DA 06-0554
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 161
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RAYMOND CASE, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 05-055
Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Roberta R. Zenker,
Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Ilka Becker,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 23, 2007
Decided: July10, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Defendant Raymond Case was convicted of two counts of felony possession of
dangerous drugs and one count of possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia, a
misdemeanor. The drugs were found during an alleged consent search of Case’s vehicle
conducted after Case was pulled over for a traffic violation. Case moved to suppress the
evidence, asserting that the officer exceeded the scope of the initial stop by detaining him
and continuing to question him after issuing the traffic citations. We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issue as follows:
¶3 Did the District Court err in denying Case’s motion to suppress evidence?
BACKGROUND
¶4 On the evening of January 19, 2005, Officer Reid observed an older Cadillac,
driven by Case, approach with its headlights off. Case, according to Reid, looked directly
at the patrol car, then reversed and made a u-turn. As Case drove off, Reid followed.
Case then ran a red light and Reid activated his lights, signaling Case to pull over. At this
point, Reid turned on his patrol car’s video camera. Case continued past a Pizza Hut
parking lot and pulled into the Warbonnet Inn where he had a room and was planning to
stay. He parked toward the back of the parking lot. Reid pulled in behind him,
effectively blocking Case’s departure.
¶5 As Reid pulled in, Case began to get out of his car. Reid told him to remain in his
car. Case complied. According to Reid’s testimony, Case, once back in the car, leaned
forward as if to shove something underneath the seat. Reid then walked up to Case’s car
and explained that he pulled him over for running a red light. Reid asked for Case’s
2
license, registration, and proof of insurance, and also wrote down his address and phone
number.
¶6 Two other passengers, Marsha White Wolf and Patrick Eatherton, were seated on
the front seat next to Case. Though Case did not appear to be intoxicated, Reid was sure
that the two passengers were. Officer Tucker, who had arrived on the scene just after
Reid pulled Case over, questioned the passengers. White Wolf was known to the Billings
police. Eatherton, who presented his federal prisoner ID card, had formerly fired a gun at
police. For this reason, dispatch asked Reid if he had “cover.”
¶7 During the initial communication with Case, Reid asked him where he was
headed. Case answered “here,” indicating the motel. Reid then asked where he was
coming from. Case paused for a couple of seconds, and White Wolf answered, with
somewhat slurred speech, “April’s.” She then clarified that they had come from “April
Romero’s.” Reid later testified that April Romero’s house was a “house of interest” that
he was actively investigating as a possible meth lab.
¶8 Reid and Tucker then returned to Reid’s patrol car. Reid called in all three
passengers to dispatch. All came up negative for arrest warrants. Another officer,
Officer Korell, informed Reid over the radio that he had pulled over Case the previous
evening in the same vehicle. Apparently a Michelle Malard was driving. Syringes were
found and Malard was arrested though Case was not. Upon hearing this, Tucker relayed
that he had worked on a prior case involving this Michelle Malard and a Ronald Case.
Ronald had skipped town and was as yet on the loose. Tucker therefore questioned
whether Raymond and Ronald were the same person, or related to one another.
3
¶9 To find out, Reid suggested that Tucker ask Case for his social security number.
Tucker walked back to Case’s window and asked him for his social security number and
asked if he knew anything about Ronald Case. Reid then obtained Case’s social security
number from dispatch, and it matched the number Case had provided to Tucker. Tucker,
however, was still suspicious. Though he had not seen Ronald, he did know that Ronald
had a black widow tattoo on his right arm. Consequently, Reid suggested that they “pull
[Case] out” to “see what [was] going on.” Reid also noted that it “took them forever to
pull over,” and suggested “something ain’t right.”
¶10 Reid, the lights of his patrol car still flashing, then walked back to Case’s window.
He asked Case to step out of his car. Case complied and, before mentioning the traffic
ticket, Reid asked Case if he had any weapons on him. Case replied that he had a Gerber
knife and pulled it out of his pocket. Reid set the knife on the back of Case’s car.
Tucker, by this time, had walked up to the back of Case’s car, near Case and Reid. Reid
issued Case a traffic ticket and explained how to pay the ticket. Reid then returned
Case’s license and some paperwork.
