State v. Whiteman

No. 04-629

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2005 MT 15

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

VINCE WHITEMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Big Horn, Cause No. DC 04-12,
The Honorable Blair Jones, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

William F. Hooks, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana

Matthew J. Wald, Attorney at Law, Hardin, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Calvin Wilson, Big Horn County Attorney; Nancy L. Rohde, James
Yellowtail, Deputy County Attorneys, Hardin, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: January 4, 2005

Decided: February 1, 2005

Filed:

__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant Vince Whiteman (Whiteman), a minor, appeals from the decision of the

Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County, to allow prosecution of his case

in district court. Whiteman raises the sole issue of whether the District Court erred when it

determined, based upon the brutal nature of the offense and the best interests of the

community and of Whiteman, that Whiteman should stand trial in District Court. We

affirm.

¶2 At the outset, we note Whiteman appears to have abandoned his claim that the statute

permitting the District Court to transfer a case back to the Youth Court, § 41-5-206(3),

MCA, violated his due process rights based upon its failure to assign the burden of proof.

In any event, the District Court clearly assigned the burden of proving that Whiteman should

stand trial in District Court to the State in this case. We will avoid hypothesizing regarding

possible permutations and incarnations not presented. New York v. Farber (1982), 458 U.S.

747, 767, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113, 1129 (citing the traditional rule that “a

person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on

the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not

before the Court”).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The State alleges that on February 6, 2004, Whiteman, using a baseball bat, beat and

killed Wayne Not Afraid (Not Afraid) and severely injured Floyd Grant (Grant). Whiteman

was thirteen years old at the time of the beatings. Earlier that day, Whiteman and two other

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males, Dietrich Shoulderblade (Shoulderblade), and John Knows His Gun (Knows His Gun),

had engaged in a verbal confrontation with Not Afraid and Grant. Cheranda Not Afraid,

decedent Not Afraid’s niece, told police that shortly after her grandmother diffused the

verbal confrontation, she overheard Whiteman, Shoulderblade and Knows His Gun

discussing a plan to assault Not Afraid and Grant. They devised a plan to have Knows His

Gun lure the two men out of their trailer where Whiteman and Shoulderblade would attack

them with a bat. Although Cheranda did not witness the attack, she told police she saw

Whiteman poised with a bat outside her uncle’s trailer shortly before the assault.

¶4 In subsequent interviews with police, Knows His Gun admitted the males had

conceived of the plan to ambush Not Afraid and Grant and that upon confronting the two

men, Whiteman had struck Not Afraid and Grant each in the head with a baseball bat.

Knows His Gun stated he did not see Whiteman’s first blow to Grant, but asserted he heard

it and saw Grant falling backwards without making any effort to catch himself. He also

claimed Not Afraid then rushed towards Whiteman at which time Whiteman struck Not

Afraid with the baseball bat, knocking him to the ground. Once Not Afraid was on the

ground, Whiteman returned to Grant and inflicted more blows to his head with the baseball

bat. Grant appeared to be unconscious as he made no effort to protect himself. Whiteman

then returned to Not Afraid and hit him in the head several more times with the bat.

¶5 The blood spatter found at the crime scene by the police and the physical appearance

of Not Afraid and Grant proved consistent with Knows His Gun’s report. The police also

recovered a pair of bloody pants from Whiteman’s trailer and a wooden bat covered with a

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large amount of blood.

¶6 On February 18, 2004, the State filed a motion in Youth Court for leave to file a

Petition of Delinquency against Whiteman. The motion alleged Whiteman had committed

acts that, if he were an adult, would have constituted the offenses of deliberate homicide and

aggravated assault. The Youth Court granted the State leave to file a petition for delinquency

and the State filed it on February 19, 2004.

¶7 The next day, February 20, 2004, the State filed in District Court a notice of its intent,

pursuant to § 41-5-206(1), MCA, to file an Information against Whiteman in district court

and a motion to transfer his case to district court. The State explained that although the

statute allowed it to file an Information against Whiteman directly in district court, it

believed that based upon State v. Butler, 1999 MT 70, 294 Mont. 17, 977 P.2d 1000, a

transfer hearing must occur before filing an Information against a minor in district court. The

State then filed its motion for leave to file an information directly in the District Court.

