December 11 2007
DA 06-0453
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 327
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
BIANCA WILSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 2005-0405
Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Raymond G. Kuntz, Attorney at Law, Red Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Kathy Seeley,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 29, 2007
Decided: December 11, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Bianca Wilson appeals from her felony conviction for tampering with
evidence in the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 On September 13, 2004, Wilson, an individual named Jesus Villarreal, and a 17-
year old girl named Candra Vasquez, drove to Lovell, Wyoming in order to meet another
individual named Justin Marchant. Marchant, as it turned out, was a confidential
informant for law enforcement officials in Wyoming. Wilson and Villarreal drove to
Lovell in a blue 2000 Ford Taurus which Villarreal had borrowed from another woman
named Amber Mendenhall. Marchant was driving a pickup truck when he met these
three individuals. After meeting, they switched cars, with Vasquez driving the pickup
and Marchant getting into the Taurus with Villarreal and Wilson. Shortly thereafter,
Wilson allegedly shot Marchant, and Marchant either jumped out or was ejected from the
Taurus.
¶3 Villarreal and Wilson drove back to Billings, Montana in the Taurus. Once there,
Wilson departed in her own car, while Villarreal drove the Taurus to his trailer in order to
return it to Mendenhall. After meeting Mendenhall, the two drove off in the Taurus.
Mendenhall noticed blood stains on the dashboard and a crack in the windshield.
Villarreal told her there had been a fight in the car and that individuals involved might
retaliate against them. Mendenhall then drove the car to a remote location and left it
there, and at that time observed a bullet on the floor in the back. After getting a ride back
into town with a friend named Lysa Chavira, Mendenhall, Wilson, Villarreal and Chavira
2
met up and proceeded to spend some time together smoking methamphetamine in various
motels around Billings for the next three to four days.
¶4 On September 14, 2004, the body of Justin Marchant was discovered on a gravel
road in Carbon County, Montana. Law enforcement officials later determined that
Marchant died from two gunshot wounds. On September 15, Wilson procured the keys
to the Taurus and got a ride to it from Chavira. The two of them removed Mendenhall’s
belongings from the car and cleaned up some of the blood stains. At that time, Wilson
also picked up her rosary which she had left in the car. According to Chavira, there was
no weapon in the Taurus when they visited it and cleaned it. Chavira drove back to the
motel to meet Villarreal and Mendenhall, while Wilson left in the Taurus. When Wilson
returned later to the motel room, she was not driving the Taurus.
¶5 According to testimony given at trial, on September 16, Wilson, visibly upset,
brought a newspaper into the hotel room where all these individuals were staying, and
stated that she needed to go clean out the Taurus. Mendenhall later testified that the
newspaper contained an article about Marchant’s death. Later that afternoon, Villarreal
and Chavira saw the Taurus parked on a street on the north side of Billings. Villarreal
obtained a set of keys to the Taurus from a third party, and later returned by himself and
moved it to an apartment complex on the south side of Billings. Later that evening,
Wilson drove to Villarreal’s trailer in another car and met with Villarreal and
Mendenhall. According to Mendenhall, during this encounter Wilson told her that she
knew where the Taurus was, that she was going to go get it, and that Mendenhall would
get it back when Wilson “knew what was going on.”
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¶6 Soon thereafter, Villarreal, Mendenhall and Chavira went to another motel, this
time without Wilson. Around mid-day of September 17, investigators caught up with
them at the motel and questioned them. Villarreal told the investigators where the Taurus
was located. He also called Wilson, in the presence of the investigators, and had her
meet them at the motel. When she arrived there, she was arrested.
¶7 When investigators located the car, they discovered blood stains, a bullet casing, a
rosary bead matching Wilson’s rosary, and a spray bottle, along with other items of
evidence. They also discovered evidence that blood had been cleaned from the car. They
did not, however, uncover any evidence of a murder weapon, and to this date the weapon
used in the shooting of Marchant has never been located or identified.
