December 15 2009
DA 09-0334
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 425N
IN THE MATTER OF J.W.L.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DI 09-032
Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry L. Seiffert; Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Mardell Ployhar,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Mark English Deputy
County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 25, 2009
Decided: December 15, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2006, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 On May 15, 2009, the Yellowstone County Attorney’s Office filed a petition to
commit J.W.L. The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone
County, ordered an evaluation and conducted a hearing on May 21, 2009. J.W.L. appeals
from the May 21, 2009, order of the District Court, committing him to the Montana State
Hospital at Warm Springs for up to three months. We affirm.
¶3 The events leading to the commitment arose on May 15, 2009, when J.W.L.’s wife
called the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office because of his erratic behavior. She
feared what he might do and the fact that he had a number of guns in the house. J.W.L.
repeatedly accused his wife of having been bribed to spy on him, and yelled at the sky to
“quit watching me.” Two deputies arrived at the house, to find J.W.L. agitated, shaking,
ready to fight. He ordered them to leave his property and accused them of appearing on
behalf of the “A.M.A.” to spy on him. The officers attempted to negotiate with J.W.L.
for over two hours. When the officers attempted to talk to his wife, he advanced toward
them in a threatening manner and ignored orders to stop. The officers had to discharge a
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Taser device several times to subdue him. Medical personnel transported J.W.L. to the
hospital.
¶4 J.W.L.’s wife testified that he had been recently laid off from his job, had stopped
taking his medication to control his mental disorder and had become increasingly
paranoid and withdrawn. His wife felt threatened by J.W.L. and feared that he could
misconstrue a situation and harm someone.
¶5 J.W.L. required sedation at the hospital. The professional person who conducted
the court-ordered evaluation concluded that J.W.L. suffered from a psychotic disorder
that was manifested through delusional beliefs and behaviors, paranoia and refusal to take
medication. The professional person was concerned that J.W.L. might attempt suicide
and concluded that he needed to be committed. Following his detention he was
delusional, paranoid, schizophrenic, uncooperative and unwilling to take any medication,
including medication for high blood pressure.
¶6 J.W.L. argues on appeal that there was insufficient proof of a recent overt act to
warrant commitment, and that the District Court improperly commented on his right to
remain silent as part of the “verbal pronouncement” of the commitment.
¶7 A district court considering an involuntary commitment must determine whether
the respondent suffers from a mental disorder and, if so, whether the respondent requires
commitment. Section 53-21-126, MCA. The court may consider whether there is an
imminent threat of injury to the respondent or others because of respondent’s acts or
omissions. Section 53-21-126(1)(c), MCA. The commitment must be supported by
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proof of overt acts sufficiently recent in time to be material to the respondent’s present
condition. Section 53-21-126(2), MCA.
¶8 This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil commitment
proceeding in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we will not disturb the
district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In the Matter of A.S.B.,
2008 MT 82, ¶ 16, 342 Mont. 169, 180 P.3d 625.
¶9 In this case, J.W.L.’s recent behavior in the days prior to the hearing was marked
by his refusal to take helpful medication; by his paranoid and delusional behavior; by the
fear his actions had instilled in his wife; and by his threatening demeanor toward the
officers who responded to her call for help. His recent behavior also involved being so
agitated and uncooperative at the hospital that he required medication to calm down.
These are the behaviors and overt acts of a person who the District Court properly
concluded was an imminent danger to himself or others. In the Matter of F.B., 189 Mont.
229, 233-34, 615 P.2d 867, 869-70 (1980).
¶10 J.W.L. also contends that the District Court improperly commented on his exercise
of his right to be silent. The professional person who evaluated J.W.L. reported that he
had refused to talk to her. At the end of the hearing the District Court announced the
decision to order the commitment, and stated:
I’m sorry that you’ve been quiet. I guess to me, it seems a little bit
uncooperative, because, how can they help you if you’re not talking to
them? So I’d encourage you to talk to them and let your feelings out. The
bottom line is, I’m going to grant the petition for commitment, and let you
be detained for up to three months.
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The District Court followed the hearing with a written order than did not mention the fact
that J.W.L. had refused to talk to the professional person.
¶11 J.W.L. correctly notes that a respondent in a commitment proceeding has the right
to remain silent. Section 53-21-115(6), MCA. It is clear from the record that the District
Court’s reference to J.W.L.’s refusal to talk to the professional person was not a ground
for his commitment, nor could it be under the statutes noted above. There were sufficient
grounds to meet the statutory requirements for a commitment. At most the comment was
advice from the District Court to J.W.L. that he could help himself with his serious
mental health issues by cooperating with caregivers. We find no error.
¶12 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2006, which provides for
memorandum opinions. The issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law. There
clearly is sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
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