No. OP 08-0181
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 174
______________
CITY OF BILLINGS, ex rel. )
CHRISTINA E. FRIEDT, )
)
Relator, )
)
v. ) OPINION AND ORDER
)
BILLINGS MUNICIPAL COURT, )
The Honorable Mary Jane Knisely, Presiding, )
)
Respondent. )
_____________
¶1 On April 9, 2008, counsel for relator Christina E. Friedt filed an Application for Writ
of Supervisory Control and To Stay Lower Court Proceedings. She alleged that the Billings
Municipal Court had made a mistake of law causing a gross injustice in ordering Friedt’s
guilty pleas and sentence withdrawn, and that allowing the Municipal Court proceedings to
continue would be fundamentally unfair and prejudicial. On April 16, we stayed the
Municipal Court proceedings pending further order from this Court. We also ordered the
Office of the Billings City Attorney, and permitted the Judge of the Billings Municipal Court,
to file a summary response pursuant to M. R. App. P. 14(7)(b). Deputy City Attorney Curtis
L. Bevolden timely filed a summary response on April 29.
¶2 The relevant facts are undisputed. In December of 2007, Friedt was cited for the
offenses of a stop sign violation, failing to carry proof of or exhibit insurance in vehicle (the
“no insurance” charge) and failing to have her driver’s license in her immediate possession.
At her arraignment in Municipal Court on January 17, 2008, Friedt responded “no” when
asked if she wished to consult an attorney, pled guilty to the stop sign violation and pled not
guilty to the “no insurance” charge. The Municipal Court sentenced Friedt by imposing a
fine of $50 plus a surcharge on the stop sign charge, dismissed the driver’s license charge
with a warning and set an omnibus hearing on the “no insurance” charge.
¶3 On February 12, 2008, Friedt appeared at the omnibus hearing and pled guilty to the
“no insurance” charge. The Municipal Court sentenced her to six months in jail, all
suspended on the condition that she pay a $500 fine plus surcharge. The court allowed Friedt
to perform community service in lieu of the fine.
¶4 On February 28, 2008, the Municipal Court, acting sua sponte, entered an order
withdrawing Friedt’s guilty pleas to the stop sign violation and the “no insurance” charge.
The court noted that, on February 15, it had received an e-mail from Bevolden and, on
February 20, had received a packet of correspondence from Moira Murphy D’Alton, the
owner of a fence allegedly damaged during the events leading to Friedt’s citations. The
subject of both Bevolden’s ex parte e-mail and D’Alton’s correspondence packet was
D’Alton’s request for restitution for the damaged fence. The correspondence packet
indicated D’Alton first communicated her request to Bevolden on December 31, 2007, and
had written letters to the Billings Police Department, Bevolden and the Municipal Court from
December of 2007 through February of 2008. Observing the address on D’Alton’s letters to
the Municipal Court was incorrect, the court determined after consulting with court
employees that the court had not received D’Alton’s previous letters, and restitution had not
been requested by the prosecutor.
¶5 The Municipal Court noted it did not have any factual information regarding a
2
potential restitution claim when Friedt entered her guilty pleas at the arraignment and
omnibus hearing, and reasoned that § 46-18-201(5), MCA, requires a court to impose
restitution if a victim has sustained a pecuniary loss. The court concluded that, because no
mutual discovery regarding the restitution claim had been afforded to Friedt before either of
her guilty pleas, the court “[could not] find that the Defendant entered into a constitutionally
sound, intelligent, knowing, voluntary plea of Guilty.” The court further reasoned that Friedt
was not afforded her right to counsel at her arraignment on the “no insurance” charge. The
Municipal Court ordered that Friedt’s guilty pleas be withdrawn, appointed defense counsel,
and set an omnibus hearing, which apparently occurred on April 8, 2008.
¶6 Friedt applied to this Court for a writ of supervisory control on April 9, 2008, and
filed her affidavit in support. Friedt maintains she knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
pled guilty to the two offenses. She also points to her written and signed waivers of rights
stating she was advised that the court would appoint counsel for her if she could not afford an
attorney, and that she “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive[d] [her] right to be
represented by an attorney.” Friedt further asserts the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction ended
when it sentenced her. In this regard, she relies primarily on State ex rel. Torres v. District
Court, 265 Mont. 445, 450, 877 P.2d 1008, 1011 (1994) which states, among other things,
that “once a valid sentence has been pronounced, the court loses jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence, except as otherwise provided by statute.” See also State v. Hirt, 2005
MT 285, ¶ 19, 329 Mont. 267, ¶ 19, 124 P.3d 147, ¶ 19; State v. Evert, 2004 MT 178, ¶ 14,
322 Mont. 105, ¶ 14, 93 P.3d 1254, ¶ 14. Friedt argues that the Municipal Court is
proceeding under a mistake of law, which would result in a gross injustice and unnecessary
3
expenditures of time and resources if she were required to stand trial on charges to which she
has pled guilty and on which she has been sentenced. She further asserts it would be
fundamentally unfair and prejudicial to force her to face further proceedings if the Municipal
Court lacks jurisdiction. Friedt asks this Court to exercise its supervisory control jurisdiction
and remand with instructions to vacate the February 28, 2008, order.