¶8 Initially, Wilson was charged with aggravated kidnapping and deliberate
homicide and Villarreal was charged with aggravated kidnapping, but those charges were
later dismissed. On April 27, 2005, Wilson and Villarreal were charged in Yellowstone
County with separate counts of tampering with evidence of the homicide of Marchant. In
the Information against Wilson, the State alleged that between September 13, 2004, and
September 17, 2004 she “altered, destroyed, concealed or removed a blue Ford Taurus
automobile and its contents with the purpose to impair its veracity or availability in such
investigation.” A trial for Wilson was scheduled for February 6, 2006. Villarreal later
agreed to a plea deal with the State, and was granted immunity in exchange for testifying
against Wilson at trial.
¶9 On the morning of the trial, while the parties were in chambers with the presiding
judge, the State announced that part of the evidence tampering charge would concern
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Wilson’s concealing or tampering with the gun allegedly used to shoot Marchant.
Wilson’s counsel objected, arguing that neither the Information, nor the affidavit in
support of the Information, contained any allegation that Wilson had tampered with a gun
as a part of the tampering with evidence count. The District Court noted this objection,
but nonetheless allowed the State to put on evidence concerning Wilson’s concealing or
destruction of the murder weapon as a part of the evidence tampering charge. The
District Court noted that the Information charged Wilson with tampering with the Taurus
and its contents and stated that “if the gun was in the vehicle, that evidence comes in.”
¶10 At trial, Villarreal was the only witness who testified that Wilson tampered with
the murder weapon. Because of previous rulings made by the District Court, Wilson was
not permitted to introduce any evidence concerning Villarreal’s alleged knowledge that
Marchant was a confidential informant, that Marchant owed Villarreal money for drugs,
that Villarreal had threatened to kill Marchant on a previous occasion, or that Villarreal
had a motive to conceal the evidence of the murder and shift the attention of the
authorities to another suspect. Chavira and Mendenhall also testified. When they were
shown photographs of the Taurus taken by law enforcement officials after i t was
recovered, they both testified that the blood which they had previously seen on the
dashboard had been cleaned off. Additionally, Chavira testified that the large spray
bottle which police found in the car when they recovered it was not there when she had
last visited the Taurus with Wilson.
¶11 At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Wilson moved for a directed verdict,
arguing that the “accomplice testimony corroboration rule,” codified at § 46-16-213,
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MCA, required a directed verdict because Villarreal was a named co-defendant and his
testimony was not corroborated by other evidence. Additionally, Wilson argued
Mendenhall and Chavira were also co-conspirators even though they had not been
charged with evidence tampering. The District Court denied the motion for a directed
verdict, concluding that under State v. Blackcrow, 1999 MT 44, 293 Mont. 374, 975 P.2d
1253, the issue of whether these individuals were co-conspirators would be submitted to
the jury if necessary.
¶12 After all the evidence had been presented and the jury instructions were being
settled, the District Court found there was no evidence that Chavira and Mendenhall were
legally accountable for the crime of evidence tampering, and so did not submit the issue
of whether they were co-conspirators to the jury or allow accountability instructions
regarding their testimony. With respect to Villarreal, however, the District Court ordered
the jury be given an accountability instruction in accordance with Blackcrow. Blackcrow,
¶ 21. The jury ultimately convicted Wilson of evidence tampering, and she was
sentenced to five years imprisonment with the Department of Corrections. Wilson timely
appeals.
ISSUES
¶13 We state the issues on appeal as follows:
¶14 Issue One: Did the District Court abuse its discretion and allow the State to
improperly amend the Information charging Wilson with tampering with evidence, by
permitting the State to argue that Wilson tampered with the gun which was allegedly used
to kill Marchant?
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¶15 Issue Two: Did the District Court err when it denied Wilson’s motion for a
directed verdict on the charge of tampering with evidence?
¶16 Issue Three: Did the District Court violate Wilson’s right to a unanimous jury
verdict because some members of the jury might have convicted her of tampering with
the gun, while others might have convicted her of tampering with the car?
¶17 Issue Four: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by limiting the admission
of evidence concerning Villarreal’s motives to murder Marchant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18 We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court’s
discretionary rulings in a criminal case. State v. Beavers, 1999 MT 260, ¶ 20, 296 Mont.
340, ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 371, ¶ 20. “Abuse of discretion occurs only when the district court
acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the
bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.” State v. English, 2006 MT 177, ¶ 23,
333 Mont. 23, ¶ 23, 140 P.3d 454, ¶ 23 (quotation omitted).
¶19 We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court’s
evidentiary rulings. Beavers, ¶ 20. With respect to evidentiary rulings, we afford the
district courts “broad discretion . . . to limit the scope of cross-examination to those issues
it determines are relevant to trial.” Beavers, ¶ 20. A district court’s decision whether to
allow the amendment of an Information is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Abe, 1998 MT 206, ¶ 28, 290 Mont. 393, ¶ 28, 965 P.2d 882, ¶ 28. As we have stated
previously, “[a]n information must reasonably apprise the accused of the charges against
7
him, so that he may have the opportunity to prepare and present his defense.” City of Red
Lodge v. Kennedy, 2002 MT 89, ¶ 10, 309 Mont. 330, ¶ 10, 46 P.3d 602, ¶ 10.
¶20 A district court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict, however, is reviewed de
novo. State v. Swan, 2007 MT 126, ¶ 17, 337 Mont. 326, ¶ 17, 160 P.3d 511, ¶ 17.
When reviewing a district court’s decision in this context, we inquire “whether, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” English, ¶ 23
(quotation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶21 Issue One: Did the District Court abuse its discretion and allow the State to
improperly amend the Information charging Wilson with tampering with evidence, by
permitting the State to argue that Wilson tampered with the gun which was allegedly used
to kill Marchant?
¶22 On appeal, Wilson asserts the District Court abused its discretion and permitted a
“de facto” amendment of the Information charging her with tampering with evidence,
when it allowed the State to argue that Wilson concealed or destroyed the gun allegedly
used to kill Marchant. Wilson notes that, under § 46-11-205(3), MCA, the State may
amend the form of the information at any time prior to the verdict. Amendments of
substance, however, are prohibited within five days of trial. Section 46-11-205(1), MCA.
Wilson asserts that presentation of evidence concerning her concealing or destroying the
murder weapon is a substantive amendment to the Information because it “relies on an
entirely separate set of proofs, and entails a separate set of defenses, than does the
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accusation that Wilson tampered with evidence by either cleaning or hiding the Taurus.”
Wilson argues that the facts of this case are analogous to Kennedy and that the District
Court should have, but failed to, follow the procedure for re-arraignment on the amended
Information under § 46-11-205(2), MCA.
¶23 Wilson asserts that nothing in the affidavit filed in support of the Information
alleges that she tampered with a gun. Because of this, Wilson maintains she was never
put on notice of the specific charge of tampering with a gun, and that, further, the District
Court was “deprived of the opportunity to evaluate whether or not the charge was
supported by probable cause.” As a result, Wilson was “denied the opportunity to
challenge the existence of probable cause with respect to the charge of tampering with a
gun.”
¶24 The State responds that the Information filed in this case—which charged Wilson
with tampering with the “automobile and its contents”—was legally sufficient to apprise
Wilson of the charges against her. The State argues that a “person of common
understanding would have sufficient information from these charging documents to know
what the State had charged and what she must defend.” The State points out that the
affidavit in support of the Information states that Marchant had been shot two times, and
that Mendenhall had seen evidence of ammunition on the floor of the Taurus. Further,
there were statements in the affidavit which referred to allegations that Wilson regularly
carried weapons, that Villarreal told Mendenhall and investigators that Wilson had shot
Marchant, and that Wilson told Chavira about the shooting of Marchant as well. Taken
together, the State asserts, the fact that it planned to argue that Wilson had tampered with
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the murder weapon “could hardly have been a surprise to Wilson.” In light of these facts,
the State maintains there was no need to amend the Information and that the charge filed
against Wilson was legally sufficient.
¶25 “An information is a written accusation of criminal conduct prepared by a
prosecutor in the name of the State. The information must reasonably apprise the
accused of the charges against him, so that he may have the opportunity to prepare and
present his defense.” State v. Allen, 278 Mont. 326, 330, 925 P.2d 470, 472 (1996). We
read the information, and the affidavit in support thereof, as a whole to determine the
sufficiency of the charging documents. State v. Harlson, 2006 MT 312, ¶ 24, 335 Mont.
25, ¶ 24, 150 P.3d 349, ¶ 24. We apply the “common understanding” rule to determine if
the charging language of a document allows a person to understand the charges against
him. State v. Brogan, 261 Mont. 79, 86, 862 P.2d 19, 23 (1993). Under this standard,
“the test of the sufficiency of a charging document is whether the defendant is apprised of
the charges and whether he will be surprised.” Brogan, 261 Mont. at 86, 862 P.2d at 23.