¶11 As Reid was handing the last piece of paperwork back to Case he said “I’m going
to give you this back and I do have a question for you before you take off here.” Reid
actually asked Case four questions. The first was “what’s your business in town? What
are you doing here?” Case answered that he was trying to bail out the woman arrested
the night before (Malard). Reid then responded, “that was one of the other questions I
had,” and continued to ask about the prior stop and the syringes found in the car.
4
¶12 Reid’s third question concerned the Ronald/Raymond dilemma. Case responded
that Tucker had asked him about Ronald before and that he did not know a Ronald Case.
Tucker then stepped up and asked “would you mind if I take a look at your right arm?”
Case replied “yea, sure,” and took off his coat. Tucker shined his flashlight on Case’s
arm, then, holding his arm, pushed up his shirt to check his upper arm. After showing his
arm, Case began to put his jacket back on. Reid told him “go ahead and put your coat
back on,” and then, without pausing, asked his final question: “Is there anything in your
vehicle tonight?”
¶13 Case replied “no sir” and stated “it’s all yours” twice while motioning to his car.
Reid thanked Case and proceeded to search the car, after briefly patting Case down and
removing the two passengers. Reid found syringes in the car as well as a white substance
later identified as rock cocaine. After arresting and booking Case, Tucker found, in the
back seat of the patrol car where Case had been seated, a small plastic baggie containing
methamphetamine.
¶14 Case moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his car,
arguing that the officers impermissibly exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. The State
opposed the motion, arguing that the officer had particularized suspicion to stop Case
because he had committed a traffic violation. The State further contended that Case was
not detained when he gave permission to search the car. Case replied that he was being
detained when he gave permission to search.
¶15 Following an evidentiary hearing where Officers Reid and Tucker testified, the
District Court denied Case’s motion to suppress. The court concluded that there was
5
particularized suspicion to stop Case and that Case was no longer detained when he
granted permission to search. Following trial, Case was found guilty of all three counts.
Case then filed this timely appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence to determine
whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its interpretation
and application of the law are correct. State v. Snell, 2004 MT 269, ¶ 7, 323 Mont. 157,
¶ 7, 99 P.3d 191, ¶ 7 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶17 Did the District Court err in denying Case’s motion to suppress evidence?
¶18 Case argues that the consent he gave to search his car was involuntary because he
was illegally detained when he consented, and therefore the evidence discovered as a
result of the search of his car should be suppressed. The District Court, however, rejected
this contention and concluded that Case was not detained at the time.
¶19 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section
11 of the Montana Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Snell, ¶ 9. A search or seizure conducted in the absence of a valid warrant is per
se unreasonable unless justified by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
Snell, ¶ 9. Knowing and voluntary consent to a search is a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Snell, ¶ 9.
¶20 We apply the totality of the circumstances test in determining whether consent has
been voluntarily given and is uncontaminated by coercion or duress. State v. Copelton,
6
2006 MT 182, ¶ 19, 333 Mont. 91, ¶ 19, 140 P.3d 1074, ¶ 19 (citations omitted). Thus,
the determination of voluntariness of consent is dependent on the facts of each case, with
no single fact being dispositive. Copelton, ¶ 19 (citations omitted).
¶21 Additionally, when an officer seizes a person, such as in a brief investigatory stop
of a vehicle, the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies. State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12, 293 Mont. 476, ¶ 12, 977 P.2d 974, ¶ 12
(citations omitted). However, this Court recognizes an exception to the general warrant
requirement, permitting a limited and reasonable investigation without probable cause,
where the State can show circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the
person is or has been engaged in wrongdoing or was a witness to criminal activity.
Roberts, ¶¶ 12-13 (citing state and federal cases as well as § 46-5-401, MCA).
¶22 We must consider, then, whether Case was seized when he gave consent to search;
if so, whether the officer possessed sufficient particularized suspicion to further detain
Case and continue the investigation; and, finally, whether Case’s consent was valid in
light of the totality of the circumstances.
¶23 A. Was Case detained when he gave the arresting officer consent to search his
vehicle?
