May 13 2008
DA 07-0310
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 173
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH EVERETTE HOWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC 2005-585
Honorable Robert L. Deschamps, III, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender, Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Jesse A. Laslovich,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Dale Mrkich, Deputy
County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 5, 2008
Decided: May 13, 2008
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In December 2005 Joseph Everette Howard (Howard) was charged with felony
operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater (DUI), misdemeanor
operating a vehicle without proof of liability insurance, and misdemeanor failure to obey
a traffic signal. He pleaded not guilty and counsel was appointed to represent him. In
March 2006 Howard filed a Motion to Dismiss/Suppress. The court held a hearing on the
Motion in June 2006, and in August 2006, the court denied Howard’s Motion. In
December 2006 Howard moved to have his case dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. At
the conclusion of a hearing on this motion, the District Court denied it. Howard
subsequently entered guilty pleas to Counts I and III and Count II was dismissed. He
reserved his right to appeal both denied motions and filed a timely appeal. We affirm the
District Court’s denial of Howard’s motion to dismiss relative to DeWitt’s authority. We
remand the matter to the District Court for further analysis of Howard’s claim that he was
deprived of a speedy trial.
ISSUES
¶2 A restatement of the issues on appeal is:
¶3 Did the District Court err in denying Howard’s motion to dismiss on the ground
that Officer DeWitt lacked authority to execute the stop?
¶4 Did the District Court err in denying Howard’s motion to dismiss for lack of a
speedy trial?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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¶5 On Saturday, November 12, 2005, at approximately 2:30 a.m., University of
Montana (UM) Security Officer DeWitt noticed a vehicle stop at a red traffic light at the
intersection of Arthur Avenue and South 6th Street East in Missoula. The car then
proceeded through the light while the light was still red. DeWitt pursued the vehicle and
activated his emergency overhead lights. The car did not stop immediately but rather
continued northbound across the Madison Street Bridge and finally stopped near the
intersection of Madison and Front Street. DeWitt approached the stopped car and
determined that it was driven by Howard. While speaking with him, DeWitt noticed that
Howard smelled of alcohol. The officer executed a records search and learned that
Howard was on probation for felony DUI and criminal possession of dangerous drugs.
Howard acknowledged that he was on probation and admitted that he had consumed
approximately six beers. DeWitt conducted a preliminary breath test (PBT) analysis
which revealed Howard’s blood alcohol concentration was .291. DeWitt arrested
Howard and transported him to the Missoula County Detention Center. At the Detention
Center, Howard consented to perform field sobriety tests and according to DeWitt failed
these tests. Howard refused further breath analysis.
¶6 The State filed an Affidavit and Information on December 7, 2005, and at his
December 20, 2005 arraignment, Howard pleaded not guilty. The court set a scheduling
conference for March 14, 2006. At the conference on March 14, Howard filed a Motion
to Dismiss/Suppress, claiming DeWitt did not have the authority as a campus security
officer to stop him at an off-campus location. The State was ordered to respond by
March 28 but subsequently was granted additional time. While its response was due on
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April 17, it did not file it until May 9, 2006. Also on May 9 the court held a status
conference. Howard was given one week to reply to the State’s response to his motion to
dismiss. He also requested a hearing on the motion. The District Court held a hearing on
Howard’s motion on June 13, 2006, at the conclusion of which the parties requested time
to submit supplemental briefs. Howard filed his brief on July 5 and the State filed its on
July 31, 2006. On August 28, 2006, the District Court denied Howard’s motion.
¶7 Upon request by the parties, the court held a status hearing on September 19,
2006, and set a trial date of December 20, 2006. On December 12, Howard filed a
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of a Speedy Trial. A hearing was held on this Motion on
December 18 at the conclusion of which the District Court denied the Motion. On
December 19 Howard entered into a plea agreement wherein he reserved his right to
appeal the two denied motions. The District Court entered its written judgment on
February 21, 2007, and Howard timely appealed.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶8 The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law
which we review de novo on appeal. Our standard of review is plenary, and we
determine whether a district court’s conclusion is correct. State v. Ashmore, 2008 MT 14,
¶ 7, 341 Mont. 131, ¶ 7, 176 P.3d 1022, ¶ 7 (citation omitted).