¶8 Whiteman filed a separate motion in District Court on June 11, 2004, requesting the

court declare the transfer statute, § 41-5-206(3), MCA, unconstitutionally vague and that the

statute’s failure to allocate which party carried the burden of proof denied him due process.

The District Court eventually assigned to the State the burden of proof under the transfer

statute based on the State’s request.

¶9 Whiteman filed a brief in support of his position that the case should be tried in Youth

Court on June 24, 2004. The next day, the District Court conducted a hearing pursuant to

§ 41-5-206(3), MCA, to determine whether Whiteman’s case should be tried in youth court

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or district court. On July 23, 2004, the District Court issued its first order in which it denied

Whiteman’s request that it declare the youth transfer statute unconstitutional. The court

entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a separate order on August 16, 2004.

This second order granted the State’s motion for leave to file an Information against

Whiteman directly in district court. This appeal followed.

¶10 This Court reviews a district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion regarding

whether a juvenile should be prosecuted in youth court or district court. State v. Spina, 1999

MT 113, ¶ 12, 294 Mont. 367, ¶ 12, 982 P.2d 421, ¶ 12 (citing Matter of J.K.C. (1995), 270

Mont. 342, 344, 891 P.2d 1169, 1171). “With regard to specific findings of fact relied on

by the [district] court in transferring the case, the standard of review is whether such findings

are clearly erroneous.” Spina, ¶ 12 (citing Matter of J.D.W. (1994), 267 Mont. 87, 91, 881

P.2d 1324, 1327). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial

evidence, if the district court misapprehended the effect of evidence, or if our review of the

record convinces us that the district court made a mistake. Spina, ¶ 12 (citations omitted).

We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether its conclusions are

correct. Spina, ¶ 12.

¶11 The State may file a motion for leave to file an information directly in district court

under certain circumstances. These circumstances include a situation in which the youth is

twelve or more years of age, the alleged criminal conduct falls within a specified category

of offenses, including deliberate homicide as defined in § 45-5-102, MCA, and the court

finds, upon considering all the relevant evidence, probable cause to believe the youth has

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committed the alleged offense. Section 41-5-206(1), MCA. Once the State submits the case

to the district court, the district court may not transfer the case to the youth court unless it

finds by a preponderance of the evidence:

(a) a youth court proceeding and disposition will serve the interests of
community protection;

(b) that the nature of the offense does not warrant prosecution in district court;
and

(c) it would be in the best interest of the youth if the matter was prosecuted in
youth court.

Section 41-5-206(3)(a)-(c), MCA.

¶12 As a preliminary matter, Whiteman asserts that the District Court, in considering these

factors, contemplated only selective factual allegations, proposed by the State and adopted

verbatim by the court, that falsely portray the nature of the alleged incident. We need not

address Whiteman’s supposition that the District Court’s findings are clearly erroneous as

a result of their “verbatim” adoption. We conclude the District Court made comprehensive

findings of fact that intimately detailed the testimony offered at trial. “Findings and

conclusions that are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis

for decision and are supported by evidence will not be overturned simply because the trial

court relied on proposed findings and conclusions submitted by counsel.” Steve v. Smith

(1993), 261 Mont. 419, 439, 863 P.2d 1000, 1012 (citation omitted).

¶13 We will address, however, Whiteman’s specific allegations of clear error in the

District Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as they relate to the transfer statute.

Whiteman first claims the District Court erred in determining that the nature of his offense

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warranted prosecution in district court. See § 41-5-206(3)(b), MCA. Specifically,

Whiteman asserts the court relied upon the nature of the allegations, rather than the nature

of the offense, in determining whether the attack on Not Afraid and Grant was deliberate,

and thus warranting prosecution in District Court. Whiteman contends the court ignored

significant evidence, including statements in the State’s Affidavit suggesting mitigating

factors, that contradicted the State’s allegations that the attack of Not Afraid and Grant had

been planned.