¶26 An information may be amended with leave of the district court. Amendments of
form are allowed any time before the verdict. Section 46-11-205(3), MCA. “An
amendment is one of form when the same crime is charged, the elements of the crime and
the proof required remain the same and the defendant is informed of the charges against
him.” Kennedy, ¶ 11. Amendments of substance are prohibited within five days of trial.
Section 46-11-205(1), MCA. “To differentiate amendments of form and substance, we
examine whether an amendment to an information or complaint alters the nature of the
offense, the essential elements of the crime, the proofs or the defenses.” Kennedy, ¶ 14.
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¶27 In Kennedy, we considered whether a district court abused its discretion in
allowing the amendment of a criminal complaint on the morning of trial. In that case,
defendant Kennedy had originally been charged in Red Lodge City Court with a count of
stalking under § 45-5-220(1)(b), MCA, due to an incident of stalking which occurred on
October 5, 1999. Kennedy, ¶ 3. Kennedy was convicted in city court and sought a new
trial in district court. There, Kennedy moved to dismiss the charges against him on
double jeopardy grounds because the City intended to use prior convictions of Kennedy
for violation of an Order of Protection issued against him 1998 to prove the “repeated”
element of the stalking charge. Kennedy, ¶ 5. In opposing his motion, the City of Red
Lodge alleged eleven incidents of stalking which would be sufficient to support the
charges. The district court denied Kennedy’s motion and the case proceeded to trial.
¶28 On the morning of trial, the State asked leave of the district court to amend the
complaint. The amended complaint alleged six specific incidents of stalking, and also
stated that between December 1997 and October 1999, Kennedy’s “acts of stalking
constituted a continuing course of conduct within the meaning of § 45-1-205(7)(a),
MCA.” Kennedy, ¶ 7. Kennedy objected to this amended complaint, but his objection
was overruled. Kennedy was ultimately convicted of stalking and appealed his
conviction to this Court.
¶29 On appeal, Kennedy argued that the amended complaint was a substantive
amendment and should have been denied because it was granted on the morning of the
trial. We agreed with Kennedy and reversed the district court. We concluded that the
addition of these new episodes to the charges against him along “with the allegation that
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all incidents formed a continuous course of conduct dating back over two years,
constituted a change of substance that added new proofs to the State's burden and
required Kennedy to prepare new defenses.” Kennedy, ¶ 16.
¶30 Wilson argues that Kennedy is applicable to the instant case, and supports her
argument that the District Court allowed a “de facto” amendment to the Information on
the morning of trial, in violation of § 46-11-205(1), MCA. We disagree. Rather, we
agree with the State that the Information and the affidavit in support, taken together,
reasonably apprised Wilson of the fact that the tampering with evidence charge could
cover any actions she may have taken in concealing or destroying the contents of the
Taurus, including the murder weapon used to kill Marchant. The Information alleges that
Wilson tampered with the Taurus and its contents between September 13, 2004, the day
of Marchant’s murder, and September 17, 2004, the date of Wilson’s arrest. See ¶ 8. As
a result, the tampering charge encompasses whatever was in the Taurus between those
dates that would have aided law enforcement in investigating the homicide of Marchant.
It is evident from the charging documents, taken as a whole, that the State believed
Wilson was involved in Marchant’s murder, that a gun was used to kill Marchant while in
the Taurus and was never recovered, and that Wilson allegedly carried weapons.
Although the Information did not specifically state that she was charged with tampering
with the murder weapon, it generally referred to the Taurus and its contents which, in
light of the allegations in the charging documents, included anything in the Taurus.
Moreover, as the State notes, Wilson did not object to the State’s argument that blood
stains, rosary beads, and bullets fell within the purview of the charge. If these fell within
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the “automobile and its contents,” then the murder weapon would as well, especially
given the fact that the charging documents allege Marchant was shot inside the Taurus by
Wilson.
¶31 As a result, we conclude that allowing the State to argue Wilson tampered with the
murder weapon as part of the underlying charge did not constitute a “de facto”
amendment of the Information. In fact, it did not amend the Information in any way.
