ELDRED
v.
SEXTON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*192 Mr. J.P.C. Cottrill, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. S.U. Pinney, contra.
*195 Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
It is a fundamental principle underlying the land system of this country that private entries are never permitted until after the lands have been exposed to public auction, at the price for which they are afterwards subject to entry.
They are first surveyed, then a day is appointed for their sale by the President, which is to be kept open for two weeks. At this sale they are offered at a minimum price, and cannot be sold for less, but may be sold for as much more as any one will give, and what remains unsold at the close of such sale is subject to entry at that price.
There is an obvious reason for requiring a public sale before leaving the lands open to private entry. It is to secure to all persons a fair and equal opportunity of purchasing them, and to obtain for the government the benefit of competition in case the lands should be worth more than the price fixed by Congress. This system commenced at an early period of our history, and was perfected in 1820. For a period of twenty years, beginning with the commencement of this century, the public lands were sold on credit at not less than two dollars an acre; but the mode of selling on credit working badly, it was in 1820 abandoned, and the price reduced to $1.25 per acre.[*]
Since that time the great body of the public domain has been brought into market, after proper notice, at this reduced price, and, unless Congress by special act ordered otherwise, private entries have never been allowed unless *196 the land applied for had been previously offered at public sale to the highest bidder at the same price. This has been the established practice of the Land Office, sanctioned by the law officers of the government, and recognized by this court as a leading feature in our system of land sales.[*]
The inquiry arises whether Congress intended to change this system in the new policy adopted by it, to aid States by grants of lands to build railroads. This policy is of comparatively recent date, but there is nothing that we are aware, in any of the various acts on the subject, which tend to show that it was the purpose of Congress, in its land-grant legislation, to alter the manner in which the public lands had been brought into market and made subject to private entry. It is true the minimum price of the lands within certain prescribed limits was doubled, on the supposition that the construction of the contemplated roads would enhance the value of the lands to such an extent that the government would be enabled to realize as much for them as if the grants had not been made, but in all other respects the general system for the disposition of public lands was preserved. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the plaintiff can succeed, unless the legislation on which he rests his title was designed to be exceptional, which we think was not the case. The grant was an ordinary one to build a road in Wisconsin, for which a change of route was desirable, after the line had been located. This change was authorized by Congress, but before the line was relocated the lands in question, being within the six-mile limit, had been, at a public land sale, offered for sale at $2.50 per acre, and not being sold, were subject to entry at that price, but not at any less sum. The location of the new route left them outside of the required distance, and legislation was necessary to take them out of the condition of lands affected by the construction of a railroad, and to restore them to the general body of the unsold lands, so that they could be sold in the same manner and at the same price that the public *197 domain is usually subject to sale. This object was accomplished by the joint resolution of April 25th, 1862, which declares that "these lands should hereafter be sold at $1.25 per acre." It is contended that this declaration fixed the price absolutely, and subjected them to private entry at that price, without any further proceeding. This proposition is based on the idea that Congress intended to adopt a different rule for the disposition of these lands from that which had always obtained for the disposition of other public lands; but there is nothing in the circumstances of this legislation which tends to prove an intentional abandonment of a long-existing policy. Why make an exception in the case of these lands? There was no exigency requiring it, nor any reason to suppose that Congress had any purpose to place them on a different footing from other government lands for sale at $1.25 an acre. Such a purpose would conflict with the general land system, and disturb its harmony, and cannot be imputed to Congress in the absence of an express declaration to that effect. This system required that all lands should be brought into market, after proper notice, so as to afford competition before being subject to private entry. It is true the lands in question were once offered at public sale at $2.50 an acre, but the reason of the rule required that they should be again offered to the highest bidder, because their condition as to price had been changed, and there had been no opportunity for competition at the reduced price. Congress meant nothing more than to fix $1.25 as their minimum price, and to place them in the same category with other public lands not affected by land-grant legislation. When they were withdrawn from the operation of this legislation, and their exceptional status terminated, the general provisions of the land system attached to them, and they could not, therefore, be sold at private entry, until all persons had the opportunity of bidding for them at public auction.
It follows that the plaintiff's entries were invalid and rightly cancelled, because they were made before the lands had been proclaimed for sale at the minimum price of $1.25 *198 an acre, and that the defendant's entries were in accordance with law, as they were located after the lands had been properly brought into market.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] 2 Stat. at Large, 73; 3 Id. 556.
[*] Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wallace, 88; Chotard v. Pope, 12 Wheaton, 588; 2 Opinions of the Attorney-Generals, 200; 3 Id. 274; 4 Id. 167.