No. 05-353
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 58
_______________________________________
CHARLES M. DeSHIELDS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Respondent.
______________________________________
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin, Cause No DV 2006-261 (DC-95-57)
The Honorable Holly Brown, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Charles M. DeShields (pro se), Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Marty Lambert, County Attorney; Bozeman, Montana
____________________________________
Submitted on Briefs: February 8, 2006
Decided: March 14, 2006
Filed:
______________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Charles DeShields (DeShields) appeals from the denial of his petition
for postconviction relief in the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County. We affirm.
¶2 We review whether the District Court properly revoked DeShields’s deferred
sentence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 DeShields entered a guilty plea to felony sexual assault on July 15, 1995. The
District Court deferred imposition of his sentence for a period of four years subject to
certain terms and conditions. The State filed a petition to revoke the deferred sentence
two years later on October 2, 1997, alleging that DeShields had failed to participate in
sex offender treatment. The District Court did not act on the petition, however, because
DeShields had left Montana. When DeShields returned to Montana in 2001, the District
Court deferred his sentence for another four years.
¶4 The State filed a second petition to revoke on October 22, 2003. The petition to
revoke alleged that DeShields again had violated the terms of his deferred sentence. The
District Court again revoked his deferred sentence and ordered DeShields to serve four
years at the Montana State Prison. DeShields did not file an appeal.
¶5 DeShields filed a petition for postconviction relief on May 5, 2004, challenging
the factual basis for the revocation of his deferred sentence in 2003. DeShields alleged
that the District Court improperly revoked his sentence based on criminal charges of
which he was ultimately acquitted and that the District Court failed to require a
presentence investigation. The District Court ruled that § 46-21-105(2), MCA, prevented
DeShields from raising a factual challenge to his revocation proceeding that reasonably
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could have been raised on direct appeal and denied DeShields’s petition for
postconviction relief. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶6 DeShields raises two additional issues for the first time on appeal. He contends
that the District Court violated his due process rights by failing to consider alternatives to
imprisonment when it revoked his deferred sentence. DeShields also maintains that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction to impose a four-year deferred sentence because § 46-
18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995), only permits a sentence to be deferred for three years. We
will not consider his due process argument as it is a well-established rule that this Court
will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Wetzel, 2005 MT
154, ¶ 13, 327 Mont. 413, ¶ 13, 114 P.3d 269, ¶ 13. We will consider his challenge of the
District Court’s jurisdiction, however, because a party may challenge the sentencing
court’s subject matter jurisdiction at any time. See Pena v. State, 2004 MT 293, ¶ 17,
323 Mont. 347, ¶ 17, 100 P.3d 154, ¶ 17.
Deferred Sentence
¶7 We review criminal sentences for legality only to determine whether the sentence
falls within the parameters set by statute. See State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180, ¶ 15, 295
Mont. 288, ¶ 15, 983 P.2d 937, ¶ 15. A district court’s authority to impose a sentence is
defined and constrained by statute, and the court cannot impose a sentence in the absence
of specific statutory authority. State v. Nelson, 1998 MT 227, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 15, ¶ 24,
966 P.2d 133, ¶ 24. We use the criminal statutes in effect at the time the crime was
committed to evaluate the sentence. Dexter v. Shields, 2004 MT 159, ¶ 13, 322 Mont. 6,
¶ 13, 92 P.2d 1208, ¶ 13.
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¶8 Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995), states that a sentencing judge may defer
the imposition of a sentence “for a period not exceeding 3 years for any felony.” The
District Court imposed a four-year deferred sentence for DeShields’s felony sexual
assault conviction. This four-year deferral runs afoul of the three-year limit set forth in §
46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995). DeShields contends that the District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to impose a deferred sentence beyond the maximum time authorized
by statute. Therefore, DeShields argues, his entire sentence is void.
¶9 DeShields improperly characterizes the issue of the District Court’s imposition of
his sentence as jurisdictional. He mistakenly relies on our decision in State v. Yorek for
the proposition that “the question of whether a district court possesses the authority to
impose a sentence is a jurisdictional issue.” State v. Yorek, 2002 MT 74, ¶ 15, 309 Mont.
238, ¶ 15, 45 P.3d 872, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Moorman (1996), 279 Mont. 330, 336, 928
P.2d 145, 149). To the extent that the Yorek decision stands for the proposition that
sentencing issues are jurisdictional, it does not represent good law. See Pena, ¶ 25.
¶10 “Jurisdiction is a word of many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment (1998), 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L.Ed.2d 210.
We, along with other courts, sometimes have been “profligate” in our use of the term.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. (Feb. 22, 2006), ___U.S.___, ___S.Ct.___, ___L.Ed.2d___,
2006 WL 397863 at *6. Jurisdictional claims challenge a court’s power or capacity to
entertain the subject matter of the proceeding. Pena, ¶ 22. A district court possesses
original jurisdiction in all felony cases. Art. VII, Sec. 4, Mont. Const. Whether a district
court commits a statutory error in imposing a sentence must not be confused with
whether the court had the power or capacity to impose a sentence. Pena, ¶ 22.
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¶11 The District Court improperly imposed a deferred sentence beyond its statutory
authority. See Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995). The mere fact that the District
Court exceeded its statutory authority in imposing a criminal sentence, however, does not
render the sentence void ab initio. A sentence in excess of one prescribed by law is not
void ab initio because of the excess, but is good insofar as the power of the court extends
and is invalid only as to the excess. Charles v. Commonwealth (Va. 2005), 270 Va. 14,
20, 613 S.E.2d 432, 435. Only the portion of the sentence beyond the district court’s
statutory authority is illegal.
¶12 The District Court deferred imposition of DeShields’s sentence for four years.
Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995), authorizes a court to defer imposition of a
sentence for a felony for three years. The court’s decision to defer imposition of
DeShields’s sentence beyond the three-year statutory limit did not render the entire
sentence void. Only the final year of DeShields’s deferred sentence exceeded the
statutory authority of § 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995). Thus, the first three years of
DeShields’s deferred sentence remained valid and in full force. See Charles v.
Commonwealth, 270 Va. at 20, 613 S.E.2d at 435.
¶13 The District Court properly revoked DeShields’s deferred sentence in 2001 and
2003. The District Court first sentenced DeShields in 1995. The State initially filed a
petition in 1997 to revoke DeShields’s original deferred sentence within the three-year
deferral period provided by § 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995). Although the court did not
rule on the petition until 2001, after the time authorized by statute, the court retained
jurisdiction because the State filed a timely petition to revoke. See Section 46-18-203(2),
MCA (1995).
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¶14 Similarly, the State timely filed its second petition to revoke in 2003, two years
after the court reimposed DeShields’s four-year deferred sentence. DeShields was
serving the second year of his deferred sentence when the State filed its second petition to
revoke. Section 46-18-201(1)(a), MCA (1995), authorizes a three-year deferral and the
State filed its revocation petition within that valid three-year deferral period.
Revocation of sentence
¶15 DeShields also contends that the District Court improperly revoked his sentence in
2003, based upon a lack of sufficient evidence. DeShields reasonably could have raised
this argument on direct appeal. We will not consider grounds for postconviction relief
that reasonably could have been raised on direct appeal. See § 46-21-105(2), MCA.
Criminal defendants may not substitute postconviction relief for direct appeal. See State
v. Hanson, 1999 MT 226, ¶ 14, 296 Mont. 82, ¶ 14, 988 P.2d 299, ¶ 14. DeShields had
the opportunity to file a direct appeal from the revocation of his deferred sentence and
chose not to do so.
¶16 Affirmed.
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
We Concur:
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM RICE
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