No. 03-802
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2005 MT 306
LENORSE L. SLAVIN,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV-02-374
Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Kristina Neal, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 18, 2004
Decided: December 6, 2005
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Lenorse L. Slavin petitioned the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County,
for postconviction relief. The District Court denied the petition and Slavin appeals. We
affirm.
¶2 We restate the issue as whether the District Court erred in denying Slavin's petition
for postconviction relief.
BACKGROUND
¶3 Slavin pled guilty to, and was convicted of, partner or family member assault (PFMA)
in 1992 and 1993. In August of 2001, he pled guilty to a third PFMA charge, which was a
felony because of his two prior convictions. See § 45-5-206(3)(a)(iv), MCA. The District
Court imposed sentence and entered judgment. Slavin did not appeal the sentence.
¶4 In July of 2002, Slavin filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in which he
alleged the prior PFMA convictions upon which his 2001 felony conviction was based were
constitutionally infirm because, in those proceedings, he did not knowingly waive his right
to counsel. Slavin further alleged that his trial attorney for the 2001 charge rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the records concerning his prior PFMA
convictions and by failing to argue the alleged constitutional infirmities of those prior
convictions.
¶5 The District Court appointed counsel to represent Slavin in the postconviction
proceeding and the State of Montana filed a written response, to which it attached a
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transcript of the 2001 change of plea hearing and an affidavit by Slavin's trial counsel in that
case. The District Court set a hearing on Slavin's petition, during which Slavin withdrew his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Both Slavin and Deborah Davis-Quitt, the presiding
Justice of the Peace in Slavin's two prior PFMA cases, testified at the hearing.
¶6 The District Court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order denying
the petition. It concluded Slavin had failed to carry his burden of providing direct evidence
overcoming the presumption of regularity attached to the prior convictions and, even if such
direct evidence existed, the State met its burden of establishing the prior convictions were
not obtained in violation of Slavin's constitutional rights. Slavin appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 We review a district court's denial of a petition for postconviction relief to determine
whether the court's findings are clearly erroneous and whether the court correctly interpreted
the law, including resolution of an issue involving a question of constitutional law.
Ellenburg v. Chase, 2004 MT 66, ¶ 10, 320 Mont. 315, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 473, ¶ 10; State v.
Snell, 2004 MT 334, ¶ 16, 324 Mont. 173, ¶ 16, 103 P.3d 503, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). We
will affirm a correct result even if the district court reached that result for the wrong reason.
Camarillo v. State, 2005 MT 29, ¶ 11, 326 Mont. 35, ¶ 11, 107 P.3d 1265, ¶ 11 (citation
omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶8 Did the District Court err in denying Slavin's petition for postconviction relief?
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¶9 Slavin claims on appeal in this postconviction proceeding that he presented direct
evidence overcoming the presumption that his two underlying misdemeanor PFMA
convictions were invalid, and the State failed to establish otherwise. He contends that,
because his two prior PFMA convictions were constitutionally infirm, the District Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him to a felony for his third offense. He relies
on State v. Moorman (1997), 279 Mont. 330, 928 P.2d 145, overruled in part, Peña v. State,
2004 MT 293, ¶ 25, 323 Mont. 347, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 154, ¶ 25, and State v. LaPier, 1998 MT
174, 289 Mont. 392, 961 P.2d 1274, for the proposition that whether a prior conviction was
constitutionally valid is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction which may be raised at any
stage of a judicial proceeding, including on postconviction relief.
¶10 In Moorman, the postconviction petitioner challenged the dangerous offender
designation portion of his sentence, alleging the sentencing court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to impose it. We concluded he was correct and held that, for issues which could
have been raised on direct appeal, the procedural bar contained in § 46-21-105(2), MCA, did
not apply where the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose the
particular sentence. Moorman, 279 Mont. at 336, 928 P.2d at 149. Similarly, in LaPier, the
postconviction petitioner argued the district court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him
as a felony offender because one of the prior convictions on which his felony status was
based was constitutionally infirm. Without substantively addressing whether the issue was
one of subject matter jurisdiction, we cited Moorman for the rule that lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction is a nonwaivable defect which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
LaPier, ¶ 9.
¶11 We decided Peña after the parties briefed this case for appeal. In Peña, the petition
for postconviction relief raised, for the first time, a claim that the sentencing court lacked
statutory authority to sentence the defendant--a minor when he committed the offense--to
more than five years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. We concluded this
was not a jurisdictional claim. "An error in sentencing does not divest a district court of
subject matter jurisdiction over the case before it." Peña, ¶ 22. Overruling Moorman in part,
we stated that the question of whether a district court commits a statutory error in imposing
a sentence must not be confused with the question of whether the court had the power or
capacity to impose the sentence in the first instance. We determined a claim of an illegal
sentence is a nonjurisdictional claim to which the issue preclusion provision of the
postconviction statutes contained in § 46-21-105(2), MCA, applies. Peña, ¶ 25.
¶12 As in Moorman, the issue in LaPier was whether the district court had statutory
authority to impose the sentence it did, not whether the court had the power or capacity to
impose sentence in the first instance. In light of Peña, we conclude LaPier is no longer
good authority on this point and, to that extent, we overrule LaPier.
¶13 Applying Peña to the present case, we conclude Slavin's claim that his two prior
convictions could not serve as a basis for charging the 2001 PFMA charge as a felony is a
nonjurisdictional claim involving whether the District Court had statutory authority to
impose the sentence it did, not whether it had the power or capacity to impose the sentence
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in the first instance. See Peña, ¶ 22. It is well-established that a guilty plea which is entered
knowingly and voluntarily constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses
which arose prior to the plea. See, e.g., Ellenburg, ¶ 21 (citations omitted). Consequently,
Slavin waived this claim when he pled guilty to felony PFMA.
¶14 In addition, and notwithstanding both his conviction pursuant to a guilty plea and the
lack of timely objection to the sentence, Slavin could have appealed the legality of his
sentence. See, e.g., State v. Gordon, 1999 MT 169, ¶ 29, 295 Mont. 183, ¶ 29, 983 P.2d 377,
¶ 29 (citations omitted). He did not do so. As a result, we conclude § 46-21-105(2), MCA,
which precludes consideration in a postconviction proceeding of grounds for relief which
could have been raised on direct appeal, bars his sentencing-related claim.
¶15 The District Court reached the correct result in denying Slavin’s petition for
postconviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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Justice James C. Nelson concurs.
¶16 I join this Opinion with two caveats. First, I concur in the analysis in ¶ 14 only
because this case involves the statutory remedy of post-conviction relief. Second, while I
joined the Court's decision in Peña v. State, 2004 MT 293, 323 Mont. 347, 100 P.3d 154,
I have since reconsidered my position and now conclude that Justice Leaphart's concurring
and dissenting opinion in that case is correct.
¶17 With those caveats, I concur.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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