No. 05-245
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 121
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CLAYTON MOONEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC-03-0635,
Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Richard J. Carstensen, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Ilka Becker,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Ingrid A. Rosenquist, Deputy
County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 23, 2006
Decided: May 31, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 After protracted proceedings, the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone
County, sentenced Clayton Mooney to a suspended six-month jail term (with the
exception of seven days) for driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of § 61-8-401,
MCA. Mooney now appeals.
¶2 We restate the issues as follows:
¶3 1. Did the District Court violate Mooney’s constitutional right to a speedy trial?
¶4 2. Did the State prove that Mooney drove the vehicle that crashed into Ruff’s
fence and that he drove it upon a public way?
BACKGROUND
¶5 On the evening of December 14, 2002, Darin Ruff answered the door to find
Clayton Mooney standing before him. Smelling of alcohol and looking not “all there,”
Mooney asked Ruff if he could leave his vehicle parked in Ruff’s yard until the next
morning because he was having car trouble. Ruff acquiesced. Some moments later,
Mooney returned, at which point, Ruff, who was watching a movie with his wife and
children, chose not to answer the door. According to Ruff, Mooney yelled, “I’m sorry
about the fence.” At his wife’s prompting, Ruff called the sheriff’s department.
¶6 Highway Patrol Officer Dell Patrick Aman reported to the Ruff residence on
Grelck Lane, located north of old Highway 212. Officer Aman testified that upon his
arrival, he observed a 1986 Ford pickup truck that had run through a fence line and
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sheared off a post. The post went through the driver’s side headlight, causing damage to
the front end of the vehicle, as well as thirty feet of fence line.
¶7 During Officer Aman’s initial interview with Ruff, Mooney again showed up at
Ruff’s door. Officer Aman walked onto the porch to talk with Mooney, at which point he
observed Mooney speaking with “very” slurred speech and smelling strongly of alcohol.
Officer Aman then asked Mooney to remove his hat and submit to field sobriety tests, at
which point, according to Officer Aman, Mooney challenged the officer’s authority.
Officer Aman arrested Mooney for DUI and transported him to the Yellowstone County
Detention Facility, where Mooney refused to provide law enforcement information
regarding the crash. At trial before the District Court judge, Officer Aman testified that
he believed Mooney “stated at some point in time that he wasn’t driving, a friend was
driving.” Mooney was alone each time he interacted with Ruff and law enforcement.
¶8 Mooney pled not guilty and was tried before the Justice of the Peace on July 25,
2003; the court convicted Mooney of DUI. 1 On July 30, 2003, Mooney appealed to the
District Court. As a result of a nonjury trial held on November 24, 2003, Mooney was
found guilty. One month later, Mooney moved for a new trial; the District Court denied
the motion on March 22, 2004, and filed an amended judgment.2 Eight months later, on
December 21, 2004, Mooney filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that his
1
The Justice of the Peace also convicted Mooney of possession of drug
paraphernalia. The District Court, however, overturned this conviction, and the State did
not appeal.
2
The amended judgment found Mooney guilty of DUI, but not possession of drug
paraphernalia.
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constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, in part because his sentence had
not yet been imposed. The District Court denied Mooney’s motion on February 1, 2005,
and sentenced him the following month, on March 3, 2005. Mooney appealed a week
later.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a question of constitutional
law. We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether its
interpretation of the law is correct. City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, ¶ 18, 290
Mont. 148, ¶ 18, 965 P.2d 866, ¶ 18.
¶10 The standard of review regarding sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is
whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony are to be determined by the trier of fact, and disputed questions of fact and
credibility will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. McCarthy, 2004 MT 312, ¶ 46, 324
Mont. 1, ¶ 46, 101 P.3d 288, ¶ 46. Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. State v. Enright, 1998 MT 322, ¶ 35, 292 Mont. 204, ¶ 35, 974 P.2d 1118,
¶ 35.
DISCUSSION
¶11 1. Did the District Court violate Mooney’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial?
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¶12 Mooney filed a motion with the District Court to dismiss his case on the grounds
that he did not receive a speedy trial as mandated by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution. Mooney
argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion, specifically because the right
to a speedy trial includes all periods of time from the date he filed his notice of appeal to
the District Court on August 4, 2003, until the date the court sentenced him on March 3,
2005.