Unlike Kennedy, where new elements to the charges were added by virtue of the
amended complaint, such is not the case here. Based on the charging documents
themselves, Wilson should not have been surprised that the State would argue she
tampered with the contents of the Taurus, including the murder weapon. While the
original Information could have alleged separate counts of tampering with respect to each
piece of evidence (i.e., the Taurus itself by cleaning up the blood, ammunition, the
removal of the rosary, and the disposal or concealment of the gun), the State chose to
charge Wilson with only one count for her actions in relation to tampering with the
Taurus and its contents, and she was in turn convicted on only one count.
¶32 For these reasons, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion and
allow the State to improperly amend the Information by permitting it to argue that Wilson
tampered with the gun which was allegedly used to kill Marchant.
¶33 Issue Two: Did the District Court err when it denied Wilson’s motion for a
directed verdict on the charge of tampering with evidence?
¶34 Wilson argues the District Court improperly denied her motion for a directed
verdict on the issue of tampering with a gun at the close of the State’s evidence because
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evidence for this charge was based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Villarreal, a
co-conspirator. However, as the State observes, there was not a separate charge for
tampering with the gun allegedly used to kill Marchant. The charge of tampering with
evidence included the Taurus and its contents. Had there been a separate charge of
tampering with a gun or had Villarreal’s testimony been the only evidence presented in
support of this charge, Wilson’s argument here would carry far more weight. However,
because there was sufficient testimony and circumstantial evidence from sources other
than Villarreal’s testimony to support the charge of tampering with the Taurus and its
contents, the District Court did not err in denying Wilson’s motion.
¶35 Issue Three: Did the District Court violate Wilson’s right to a unanimous jury
verdict because some members of the jury might have convicted her of tampering with
the gun, while others might have convicted her of tampering with the car?
¶36 Wilson argues the verdict for tampering with evidence in this case violated her
right to a unanimous verdict under Article II, Section 26 of the Montana Constitution.
We agree with the State that she has not preserved this issue for appeal because she did
not object to the lack of a specific unanimity instruction on this point at the time that jury
instructions were settled. See Section 46-16-410(3), MCA. Under § 46-20-104(2),
MCA, “[f]ailure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the
objection except as provided in 46-20-701(2).” Because Wilson does not allege that any
of the exceptions under subsection 701(2) applies, we will not consider this argument for
the first time on appeal. State v Weaver, 1998 MT 167, ¶ 24, 290 Mont. 58, ¶ 24, 964
P.2d 713, ¶ 24.
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¶37 Recognizing her failure to object, Wilson urges us to review for plain error,
arguing that the District Court violated her fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict.
We decline Wilson’s invitation to apply the plain error doctrine with respect to the issue
of a unanimous jury verdict in this case.
¶38 Under the doctrine of plain error, this Court has the discretion to review issues
raised for the first time on appeal in spite of the fact the criteria under § 46-20-701(2),
MCA, are not satisfied, so long as the alleged error of the district court implicates a
defendant’s constitutional rights and a failure “to review the claimed error at issue may:
(1) result in a manifest miscarriage of justice; (2) leave unsettled the question of the
fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings; or (3) compromise the integrity of the
judicial process.” Weaver, ¶ 25.
¶39 The tampering with evidence count charged Wilson with tampering with the
Taurus and its contents. Although the State could have framed the tampering charges
more specifically, and charged separate counts for each act, it was not required to do so.
Accordingly, it would not compromise the integrity of the judicial process, result in a
manifest miscarriage of justice, or leave unsettled the fundamental fairness of the trial, if
some jurors reached different conclusions on what specifically Wilson tampered with, so
long as they all agreed that she was guilty of tampering with the Taurus and its contents,
as the State charged. All that is ultimately required is that the jury unanimously agree to
the particular set of facts necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime alleged in the
Information. Weaver, ¶ 34. In this case, the pertinent set of facts is the alleged tampering
with evidence of Marchant’s homicide, including the Taurus and its contents.
15
¶40 For these reasons, we decline to review this matter for plain error.
¶41 Issue Four: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by limiting the admission
of evidence concerning Villarreal’s motives to murder Marchant?