¶7 In his summary response, Bevolden asserts that, because he was distracted at the
February 12 omnibus hearing by “activity” including negotiations with several defendants
and simultaneous proceedings in two courtrooms, he failed to raise any issue regarding
restitution before Friedt was sentenced. He argues, however, that the Municipal Court had
jurisdiction after imposing sentence under § 46-16-702, MCA, which provides in part that,
following a verdict or finding of guilty, a court may grant a defendant a new trial without a
motion if required in the interest of justice. He maintains the “interest of justice” to the
victim and the mandatory restitution provision in § 46-18-201(5), MCA, required the
Municipal Court to remedy the situation sua sponte.
¶8 Bevolden’s reliance on the provision for granting a new trial in § 46-16-702, MCA, is
misplaced. “The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if there had
been no trial.” Section 46-16-701, MCA. Here, no trial occurred. Moreover, the clear intent
of the § 46-16-702, MCA, language is to grant a defendant a new trial if the interests of
justice would be served. Nothing in the statute authorizes a new proceeding to benefit an
alleged victim or a prosecutor who failed to timely raise a sentencing matter. We conclude
§ 46-16-702, MCA, has no application here.
¶9 We observe that § 46-16-105(2), MCA, provides that “[a]t any time before judgment
4
or, except when a claim of innocence is supported by evidence of a fundamental miscarriage
of justice, within 1 year after judgment becomes final, the court may, for good cause shown,
permit the plea of guilty or nolo contendere to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty
substituted.” Nothing in the plain language of § 46-16-105(2), MCA, authorizes a court, in
essence, to forcibly withdraw a defendant’s plea sua sponte under any circumstance.
¶10 Nor can we agree with the Municipal Court’s possible reliance on §§ 46-12-
210(1)(a)(iv) and (1)(b), MCA, which provide, respectively, that a court must determine
before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that the defendant understands the
possibility of restitution “when applicable,” and the right to counsel. The Municipal Court
apparently interpreted § 46-12-210(1)(a)(iv), MCA, as rendering a plea invalid if the court
has failed to advise the defendant of potential restitution claims that the prosecution has
failed to timely and properly assert—an interpretation we reject. Regarding advice of the
right to counsel under § 46-12-210(1)(b), MCA, the audio record confirms that the Municipal
Court failed to advise Friedt orally that she had the right to appointed counsel if she could not
afford an attorney—instead asking only if Friedt wished to speak with an attorney at her
January 17 arraignment and saying nothing regarding counsel at the February 12 hearing. As
provided in § 46-12-210(2), MCA, however, the requirements for ascertaining a defendant’s
understanding of the matters set forth in § 46-12-210(1), MCA, “may be accomplished by the
defendant filing a written acknowledgment of the information[.]” Here, Friedt executed a
written waiver of rights, including her right to appointed counsel, with respect to each of her
guilty pleas. Moreover, Friedt maintains her guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary and
intelligent. We conclude, based on the undisputed facts, that the Municipal Court erred in
5
determining otherwise.
¶11 Supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy and is sometimes justified when
urgency or emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inadequate, when the
case involves purely legal questions, and when one or more of the following circumstances
exist: (a) the other court is proceeding under a mistake of law and is causing a gross injustice;
(b) constitutional issues of state-wide importance are involved; (c) the other court has granted
or denied a motion for substitution of a judge in a criminal case. M. R. App. P. 14(3).
Applying these standards, we conclude the Municipal Court’s sua sponte order withdrawing
Friedt’s guilty pleas—contrary to the undisputed facts of record and Friedt’s characterization
of her pleas—constitutes a mistake of law causing a gross injustice. Moreover, we conclude
these unique facts render the normal appeal process inadequate.
¶12 We observe that this case does not present an issue of whether the sentence here may
be illegal. Likewise, it does not involve any remedies available to a prosecutor in the event
an illegal sentence is imposed.
¶13 IT IS ORDERED that Friedt’s application for a writ of supervisory control is
GRANTED.
¶14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is remanded to the Municipal Court with
instructions to vacate the February 28, 2008, order withdrawing Friedt’s guilty pleas.
¶15 The Clerk is directed to mail copies of this order to all counsel of record, to the Clerk
of the Billings Municipal Court, and to the presiding judge.
DATED this 13th day of May, 2008.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
6
We concur:
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
Justice James C. Nelson concurs.
¶16 I concur with all that is said in the Court’s Opinion and Order except that in ¶ 12. In
my view, there was nothing illegal in the trial court’s sentence prior to the court sua sponte
withdrawing Friedt’s guilty pleas, appointing defense counsel—which she had not
requested—and setting an omnibus hearing. I was shocked at the prosecutor’s and court’s
handling of this matter. While the Billings Municipal Court may be very busy, the “activity”
of the omnibus hearings, as the prosecutor describes it, is hardly the fault—or the problem—
of defendants appearing before the court. If the prosecutor makes mistakes because of being
distracted by negotiations or because he was in another courtroom, then the consequences of
his error—or the system’s failure—should not fall on the defendant. Friedt came to court as
ordered; she entered a lawful plea after being advised of her rights; she was legally
sentenced. She should not, again, be required to repeat this process to undo alleged mistakes
made by the State in the first go-around. If the victim is owed damages, then she has civil
remedies against Friedt. With that caveat, I concur.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
7