1299, 1301. Therefore, the District Court did not err
in concluding that Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid., was inapplicable to Megard’s revocation hearing.
¶22 Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Rule 611(e), M.R.Evid., Megard asserts the
admission of telephonic testimony nevertheless violated his constitutional right to confront
witnesses. A revocation hearing is not a criminal trial. Pedersen, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).
Therefore, contrary to Megard’s assertion, Article II, § 24, of the Montana Constitu-
tion–which secures the right to confront “[i]n all criminal prosecutions”–does not afford him
a constitutional right to confront witnesses at his revocation hearing.
¶23 Megard also contends the District Court improperly applied what he calls “common
law” minimum due process standards in analyzing his right of confrontation. It is undisputed
that a revocation hearing must be fundamentally fair and must meet minimum due process
requirements. See, e.g., Pedersen, ¶¶ 20-21 (citations omitted). One of the minimum due
process requirements is “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” See,
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e.g., Finley, ¶ 31 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756,
1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656). This right applies “unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation.” Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. at 1761-62,
36 L.Ed.2d 656; see also State v. Kingery (1989), 239 Mont. 160, 165, 779 P.2d 495, 498
(citations omitted); State v. Friedman (1987), 225 Mont. 373, 377, 732 P.2d 1322, 1325
(citations omitted).
¶24 Megard asserts he was entitled to application of § 46-18-203(4), MCA, rather than
the right to cross-examine and confront, absent good cause. In other words, he contends, the
statutory right is broader than that set forth in both Montana and federal case law. He is
incorrect.
¶25 Section 46-18-203(4), MCA, requires that an offender be advised of “the opportunity
to question adverse witnesses.” Because Megard’s counsel actually cross-examined Watson
and Rowberry, he clearly received the statutorily required “opportunity to question.” The
minimum due process requirement affording the right to confront–absent good cause–and
cross-examine witnesses is broader than merely having the opportunity to question adverse
witnesses. We conclude the District Court did not err in applying the minimum due process
requirements instead of § 46-18-203(4), MCA.
¶26 Alternatively, Megard argues no good cause existed for the limitation on his right to
confront adverse witnesses and, therefore, the District Court erred in admitting the telephonic
testimony. We agree with Megard’s implicit suggestion that good cause to limit the right to
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confront adverse witnesses is a difficult test to meet. Under the relatively unique
circumstances of this case, however, we conclude the good cause test was met.
¶27 Upon receiving the State’s April 15 motion to reschedule the revocation hearing,
together with defense counsel’s agreement to reschedule only to a date prior to April 30, the
District Court rescheduled the hearing for April 24 to accommodate both counsel. As later
became evident, two of the State’s witnesses could not testify in person on the rescheduled
date because they were attending scheduled law enforcement academy courses. Given the
confluence of scheduling problems presented here, we conclude that good cause existed for
the District Court to admit the witnesses’ testimony by telephone.
¶28 Finally, we recently determined that actual error in admitting evidence at a revocation
hearing can be harmless when abundant evidence admitted without error demonstrates
violations of conditions which are sufficient to support a revocation. See Pedersen, ¶¶ 21-
22. Stated differently, prejudice must result from the improper admission of evidence in
revocation hearings. In Pedersen, evidence relating to certain alleged violations of probation
conditions was improperly admitted but not relied on by the trial court in revoking a
suspended sentence. Pedersen, ¶¶ 21-22. The probationer had admitted at least two
violations and uncontroverted evidence of two other violations was presented. We concluded
that, under such circumstances, no abuse of discretion occurred when the trial court revoked
the suspended sentence. Pedersen, ¶¶ 19, 22.
¶29 Here, even assuming error had occurred, Megard has not established–and could not
establish–prejudice under Pedersen. As set forth above, Megard admitted three violations
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and the District Court determined the State had proven two more: the assault and the failure
to provide a urine sample. The telephonic testimony Megard challenges relates only to the
assault violation and he asserts no error regarding the other four violations.
¶30 We hold the District Court did not violate Megard’s due process rights by admitting
telephonic testimony at his revocation hearing.
¶31 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
Justice W. William Leaphart specially concurring.
¶32 I concur in the result reached by the Court. I would not, however, reach the question
of whether the telephonic testimony concerning the assault violations constitutes error. The
unchallenged evidence of four other violations is sufficient to sustain the revocation of his
suspended sentence.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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