No. DA 06-0110
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 15N
____________________________________
CHRIS MAHONEY,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Respondent.
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APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DV 05-965,
The Honorable Ingrid Gustafson, Presiding Judge.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chris Mahoney (pro se), Deer Lodge, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Joslyn Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Mark Murphy, Deputy County
Attorney, Billings, Montana
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Submitted on Briefs: September 26, 2006
Decided: January 23, 2007
Filed:
______________________________________________
Clerk
Justice John Warner delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. Its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be
included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific
Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Chris Mahoney (Mahoney) appeals an Order from the Thirteenth Judicial District
Court, Yellowstone County, denying his petition for postconviction relief and other
claims. We affirm.
¶3 On October 18, 1989, Mahoney pled guilty to attempted deliberate homicide,
attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and use of a dangerous weapon, a knife, in
the commission of both offenses. On November 22, 1989, he was sentenced to forty
years in the Montana State Prison for the attempted deliberate homicide charge, eighteen
years for sexual intercourse without consent, and an additional eight years for the use of
the knife. All of the sentences were ordered to run consecutively. In addition, Mahoney
was designated a dangerous offender under § 46-18-404(3), MCA (1989).
¶4 A person designated a dangerous offender was required to serve one-half of his
sentence before becoming eligible for parole, while a person without such designation
would be eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of his sentence. In 1995, the
Legislature repealed those parts of § 46-18-404, MCA, which established the dangerous
offender designation.
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¶5 Mahoney argues that because the title to the 1995 bill which amended § 46-18-404
contained the word “abolish,” the Legislature meant to eliminate the dangerous offender
classification from any sentence that had been previously imposed. Thus, Mahoney now
argues that because the dangerous offender designation was abolished, he became eligible
for parole after serving only one-fourth of his sentence.
¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to
determine whether the findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the conclusions
of law are correct. Garrett v. State, 2005 MT 197, ¶ 10, 328 Mont. 165, ¶ 10, 119 P.3d
55, ¶ 10. A petitioner seeking to reverse a district court’s denial of a petition for
postconviction relief bears a heavy burden. State v. Cobell, 2004 MT 46, ¶ 14, 320 Mont.
122, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 20, ¶ 14.
¶7 After reviewing the record and the lower court Order, we conclude the District
Court was correct when it found Mahoney’s claim was time-barred. Under the current
version of § 46-21-102, MCA,1 a petition for postconviction relief must be brought
within one year of a defendant’s conviction becoming final. As the lower court noted,
however, Mahoney failed to bring his petition within one year of either his 1989
conviction or the Legislature’s repeal of § 46-18-404 in 1995. Even giving Mahoney the
benefit of § 46-21-102 and its five-year statute of limitations that was in effect both at the
time he committed his crime and when the Legislature repealed § 46-18-404, Mahoney
1
Section 46-21-102, MCA, was amended in 1997 to reduce the statute of limitations for filing
petitions for postconviction relief from five years to one year. The five-year statute of
limitations was in effect both at the time Mahoney committed the offenses and when the
Legislature repealed the dangerous offender classification found in § 46-18-404, MCA, of which
Mahoney now complains.
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still failed to bring his petition within the appropriate timeframe. Mahoney’s petition
fails because it is time-barred.
¶8 Mahoney’s claim also fails on its merits. It is well settled that the statutes in effect
at the time of the offense are used to determine what sentence is imposed. See State v.
Tracy, 2005 MT 128, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 220, ¶ 16, 113 P.3d 297, ¶ 16; Dexter v. Shields,
2004 MT 159, ¶ 13, 322 Mont. 6, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d 1208, ¶ 13; State v. Muhammad, 2002
MT 47, ¶ 24, 309 Mont. 1, ¶ 24, 43 P.3d 318, ¶ 24. Here, Mahoney committed and
confessed to his crimes in 1989. Section 46-18-404(3), MCA, and its dangerous offender
designation, was in effect at the time Mahoney committed the offenses for which he was
sentenced. While the title to House Bill 356, 54th Legislature, 1995, did include the term
“abolish,” the legislation itself merely repealed § 46-18-404, and deleted the
accompanying references to the dangerous or non-dangerous offender designations in
other sections of the Montana Code. Moreover, the title to HB 356 actually says it is
“repealing section 46-18-404.” The 1995 change in the law did not affect Mahoney’s
parole eligibility date.
¶9 Finally, the District Court was correct in its determination that Mahoney’s attempt
to bring this action as one for a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act must fail because what he attempts to do is alter his sentence and not
challenge a statute.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ JOHN WARNER
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We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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