¶42 During opening statements, the District Court prohibited Wilson from referring to
evidence concerning Villarreal’s motives to kill Marchant. The District Court ruled that
this evidence was not “relevant to the strict issue of whether or not Ms. Wilson tampered
with evidence as these elements are defined in the criminal code. So we’re not going to
try the homicide here or anybody’s motives for a homicide, that’s a different case . . . .”
Although Wilson argued that Villarreal’s motivation to kill Marchant transferred to his
motive to cover up the crime by tampering with the evidence of his murder, the District
Court disagreed. In response to Wilson’s query about the parameters of her opening
statement, the District Court ruled that Wilson could not mention Villarreal’s knowledge
of Marchant’s status as a confidential informant, any debts for drugs owed Villarreal by
Marchant, or any threats by Villarreal to kill Marchant.
¶43 During Wilson’s cross-examination of Villarreal, Wilson did not examine
Villarreal on any of these topics, or ask the District Court to rule on the parameters of
Villarreal’s cross examination. Wilson claims that it would have been misconduct on her
part to do so, in light of the explicit instructions given by the District Court during
opening statements. Because of this limitation, Wilson argues she was unable to develop
evidence concerning Villarreal’s prior false statements and his motive to cover up the
homicide, as well as his plan to cover up evidence of the homicide of Marchant.
16
Accordingly, Wilson argues, the District Court abused its discretion and violated her
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her.
¶44 The State counters that during her cross-examination of Villarreal, Wilson never
asked the District Court to rule on the parameters of the cross-examination. Further, the
State contends that Wilson had ample opportunity to cross-examine Villarreal about his
motives in testifying. Specifically the State notes that Wilson cross-examined Villarreal
about his plea of nolo contendere on tampering with evidence, his grant of immunity for
testifying, his drug use and whether he provided drugs to others, as well as other
inconsistencies in his testimony. The State argues that the main purpose of the right to
confrontation was served in this case, even though both parties were prohibited from
presenting evidence relating to the underlying homicide, because Wilson had the
opportunity to examine and expose Villarreal’s motives in testifying.
¶45 The right of a defendant in a criminal trial to confront the witnesses against him is
contained in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of
the Montana Constitution. “The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure
for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986) (alterations and quotations omitted). This
includes an opportunity to expose the witness’ motivation in testifying. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. at 678-9, 106 S. Ct. at 1435. However, the constitutional guarantee of the
Confrontation Clause does not mean that a defendant may cross-examine witnesses on
any subjects in any manner whatsoever, without the imposition of limits by the trial
judge.
17
On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such
cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things,
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we
observed earlier this Term, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 295 (1985) (per curiam).
¶46 Given the circumstances at bar, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting evidence about Villarreal’s motives to kill Marchant during opening
statements. The standard for an abuse of discretion is whether “the district court acted
arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of
reason resulting in substantial injustice.” English, ¶ 23. Moreover, we afford district
courts “broad discretion . . . to limit the scope of cross-examination to those issues it
determines are relevant to trial.” Beavers, ¶ 20. Arguably, evidence of Villarreal’s
motives to murder Marchant could bear on whether he would lie about the evidence
tampering charge against Wilson in order to shift the blame to her. At the same time, it
could also turn the tampering with evidence trial into a trial on the murder of Marchant—
a course of action which the District Court wisely foreclosed in this case because it was
outside the scope of the tampering charge, and would confuse the jury as to the issues
before it.
¶47 Assuming, arguendo, that the limitations placed on opening statements applied to
Wilson’s cross of Villarreal, we nonetheless agree with the State that Wilson did have the
opportunity to cross-examine Villarreal on his motives for testifying and inconsistencies
18
in his statements, see ¶ 44, and that this opportunity satisfied Wilson’s constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against her. The limitations placed on the presentation of
evidence concerning Villarreal’s motives to kill Marchant or cover up evidence of his
homicide by the District Court did not exceed the bounds of reason resulting in
substantial injustice to Wilson. Had Wilson been charged with homicide, the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause would likely require more. But here they do
not, because Wilson and Villarreal were both charged with tampering with evidence, not
with homicide.
¶48 Accordingly, we hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the
admission of evidence concerning Villarreal’s motives to murder Marchant during
opening statements.
CONCLUSION
¶49 For these reasons, we affirm Wilson’s conviction.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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