¶9 We review a district court’s ruling on a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and
whether the court correctly applied those findings as a matter of law. A court’s findings
of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial credible evidence,
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the court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or our review of the record
convinces us that a mistake has been committed. State v. Ruggirello, 2008 MT 8, ¶ 15,
341 Mont. 88, ¶ 15, 176 P.3d 252, ¶ 15 (citation omitted).
¶10 We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s speedy trial ruling to
determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204,
¶ 119, 338 Mont. 442, ¶ 119, 167 P.3d 815, ¶ 119 (citation omitted). The court’s findings
are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the
court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves
this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ariegwe,
¶ 119 (citation omitted). However, whether the defendant has been denied a speedy
trial—i.e., whether the factual circumstances, when evaluated pursuant to the four-factor
balancing test, amount to a speedy trial violation—is a question of constitutional law.
Ariegwe, ¶ 119 (citations omitted). We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo
to determine whether the court’s interpretation and application of the law are correct.
Ariegwe, ¶ 119 (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶11 Did the District Court err in denying Howard’s motion to dismiss on the ground
that Officer DeWitt lacked authority to execute the stop?
¶12 Howard argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or
suppress. He asserts the District Court erroneously based its denial on the Uniform Act
on Close Pursuit (the “Act”). Howard maintains the Act was not intended to authorize
traffic stops such as the one in this case but rather was developed to allow peace officers
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of one state engaged in close pursuit with the intent to arrest, to cross state lines in
continued pursuit. Howard also asserts that the statutes and the memoranda of
understanding relied upon by the State do not extend DeWitt’s authority, as a University
security officer, to the place where Howard stopped his vehicle, and that DeWitt did not
have the authority to conduct an investigation or field sobriety tests or to arrest him.
¶13 The State concurs that the Act is inapplicable in this case but argues that the
District Court nonetheless reached the right decision in denying Howard’s motion to
dismiss based on the authority vested in DeWitt under the memoranda of understanding
among the University of Montana, the Missoula Police Department and the Missoula
County Sheriff’s Department.
¶14 Section 20-25-321(1)(a) and (b), MCA, give UM security officers the following
jurisdiction: (1) within campus boundaries, (2) over an area within one mile of the
exterior boundaries of the campus “for campus-related activities,” and (3) over other
properties owned, operated, controlled, or administered by the university. Additionally,
§ 20-25-321(3), MCA, provides that any university system security department may enter
into an agreement with law enforcement agencies that specifies the geographic and
subject matter jurisdiction of the campus security officers in areas outside the areas
described in subsections (1)(a) and (b) above.
¶15 Additionally, § 20-25-322, MCA, allows universities to enter into an agreement
with the city or county, under which the campus security officer is authorized to issue
citations for moving traffic violations which occur within the boundaries of the campus
or on streets or alleys contiguous to the campus.
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¶16 In accordance with these statutes, in July 1993 UM entered into such an agreement
with the City and County of Missoula and their respective police departments. Under this
agreement campus security officers had the authority to issue citations for moving traffic
violations that occurred “within the boundaries of the campus or on streets or alleys
contiguous thereto.” In July 2005 U M entered into a second agreement with the
Missoula Police Department and the Missoula County Sheriff’s Department. The
relevant portion of the 2005 agreement provides:
The [campus security officers’] primary focus is the University of Montana
campus properties, as they are defined in this agreement, and campus
related activities within one mile of the exterior boundaries of each campus.
Under this agreement and under Montana law, the [Missoula Police
Department] extends the jurisdiction of the [campus security officers]. The
[campus security officers’] jurisdiction is extended to the City limits of
Missoula for the enforcement of all traffic and criminal offenses that occur
in the [campus security officer’s] presence and poses an imminent threat to
public safety.
¶17 It is undisputed that Howard’s failure to obey the traffic signal at the intersection
of Sixth and Arthur constituted a “traffic offense” as provided in the two agreements.
Additionally, it is undisputed that this intersection is located on streets that are contiguous
to the campus; therefore the offense “occurred” within DeWitt’s jurisdiction. Lastly, it is
undisputed that the traffic offense occurred in the presence of DeWitt.