¶13 In Bruce, ¶ 19, we discussed the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, for reviewing
claims that a defendant has been unconstitutionally denied a speedy trial. “The Barker
test requires that we consider: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3)
the assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant; and (4) the prejudice to the
defense.” Bruce, ¶ 19. We noted that these four factors “are necessarily general
guidelines to be applied on a case-by-case basis to the unique circumstances of each case
. . . [meaning that] courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”
Bruce, ¶ 20 (citation omitted). We also concluded, with regard to the third factor, that
“[s]o long as the defendant asserts his or her right to a speedy trial by a motion to dismiss
on speedy trial grounds filed prior to the time of trial . . . the defendant has satisfied the
third-prong of the Barker test and . . . further analysis of that prong is not only
unnecessary, but inappropriate.” Bruce, ¶ 48 (emphasis added).
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¶14 The State succinctly argues that we should affirm the District Court’s denial of
Mooney’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial because Mooney did not assert his
right prior to trial, thus failing to satisfy the third prong. Given that Bruce involved a
delay in trial, opposed to sentencing, this issue requires further analysis.
¶15 Mooney specifically argues that his speedy trial right includes the period between
November 24, 2003, when he was convicted, and the date he actually received his
sentence on March 3, 2005. Although we have not previously addressed whether the
right to a speedy trial includes sentencing, the United States Supreme Court stated in
Pollard v. United States (1957), 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 486, 1 L.Ed.2d 393,
399, that it would “assume arguendo that sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment.” In light of Pollard, we now conclusively hold that the right to a
speedy trial applies through sentencing. We also hold that when analyzing a speedy trial
claim involving the period between trial and sentencing, courts shall still consider the
four prongs of the Barker test—(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay;
(3) the assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant; and (4) the prejudice to the
defense. Importantly, as to the third prong (assertion of the right), when the issue is
sentencing rather than trial, the test is not whether the defendant asserts his or her right
before trial, but rather whether the right is asserted before sentencing. We conclude that
Mooney satisfied the third prong of the Barker test because he asserted his right prior to
sentencing. Mooney, however, has not satisfied the fourth prong—that is, he has not
shown that the delay in sentencing resulted in prejudice.
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¶16 When analyzing the prejudice element, the Supreme Court identified three defense
interests: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. The Court determined that
“the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his
case skews the fairness of the entire system” in that witnesses could die or disappear
during a delay, or be unable to accurately recall events. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct.
at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. In this case, Mooney was not incarcerated in the period
between trial and sentencing, nor is there any indication that the delay impaired his
defense. Mooney has also not shown that he experienced inordinate anxiety due to the
delay.
¶17 Because we conclude that Mooney has not satisfied the prejudice prong of the
Barker test, we decline to address the first and second prongs. We hold that the District
Court did not err in denying Mooney’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.
¶18 2. Did the State prove that Mooney drove the vehicle that crashed into
Ruff’s fence and that he drove it upon a public way?
¶19 Mooney contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was the person “in actual physical control” of the vehicle that crashed into Ruff’s fence
“upon the ways of this state open to the public,” as mandated by § 61-8-401, MCA.
Specifically, Mooney argues that there was no evidence introduced at trial proving that he
was the one driving the vehicle in question; nor was there any proof, according to
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Mooney, that the crashed vehicle was ever driven upon “ways of this state open to the
public”—i.e. “any highway, road, alley, lane, parking area, or other public or private
place adapted and fitted for public travel that is in common use by the public.” Section
61-8-101(1), MCA.
¶20 The State presented testimony that Mooney repeatedly appeared at Ruff’s front
door on December 14, 2002, communicating that his vehicle had crashed into Ruff’s
fence. Mooney claimed ownership of the vehicle by referring to it as “his” car. He also
apologized for damaging Ruff’s fence. Neither Ruff nor Officer Aman observed anyone
else in the vicinity any of the times Mooney came to the door. We conclude that based
on the circumstantial evidence presented by the State, a rational trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mooney was the driver of the vehicle.
¶21 As for Mooney’s contention that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the car was driven “upon ways of this state open to the public,” we conclude
that a rational trier of fact could have inferred from Officer Aman’s testimony regarding
the location of Grelck Lane (on which the Ruff property sits) that it qualifies as a “road
. . . lane . . . or other public or private place adapted and fitted for public travel that is in
common use by the public.” Section 61-8-101(1), MCA.
¶22 Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
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