¶14 We conclude that substantial credible evidence supports the findings that probable

cause existed for the charge of deliberate homicide and thus prosecution in district court. See

Section 41-5-206(3)(b), MCA. The District Court received testimony at the hearing from

both parties concerning the basis for the charges. Between the testimony presented,

including eye-witness accounts, the court found more reliable the reports by Detectives

Dalton and Bahm that characterized the attack as premeditated and vicious. The court stated,

“[b]oth Detective Dalton and Detective Bahm were called as witnesses for the State. Their

respective testimony at hearing confirmed the substantive allegations of the Affidavit . . . .”

Having found “no allegations or assertions currently before the Court suggesting that the

death of Wayne Not Afraid and severe beating of Floyd Grant could in any way be

characterized as justifiable or the result of negligent rather than deliberate conduct,” the court

concluded, “based not only on the seriousness of the alleged offenses but also on what

appears to be the premeditated, violent, and deliberate character of the conduct resulting in

the alleged offenses, that the nature of the offenses warrants prosecution in the district court

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in the adult system.” See Section 41-5-206(3)(b), MCA.

¶15 As this Court has recognized, “[i]t is within the domain of the trial court to resolve

conflicts in the evidence based on its assessment of the demeanor and credibility of the

witnesses before it, and this Court will not resolve conflicts on appeal.” Spina, ¶ 24 (citing

Matter of T.N. (1994), 267 Mont. 81, 85, 881 P.2d 1329, 1332). Therefore, we conclude,

based on the evidence presented at the transfer hearing, the District Court did not err when

it determined the testimony of Detectives Dalton and Bahm supplied probable cause that

Whiteman committed the offense and that the nature of the offense warranted prosecution

in district court.

¶16 Whiteman, pointing to § 41-5-206(3), MCA, next contends the District Court

improperly relied only upon the State’s witnesses in determining whether youth court

proceedings would serve the interests of the community and Whiteman. Whiteman asserts

the absence of any criminal history and the testimony of three of his former teachers as well

as a psychologist established that he does not present a danger to the community. Further,

Whiteman maintains the youth court’s dispositional options included facilities designed to

rehabilitate youths that would be more therapeutic and thus better suited to his interests than

those offered in the adult prison system.

¶17 We conclude once again that sufficient evidence supports the District Court’s findings

that a youth court proceeding and disposition would not serve the interests of the community

or promote Whiteman’s rehabilitation. The District Court received testimony at trial from

both parties concerning the interests of the community and of Whiteman. Between the

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testimony presented, including three of Whiteman’s teachers, a psychologist, and two

officers from the Department of Corrections, the court found more substantive the testimony

of Officer Pamela Bunke, an administrator for the Department of Corrections, and Officer

Jack Lane, a probation officer. Officers Bunke and Lane both testified to the limited

resources available to the youth court in handling young violent offenders like Whiteman as

well as the continuity to which Whiteman’s case would receive in the adult system. Further,

both Officers Bunke and Lane testified that Whiteman’s rehabilitation would be better suited

to the adult system.

¶18 The District Court determined that youth court proceedings would limit the

dispositional options to juvenile correctional or treatment facilities and only for the limited

time frame of the youth court’s jurisdiction. “Such limitations,” the court reasoned, “do not

serve the interest of the community protection as does the more extensive sentencing options

available to the district court through the adult system.” The court also concluded, “[n]o one

reasonably disputes that it is in the offenders’ best interests that they be held accountable for

their actions . . . The broader options available to the district court in adult proceedings to

hold offenders accountable provide the Court with greater ability to impose the appropriate

level of accountability . . . .”

¶19 The trier of fact resolves conflicts in the evidence before it, and this Court will not

reevaluate this same evidence on appeal. Spina, ¶ 30. Despite the testimony of three of

Whiteman’s teachers describing him as intelligent and respectful and a psychologist who

believed Whiteman just needed more structure, sufficient credible evidence supports the

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District Court’s findings that a youth court proceeding and disposition would not serve the

interests of the community or promote Whiteman’s rehabilitation. See Section 41-5-

206(3)(a) and (c), MCA. We thus conclude that the District Court’s findings and

conclusions that prosecution of Whiteman in youth court would not serve the best interests

of the community or Whiteman are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we hold that the

District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Whiteman should be tried in

the District Court.

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court.

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JIM RICE

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