¶18 Howard argues that because the offense occurred at 2:30 a.m. when there was little
traffic on the road, it did not pose an “imminent threat to public safety.” The State
counters that, in accordance with the agreements, the offense occurred within DeWitt’s
jurisdiction and Howard’s failure to respond to the patrol car’s flashing emergency lights
until approximately one mile off-campus does not defeat the officer’s jurisdiction. The
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State also argues that Howard’s failure to obey traffic signals, regardless of the amount of
traffic, presented an imminent threat to public safety. In this connection, DeWitt testified
that, based on his experience, observing a vehicle run a red light at two-thirty in the
morning is an indicator of a possible DUI which always presents an imminent threat to
public safety.
¶19 We agree with the State. At the time of the offense, Howard was on roads
contiguous to the university campus, meaning he committed this offense within the
narrowest geographic parameters of DeWitt’s jurisdiction. Additionally, Howard’s
traffic violation presented an imminent threat to public safety. While there may not have
been heavy vehicle traffic at two-thirty on that particular morning as DeWitt testified,
various employees typically get off work at that time. Additionally, it is reasonable that
students or other pedestrians could have been walking in the area at two-thirty on a
Saturday morning. We are also persuaded by DeWitt’s explanation that after observing
Howard run the red light, he pursued Howard both for the traffic violation and his
concern that Howard may have been drinking. From a public policy perspective, to
conclude that DeWitt lost jurisdiction because Howard failed to stop until he was beyond
the campus parameters would encourage violators to simply drive beyond a defined
jurisdictional boundary to escape potential penalty for a violation.
¶20 While relying on an inapplicable statute, the District Court nonetheless correctly
concluded that DeWitt had the authority to stop, investigate and arrest Howard. As we
have held before, we will affirm a district court’s decision when it reaches the correct
result for the wrong reasons. Mary J. Baker Revoc. Trust v. Cenex Harvest, 2007 MT
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159, ¶ 80, 338 Mont. 41, ¶ 80, 164 P.3d 851, ¶ 80 (citation omitted). The court’s denial
of Howard’s motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was not error.
¶21 Did the District Court err in denying Howard’s motion to dismiss for lack of a
speedy trial?
¶22 Howard argues that the District Court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss
on the ground that the State failed to provide him with a speedy trial. We note that when
Howard argued for dismissal before the District Court he primarily relied upon the
speedy trial analyses set forth in City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148,
965 P.2d 866, overruled in part by Ariegwe, and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct.
2182 (1972). He maintained that he satisfied the four-prong test established in those
cases in that he was in jail for a total of 403 days before his trial; the State was
responsible for 354 days of delay; he timely asserted his right to a speedy trial; and he
was prejudiced by his delayed trial. He submits that the District Court should have
dismissed his case.
¶23 The State countered before the District Court that under the test established in
Barker, Howard was responsible for more delay days than he claimed and he was not
unduly prejudiced by the delay. As a result, the balancing test actually weighed in favor
of the State.
¶24 The District Court did not issue a written order denying Howard’s motion to
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; rather, it ruled from the bench at the conclusion of a
hearing on the motion which was conducted on December 18, 2006. Without specifying
the number of delay days attributable to each party, the court ruled that both parties bore
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responsibility for delays in moving the matter forward. The court also concluded that
Howard was not “overwhelmingly” prejudiced by the delay in that Howard presented no
evidence that his defense was impaired or that he suffered loss of witnesses.
¶25 Subsequently, in August 2007 we rendered our decision in Ariegwe in which we
established a new framework for analyzing speedy trial claims and overruled in part our
decision in Bruce. Since that time, we have remanded speedy trial questions to the
district courts when the trial court did not have an opportunity to apply the Ariegwe
analysis to the claim before it. State v. Smith, 2008 MT 7, 341 Mont. 82, 176 P.3d 258;
State v. Madplume, 2008 MT 37, 341 Mont. 321, 176 P.3d 1071. We conclude this
remains the appropriate method to resolve such cases; therefore we remand this matter to
the District Court for analysis of Howard’s speedy trial claim under Ariegwe.
CONCLUSION
¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Howard’s
Motion to Dismiss/Suppress relative to DeWitt’s authority. We dismiss without
prejudice and remand to the District Court for a speedy trial analysis under Ariegwe.
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
We concur:
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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