After a panel opinion in this case was issued a petition for rehearing en banc was granted. Additional briefs were submitted including an amicus brief by the Securities and Exchange Commission. On consideration by the full court the order of the district court granting summary judgment for the defendants is affirmed as to the defendant Paribas Corporation and reversed as to the other defendants.
The petition for rehearing sought reconsideration only of the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment under Rules 12(e) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure^ The court en bane has not reviewed the ’ decision announced by Chief Judge Lumbard on the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter and that decision stands as the holding of the court.
Factual Background of the Controversy
This is a stockholder’s derivative action on behalf of Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation. The corporate defendants are Aquitaine Company of Canada, Ltd., and Paribas Corporation. The individual defendants are directors of Banff. Aquitaine is a wholly owned subsidiary of a French corporation, Société National des Petroles d’Aquitaine, which is in turn a subsidiary of an agency of the French government. Paribas is an investment banking corporation, incorporated in Delaware. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of a French banking institution.
In February, 1964, Aquitaine acquired control of Banff through a tender offer to Banff shareholders. Aquitaine thereupon designated three of its representatives to sit on Banff’s eight man board of directors.
In March, 1964, Banff and Aquitaine agreed to conduct joint explorations for oil. The exploratory operations involved in the present case began toward the end of 1964. A test well struck oil on February 6, 1965 and on March 17, 1965 the well was completed.
On December 11, 1964, Banff’s board of directors voted to offer 500,000 shares of Banff treasury stock to Aquitaine, its controlling shareholder, at $1.35 a share. The closing price of Banff stock on the Toronto Stock Exchange on that day was $1.31 bid and $1.37 asked. Aquitaine claims that the sale of stock was necessary in order to finance Banff’s share of the expenses of exploration *218However it appears that Banff needed only $77,500 for this purpose, whereas the proceeds of the sale amounted to $675,000. On January 5, 1965, the president of Aquitaine wrote to Banff “on behalf of Aquitaine’s members of Banff Oil Board” saying “our Chairman and Managing Director * * * has agreed to your * * * proposal.” The shares were delivered to Aquitaine on March 16, 1965, the day before the completion of the first well.
In November 1965 Paribas negotiated a purchase of 270,000 shares of Banff stock at $7.30 a share, the then current price on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
During 1966, after public announcement of the oil discovery, Banff stock traded at prices as high at $18 a share.
The complaint alleges, in effect, that the defendants, knowing of the oil discoveries and the consequent increase in value of Banff stock, sold 770,000 shares of that stock to Aquitaine and Paribas at vastly inadequate prices as a result of a conspiracy among them to enrich Aquitaine’s “affiliates, business associates and friends” at the expense of Banff and its shareholders other than Aquitaine.
Summary Judgment
The district court’s grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff was accompanied by a refusal of his request for discovery. This court has indicated that summary judgment should rarely be granted against a plaintiff in a stockholder’s derivative action especially when the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to resort to discovery procedures, See, for example, Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883, 76 S.Ct. 136, 100 L. Ed. 779 (1955); Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948). The plaintiff typically has in his possession only the facts which he alleges in his complaint. Having little or no familiarity with the internal affairs of the corporation, he is faced with affidavits setting forth in great detail management’s version of what actions were taken and what motives led the affiants to take these actions. Since the facts in such a case are exclusively in the possession of the defendants, summary judgment should not ordinarily be granted where the facts alleged by the plaintiff provide a ground for recovery, at least not without allowing discovery in order to provide plaintiff the possibility of counteracting the effect of defendants’ affidavits.
Indeed in many stockholder’s derivative actions there will be issues as to the knowledge, intent and motive which will require a full trial with an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and to conduct cross-examination in open court. In such cases summary judgment cannot be granted even after discovery has been had. See Subin v. Goldsmith, supra, 224 F.2d at 757. See also Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (“We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”); Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1964); Alvado v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983, 76 S.Ct. 1050, 100 L.Ed. 1497 (1956). (For a discussion of a number of additional cases, see Judge Frank’s opinion in the Subin case.)
In the present case the plaintiff’s allegations constitute a claim that Aquitaine, knowing the true value of Banff stock, used its control over Banff to acquire 500,000 shares at a vastly inadequate price. The allegations have a sufficient factual basis — Aquitaine’s control, Aquitaine’s knowledge of the oil discovery, the inadequacy of the price paid for the stock — to require at least that the plaintiff be permitted through discovery to develop the evidence to counter defendants’ affidavits.
*219 Plaintiffs Cause of Action Under Section 10-b and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
We hold that the complaint states a triable claim under Section 10(b)1 and Rule 10b-52 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against all defendants except Paribas.
As to Paribas it appears that the negotiations for the purchase of treasury stock were arm’s length negotiations. There is no reason to believe that Paribas was in possession of any information not available to Banff and, more importantly, there is no reason to believe that Paribas was in any position to influence the judgment of the Banff directors by any improper means. Paribas and the purchasers whom it represented were, so far as appears, unconnected with Banff and unable through ownership of Banff stock or otherwise to bring any pressure on Banff to sell its stock at a price below its true value. For these reasons the dismissal of the complaint as to Paribas is affirmed.
The case against the other defendants is a far different one.
The issuance by Banff of its stock to Aquitaine was a sale of securities within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The stockholders of Banff may bring a derivative action for damages to the corporation suffered by reason of a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Ruckle v. Roto Amer. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814, 81 S.Ct. 695, 5 L.Ed.2d 693 (1961).
In Ruckle v. Roto Amer. Corp., supra, the corporation proposed to issue shares for an inadequate consideration. The new shares were to be issued to or, at least, to be controlled by the president of the corporation. Certain material information was withheld from one of the directors when the board was called upon to approve the transaction. The issuance of the shares under these circumstances was held to be a fraud upon the corporation within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The court said: “in other contexts, such as embezzlement and conflict of interest, a majority or even the entire board of directors may be held to have defrauded their corporation.” 339 F.2d at 29.
In the present case it is alleged that Aquitaine exercised a controlling influence over the issuance to it of treasury stock of Banff for a wholly inadequate consideration. If it is established that the transaction took place as alleged it constituted a violation of Rule 1 Ob-5, subdivision (3) because Aquitaine engaged in an “act, practice or course of *220business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale oany security.” Moreover, Aquitaine and the directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff (other than Aquitaine). See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
It is argued that the agreement to sell Banff stock to Aquitaine was entered into before the results of the oil exploration were known. However it is by no means clear that the letter of Aquitaine’s president dated January 5, 1965 resulted in the formation of a binding contract. Moreover in the absence of an opportunity for discovery procedures it cannot be accepted as true that on January 5, 1964 or at the earlier date in December, 1964 when Banff made the offer to sell, the parties were not in possession of sufficient information as to the true value of Banff stock to make the sale at market price a fraud on Banff. In addition, whether Aquitaine’s acquisition of the Banff stock on the eve of the completion of the first oil well constituted overreaching presents an issue to be resolved only after an opportunity for further investigation.
The order of the district court is reversed as to all defendants except Paribas and the ease is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Regulation op the Use op Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
. Employment op Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.