No. 04-103
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 19
CONRAD and TERESA STROEBE,
Husband and Wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDV 2001-325,
Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Lawrence A. Anderson, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Chris D. Tweeten, Chief
Civil Counsel, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 8, 2004
Decided: January 24, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Conrad and Teresa Stroebe (Appellants) appeal from the order entered by the First
Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granting the State’s Motion to Dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. We affirm.
¶2 The Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:
¶3 Did the District Court err by concluding that the Appellants brought this action as
taxpayers and, as such, lacked standing to challenge Montana’s school funding system under
the equitable funding of education provision of Article X, Section 1 of the Montana
Constitution?
¶4 Is equality of educational opportunity a fundamental constitutional right under
Montana’s Constitution?
¶5 Did the District Court err by denying the Appellants’ motion to summarily judge
Montana’s school funding system unconstitutional?
¶6 Because we conclude that this matter is no longer justiciable, we decline to address the
issues raised by the Appellants herein.
BACKGROUND
¶7 The Appellants filed suit in the District Court challenging the constitutionality of
Montana’s system of funding public schools. Their complaint claimed that the system
violated equal protection, due process, the “Tax Purposes” Clause (Article VIII, Section 1,
denominated their “uniform taxation” claim), and the “Property Tax Administration” Clause
(Article VIII, Section 3, referred to as the “tax equalization doctrine”). In an order dated
September 30, 2002, the District Court dismissed the Appellants’ complaint, concluding that
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the claims as alleged must fail. Thereafter, the court granted the Appellants leave to amend
their pleadings, and, in their Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint” hereinafter), the
Appellants alleged that the State violated “the equitable funding provisions of Article X,
Sect. 1 (3)” of the Montana Constitution “because the system of funding the state’s share of
the base budget arbitrarily and capriciously imposes different mill levies on like taxpayers.”
In support of the Complaint, Conrad Stroebe submitted an affidavit in which he averred that
he and his wife were both public school board members and parents of students in Montana
public schools.
¶8 The State moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., arguing that the Appellants
lacked standing to bring suit under Article X, Section 1(3). The Appellants responded by
moving for summary judgment, requesting that the District Court declare the school funding
system unconstitutional as violating the Public Schools Clause of Article X. In its order of
December 3, 2003, the District Court granted the State’s motion, concluding that the
Appellants had clearly brought the action as taxpayers, and that the Public Schools Clause
does not convey standing to taxpayers to bring suit. Further, the District Court denied the
Appellants’ motion for summary judgment. The Stroebes appeal.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 “We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
M.R.Civ.P., de novo.” Cowan v. Cowan, 2004 MT 97, ¶ 10, 321 Mont. 13, ¶ 10, 89 P.3d 6,
¶ 10.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Is the question whether Montana’s school funding system satisfies the equitable
funding provisions of Article X, Section 1(3) of the Montana Constitution currently
justiciable?
¶11 The parties offer countering arguments regarding the District Court’s dismissal of the
action for the Appellants’ lack of standing. The Appellants contend that the District Court
erred in concluding that they brought their action only as taxpayers because they are also
parents of children in the public schools and as members of public school boards, referencing
their supporting affidavit. Alternatively, the Appellants argue that, even if they brought the
action only as taxpayers, that status is sufficient to confer standing under this Court’s
decision in Helena Parents Comm’n v. Lewis and Clark County Comm’rs (1996), 277 Mont.
367, 922 P.2d 1140.
¶12 The State responds that the District Court correctly found that the Appellants based
their Complaint entirely on their status as taxpayers, not as parents or public school board
members on behalf of students, and that the Appellants’ taxpayer status was sufficient only to
bring their “uniform taxation” and other tax-related constitutional claims. Because the
Appellants offer no argument on appeal regarding these other claims, the State argues that we
should affirm the District Court’s holdings thereon. However, except for their equal
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protection argument, mentioned below, the Appellants do not challenge the District Court’s
other rulings on appeal, and thus, we do not address them.
¶13 Beyond standing, the Appellants argue for the relief they ultimately seek—for this
Court to “direct the entry of summary judgment holding Montana’s school-funding system
unconstitutional.” The Appellants argue that the school system is more inequitably funded
now than it was at the time it was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Helena
Elementary School District No. 1 v. State (1989), 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 689. Asserting that
educational opportunity is a fundamental right, the Appellants argue that the District Court
erred by applying a rational basis test and in holding that the school funding system did not
violate equal protection.
¶14 Standing is part of the larger question whether a controversy is justiciable. The
question of justiciability of a matter may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Skinner v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 2005 MT 323, ¶ 15, 329 Mont. 511, ¶ 15, _ P.3d _, ¶ 15. Generally,
justiciability is evaluated under a three-part test:
First, a justiciable controversy requires that parties have existing and genuine,
as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interest. Second, the controversy
must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as
distinguished from a debate or argument invoking a purely political,
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a
controversy the judicial determination of which will have the effect of a final
judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or legal
relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or lacking these
qualities be of such overriding public moment as to constitute the legal
equivalent of all of them.
Skinner, ¶ 15 (quoting Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass’n of Counties, 2000 MT 256, ¶ 12,
301 Mont. 472, ¶ 12, 10 P.3d 813, ¶ 12) (brackets omitted).
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¶15 Recently, we addressed the constitutionality of Montana’s school funding system in
Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d
257. We held therein that “the current school system is constitutionally deficient,” Columbia
Falls, ¶ 22, and we referred the matter to the Legislature for reform of the system. Columbia
Falls, ¶ 31.
¶16 Also raised in Columbia Falls was the issue the Appellants raise here—whether the
school funding system violates equal protection. Columbia Falls, ¶¶ 8, 38. Taking up this
issue after holding the system unconstitutional as inadequately designed and funded, we
stated as follows:
The District Court concluded that the present system violates Article X,
Section 1(3), of the Montana Constitution (basic system of free quality public
schools), but not Article II, Section 4 (equal protection). Since we have
concluded that the present system violates Article X, Section 1(3), we need not
address the question of whether the system complies with the Equal Protection
Clause of Article II, Section 4. See Helena Elementary, 236 Mont. at 55, 769
P.2d at 691. Similarly, when the District Court concluded that the present
system violates Article X, Section 1(3), it need not have addressed the
Coalition’s equal protection claim. Accordingly, we direct the District Court to
vacate its conclusion that the system does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of Article II, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution.
Columbia Falls, ¶ 39.
¶17 Likewise, we here conclude that we need not address the Appellants’ equal protection
challenge to the school funding system. Columbia Falls requires that the system undergo
reform, and, consequently, a further constitutional challenge to the funding system at this
time is not “one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate.” Skinner,
¶ 5. Indeed, the system as challenged by the Appellants has already been invalidated and is
undergoing change. Regardless of what constitutional insufficiencies may have plagued the
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previous funding system, the circumstances under which this action was brought have now
sufficiently changed as a result of Columbia Falls that another judgment from this Court
would come both too late and too early—that is, too late for the old system and too early for
the new system. To render a decision now would not only interfere with our decision in
Columbia Falls, but would decide a question that has been essentially mooted.
Consequently, we hold that the equitable funding challenge raised herein by the Appellants is
not currently justiciable.
¶18 The appeal is dismissed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
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