¶24 “A person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he [or she] was not free to leave.” Roberts, ¶ 16 (quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)). This test is applicable to
seizure issues raised under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
7
and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. Snell, ¶ 22 (citing State. v.
Merrill, 2004 MT 169, ¶¶ 10-11, 322 Mont. 47, ¶¶ 10-11, 93 P.3d 1227, ¶¶ 10-11). In
addition, this test is “purely objective.” Snell, ¶ 22 (quoting Merrill, ¶ 11).
¶25 A reasonable person would not feel free to leave if he is physically detained. In
Roberts, a police officer pulled into a one-lane driveway, blocking the car of a driver
suspected of driving under the influence. Though the suspect was not attempting to leave,
we held that, given the officer’s actions and show of authority, a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave. Roberts, ¶ 16. Likewise, in State v. Carlson, we concluded
that the occupants of a van were clearly not free to leave when, at gunpoint, the officers
on the scene prevented them from leaving. 2000 MT 320, ¶ 20, 302 Mont. 508, ¶ 20, 15
P.3d 893, ¶ 20.
¶26 In contrast, a reasonable person would feel free to leave if an officer indicates,
expressly or impliedly, that the stop is over and the person is free to go. In Merrill, both
deputies had stepped away from the defendant’s car after issuing a warning and telling
the defendant she was free to go. Merrill, ¶¶ 3-4. Although the deputy asked permission
to talk with the defendant and to search her car and person, nothing in the deputy’s
manner indicated he was ordering the defendant to stay and thus we concluded a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Merrill, ¶ 15. Similarly, in State v. Hill,
an officer stopped the defendant for speeding, issued a citation, returned his driver’s
license and said “we’re done.” 2004 MT 184, ¶ 5, 322 Mont. 165, ¶ 5, 94 P.3d 752, ¶ 5.
Noticing the defendant had no bags or clothes in the car, the officer initiated small talk
and obtained consent to search the car. Hill, ¶¶ 6-7. Relying on Merrill, we concluded
8
that a reasonable person would have believed he was free to leave and, therefore, the
subsequent conversation was a voluntary exchange. Hill, ¶ 17.
¶27 In Snell, we determined, based on the implication of the officer’s actions, that a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Snell could not find his proof of
insurance, and the officer instructed him to continue looking for it and bring the proof to
his patrol car. Snell, ¶ 3. Snell entered the patrol car and told the officer he could not
find current proof of insurance. The officer then returned Snell’s license, issued a
citation, and asked whether Snell would mind if he searched the vehicle. Snell, ¶¶ 3-4.
We noted that the situation differed somewhat from Merrill and Hill in that Snell was
sitting in the patrol car and the officer did not expressly state that Snell was free to go or
that the matter was done. However, no evidence indicated that the officer ordered Snell
to stay, attempted to restrain him, or prevented him from exiting the vehicle. In view of
all the circumstances, we concluded a reasonable person would have felt free to leave the
patrol car. Snell, ¶ 25.
¶28 Here, the patrol car was parked in such a way that it “physically constrain[ed]
[Case’s] means and direction of travel” in a similar manner to the patrol car in Roberts.
See Roberts, ¶ 16. Both Officer Reid and Tucker were armed, in uniform, and the patrol
car lights were flashing for the duration of the stop. Of course, this case differs from
Roberts somewhat in that the legality of the traffic stop is not at issue. The question then
becomes whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave after his license and
paperwork were returned to him and the traffic stop was technically complete.
9
¶29 Before receiving the traffic ticket, a reasonable person in Case’s shoes would
have assumed that the officers were investigating more than just a traffic violation. Case
was initially ordered to get back in the car. After he had handed over his license,
paperwork, address and phone number, Case was questioned as to whether he knew
anything about Ronald Case and was asked to provide his social security number. Case
was then ordered to step out of the car and asked if he had any weapons on him.
¶30 Next, and most importantly for the “free to leave” analysis, when Reid returned
Case’s paperwork he said, without pausing, “I do have a question for you before you take
off here.” When a police officer states that he has a question before you take off, that
means, to the reasonable person, you have to stay and answer the question before you are
free to leave, especially when the officer’s patrol car is parked directly behind your car.
