October 9 2008
DA 07-0697
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 345N
FIONA L. SHAFFER, on behalf of:
ADAM SHAFFER, RACHAEL SHAFFER,
CHLOE SHAFFER, JONATHAN SHAFFER,
JASON SHAFFER, MARY SHAFFER,
PAUL SHAFFER, AARON SHAFFER,
and MIRIAM SHAFFER,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
CHESTER SHAFFER,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-07-1384
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chester Shaffer, self-represented; Victor, Montana
For Appellee:
(No Appellee brief filed.)
Submitted on Briefs: August 6, 2008
Decided: October 9, 2008
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 Self-represented appellant Chester Shaffer (Chester) appeals from an order issued
by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, dismissing his appeal. We affirm.
¶3 Chester’s wife, Fiona Shaffer (Fiona), received a temporary order of protection
(TOP) from the Missoula County Justice Court, on behalf of herself and her 9 children, 5
of whom are minors.
¶4 A hearing on the TOP was held in November of 2006. The court determined Fiona
was in danger of harm from Chester, and extended the order of protection until November
28, 2007.
¶5 On October 15, 2007—nearly 11 months after the Justice Court had extended it,
Chester appealed the TOP to the District Court. Upon determining that no basis existed to
review an order of protection months after issuance, the District Court sua sponte
dismissed the appeal. Chester moved for reconsideration, arguing no time limitation for
appeal was applicable under § 40-15-302, MCA. The District Court issued an order
refusing to reconsider, citing § 25-33-102, MCA, which requires appeals to be filed within
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30 days of rendition of judgment.
¶6 Chester filed a second motion requesting that the court reconsider on the basis that
no judgment had been rendered. He argued the order extending the TOP was an
injunction—not a judgment—which is not a final order under M. R. App. P. 54(a).
Chester maintained that the statutes do not specify a timeframe for appeal from issuance
of an injunction. The District Court issued another order clarifying that appeals from
justice court are governed by Title 25, Chapter 33, MCA.
¶7 Chester appeals, arguing that an injunction differs from a judgment and,
consequently, that appeal rights from an injunction extend from day to day, thereby
rendering his appeal timely. He maintains the District Court erred in failing to recognize
this distinction. Chester also insists that the protective order is fraudulent because Fiona
does not reasonably fear bodily harm from him and, had the children been allowed to
testify, he could demonstrate that Fiona is lying.
¶8 The issue properly before us is whether the appeal to the District Court was timely
filed. Pursuant to M. R. App. P. 12(1)f, the appellant must state contentions, provide
rationale, and cite authority that supports the appellant’s position. We have no obligation
to perform legal research or develop legal analysis that might support an appellant’s
arguments. State v. Torgerson, 2008 MT 303, ¶ 36, 345 Mont. 532, ¶ 36, ___P.3d___, ¶
36 (citing State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶¶ 99-100, 331 Mont. 517, ¶¶ 99-100, 134 P.3d 53,
¶¶ 99-100). Chester has not advanced cognizable authorities in support of his assertion of
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error. Moreover, it is the appellant’s burden to establish error. Torgerson, ¶ 36. Chester
has failed to do so.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our
1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for memorandum
opinions. Nothing on the face of the brief or the record before us even suggests that the
District Court did not correctly interpret and apply Montana Law.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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