Further, the series of questions leading up to Case’s consent, the position of the two
officers and Officer Tucker’s investigation of Case’s arm were objective signs that the
investigation was ongoing and concerned more than mere traffic offenses.
¶31 Finally, just prior to asking Case if there was anything in his vehicle, Reid gave
him a command, “go ahead and put your coat back on,” indicating that Case remained
under police control. As such, Case was effectively ordered to stay and was then
prevented from leaving until he answered the officer’s questions. In view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person in Case’s situation would not
have felt free to leave.
¶32 Consequently, we conclude that Case was not involved in a voluntary exchange
but was in fact “seized” when he gave Reid consent to search his car. We now turn to
10
whether the officers’ detention of Case was lawful; that is, was there particularized
suspicion to continue the investigation.
¶33 B. Did the arresting officer possess sufficient particularized suspicion of
wrongdoing to justify continuing the investigatory stop past the issuance of the traffic
citation?
¶34 The question of whether particularized suspicion of wrongdoing exists is a
factually driven inquiry dependent upon the totality of circumstances. Roberts, ¶ 13
(citations omitted). Here, Reid clearly had particularized suspicion for the initial traffic
stop, as Case was driving without headlights when it was dark and ran a red light. Still,
“[a] stop authorized by 46-5-401 or 46-5-411 may not last longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Section 46-5-403, MCA. If additional objective data
of wrongdoing exists, however, the additional information may give rise to further
suspicions and enlarge the scope of the investigation. See State v. Nelson, 2004 MT 310,
¶ 20, 323 Mont. 510, ¶ 20, 101 P.3d 261, ¶ 20.
¶35 In the case sub judice, there was sufficient evidence, presented at the suppression
hearing and on the video, of objective data from which Officer Reid, an officer with
sixteen years of law enforcement experience who has made “thousands” of stops during
his career, could make certain inferences. Case, upon seeing the patrol car, reversed his
car and turned to drive in the opposite direction. After Reid had signaled him to pull
over, Case, rather than pulling over at obvious stopping points, continued driving to the
rear of the Inn. Once stopped, Case attempted to leave his car, which, according to Reid,
“is very common with people that use drugs or have something in the vehicle to hide.”
11
He then leaned forward as if he was shoving something under his seat. When asked
where they were coming from, White Wolf, who was known to the police, admitted they
had come from April Romero’s, a suspected meth house that Reid was actively
investigating.
¶36 Subsequently, while writing the ticket and doing background checks, Reid learned
that Case’s car had been stopped the previous night, that syringes were found, and that
the driver, Malard, was arrested. Further, this same Malard was involved in a previous
crime with a Ronald Case who had skipped town. Although the confusion between
Ronald and Raymond was lessoned after Tucker obtained Case’s social security number,
Tucker and Reid were still suspicious that there was a connection.
¶37 Therefore, while the purpose of the traffic stop had been effectuated, the additional
information, including Case’s questionable behavior, the multiple connections with
drugs, and the Ronald/Raymond enigma, gave rise to further suspicions that served to
properly enlarge the scope of the investigation.
¶38 C. Was Case’s consent to search, given during the legal additional investigation,
voluntary and knowing?
¶39 Voluntariness hinges on the totality of the circumstances. Copelton, ¶ 19
(citations omitted). Here, the only circumstance that Case claims affected the
voluntariness of his consent was that the detention was illegal. As explained above,
however, the State had particularized suspicion to continue the investigation past the
completion of the traffic stop. We hold, therefore, that Case’s consent was not the
product of an illegal detention.
12
¶40 While the District Court concluded that Case was not detained at the time he
consented to the search of his vehicle, and thus the court did not make a decision as to
whether the State had particularized suspicion to continue the investigation, we will
affirm a court’s decision even if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason. State v.
Parrish, 2005 MT 112, ¶ 20, 327 Mont. 88, ¶ 20, 111 P.3d 671, ¶ 20 (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
¶41 Case, while legally detained, voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.
We therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of Case’s motion to suppress.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM RICE
13